Читать книгу Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia - Ana Omaljev - Страница 10

In the vast scholarship on European identity, it is a fundamental precept that Europe as a whole has been fused from many different identities, brought together as a consequence of a diverse range of countries trying to shape their common history throughout many centuries. Yet, it is clear that each of these countries mirrors and personifies its own national anxieties within the resulting image of Europe. As Gibbins points out, “Europe functions as a symbolical space where one’s own ideas are reflected, where no single interpretation of Europe is correct,”[27] and where the Serbian view of that image just mirrors its own national anxieties and self-image. It is clear that the “First” and “Other” Serbia construction of Serbian national identity is projected onto European identity, and this projection has an ideological underpinning since, as Strath argues, no projection is ever non-interested/non-ideological.[28] With this in mind, how should one tackle the question of why Serbia aspires to be part of the EU in the first place?

Each year in March, the commemoration of the 1999 NATO intervention repeatedly triggers an intense and frequently contradictory debate regarding the understanding of who were victims and who were perpetrators in recent conflicts and the relevance this has for understanding the Serbian identity. Former Prime Minister Ivica Dačić[29] said, emphasizing the importance of innocent victims who have been forgotten, “we cannot forget nor accept the notion that their victims are more important than ours[30]…. Today, after surviving genocide in two world wars because we were on the right side of the international community, Serbia and Serbian national interests do not deserve such unjust treatment as Serbia has always supported the side that fought against fascism.”[31] Dačić and many others frequently put forward the view that, because Serbia took part in the fight against fascism in the First and Second World Wars and suffered the ensuing sacrifices, it deserves a place in the European Union today.[32] A study of how Serbian national identity is being constructed vis-à-vis Europe and the analysis of the dominant discourses reveals both the fluidity and stability of the Serbian subject positions. One thing is certain: the ongoing public construction of pro- or anti-Europe positions by politicians, intellectuals, and academics—in other words, the main constructors of First and Other Serbia—not only interact with projections of the national-self, but, as Milutinović notes, these projections were created in order to re-define and reinvent the Serbian nation via the discursive image of Europe.[33] As an example of an anti-Europe position I cite Koštunica[34] who, in the DSS party interview, advances the idea that “Serbia is an old European state, and she has never been outside of Europe in her entire history.”[35] Following this reasoning, Serbia’s symbolic positioning is already inside Europe, and the narrative of the “path to Europe” and ensuing acceptance of change are undesirable and obsolete. In the First Serbia discourse, the main argument against the choice of Europe is based on Serbia’s military neutrality, or saying a “historical no” to NATO military affiliation. Second, what makes Russia much closer than Europe to Serbia is explained primarily on the grounds of security, religion and culture. In these comparisons, the closeness of Russia to Serbia is usually supported by making overt references to the religious heritage that Serbia and Russia share. This observation supports my findings that Orthodox Christianity appears to be a major constitutive element of Serbian identity as seen in the First Serbia discourse. In this respect, it is evident that the perceived religious differences between Eastern and Western Christianity, contribute greatly to the Otherness of “Europe.”

One can see how national identity, and indeed any kind of collective identity, is built through interaction. Triandafyllidou finds that national identity is formed through contrast with, and differentiation from, Others hence helping to clarify the boundaries of the in-group.[36] A vast amount of research has been done in the field of representations of Europe and the nation in current and prospective EU member states. For instance, in the case of the membership of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel noted that the aspiration to membership was a goal belonging to the democratic consolidation of the entire Central European region, based on the belief that shared principles of mutual cooperation, civil society and equal rights would be the best guarantee “against nationalist hatred.”[37] On the other hand, research on representations of Europe indicates that Britain’s relationship with the EU can best be described as “half-detachment,” i.e. not characterized by clear hostility but rather by widespread indifference.[38] Ichijo points out that Europe is a significant other for the contemporary British, yet without being the source of fear or inspiration.[39] Regarding Greece, there is an apparent tension between tradition and modernity as a result of the process of belated modernization. In this respect, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos note that Greek culture understands itself as a bridge between East and West.[40] In contrast, Italy has been and still is tormented by the “Southern question,” the social and economic divide between North and South, and Triandafyllidou points out that Italy’s significant other par excellence since national unification has been its fragmented national Self, and more specifically “the South.”[41] Indeed, in Italy, (Western) Europe is framed in inspirational terms, because Europe has been perceived as a model of civic community which is sadly absent from national politics. Triandafyllidou rightly points out that in Italy, identifying with Europe was seen as providing the common civic basis necessary to consolidate national unity.[42] These examples highlight cases where “Europe” and the “European project” are reinforced either by the public or by the state, and operate with the structural tenets of democracy, as illiberal values are generally dismissed. While the literature deals with the exploration of the Self and the Other, much analysis has been undertaken in countries where belonging to Europe is not frequently questioned on essentialist grounds but is almost universally accepted. The unique contribution of this book lies in its investigation of the identity debate on Europe in a country outside the EU and in the marginal geopolitical space of Europe. This study is relevant and new exactly because Serbia is not a major political power but at the European periphery,[43] and because its post-conflict identity is in direct connection with its efforts toward European integration.

Moreover, in light of the literature on Europeanization, recent scholarly debates have been concerned with the meaning, uses and power of the promise of Europe—a power increasingly seen as being able to change mentalities. Europe is considered as a structuring discourse in as much as Europe cannot be reduced to an idea, an identity or a reality since it is itself a structuring force.[44] As Delanty notes, what is real is the discourse in which ideas and identities are formed and historical realities constituted.[45] This notion of Europe is brought into focus as a political and cultural construction and I suggest, following Delanty, that “it cannot be regarded as a self-evident entity: it is an idea as much as reality.”[46] The First and Other Serbia construction of Serbian national identity is “projected” onto European identity. It is thus not a question of “deconstructing Europe,”[47] but instead one of analyzing those discourses about Europe which would claim or simply assume some relationship between the discourse itself and Europe, i.e. between speaking about Europe, and speaking about Serbia. From the Serbian perspective, Europe is not only Europe as the Other, but also Europe as an element of “Us.” This means that “Europe is a category of both inclusion and exclusion”,[48] which can provoke tension in communities constructed around the concept of the nation such as Serbia. Still, the Serbian self-image is also reflected in examples of the usage of the term Europe and its derivatives. The core strategy in the First and Other Serbia discourses on Europe is the creation of inclusion and exclusion through the construction of in- and out-groups. These demarcations are not static but in perpetual transformation. Through these constructions, Serbian discursive actors are involved in an ongoing process of identity formation: creating degrees of difference from Europe and Europeans. Europeanization in this sense[49] indicates a clear awareness of “Us” and “Them,” and of an Other that possesses certain European features which “We” want to acquire. In general, Malksoo notes, Eastern Europeans’ relation to this hierarchy has been a mixture of acceptance and resistance.[50] On the one hand, Western Europe is the idealized Other whose recognition Serbs crave and desire but, as all other Eastern Europeans, they see themselves as being truer to the idea of Europe than Western Europeans.[51] One can be sure that, in First and Other Serbia contested dialogues where two different historical and political visions of Serbian society meet, Europe is understood, as Milutinović notes, as a set of values, a concept, a principle, an idea, and a place where structural ideas of Europeanization are taken seriously.[52]