Читать книгу The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Ali Ahmad Jalali - Страница 30

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Soviet lack of adequate reconnaissance cost them dearly. Moving a convoy of supply vehicles in close terrain, without effective security arrangements, often resulted in major tactical setbacks. They further failed to cover the convoy movement with helicopter reconnaissance and helicopter gunships. The Mujahideen had calculated the reaction time for helicopter gunships from Kandahar air base. Timely action by helicopter gunships could have saved the day for the Soviet convoy, but they were apparently not planned for and not on call.

Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zonewould drive out of it. The security detail followed this SOP. Instead of aggressive efforts to use their armored strength and fire power to outflank the ambush groups and cut off their withdrawal, the Sovietsecurity vehicles passively remained with the embattled column and fired on suspected Mujahideen positions. They had little effect.

Later on, as the Soviet forces established stationary security posts in the key areas along the highway, they failed to support and sustain them in the face of constant Mujahideen attacks. This later led them to construct a bypass road further to the north away from the dangerous green zone. The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerilla war, the loss of initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of tactical combat.

What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to the ambush site. Simultaneous attack on the enemy column along its entire depth was perhaps the most decisive element in this ambush. In this case, the Mujahideen had approximately 40 combatants to a kilometer of ambush. This was much denser than usual Mujahideen ambushes andreflected that they were fighting from a green zone which could accomodate more combatants.

However, the Mujahideen failed to exploit the initiative they achieved through surprise by moving to the road to complete the destruction of a demoralized and panicked enemy. Instead, they pulled out immediately after their success. This failure to fully exploit an ambush became a hallmark of Mujahideen hit and run tactics throughout the war.

Later fighting confirms the importance of field fortifications and terrain to increase battlefield survivability and sustain combat despit eenemy air and artillery superiority. This was a lesson once learned bythe Mujahideen that was effectively implemented throughout the war. The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted effort to find and destroy these positions. The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection ofthe place and time of tactical actions against the enemy. In areas where the local population remained in their homes and had not emigrated, local resistance units preferred to reserve for themselves the choice of time, place and method of action against the enemy and not let outside Mujahideen groups risk their security and plans by conducting combat in their area without their consent. The decentralized nature of the resistance, factionalism and lack of unified command were both a Mujahideen strength and weakness.