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THE CANADIAN SOF LEGACY[1]

The general public has become more attuned to SOF as a result of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. For many, though, the existence of an elite C anadian counterterrorist unit only became known as a result of a media disclosure that they were deploying to Afghanistan in support of the American effort. However, the nation’s SOF legacy goes far deeper than that. In fact, Canada has a long history and association with SOF.

After all, nothing embodies the idea of daring special operations more than the practice of la petite guerre by the French Canadian raiders during the struggle for colonial North America. Facing a harsh climate, unforgiving terrain, and intractable and savage enemies, the intrepid Canadian warriors personified boldness, courage, cunning, and tenacity. Their fearless forays and daring raids behind enemy lines struck terror in the hearts of their Native antagonists, as well as the British and American colonists and soldiers. In fact, for an extended period of time, these tac­tical actions had a strategic effect on the bitter struggle for North America.

Schooled in the bitter war of annihilation with the Iroquois in the seventeenth century, the French Canadians developed a class of fighters who were able to adapt to the new style of warfare required in the New World.[2] Moreover, they demonstrated an intellectual and tactical agility that made them unsurpassed in “raiding” and what would later be dubbed commando operations. Their emphasis on stealth, speed, violence of action, physical fitness, and courage, as well as their ability to mount joint operations with indigenous allies created a force that successfully wreaked havoc on their enemy.

This capability, much to the misery of the English, was consistently displayed as the two competing European powers increasingly fought for control of North America. Quite simply, the French consistently relied on the outnumbered Canadians to hold onto French territory through their proficient execution of their distinct Canadian way of war, specif­ically small parties of experienced coureur de bois and partisans who conducted dangerous scouts, ambushes, and raids in English territory.[3] Raids against the English in Hudson Bay in 1686, the Seneca in New York in 1687, the Iroquois in 1693 and 1696, and a number of devastating strikes against English settlements such as Casco, Deersfield, Haverhill, Salmon Falls, and Schenectady during a succession of wars from 1688 to 1761, provided proof of the effectiveness of the French Canadian raiders who specialized in the conduct of lightning strikes behind enemy lines.

Many French and Canadian leaders, particularly those with extended exposure to the North American manner of war, or those born and raised in Canada, came to reject the conventional European manner of making war. Rather, they believed that the optimum war-fighting technique was achieved by a mixed force — regulars, with their military strengths (e.g., courage, discipline, tactical acumen), and volunteers and Natives, with their strengths (e.g., endurance, familiarity with wilderness navigation and travel, marksmanship) — who relied more on initiative, inde­pendent action and small unit tactics than on rigid military practices and drills. The effectiveness of the Canadians was evidenced in the fear they created in their enemies. British generals and numerous contemporary English accounts conceded that the Canadian raiders “are well known to be the most dangerous enemy of any … reckoned equal, if not superior in that part of the world to veteran troops.”[4]

The impact of the French Canadian raiders was immense. One British colonel confided, “I am ashamed that they have succeeded in all their scouting parties and that we never have any success in ours.”[5] This state of affairs continually blinded the British command and deprived them of intelligence of French preparations or plans. Understandably, this often led to poor and untimely decisions, which in turn led to unfortunate consequences, whether the ambush of a British column or the loss of a strategic fort.[6] Moreover, the constant depredations, ambushes, and raids of the Canadians and their Native allies caused a constant material and economic drain on the British. But equally important, they created an overwhelming blow against the morale of the Anglo-American colonies. The British forces seemed unable to strike back. It was a constant series of defeats, thwarted campaigns, and offensives, all of which devastated the Anglo-American colonies. Everywhere, the Canadians and Natives would appear as phantoms in hit-and -run attacks, leaving in their wake smouldering ruins and the mutilated bodies of the dead and dying. Despite their small numbers, they consistently inflicted a disproportionately high number of casualties on the enemy. The end result was an utterly paralyzing effect on the English combatants and colonists alike.[7]

The unmitigated success of the French Canadians raiders forced the British to develop a similar capability of their own. One of the first efforts was in 1744, in the North American theatre of operations, as part of the larger War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). During this conflict, the British presence in the Maritimes was once again prey to the marauding Abenakis and Mi’kmaq war parties that were aligned with the French. As a result, an “independent corps of rangers,” also known as the corps of New England Rangers, was raised. Two companies were recruited and deployed to Annapolis, Nova Scotia, in July 1744 to reinforce the garrison. In September, a third company arrived, led by Captain John Goreham.

Goreham’s command composed of sixty Mohawk and Metis warriors. Familiar with the Native way of war, they swiftly engaged the French and their Native allies. Massachusetts governor William Shirley commended Goreham and his Rangers for their success, stating that “the garrison is now entirely free from alarms.”[8] The majority of the companies later returned to Massachusetts, where they originated, leaving Captain Goreham and his company to patrol Nova Scotia alone from 1746 to 1748. Their success was such that Shirley wrote, “the great service which Lieutenant-Colonel Gorham’s Company of Rangers has been to the Garrison at Annapolis Royal is a demonstration of the Usefulness of such a Corps.”[9]

Goreham’s Rangers continued to serve on the volatile frontier. Prior to the onset of the French and Indian War, also known in its global context as the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), Goreham’s Rangers were used to protect the British settlements in Nova Scotia against Native raids. However, with the official outbreak of the war, they became increasingly involved in military operations, specifically because of their expertise at irregular warfare.[10]

Despite their prior success, Goreham’s Rangers were eclipsed in the war by a British creation aimed at matching the effectiveness of the French Canadian raiders in the strategically important Lake Champlain theatre of operations. What the British eventually created was the le­gendary Rogers’ Rangers. In the early stages of the war, when fortunes seemed to be against the British, Robert Rogers’s knowledge and ex­peri­ence with the “haunts and passes of the enemy and the Indian method of fighting” soon brought him to the attention of his superior, Major- General William Johnson.[11] By the fall of 1755, Rogers was conducting dangerous scouts deep behind enemy lines. Rogers’s efforts soon earned him an overwhelming reputation. These efforts also led Major-General William Shirley, then the commander-in -chief of the British Army in North America, to argue:

It is absolutely necessary for his Majesty’s Service, that one Company at least of Rangers should be constantly employ’d in different Parties upon Lake George and Lake Iroquois [Lake Champlain], and the Wood Creek and Lands adjacent … to make Discoveries of the proper Routes for our own Troops, procure Intelligence of the Enemy’s Strength and Motions, destroy their out Magazines and Settlements, pick up small Parties of their Battoes upon the Lakes, and keep them under continual Alarm.[12]

By the winter of 1756, Rogers’s bold forays with his small band of unofficial rangers behind enemy French lines were regularly reported in newspapers throughout the colonies. They provided a tonic to a belea­guered English frontier. In March 1756, Major-General Shirley, ordered Rogers to raise a sixty-man independent ranger company that was sep­arate from both the provincial and regular units. As such, it was titled His Majesty’s Independent Company (later Companies) of American Rangers. His unit was directed to scout and gain intelligence in the Lake Champlain theatre, as well as “distress the French and their allies by sacking, burning, and destroying their houses, barns, barracks, canoes, battoes … to way-lay , attack, and destroying their convoys of provisions by land and water.”[13]

The reputation and accomplishments of the rangers soon had an impact on British officers. All wanted rangers to accompany their exped­itions as a foil against the enemy’s Canadians and Natives, and because of the rangers’ ability to navigate and survive in the merciless wilderness.

Without doubt, Rogers’ Rangers, as they became universally known, brought to life the ranger tradition in North America and ensured it would forever endure. Their deeds and prowess have with time become legendary, even if this is not fully deserved.

Indeed, Rogers was repeatedly bested by his Canadian counterparts and normally suffered horrendous casualties. Generals Jeffrey Amherst and Thomas Gage considered the Canadians superior to the American Rangers.[14] In addition, throughout this period, Goreham’s Rangers were also active. In 1758, they played an important part in the capture of the strategic Fortress of Louisbourg and a year later assisted in the exped­ition against Quebec. In fact, at the end of the conflict the British high command rated Goreham’s Rangers, although rarely mentioned, as the most highly rated ranger organization employed during the war.[15]

Nonetheless, Rogers’ Rangers, led by the very adventurous, courageous, and exceptionally tough Robert Rogers, created a very romantic image that seemed to both symbolize, as well as define, the strength of the American ranger.

