Читать книгу Wounded Leaders: How Their Damaged Past Affects Your Future - Allan Bonner - Страница 9

The bayonet has been an instrument of war for hundreds of years of recorded history and was probably one for thousands of years before that. It may have had its beginnings as a sharp stone on the end of a stick. However, for the last three hundred years, the bayonet has been of limited use.

The plug bayonet, used around 1700, rendered a musket unusable, since the muzzle was literally plugged with the blunt end of the instrument. In the US Civil War, hospitals and field medics reported very few bayonet wounds. Yet fifty-five years later, the fixing of bayonets and marching toward enemy trenches was standard procedure in World War I. In that Great War, soldiers had difficulty wielding their long rifles within the narrow trenches. Elongating the weapons with bayonets may have actually lessened their utility. Yet decades after the bayonet had lost much of its utility, tens of thousands of men marched to their deaths, pointing them straight into machine gun fire. It is said that some machine gunners went mad at the slaughter.

Even more astounding, the bayonet was standard issue in World War II and can even be found on some modern rifles today. There was even a bayonet charge during the Falklands War. This illustrates the tenacity that many organizations display in clinging to useless or destructive policies, despite empirical evidence to stop.

Similarly, command and control was impossible and ineffective when World War I commanders, far behind trench lines, seemed unaware of the futility of infantry formations marching toward machine guns. Yet, these commanders repeatedly ordered troops to go “over the top”, condemning tens of thousands to their deaths. Command and control was as outdated as the bayonet.

Certainly, if a soldier with an empty rifle were facing an enemy two feet away, the bayonet would have been useful. Similarly, if a boom were coming overhead on a ship and the watch officer shouted “duck”, command and control would be very useful-even life-saving. But both the bayonet and command and control seem to require special circumstances to prove their worth.

In World War I, British troops not only subscribed to the command and control doctrine, but were also hampered by class-consciousness. There’s at least one story of how a lost British officer near Vimy Ridge would not take directions from a private soldier. The officer took his troops into harm’s way and probably died rather than break with tradition, rank and class.

Canadian troops took Vimy Ridge when French and British troops could not, in great part because of their egalitarian backgrounds, fostered in the rough-and-tumble Colony. Much of the work involved in trench warfare was exhausting manual labour. This was familiar to rural farm boys and woodsmen, but not to British troops, whose officers achieved their ranks largely as a result of class. The unorthodox Canadians once booed an officer off the parade ground for being late, destroyed a theatre because they did not appreciate the movie and generally showed limited decorum and deference. These were court-martial offences in other armies. But it was this individualism that made victory possible at Vimy.

Canadians developed the trench raid in which anywhere from dozens to thousands of soldiers tested German defences, captured enemies for interrogation, and killed or wounded thousands. Unorthodox Canadian officers recognized the importance of the machine gun. They used their own in an unorthodox manner for indirect fire, over ridges, as one would use artillery.

Fine calibration of artillery pieces made them more effective against the enemy, prevented many friendly-fire incidents and made creeping barrages more effective. Similarly, one officer with a scientific bent used the new field of acoustics to pinpoint enemy artillery and destroy it.

The most unorthodox tactic of all was the official flouting of the major tenets of command and control. First, massive rehearsals were held well behind the lines, using flags and markings on the ground to represent trenches and machine guns. Officers on horseback simulated creeping barrages. Most dramatically, every soldier was thoroughly briefed on routes and objectives and given a map. The idea of ordinary soldiers being entrusted with all this valuable information at that time was ground-breaking and unorthodox management. But egalitarianism worked. Vimy Ridge was taken. Command and control has its place, but the lesson of history is that its utility and value is not universal.

Another military lesson involves dealing with errors. Missteps abound in military history. Many can be blamed on the “fog of war”, because when the action is in progress, it is difficult for everyone, including the commander, to know exactly what is going on. Much effort is expended to counter the fog of war, which commanders know will prevail during battle. Commanders know that a “hot wash-up”, or debriefing and discussion, after the encounter will reveal errors and omissions. They not only expect these, but schedule formal “appreciations” before the event to gain all possible information, and follow up with debriefings to determine lessons learned.

I don’t know if any business corporations subscribe to the military concept of the fog of war. I’ve never heard it mentioned during all the years I have worked with and coached senior executives. Perhaps they should remember that they will occasionally be in thick fog.

In the case of mergers and acquisitions the analogy might be that CEOs and others responsible for the venture are yelling “charge!” behind the lines, ignoring the significance of new technology, techniques, markets and shifting trends. They are clinging slavishly to missions and plans, even if reports back from the field are telling them they need to change tactics. CEOs need to take the longer view-as do good military commanders-that in all probability things will not go as planned. Circumstances and conditions can change and when they do, tactics need to be adjusted even if the overall strategy remains.