Читать книгу The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Ali Ahmad Jalali - Страница 28

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The Mujahideen showed good planning and discipline in this ambush, but used prepared positions that they had used before. They also knew that these positions had exposed flanks, but took no precautions. They felt that the Soviets would not dismount to check the known ambush sites and did not expect immediate Soviet counter-actions to turn their flanks. They were right. The Mujahideen were setting a pattern, but the Soviets failed to react to it. The Mujahideen stocked their positions with sufficient ammunition for a fight of several hours duration. They apparently took many of their casualties from artillery and air strikes while moving to the burning vehicles to loot or when pulling back.

The Soviet convoy movement was no secret. The Mujahideen had contacts within the DIVA and agents near the assembly areas. The Soviets usually left after first light and therefore arrived in the area between 0830 and 0930. This made it convenient for the Mujahideen who did not have to stay in position all day. The Soviets knew that this was an ambush site, but did not destroy the ambush positions, put security elements on the high ground with helicopters or put a dismounted force through the area to check for ambushes. Further, they did not have helicopter gunships flying overhead or on strip alert. They did not carry an immediate reaction force which could get up into the mountains and turn the flanks of the ambush sites. Instead, they relied on the combat power of their armored vehicles and slow-reacting artillery and air support.

The Mujahideen commander had 60 combatants spread over a five kilometers stretch of ambush on both sides of the road. He did not have radio communications with all his people. Instead, the signal to initiate fire was the commander firing the first shot. Other commands were given by messenger or visual signals—mirrors, flares, smokegrenades and waving. Command and control depended greatly on thecommander's pre-ambush briefing and SOP actions.