And the American rangers, together with the Canadian rangers, established a tradition of adventurous, if not daring, action that was very aggressive and always offensively minded. The ranger tradition that was created also valorized the concept of individuals who were seen as mav­ericks, outside of conventional military institutions and mentality — men who were adaptable, robust, and unconventional in their thinking and war fighting; men who could persevere against the greatest hardships and despite an inhospitable environment and merciless enemy, achieve mission success.[16]

* * *

The tenacious spirit engendered by the rangers in the eighteenth century would remain with Canada’s warriors and be resurrected in future generations. The more contemporary component of Canada’s SOF legacy coincided with the explosion of special operations forces at the commencement of World War II (WWII). In essence, modern-day SOF are largely a phenomena of this era.

Paradoxically, they were largely born in crisis from a position of weakness. They were created to fill a specific gap. In the immediate aftermath of the early German victories, the Allies found themselves devoid of major equipment, with questionable military strength, and on the defensive throughout the world.[17]

Despite the still smouldering British equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk, the combative new prime minister, Winston Churchill, declared in the British House of Commons on June 4, 1940, “We shall not be content with a defensive war.”[18] He was well aware that to win a war meant ultimately offensive action. Only through offensive action could an army provide the needed confidence and battle experience to its soldiers and leaders. Furthermore, only offensive action could sustain public and military morale. Also, offensive action represented a shift in initiative. Striking at the enemy would force Germany to take defensive measures that would demand a diversion of scarce resources.

That afternoon, Churchill penned a note to General Hastings Ismay of the War Cabinet Secretariat, “We are greatly concerned … with the dangers of the Germans landing in England,” he wrote, “… why should it be thought impossible for us to do anything of the same kind to them?” He then added, “We should immediately set to work to organize self-contained , thoroughly equipped raiding units.”[19] After all, exclaimed Churchill, “how wonderful it would be if the Germans could be made to wonder where they were going to be struck next, instead of forcing us to try to wall in the island and roof it over!”[20]

On June 6, Churchill sent yet another missive to Ismay. “Enterprises must be prepared,” he wrote, “with specially trained troops of the hunter class who can develop a reign of terror down these coasts, first of all on the butcher and bolt policy.” He vividly recounted, “There comes from the sea a hand of steel that plucks the German sentries from their posts.”[21] He then curtly directed the “Joint Chiefs of the Staff to propose me measures for a vigorous, enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline.” He added the requirement for deep inland raids that left “a trail of German corpses behind.”[22]

As a result, during the early years of the war a plethora of SOF organ­izations and units, such as the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Commandos, the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), the Special Air Service (SAS), and the American Rangers, to name a few, emerged, creating a means to strike back at the seemingly invincible German military machine.

One of the first unconventional efforts was the creation of the Special Operations Executive, which was a British secret service intended to promote subversive warfare in enemy-occupied territory. It was formed in July 1940 in the aftermath of the disastrous retreat from Dunkirk, as England braced itself for the inevitable invasion. It was designed as a “full[-]scale secret service, the mere existence of which could not be admitted either to Parliament or to the press.”[23] The SOE became responsible for “all operations of sabotage, secret subversive propaganda, the encouragement of civil resistance in occupied areas, the stirring up of insurrection, strikes, etc., in Germany or areas occupied by her.”[24] Specifically, the SOE was responsible for training agents and organizers, as well as deploying them into the various target countries, with the object of establishing basic subversive organizations that could be expanded as required as the situation allowed. The main functions of the subversive organizations were explained as:

1 Political Subversion and Propaganda: To encourage the popu­lation of the occupied countries against the forces of occu­pation and to undermine the morale of the latter;

2 Sabotage: To build up a sabotage organization wherever the Axis can be effectively attacked, which is mainly in the occupied territories. The object of this activity is to wear down the Axis morally and economically and so hasten the date by which our military forces can take the offensive. Sabotage efforts must be correlated with those of the fighting services especially the bomber forces, and our present short term policy is, therefore, based on the instructions recently given to Bomber Command, whose efforts we intend to supplement by attacking rail, sea, canal, and road transport. The sabotage organization must also be prepared to harass the Axis lines of communication, should Great Britain be invaded, and to intensify its activities in close co-operation with any [A]llied invasion of the [C]ontinent;

3 The Organization of Secret Armies: To build up and equip secret armies in occupied territories. These armies, in co-operation with the sabotage organizations, will be prepared to assist our military forces when they take the offensive, either directly in the theatre of operations or indirectly elsewhere, by attacks on communications, whether telegraphic or transport, by neutralization of seizure of aerodromes, by a general attack on enemy aircraft and personnel, and by producing disorder in the enemy’s rearward services.[25]

The Canadian connection was not long in coming. Shortly after its creation, the SOE queried the senior Canadian commander overseas, Major- General A.G.L. McNaughton, for Canadian volunteers. Specifically, they were looking for French Canadians for service in France, Canadians of Eastern European descent for the Balkans, and Chinese Canadians for Far East operations. Clearly, the racial, linguistic, and cultural attributes and knowledge of these volunteers would provide the SOE with, in many aspects, ready-made operatives. Inculcating the specific technical skills would just be a matter of training.

The Canadian volunteers, like the remainder of the men and women trained to serve in the SOE during World War II “were quickly made to forget all thoughts about Queensbury rules and so-called ‘gentlemanly’ warfare … [ and they] were taught a vast range of sabotage techniques and bizarre methods of killing.”[26] Moreover, they were thoroughly trained in advising, arming, and assisting members of the various resist­ance movements in the enemy-occupied countries.

As much of the art and science of SOF was in its infancy, it is not surprising that SOE selection was inefficient. Initially, it consisted of a three- to four-week selection/training course. However, this was soon deemed too leisurely and ineffective. Many of those on course were failed out at the end of the process, which proved a waste of time and resources. By July 1943 a new selection course (student assessment board (SAB)) had been developed. This applied a variety of psychological and practical tests to candidates over a four day period. In this manner, questionable volunteers were screened out early. The SAB took less time and provided better results.

Successful volunteers went through several phases of training. The first phase focused on ensuring all operatives were in top physical condition. In addition, the course provided all with an in-depth proficiency with Allied and German small arms, as well as expertise in explosives and demolition work. The first phase also provided instruction in the recognition of German uniforms and equipment. The next stage of training was conducted at the commando training centre in Arisaig, in the western Highlands of Scotland near the Isle of Skye. This phase provided rigorous field training and live fire exercises. Following the commando training came parachute qualification in Manchester. At the termination of qualification training, operatives were then separated according to their respective skills and sent to specialized training centres.

The Canadian connection to the SOE went beyond the volunteers who served in the organization. It also extended to the establishment of Special Training School (STS) 103 or Camp X, which was located on secluded farmland outside of Whitby, Ontario. The camp served two functions. The first was to train men recruited in Canada, such as French Canadians and refugees from Eastern Europe, for service with the SOE in Europe. The second function was to give top-secret assistance to the American foreign intelligence service, an activity that could not be done in the United States as long as the United States remained neutral in the war.[27]

Camp X was the first secret-agent training establishment in North America. It opened on December 9, 1941, and trained individuals according to their cultural groups. The officers, less the camp adjutant, were all British; however, the senior non-commissioned officers were all Canadian. Camp X closed on April 20, 1944.

Throughout the war, 227 Canadians served in the SOE in the various theatres of the conflict. In addition, Canadian personnel in the Royal Canadian Air Force and those posted to Royal Air Force units also served in the Special Duties Squadrons used to drop weapons and insert and extract SOE personnel.[28] In the end, the value of the SOE was immense. In a Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on July 18, 1945, General Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower’s staff noted, “without the organization, communications, training, and leadership which SOE supplied … resistance [movements] would have been of no military value.”[29]

The SOE, however, was not the only innovative, unconventional effort. In a remarkable display of military efficiency, by June 8, 1940, two days after Churchill’s directive, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, received approval for the creation of the Commandos and, that same afternoon, Section MO9 of the War Office was established. Four days later, Churchill appointed Lieutenant- General Sir Alan Bourne, the adjutant-general of the Royal Marines, as “Commander of Raiding Operations on Coasts in Enemy Occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.”[30]

The men drawn to the commando idea very quickly brought into being the concept that was expected. Raiding was their primary role. In essence, they were to be trained to be “hard[-]hitting assault troops” who were capable of working in co-operation with the navy and air force. As such, they were expected to execute plans from headquarters and capture strong points, destroy enemy services, neutralize coastal batteries, and wipe out any designated enemy force by surprise.[31] They were also told that they would have to become accustomed to longer hours, more work, and less rest than the other members of the armed forces.

