Читать книгу A Voyage Round the World - Anson George - Страница 2

The squadron under the command of Mr. Anson (of which I here propose to recite the most material proceedings) having undergone many changes in its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final sailing from St. Helens; I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have been entrusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to presage, were principally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.

When, in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the council. And in all these deliberations it was from the first determined that George Anson, Esq., then captain of the Centurion, should be employed as commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of September to order him to return with his ship to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is on the 10th of November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager directing him to repair to London, and to attend the Board of Admiralty: where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles that two squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which, however, would have some connexion with each other; that he, Mr. Anson, was intended to command one of them, and Mr. Cornwall (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his country's honour) the other; that the squadron under Mr. Anson was to take on board three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as this squadron could be fitted for the sea, they were to set sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java Head in the East Indies; that there they were only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of Manila, situated on Luconia, one of the Philippine Islands; that the other squadron was to be of equal force with this commanded by Mr. Anson, and was intended to pass round Cape Horn, into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and after cruising upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this squadron in its return was to rendezvous at Manila, there to join the squadron under Mr. Anson, where they were to refresh their men, and refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but greatly advance the public service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution; for had Mr. Anson proceeded for Manila at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manila might be well supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking out of the war; that is to say, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldring of their carriages; their magazines, whether of military stores or provision, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests in Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive their redress, drained to the very bottom; this, from the intercepted letters of their viceroys and governors, it is well known to have been the defenceless state of Panama, and the other Spanish places on the coast of the South Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be supposed that the city of Manila, removed still farther by almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced from the Spanish government a greater share of attention and concern for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends. Indeed, it is well known that Manila was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and in all probability would have surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may be in some measure estimated, from the known healthiness of its air, the excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce which it carries on to the principal ports in the East Indies, and China, and its exclusive trade to Acapulco, the returns for which, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest valuation, not less than three millions of dollars per annum.

On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent that in a few days after this first conference, that is, on November 18, Mr. Anson received an order to take under his command the Argyle, Severn, Pearl, Wager, and Tryal sloop; and other orders were issued to him in the same month, and in the December following, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But Mr. Anson attending the Admiralty the beginning of January, he was informed by Sir Charles Wager that for reasons with which he, Sir Charles, was not acquainted, the expedition to Manila was laid aside. It may be conceived that Mr. Anson was extremely chagrined at the losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect, so desirable an enterprize, especially too as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove a very long one. However, Sir Charles, to render his disappointment in some degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the South Seas was still intended, and that he, Mr. Anson, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And on the 10th of January he received his commission, appointing him commander-in-chief of the forementioned squadron, which (the Argyle being in the course of their preparation changed for the Gloucester) was the same he sailed with above eight months after from St. Helens. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was soon so far advanced that he conceived the ships might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation. And at last, on the 28th of June 1740, the Duke of Newcastle, principal Secretary of State, delivered to him his Majesty's instructions, dated January 31, 1739, with an additional instruction from the Lords Justices, dated June 19, 1740. On the receipt of these, Mr. Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the musters that his squadron wanted three hundred seamen of their complement (a deficiency which, with all its assiduity, he had not been able to get supplied), yet, as Sir Charles Wager informed him, that an order from the Board of Admiralty was dispatched to Sir John Norris to spare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being complied with. But on his arrival at Portsmouth, he found himself greatly mistaken, and disappointed in this persuasion; for on his application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very considerable delay; for it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of three hundred able sailors, which Mr. Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron a hundred and seventy men only; of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick quarter, thirty-seven from the Salisbury, with three officers of Colonel Lowther's regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five hundred invalids to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers who from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching regiments, Mr. Anson was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of action, since the delays he had already encountered necessarily confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager too joined in opinion with the commodore, that invalids were no ways proper for this service, and sollicited strenuously to have them exchanged: but he was told that persons who were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr. Anson, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August; but instead of five hundred, there came on board no more than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving behind them only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans: they were themselves extremely averse to the service they were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any ways proportioned, and where, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize, they would, in all probability, uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this too after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their country's service.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in, that amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known that however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet by a prudent choice there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour left: and Mr. Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was sent to him seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion above-mentioned, these were a second time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty.

And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. It was proposed to Mr. Anson, after it was resolved that he should be sent to the South Seas, to take with him two persons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Those who were mentioned for this employment had formerly been in the Spanish West Indies, in the South Sea Company's service, and it was supposed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast they might often procure provisions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms: these agent victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of £15,000 in merchandize on board the squadron; for they had represented that it would be much easier for them to procure provisions with goods than with the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr. Anson from the beginning objected both to the appointment of agent victuallers and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron: for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the government ought to have done on this occasion was to put on board to the value of £2000 or £3000 only of such goods as the Indians or the Spanish planters in the less cultivated part of the coast might be tempted with; since it was in such places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions: and in these places it was sufficiently evident a very small cargo would suffice.

But though the commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers and to their project, of the success of which he had no opinion; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling their squadron, might contribute to settling a trade upon that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by some considerable persons: and of the £15,000 which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to advance them 10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining 5000 they raised on bottomry bonds; and the goods purchased by this sum were all that were taken to sea by the squadron, how much soever the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report.

This cargo was at first shipped on board the Wager storeship, and one of the victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war. But when the commodore was at St. Catherine's, he considered that in case the squadron should be separated, it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder principally on board the Wager, where it was lost; and more of the goods perishing by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home to England did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at Portsmouth.

To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely anything more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of August, and on the 10th the squadron sailed from Spithead to St. Helens, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition.

But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very constant, and very violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. As we made up in all twenty-one men-of-war, and a hundred and twenty-four sail of merchant-men and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the Channel with so large a number of ships without the continuance of a fair wind for some considerable time. This was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; so that our golden dreams and our ideal possession of the Peruvian treasures grew each day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape Horn in the winter season filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St. Helens, to our final departure from thence: and even then (having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time, on the 23d of August, we got under sail, and Mr. Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea, but the wind soon returning to its old quarter obliged us to put back to St. Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, who, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts to sail, but without any better success. And, on the 6th of September, being returned to an anchor at St. Helens, after one of these fruitless efforts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet struck their yards and topmasts to prevent driving: yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the Centurion drove the next evening, and brought both cables ahead, and we were in no small danger of driving foul of the Prince Frederick, a seventy gun ship, moored at a small distance under our stern; though we happily escaped, by her driving at the same time, and so preserving her distance: but we did not think ourselves secure till we at last let go the sheet-anchor, which fortunately brought us up. However, on the 9th of September, we were in some degree relieved from this lingring vexatious situation, by an order which Mr. Anson received from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his own squadron only, if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr. Anson received on the 12th of September; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the St. Albans, with the Turky fleet, and to join the Dragon and the Winchester, with the Streights and the American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together. This incumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to the Maderas. However, Mr. Anson, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in a readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of September, he weighed from St. Helens; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter.

Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January, from what it had in the latter end of September, when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the commodore was at first promised) and having our numbers compleated to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board a hundred and seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more disadvantageous; for there, instead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced (as we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty was not always submitted to) occasioned a delay and waste of time, which in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this enterprise was afterwards exposed: for by this means we were obliged to make our passage round Cape Horn in the most tempestuous season of the year; whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction. By this delay, too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs, that a person who had been employed in the South Sea Company's service, and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth, was able to relate to Mr. Anson most of the particulars of the destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learnt amongst the Spaniards before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance: For we shall find that, when the Spaniards (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended for the South Seas) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had so far got the start of us, as to arrive before us off the island of Madera, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr. Anson's broad pendant, and had imitated it so exactly, that he thereby decoyed the Pearl, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him, before the captain of the Pearl was able to discover his mistake.