Predictably, the commando units attracted a like-minded group of aggressive, action-oriented individuals. “There was a sense of urgency, a striving to achieve an ideal, an individual determination to drive the physical body to the limit of endurance to support a moral resolve,” explained one veteran officer. “The individual determination,” he added, “was shared by every member of the force, and such heights of collective idealism are not often reached in the mundane business of soldiering.”[32] Together they forged a “commando spirit,” one comprised of determination; enthusiasm and cheerfulness, particularly under adverse conditions; individual initiative and self reliance; and, finally, comradeship.[33]

Canada, however, was initially slow to react to the commando concept. Moreover, its commitment to creating an elite commando unit in World War II did not last very long, a reality that betrayed the nation’s underlying sentiment toward SOF-type units. In fact, the government’s creation of the Canadian “Viking Force” was actually a response to public criticism at home and the opportunity the British raiding program provided. Major-General Harry D.G. Crerar, reacting to public criticism and government pressure to get Canadian troops into the fray, since they had been in England for almost two years and had still not engaged in battle with the enemy, took the initiative as the acting commander of the Canadian Corps and spoke to his immediate superior, Lieutenant-General Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of the South-Eastern Army in England, about utilizing Canadian troops in a commando role.

Montgomery was not a proponent of SOF forces, but he did see raid ing as a means to instil offensive spirit and combat experience within his command. As such, Crerar did not have a hard sell. “I believe that occasions will increasingly present themselves for small raids across the Channel opposite the Army front,” Crerar argued, “in default of a reputation built up in battle, the [Canadian] Corps undoubtedly would receive great stimulus if, in the near future, it succeeded in making a name for itself for its raiding activities — a reputation which, incidentally, it very definitely earned for itself in the last war.”

Montgomery replied, “Your men should be quite first class at raiding” and he gave Crerar the green light to run Canadian raiding activities from the port of Newhaven.[34]

Crerar lost no time and on March 6, 1942, discussed raiding operations with the director combined operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Mountbatten was initially reluctant to accept Canadian participation in raiding because he felt that it would dilute the role of the British Commandos, who had a monopoly on the activity. However, Mountbattten was well attuned to political realities and made an exception. He laid out two conditions for the Canadians:

1 ample time should be allowed for proper organization and training — this was stated to be six to eight weeks; and

2 the enterprise should be known only to the Corps commander, BGS (brigadier general (staff)), and a limited number of his own (Mounbatten’s) staff.[35]

That afternoon, a second meeting between Crerar, BGS Guy Simonds, and Brigadier J.C. Haydon, commander of the special service force (SSF), transpired.[36] In this forum the senior officers present reached a decision to create a Canadian commando unit of two hundred men, who were to start training by mid-March .

The Canadian commando unit, named Viking Force, was based on 2nd Division. Within a fortnight, 267 volunteers from the division were training at Seaford in the muddy estuary of the Cuckmere River in Sussex. The Viking Force organization was based on the British Commandos but was on a smaller scale. The headquarters section was led by a major and comprised twenty-four all ranks. A further thirty-six officers and men staffed the support squadron (i.e., intelligence, signals, and medical). The remaining 130 personnel were divided into two troops, each consisting of five officers and sixty men. The Viking Force placed heavy emphasis on firepower. In addition to the standard .303 Lee Enfield rifle, each troop carried four Bren light machine guns and eight Thompson submachine guns, as well as two anti-tank rifles and a two-inch mortar.

Within days of the commencement of training, instructors whittled the large group of volunteers down to its official strength of 190 all ranks. From April 4, 1942, personnel from the SSF joined the men of Viking Force to increase the intensity of the training and begin to turn them into hardened commandos. The commanding officer (CO) responsible for whipping the Canadian neophyte commandos into shape was Major Brian McCool of the Royal Regiment of Canada.

During the last half of April 1942, training intensified. It now included speed marches with weapons and sixty-pound rucksacks, river crossings, leaping from crags into sand pits fifteen feet below, cliff climbing, and night manoeuvres. If the men did not get back to the beaches in time to be ferried to the mother ship during these training exercises, they had to swim back with their full equipment .

On April 30, Montgomery visited Major-General Andrew McNaughton, the Canadian Corps commander, and they agreed that the Canadians should form the main striking force for a planned raid on the French port of Dieppe. That same day, McNaughton’s headquarters issued a training instruction to enlarge the scale of combined operations training. This new direction was designed to cover the training of 4 and 6 Brigades for the large conventional raid planned on Dieppe. Therefore, before Viking Force was even fully established, BGS Simonds already laid the blueprint for its demise. “Personnel of detachments which have completed [combined operations/commando] training in accordance with Instruction No. 7,” he ordered, “will be returned to parent units and employed as a cadre to develop combined operations techniques within the latter.”[37]

As a result, Viking Force became swept up in the preparations for Operation Rutter (i.e., the Dieppe raid), and the intensive training that had been reserved for the elite of Viking Force was now extended to the entirety of 4 and 6 Brigades. Quite simply, Major McCool and his cadre became instructors for the others. In this regard, from the end of May to the beginning of July the Viking Force cadre became key to the efforts to help 4 and 6 Brigades master the rigours of amphibious warfare.

However, with the emphasis on conventional forces to take over the raiding role it was not surprising that Crerar wrote on June 4, 1942, “The opportunity to land on enemy shores may not long be denied us.” He added,

The training of detachments, units and formations of the Canadian Corps, with this end in view has already proceeded some distance.… It is the intention that it shall be carried through to the stage when every formation of the Corps is thoroughly capable of taking full part in operations involving the landing on beaches in enemy occupation, and the rapid seizure and development of “bridgeheads.”

He ended his missive with a revealing, “There must be no need for the Canadian Corps to call upon outside, and special ‘Commando’ units for assistance in initial beach-landing operation.”[38]

The new Canadian approach was a polar opposite to the original intent. Viking Force had been intended as a hard-hitting group of specially trained raiders whose job was to inflict damage on the enemy in limited operations using surprise as a major element and then employing their skills to withdraw before enemy had time to recover. Diluted among the battalions in 4 and 6 Brigades during the ill-fated Dieppe raid on August 19, 1942, the original Viking Force commandos were never given the opportunity to do the job they had been trained for. In the aftermath of the disastrous raid, no effort was made to resurrect Viking Force.[39]

However, the Dieppe raid did lead to the establishment of another SOF-like Canadian organization, namely the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Beach Commandos. Their genesis stemmed from the Dieppe raid, where Royal Naval (RN) Beach Parties (“C,” “D,” and “H”) were responsible for disembarking troops and vehicles from assault landing craft, organizing and supervising suitable “beach” areas, and loading serviceable vessels at the time of withdrawal. Of the two hundred navy personnel assigned to the Beach Parties during the Dieppe raid, sixty-three became casualties. As a result, all three RN Beach Parties had to be totally reconstituted. Not surprisingly, soon after Dieppe the Admiralty decided to change the Combined Operations Beach Party Branch name to “Naval Commandos.” Accordingly, the Admiralty directed that twenty Beach commandos would be required for the invasion of Occupied Europe (i.e., two each for three assault divisions, one per assault brigade, with 100 percent spare in reserve).[40]

The RCN soon created its own capability and in late 1943 established RCN Beach Commando “W.” This unit was modelled upon its Royal Navy counterpart and comprised of eighty-four RCN Volunteer Reserve men (i.e., twelve officers and seventy-two ratings (enlisted personnel). The Naval Beach Commando was described as “a unit especially trained in the control and handling of landing craft on the beaches …[and] is designed to handle landing ships, craft, and barges of an assault brigade group and the further ships, craft and barges landed on the same beaches.”[41] Beach Commandos were also responsible for neutralizing beach obstacles, mines, and booby traps.

RCN Beach Commando “W” was assigned to Force “J” on Juno Beach during the Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944, and served with valour and distinction. Canadian newspapers quickly trumpeted the role of the Beach Commandos and described them as the “leather tough Canadians” and “tough, scrappy and self-reliant .”[42] Beach Commando “W” was disbanded at the end of August 1944.

Canada’s SOF legacy in World War II did not end with the Dieppe raid. One month prior to the disastrous assault, another SOF-like or­gan­ization that fits into the legacy of Canada’s CANSOF community was created, namely the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion (1 Cdn Para Bn). Although contemporary airborne units are not considered SOF, 1 Cdn Para Bn, like many of the early airborne organizations that sprang up early in World War II, meets many of the SOF criteria. The paratroopers were specially selected, specially trained, and given special missions behind enemy lines. They possessed an indomitable spirit that defied any challenge. In fact, the selection rate for 1 Cdn Para Bn in its infancy was only 30 percent.[43]

At its creation, the army’s generals, as well as the media at large, were clear on the type of individual and organization they were creating. Robert Taylor, a reporter for the Toronto Daily Star, described the volunteers as “action-hungry and impatient to fill their role as the sharp, hardened tip of the Canadian army’s ‘dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin.’”[44]

Senior military officers described the new Canadian paratroopers as “super-soldiers” and newspapers, with unanimity, invariably described the parachute volunteers as “hard as nails” representing the toughest and smartest soldiers in the Canadian Army.[45]

One journalist wrote, “They are good, possibly great soldiers, hard, keen, fast-thinking and eager for battle,” while another asserted that they were “Canada’s most daring and rugged soldiers … daring because they’ll be training as paratroops: rugged because paratroops do the toughest jobs in hornet nests behind enemy lines.”[46] Others painted a picture of virtual supermen. One writer invited his readers to “Picture men with muscles of iron dropping in parachutes, hanging precariously from slender ropes, braced for any kind of action … these toughest men who ever wore khaki.”[47] Another simply explained that “your Canadian paratrooper is an utterly fearless, level[-]thinking, calculating killer possessive of all the qualities of a delayed-action time bomb.”[48]

But it had not always been that way. Initially, the senior generals had rejected the need for Canadian paratroops, citing a lack of role and purpose for such specialized troops in the Canadian context. However, by the spring of 1942, both the British and Americans fully embraced the concept of airborne forces. And, as the tide of the war began to swing in favour of the Allies, the focus quickly swung from defence to offence. And nothing embodied raw, offensive, aggressive action more than paratroopers. Very quickly, airborne troops became a defining component of a modern army. Not to be left out, senior Canadian military commanders quickly reversed their earlier reservations and recommended the establishment of a parachute battalion to J.L. Ralston, the minister of National Defence (MND). The minister readily agreed and on July 1, 1942, the Canadian War Cabinet Committee approved the formation of a parachute unit, namely 1 Cdn Para Bn.

The unit’s training was in many ways innovative for the time and exceeded the challenges faced by other combat troops. Greater demands were placed on the individual soldier for leadership, weapon handling, and navigation. Orders for exercises and later operations were always given to all ranks, so that regardless of the circumstances of a parachute drop everyone had an understanding of the mission and so would be able to execute the necessary tasks whether or not officers or senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were present. As such, the unit placed an exorbitant emphasis on courage, physical fitness, tenacity, and particularly on individual initiative.

With no domestic defence role in Canada, the unit was offered up to the commander of Home Forces in England. The British quickly accepted the offer and the government announced in March 1943 that 1 Cdn Para Bn would be attached to the 3rd Parachute Brigade, as part of the 6th Airborne Division. For the remainder of the war the battalion fought as part of a British formation. It established a remarkable record. The battalion never failed to complete an assigned mission, nor did it ever lose or surrender an objective once taken. The Canadian paratroopers were among the first Allied soldiers to land in occupied Europe, the only Canadians who participated in the “Battle of the Bulge” in the Ardennes, and by the end of the war, they had advanced deeper into Germany than any other Canadian unit. Unquestionably, the paratroopers of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, at great cost and personal sacrifice, pion­eered a new innovative form of warfare and demonstrated agility of thought and action, as well as an unrivalled warfare spirit in their daring assaults behind enemy lines. They were disbanded on September 30, 1945, at Niagara-on -the-Lake .

Interestingly, in July 1942, at the same time as 1 Cdn Para Bn was established, the Canadian War Cabinet authorized a second “parachute” unit, designated the 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion (2 Cdn Para Bn). The name of this unit was misleading, however. It was not a parachute battalion at all, but rather a commando unit. The designation was assigned for security reasons to cover the true nature of its operational mandate.[49] On May 25, 1943, the name was changed to reflect this. It was re-designated the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion and it represented the Canadian element of the joint U.S./Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF).[50]

Nonetheless, its genesis originated in England with Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) and Prime Minister Churchill’s personal support. The original concept, code-named Operation Plough, was of a guerrilla force capable of operations in Norway to attack the hydroelectric and heavy water plants in that country, in order to disrupt the German war industry and the Nazi atomic weapons program.[51] Some thought was also put to using the force to destroy the Ploesti oil fields in Romania and hydroelectric facilities in Italy. In all, the planners reasoned that in destroying any of these targets a hard-hitting raiding force would not only damage Germany’s vital war industry, it would also tie up German forces required to protect facilities and chase down the guerrilla force.[52]

The Americans accepted the project and Prime Minister Churchill and Lord Mountbatten very quickly convinced the Canadians to participate as well. As a result, a U.S./Canadian brigade-sized formation was created, with Americans and Canadians serving side by side, wearing the same American uniform, in a military command that was completely integrated. At any given moment, it was impossible to differentiate Canadian from American and vice versa. Each had officers commanding troops of the other nation. At inception, the Canadians contributed 697 all ranks to the formation, representing approximately a quarter of the total number of troops.[53]

As was the case with 1 Cdn Para Bn, the Canadian Army took their commitment seriously and attempted to pick the best soldiers possible for this unique endeavour. Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the American commander of the FSSF, made it clear that he preferred that Canadian volunteers be chosen in the “lower ranks between 18 and 45 [years old], physically rugged and mentally agile, physically able and willing to take parachute training.”[54] It became obvious to everyone concerned that superior physical fitness, experience, maturity, and youth were the cornerstones on which the FSSF would be forged.[55] In addition, Frederick also stressed that it was imperative that each man be able to work efficiently independently or in small groups, regardless of the tactical situation or operational theatre. Ross Munro, the renowned Canadian war reporter, noted that the First Special Service Force “will be a continental edition of commandos of the British Army.” He added, “In selecting the men to make it up, emphasis will be placed on ‘youth, hardness and fitness.’”[56]

As the initial focus of the FSSF was to be sabotage, raiding, and guerrilla-type warfare, the “Forcemen” were trained in a wide spectrum of skills, including parachuting, demolitions, unarmed combat, weapons handling, mountaineering, and arctic warfare. Physical fitness very quickly became the decisive selection tool. Only the hardest of men could successfully complete the training. For instance, members of the FSSF were expected to be “capable of marching [thirty-five ] miles a day across rough country or [ninety] miles without rest.”[57]

But, after all, the force was to be ready to deploy to Norway on December 15, 1942, for an arduous and very dangerous mission. So, even as the FSSF was in the process of establishing itself, its training regime was in overdrive. Upon arrival, members undertook their jump training, which in some cases, was all of forty-eight hours as opposed to the more standard three week course. In August 1942, journalist Don Mason captured the contemporary image of the force that was being created in Helena, Montana, where they were based: “The cream of Canada’s hard-fighting army youth is training in the United States today for ‘aerial commando’ raiding which one day soon will make the German and the Jap think cyclones have struck where they thought they were safe and secure.”[58]

However, by late 1942 it became clear that Operation Plough was not going to happen. There were three major impediments. First, Frederick’s request for the temporary diversion of 750 Lancaster bombers to insert his formation hit an immediate wall. The intractable architect of Britain’s strategic bombing campaign, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal of the Royal Air Force (RAF), responded, “That is our best bomber.” He continued, “if you can show us where Plough can accomplish more in its operation than one thousand Lancasters could do on the bombing runs, we shall consider the plane for your uses.”[59]

Frederick’s next dose of reality occurred when the Combined Operations Command planners briefed him on the Commando raiding program and, more important, the work of Brigadier Colin Gubbins’s Special Operations Executive and their Norwegian sabotage campaign. Although the SOE had never even heard of Operation Plough, or the FSSF for that matter, they, too, had plans for sabotaging most of the targets that the FSSF was theoretically earmarked to destroy. Significantly, Gubbins’s plan required very few aircraft and only two or three Norwegian soldiers for each target.[60]

The final nail in the coffin resulted from Colonel Frederick’s discussion with Major-General Wilhelm von Tangen Hansteen, the commander in chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Hansteen bluntly informed Frederick that the king and prime minister of Norway opposed the concept of Operation Plough. They were concerned that the large-scale destruction of power would create a greater hardship for the Norwegian people than it would for the Germans. Moreover, although they welcomed any assistance in ousting the occupying German forces, they did not wish to do so by destroying the vital industrial infrastructure that was key to Norway’s economic well-being .[61]

And so, with no aircraft, no host country support, and a competing organization that appeared to have a more efficient, more precise, and less resource-intensive means of achieving the same goal, Colonel Frederick quickly realized that Operation Plough was doomed. Any doubt he may have harboured was quickly dashed when he returned to London to meet with Lord Mountbatten prior to his flight to Washington, D.C. The chief of Combined Operations candidly explained to Frederick that Operation Plough was no longer a pressing issue.

By this time, Combined Operations and the whole raiding concept was under siege by the War Office. The Allied effort, particularly as a result of American might and industrial capacity, was slowly beginning to turn the tide of the war. Raiding and subversive activities, never fully supported by the mainstream military, were further marginalized as large-scale conventional operations such as the invasion of Northern Africa took shape.

Moreover, Mountbatten had no means of influencing the release of aircraft and he conceded that SOE provided a more economical means of achieving the desired result, not to mention at a more politically acceptable price for the Norwegian government in exile in London. As such, both men agreed to let Plough die. Frederick quickly sent a message to his formation in Helena, Montana. True to Frederick’s character — it was short and to the point:

Suspend effort on present line.… New plan may be rad­ically different and not concerned with hydroelectric or other industrial installations…. Cease training on hydroelectric installations and … stress general tactical training, to include attack of fortifications, pill boxes, barracks, and troop concentrations. Change in weapons may be necessary to provide greater firepower, so suspend further small arms training pending a decision.[62]

On his return to North America, Colonel Frederick briefed General Marshall, the American army chief of staff. He then left for Montana, unsure whether the FSSF would be continued or scrapped. That decision was now left with the General Staff to get a political decision. By October 8, 1942, the Canadian chief of the General Staff forwarded a telegram to Lieutenant-General McNaughton, Canada’s overseas commander, informing him of the latest turn of events. The Canadians were now waiting for the Americans to make known their intentions prior to articu­lating their continuing support.

However, Major-General Murchie’s missive provided some telling clues. The alternatives considered were:

1 continue with special service force if Americans so desire;

2 amalgamate with 1st Parachute Battalion;

3 disband and disperse personnel; and

4 retain as an ordinary parachute battalion for service and abroad.[63]

Murchie highlighted the negative effects of options B, C, and D. He stated each has the “disadvantage of unwelcome publicity over cancellation of highly publicized special service forces as have B and C over apparent curtailment of our plans for Cdn [Canadian] Parachute Troops.”[64]

In due course, the Americans decided to proceed with the FSSF. On October 17, General Marshall informed Major-General Maurice Pope, the chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., that a decision was reached to retain the FSSF as a special unit.[65] It was now up to the Canadians to confirm their continued participation.

Although a will to continue seemed to be present within the military, the ultimate decision was the purview of the politicians.[66] As such, the War Cabinet Committee discussed the issue on October 28, 1942. From a Canadian perspective the existence of the “elite” First Special Service Force was considered by the government to be of marginal operational value after its original mission was cancelled. The Minutes of the War Cabinet Committee noted, “Though the future employment of the unit was doubtful, beyond its existence as a ‘stand-by ’ force, acceptance of the U.S. proposal [continue unit’s existence for special operations] was recommended as a token of intimate co-operation between the two countries.”[67]

With its existence guaranteed — at least for the time being — the question became: what was its role? FSSF became, in many ways, a highly specialized infantry, capable of a wide range of operations in virtually any terrain. In August 1943, the FSSF participated in the assault on Kiska Island. As the Japanese had already withdrawn from the Aleutians, the FSSF was quickly returned to the mainland and prepared for operations in Italy. Here the force made a name for itself because of its successful assault on Monte La Difensa, a seemingly impregnable German defensive position on the top of a 945 metre (3,100 feet) high mountain. Up until that time, the Germans had repelled numerous Allied attacks and, thus, delayed the advance toward the Gustav Line, the main German defensive line, and Rome, which lay beyond. On December 3, 1943, by a daring night assault that entailed climbing up the rear cliffs of the mountain, which the Germans considered impassable, the FSSF successfully captured the summit. However, the assault and subsequent struggle to maintain their hold over the saucer-shaped mountain top and extend their grip to the adjacent Monte La Remetanea inflicted a terrible toll on the formation. In the aftermath of the battle, the FSSF would never reach its former level of specialized capability or personnel. Reinforcements were simply pulled directly from normal reinforcement pools and given basic training on weapons and tactics.

Nonetheless, the FSSF reinforced its reputation at Anzio in February 1944, where, despite their light armament and only approximately 1,200 all ranks, they held an extended portion (thirteen kilometres) of the vital Mussolini Canal sector. Through aggressive night raiding, they struck fear into the enemy, who believed they were facing up to a small division. The German soldiers were so terrified by the FSSF raids that they nick-named them the “Black Devils.” In the subsequent breakout phase, the FSSF advanced on Rome. Upon its capture, and after a brief period of rest and recuperation, the Force seized two of the Hyères Islands in the Mediterranean Sea, to protect the left flank of the landings on the French Riviera in August 1944. The FSSF then joined the Sixth Army Group in the advance through southern France.

The Canadian component of the FSSF, however, proved to be problematic for the Canadian government. Facing a manning shortage resulting from a conscription crisis, the continuing demands to provide reinforcements for the FSSF, which was difficult to administer and in the context of the dying days of the war was also arguably redundant, prompted the Canadian government to make a simple decision. The time had come to pull the Canadians from the force. As such, the FSSF was disbanded at Menton on December 5, 1944.

The disbandment of the FSSF was not surprising. As the tide of the war shifted in favour of the Allies, who by late 1942 had begun to field large modern armies, SOF evolved to provide specific capabilities not resident with the larger conventional military and perform distinct tasks such as raiding, sabotage, and economy-of -effort missions to tie down enemy forces. These activities were soon eclipsed by tasks such as strategic reconnaissance and unconventional warfare. But even at that, the Allied strategy had become a very attritional conventional approach, much akin to a large steamroller simply flattening the opposition before it. As such, the precision and special capabilities provided by SOF were neither required nor appreciated by most senior military commanders.

In the end, despite the overall success and value of special operations, SOF never received full acceptance from the larger military community.[68] The irregular nature of their tactics, the unconventional, if not rakish nature of the operators, who were often seen as lacking discipline and military decorum, as well as the almost independent status of the SOF organizations, were alien and distasteful to the more traditional and conservative-minded military leadership. Not surprisingly, at the end of the war, as already noted, most SOF organizations were disbanded.

Canada was no different. In fact, Lieutenant-General McNaughton provided a clear picture of his perception of SOF. “I have watched with interest the organization here [in England] of such special units as Commandos, Ski Battalions and Paratroops,” he noted. He concluded, “The cycle is always the same — initial enthusiasm which is very high, drawing good officers and men from regular units, distracting and unsettling others, and upsetting the units’ organization.” As a result, he clearly stated his opposition to the formation of such units.[69]

Not surprisingly then, as noted, all Canadian SOF units were disbanded by September 1945. However, a brief breath of air seemed to rekindle the flames of a national SOF capability in 1947. Former members of the SOE, FSSF and 1st Cdn Para Bn developed a plan to resurrect a distinct Canadian SOF entity. Their methodology was as shadowy as the unit they intended to build.

The long, costly global struggle had taken its toll and a debt-ridden and war-weary government was intent on creating a post-war army that was anything but extravagant. Notwithstanding the military’s achievements during the war, the Canadian government articulated two clear requirements for its peacetime army. First, it was to consist of a representative group of all arms of the service. Second, its primary purpose was to provide a small but highly trained and skilled professional force that in time of conflict could expand and train the citizen soldiers who would fight that war. Within this framework, SOF had no relevance.

As the army worked feverishly at demobilizing and at the same time creating the structure for the post-war Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the commanding officer of the small Canadian Parachute Training Centre in Shilo, Manitoba, became instrumental in the next phase of Canadian SOF.[70] He selectively culled the ranks of the disbanded 1 Cdn Para Bn, which also included those from the FSSF. Quite simply, he chose the best from the pool of personnel who had decided to remain in the active force to act as instructors and staff for his training establishment.

Devoid of any direction from army headquarters, the CO and his staff focused on making contacts and keeping up to date with the latest airborne developments. These prescient efforts were soon to be rewarded. It was the perpetuation of links with Canada’s closest allies, as well as the importance of staying abreast of the latest tactical developments in modern warfare, specifically air-transportability , that provided the breath of life that airborne and SOF advocates were searching for.

Not surprisingly, Canadian commanders were looking abroad for the way ahead in the post-war environment. In 1947, a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) study revealed that British peacetime policy was based on training and equipping all infantry formations to be air-transportable . Discussions with allies quickly ascertained that both the British and Americans would welcome an airborne establishment in Canada that would be capable of filling in the “gaps in their knowledge” — specifically in areas such as the problem of standardization of equipment between Britain and the United States, and the need for experimental research into cold weather conditions. To its allies, Canada was the ideal intermediary.

Canadian military leaders quickly realized that co-operation with their closest defence partners would allow the country to benefit from an exchange of information on the latest defence developments and doctrine. For the airborne and SOF advocates, a test facility would allow the Canadian military to stay in the game. In the end, for the sake of efficiency of manpower and resources, NDHQ directed that the parachute training and research functions reside in a single Canadian joint army/air training centre. As a result, on August 15, 1947, the Joint Air School (JAS), in Rivers, Manitoba, was established.

The JAS became the “foot in the door.” It was responsible for the retention of skills required for airborne and, with some ingenuity, special operations, for both the army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). More important, the JAS, which was renamed the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre (CJATC) on April 1, 1949, provided the seed from which a SOF organization would eventually grow.[71]

The hidden agenda of the airborne advocates quickly took root. Once the permanent structure of the army was established in 1947, they quickly pushed to expand the airborne capability within the JAS by submitting a proposal in the spring for a Canadian special air service (SAS) company.[72] This new organization was to be an integral sub-unit of the army component of the JAS with a mandate of filling army, inter-service , and public duties such as army/air tactical research and development; demonstrations to assist with army/air training; airborne firefighting; search and rescue; and aid to the civil power.[73] Its development, however, proved to be quite different, as its name implies.

The initial proposal for the special sub-unit prescribed a clearly defined role. The army, which sponsored the establishment of the fledgling organ­ization, portrayed the SAS Company’s inherent mobility as a definite asset to the public at large for domestic operations. A military appreciation written by its proponents argued the need for the unit in terms of its potential benefit to the public. It explained that the specially trained company would provide an “efficient life and property[-]saving organization capable of moving from its base to any point in Canada in ten to fifteen hours.”[74] Furthermore, the Canadian SAS Company was framed as critical in working in support of the RCAF air search/rescue duties required by the International Civil Aviation Organization agreement.

The proposed training plan further supported this image. The training cycle consisted of four phases broken down as follows: 1) tactical research and development (parachute related work and field[-]craft skills); 2) airborne firefighting; 3) air search and rescue; and 4) mobile aid to the civil power (crowd control, first aid, military law).[75] Conspicuously absent was any mention of commando or specialist training, which the organization’s name suggested. After all, the Canadian SAS Company was actually titled after the British wartime Special Air Service, which earned a reputation for daring commando operations behind enemy lines.

In September 1947, the request for approval for the sub-unit was forwarded to the deputy chief of the General Staff. Significantly, it now had two additional roles added to it — public service in the event of a national catastrophe; and provision of a nucleus for expansion into parachute battalions. However, the proposal also noted that the SAS Company was required to provide the manpower for the large programme of test and development that was underway by the Tactical Research and Development Wing, as well as demonstration teams for all demonstrations within and outside the CJATC.[76]

As support for the sub-unit grew, so too did its real identity. An assessment of potential benefits to the army included its ability to “keep the techniques employed by [British] SAS persons during the war alive in the peacetime army.”[77] Although this item was last in the order of priority in the list, it soon moved to the forefront.

NDHQ authorized the sub-unit with an effective date of January 9, 1948. Once this was announced, a dramatic change in focus became evident. Not only did its function as a base for the development of airborne units take precedence, but the previously subtle reference to combat fighting and war, specifically its special forces role, leapt to the foreground. The new terms of reference for the employment of the SAS Company, which were confirmed in April, outlined the following duties in a revised priority:

1 provide a tactical parachute company for airborne training. This company is to form the nucleus for expansion for the training of the three infantry battalions as parachute battalions;

2 provide a formed body of troops to participate in tactical exercises and demonstrations for courses at the CJATC and service units throughout the country;

3 preserve and advance the techniques of SAS [commando] operations developed during WW II (1939–1945);

4 provide when required parachutists to back-up the RCAF organizations as detailed in the interim plan for air search and rescue; and

5 aid civil authorities in fighting forest fires and assisting in national catastrophes when authorized by Defence headquarters.[78]

The shift was anything but subtle. The original emphasis on aid to the civil authority and public service–type functions, duties that were attractive to a war-weary and fiscally conscious government, were now re-prioritized if not totally marginalized. It did, however, also represent the army’s initial reaction to the government’s announcement in 1946, that airborne training for the Active Force Brigade Group (regular army) was contemplated and that an establishment to this end was being created.

The new organization was established at company strength — 125 personnel all ranks. It was comprised of one platoon from each of the three regular infantry regiments: the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Royal 22nd Regiment (R22R) and Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). All of the carefully selected members were volunteers, most with wartime airborne experience. They were all bachelors, in superb physical condition, and possessed of initiative, self-reliance , self-discipline , mental agility, and an original approach.

If there was any doubt of the intention of the unit, it was quickly dispelled when Captain Guy D’Artois, a wartime member of the FSSF, and later the SOE, was posted to the sub-unit as its second-in -command. However, due to a difficulty in finding a qualified major, he became the acting officer commanding.[79] After all, his credentials were impeccable. D’Artois had dropped by parachute into Mont Cortevaix in France, then under German occupation, in April 1944. Prior to the sector being liberated, he had trained six hundred partisans, established the Sylla underground, developed an eight-hundred -kilometre secure telephone line; he had also attacked the occupying German troops on numerous occasions within his area of operation. Moreover, he instilled in his French allies a taste for victory. For his feats, D’Artois was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and the French Croix de Guerre avec palme from General Charles de Gaulle. His service with the underground earned him the praise: “Major D’Artois is the embodiment of nobility in figure, strength, and stature, but more importantly, nobility in simplicity and kindness.”[80]

D’Artois trained his sub-unit of carefully selected paratroopers as a specialized commando force. His intractable approach and trademark persistence quickly made him the “absolute despair of the Senior Officers at Rivers [CJATC].” Veterans of the SAS Company explained that “Captain D’Artois didn’t understand ‘no.’ He carried on with his training regardless of what others said.” Another veteran recalled that “Guy answered to no one; he was his own man, who ran his own show.”[81]

But the issue was soon moot. At that point, the continued survival of the JAS and its limited airborne and SOF capability, as represented by the Canadian SAS Company, was largely due to a British and American preoccupation with airborne and air-transportable forces in the post-war period. This was based on a concept of security established on smaller standing forces with greater tactical and strategic mobility. In essence, possession of paratroopers represented the nation’s ready sword. This was critical in light of the looming 1946 Canada/U.S. Basic Security Plan (BSP), which imposed on Canada the requirement to provide one airborne/air-transportable brigade, and its necessary airlift, as its share of the overall continental defence agreement. By the summer of 1948, the SAS Company represented the total sum of Canada’s operational airborne and SOF capability. Clearly, some form of action was required.

As a result, the Chief of the General Staff directed that training for one battalion of infantry for airborne/air-transported operations be completed by April 1, 1949. After all, the BSP dictated that by May 1, 1949, the Canadian government be capable of deploying a battalion combat team prepared to respond immediately to any actual Soviet lodgement in the Arctic, with a second battalion available within two months, and an entire brigade group within four months.[82] This was the death knell for the Canadian SAS Company.

The Canadian Army was now finally moving toward its airborne/air-transportable active brigade group, which was titled the Mobile Striking Force (MSF). Its effect on the Canadian SAS Company was devastating. The respective highly trained SAS platoons provided the training staff for each of the regular force infantry regiments (i.e., RCR, R22R, PPCLI) that rotated through the JAS for parachute qualification, and upon completion returned to their parent regiments to provide an experienced airborne cadre for each of these regular force infantry regiments. The slow dissolution of the Canadian SAS Company was formalized by the CGS when he announced that the sub-unit would not be reconstituted upon the completion of airborne conversion training by the R22R, which represented the last unit of the three active force infantry regiments to undertake it.

The actual disbandment was so low-key that no official date exists. Its personnel just melted away. Nonetheless, the SAS Company served a critical function in Canadian airborne and SOF history. It was the “bridge” that linked 1 Cdn Para Bn and the three infantry battalions that conceptually formed an airborne brigade (i.e., the MSF). In so doing, it perpetuated the airborne spirit and kept the requisite parachute skills alive. In also perpetuated, albeit briefly, the concept of a selected, highly trained commando force capable of special operations in keeping with the SOE and SAS traditions of WWII.

The nation’s SOF lineage went into a hiatus at this point. Neither the existence of the MSF or its successor the Defence of Canada Force represented a SOF capability. Arguably, neither even provided a real airborne capability for that matter.

As always, external factors influenced internal organizational shifts. By the early sixties, the notion of an army rapid reaction and special forces capability gathered momentum, largely fuelled by the American involvement in Vietnam. In 1966, Lieutenant-General Jean Victor Allard, the new commander of Force Mobile Command (FMC — i.e., Canadian Army), decided that the Canadian Army would develop a similar capability. Specifically, he aimed to have a completely air-portable unit, with all its equipment deployed and in the designated operational theatre in as quickly as forty-eight hours. Therefore, on May 12, 1966, the MND announced, “FMC [will] include the establishment of an airborne regiment whose personnel and equipment [can] be rapidly sent to danger zones.”

For the army commander, the new airborne regiment represented flexibility and a higher order of professionalism and soldiering. The army commander clearly believed that “this light unit is going to be very attractive to a fellow who likes to live dangerously, so all volunteers can go into it.” His creation was to be open to all three services and manned exclusively by volunteers. “We intend,” he asserted, “to look at the individual a little more rather than considering the unit as a large body of troops, some of whom might not be suited for the task.”[83]

In the spring of 1966, General Allard, now the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), took the next step and discussed the formation of what he fondly labelled the new “airborne commando regiment.” Colonel Don H. Rochester was appointed as the commander-designate and he was given a further year to refine the “concept of operations,” organization, and structure. The prospects seemed unlimited. The “exciting thing about General Allard’s concept,” recalled Rochester, “was that this unit was to be radically different. Except for aircraft, it was to be self-contained , with infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, signals, and supporting administration.” Furthermore, he explained, “all were to be volunteers and so well trained in their own arm or service that they could devote their time to specialist training.”[84]

The Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) was officially established on April 8, 1968.[85] It consisted of an airborne headquarters and signal squadron (eighty personnel), two infantry airborne commandos (278 personnel each), an airborne field battery (eighty personnel capable of providing two three-gun troops of pack howitzers, or two groups of six medium (82 mm) mortars), an airborne field squadron (eighty-one personnel), and an airborne service commando (i.e., combat service support and administration — eighty-nine personnel).

The regiment’s mandate was impressive if not over-optimistic . The Cdn AB Regt was required to be capable of performing a variety of tasks, which included: the defence of Canada; the U.N. “stand-by ” role; peacekeeping operations; missions in connection with national disasters; “Special Air Service”–type missions; coup de main tasks in a general war setting; and responsibility for parachute training in the CAF. The respective Canadian Forces organizational order (CFOO) stated, “the role of the Canadian Airborne Regiment is to provide a force cap­able of moving quickly to meet any unexpected enemy threat or other commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces.”[86] In addition, the army commander, Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson, ordered the Cdn AB Regt planning team to visit both the U.S. Special Forces Center, as well as the British SAS Regiment to gather the “necessary stimulus and factual data upon which to develop your concept.”[87] Moreover, he directed that an element of the regiment must be proficient at: HALO [High Altitude Low Opening] team parachute descents; deep penetration patrols; underwater diving; obstacle clearance and laying of underwater demolitions; mountain climbing; and special service forces–type team missions.[88]

Although outwardly a conventional airborne regiment, it was clear that the Cdn AB Regt, both officially, in accordance with its CFOO, and through direction given by the CAF chain of command, was intended to be capable of special operations. The emphasis on SOF-like capability was also enshrined in the operational concept, as well as in the later doctrinal manual, CFP 310 (1) Airborne — The Canadian Airborne Regiment . Under the heading “Special Operations,” a long list of tasks was included that were clearly special forces–like in nature. Specifically, the document stated that the

Canadian Airborne Regiment is to be prepared to carry out the following operations for which it is specially trained: disruption of lines of communications; destruction of critical installations; psychological warfare operations; special intelligence tasks; recovery tasks; deception operations; internal security operations; counter-guerilla operations; and support of indigenous paramilitary forces.[89]

The emphasis on special operations was not lost on the Cdn AB Regt’s leadership, which focused at times almost exclusively on daring, direct-action , commando-like raids. Moreover, as a number of former commanding officers noted, if something happened (e.g., a terrorist incident), they knew they would get the call, so they attempted to train individuals in the necessary skills required for special operations.

The quality of the original individuals was incontestable. Official recruiting themes stressed the superior attributes of the new genre of warrior. They emphasised the fact that the new paratrooper had to be an excellent athlete, an expert at small arms, and a survival specialist. Furthermore, they underscored the necessity of their soldiers being robust, courageous, and capable of a high level of endurance.

Not surprisingly, the Cdn AB Regt received a high percentage of the more ambitious, determined, and energized individuals in the CAF. They skimmed the cream of the army. Only experienced officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were accepted. All riflemen within the commandos were required to be qualified to the rank of corporal. This meant that they had previously served within a regular rifle battalion. As a result, they were already competent and experienced in the basic drills of soldiering. Equally important, they were, on the whole, older and, normally, more mature. This allowed the regiment to direct its training efforts toward specialized training such as mountain and pathfinder operations, patrolling courses, skiing, and unarmed combat.

The Cdn AB Regt quickly forged a reputation for undertaking tough, demanding, and dynamic activities. It set new standards for physical fitness and training realism. In consonance with its status as a strategic force capable of global deployment, the regiment travelled throughout Canada and the United States, as well as to exotic locations such as Jamaica, to practise its lethal craft. It conducted training and exchanges with the British SAS, American Rangers and Special Forces, and the French Foreign Legion. By the early seventies, the airborne regiment was at its zenith of power. It had the status of a mini-formation , direct access to the commander of the army, and an increased peacetime establishment of 1,044 all ranks.

The Cdn AB Regt deployed to Montreal, Quebec, during the FLQ Crisis in October 1970, and four years later was dispatched to Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of that island. However, in all cases the regiment functioned solely as conventional infantry. On November 26, 1976, the Cdn AB Regt was moved from Edmonton to Petawawa and its formation status was stripped.[90] It became a simple unit within the newly re-roled special service force (SSF), which provided the army with a relatively light, airborne/air-portable quick reaction force in the demographic centre of the country, one that could be moved quickly to augment either of the flanking brigades (i.e., 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade in the West and 5 Mechanized Brigade in Quebec) for internal security tasks, to the Arctic, or to U.N.-type operations.[91]

The restructuring inflicted additional wounds. The regiment was dramatically pared and it lost both its preferred standing within the army manning and exemptions from the mundane taskings that other units endured. Out of necessity, it began to accept more junior members across the board (i.e., officers, senior NCOs, and men); this resulted in a corollary degradation of capability. Moreover, it became increasingly under attack by senior CAF leaders, who were not favourable to “special soldiers,” particularly during a period of constantly shrinking defence budgets.

Adding to the frustrations of the members of the Cdn AB Regt was the fact that despite the regiment’s CFOO and international stand-by status, it was never deployed. Senior CAF leadership argued that to deploy the regiment would strip Canada of its strategic reserve. More realistically, the problem centred around the make-up of the airborne unit itself. It lacked the necessary mobility (i.e., armoured and wheeled vehicles) as well support capability to deploy for extended periods of time. As a result, the army command deemed that it was easier to send conventional units to do the operations, which were all conventional in nature anyway.

Downsizing of the regiment continued, further degrading both the status and capability of the Cdn AB Regt, with the result that it was reduced to battalion status in 1992. Nonetheless, in December of that year, the Cdn AB Regt deployed to Somalia on a U.N. Chapter VII operation, or, in simpler terms, a peace-making operation, under Security Council Resolution 794. Unfortunately, the Cdn AB Regt experienced disciplinary problems in theatre that detracted from their actual performance.[92] The regiment pacified its sector in less than three months, earning the praise of Hugh Tremblay, the director of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation in Somalia, who stated to all who would listen, “If you want to know and to see what you should do while you are here in Somalia, go to Belet Huen, talk to the Canadians, and do what they have done, emulate the Canadians and you will have success in your humanitarian relief sector.”[93]

Nonetheless, the mission was ultimately redefined in the media and the public consciousness as a failure, due to the poor leadership and the criminal acts of a few. The inexplicable and lamentable torture killing of Shidane Arone, a Somali national caught stealing within the regiment lines, became the defining image of the Cdn AB Regt’s operation in Africa. The public outcry and criticism of the Department of National Defence (DND) as a result of the attempted cover-up at NDHQ, and later revelations of hazing videos within the Cdn AB Regt, created a crisis of epic proportions, and senior political and military decision-makers desperately sought a quick and easy solution to their troubles. They swiftly found one. During an official press release on the afternoon of January 23, 1995, David Collenette, the MND, announced, “although our senior military officers believe the regiment as constituted should continue, the government believes it cannot. Therefore, today under the authority of the National Defence Act, I have ordered the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.”[94]

The Cdn AB Regt represented Canada’s only capability to conduct special operations from 1968 to 1993. A widespread feeling, by former members of the Cdn AB Regt was captured by Brigadier General Jim Cox. “In our hearts,” he revealed, “we equated ourselves with the SAS and the SF [Special Forces] in the United States.”[95] In the end, although the regiment did not possess all the characteristics of a pure SOF organization, especially toward the latter years of its existence, it did have both the official mandate and the implicit understanding of the senior CAF leadership that it would be the entity that conducted special operations if required. Moreover, the Cdn AB Regt did practise direct action (DA)– and strategic reconnaissance (SR)–type tasks. In addition, it regularly exercised and conducted small-unit exchanges with SOF organizations in the United States and Britain. In the end, it filled an important position in Canada’s SOF history.

* * *

Even before the Cdn AB Regt was disbanded, the genesis of Canada’s true contemporary SOF capability began to germinate. A fundamental shift in the perception of the nature of the threats to Western industrialized nations erupted in the late 1960s. Political violence, or, more accurately, terrorism, became recognized as a significant “new” menace. Bombings, kidnapping, murders, and the hijacking of commercial aircraft became frequent occurrences, exploding onto the world scene seeming out of nowhere. Not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe, countries descended into a state of violence, as both home-grown and international terrorists waged violent campaigns that recognized no borders or limits. The murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, West Germany, became one of the defining images of the crisis, as did the 1975 terrorist assault on the headquarters of OPEC in Vienna, Austria.[96]

But the problem went beyond a spillover of Mid-East conflict and politics. In Germany, groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang (or Red Army Faction), waged violent terrorist campaigns that resulted in death and destruction. Holland was besieged by Moluccan terrorists, and Britain struggled with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Northern Ireland question. Even in North America, terrorism raised its ugly head. The Americans saw the growth of radical groups such as the Weathermen, the New World Liberation Front, and the Black Panther Party, to name but a few.

In Canada, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) began a reign of terror that culminated in the October Crisis of 1970. In addition, foreign terrorists imported their political struggles and launched attacks against targets in Canada. A few examples include the storming of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa by three Armenian men (Armenian Revolutionary Army) on March 12, 1985; the paralyzing of the Toronto public transit system on April 1, 1985, as a result of a communiqué sent by a group identifying itself as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of our Homeland, in which they threatened death to passengers of the transit system; and the downing of an Air India flight off the coast of Ireland on June 23, 1985. This act, which killed 329 people, was the result of a bomb that was planted prior to its departure from Toronto’s Pearson International Airport.

Not surprisingly, like other countries around the world, Canada decided it needed a counterterrorist (CT) capability of its own.[97] Its first attempt was to create the Hostage and Rescue Patrol (HARP) under the auspices of the RCMP in 1982. The small, twenty-five-man team was well-trained by foreign SOF personnel, but, unfortunately, a bureaucratic failure to reach a suitable administrative arrangement for the force scuttled the project. The RCMP wanted the operators to do tours of three months in Ottawa and then one and a half months back in their home precincts. The members wanted a permanent posting to Ottawa so they could move their families. In the end, no agreement could be reached and the program was shut down.

Three years later, in 1985, following a number of high-profile terrorist acts committed on Canadian soil, specifically the attack on the Turkish Embassy, the Government of Canada could delay no longer. It was time to establish a CT force of its own. The initial discussion of whether the new CT force should be based in the military or the police became a struggle between the CDS and the RCMP commissioner. Neither wanted the responsibility of creating or owning the force. The commissioner of the RCMP felt the proposed entity was more a military commando unit than a police organ­ization. The CDS was of the mind that the type of individual created in such an organization could be problematic. He feared that once they were done their tour of service they would invariably become mercenaries of one sort or another, and he did not want that type of fallout. As a result, he did not want that type of unit within his Canadian Armed Forces.[98]

In the end, the CDS had his way because the Solicitor General believed the CT task was a policing function. As a result, the following year, in 1986, the RCMP created the seventy-five-member strong Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) as Canada’s first hostage rescue (HR)/CT organization. The unit quickly established itself, drawing its personnel from existing trained police emergency response teams (ERT) from across the country. They received comprehensive training, much of it initially from a number of international CT experts. Although SERT was constantly busy, it was never deployed for an actual mission.

By the early 1990s, the continuing efforts of the federal government to combat its enormous deficit led to continuing deep budget cuts to all government departments. The RCMP was not immune. Faced with financial constraints, the requirement to pay overtime to members of the SERT, a force that had been in existence for years but had not yet deployed, as well as the requirement to continually rely on military airlift and other support provided the impetus for change. Moreover, the military in the post–Cold War era was also amenable to taking on new roles.[99] The deputy minister at the time, Bob Fowler, was instrumental in pushing for the DND to take on the role. And so, in February 1992, senior governmental, RCMP, and DND decision-makers decided to transfer the HR/CT responsibilities from the RCMP SERT to a military organization. As such, JTF 2 was born.

The challenge for the unit was immense. It had to select and train its personnel, and establish a new unit and be operational by April 1, 1993. The tight timelines meant that the first CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Romses, had little choice but to utilize the RCMP SERT model for pre-selection , selection, and qualification standards. The RCMP SERT was composed of two distinct entities. Its Dwyer Hill Training Centre was run by an RCMP inspector who was responsible for the infrastructure and training. However, the command and control of the actual SERT was vested in another RCMP officer. Romses, however, would be responsible for both the operational and training functions.

The RCMP trained the first group of JTF 2 personnel. The newly trained military members now became the training cadre, and from the second serial onward, took control of instructing the remainder of the military personnel. Increasingly, the RCMP SERT members maintained less and less responsibility.

Timelines were tight, but JTF 2 was ready for the April 1 stand-up date. A formal handover parade and mess dinner were held at Dwyer Hill on March 31, 1993, to mark the handover of the HR/CT role from the RCMP SERT to the CAF JTF 2. The following day, the unit was already undertaking operational tasks.

From the beginning, the CO realized that the unit would have to evolve. The RCMP SERT had been content to remain strictly a police HR type organization. Initial time constraints meant that JTF 2 had to take on that paradigm and the police culture that accompanied it. However, with the “black” (i.e., CT) role came the issue of utility. How often would it be used? Romses realized this could also create retention issues. Moreover, for JTF 2 to provide utility to the greater CAF a “green” role (i.e., a traditional military SOF role, such as direct action and strategic reconnaissance) would need to be developed.

As a result, the unit began to evolve in the mid to late-1990s , developing a more typical military SOF orientation and capability; however, HR/CT remained JTF 2’s primary focus. In 1994, the CDS approved growth for JTF 2, as well as a transition from a pure “black” CT role to other special operations tasks. As a result, the unit undertook tasks around the globe that gave its members both experience in foreign locations, and exposure to senior military and civilian decision makers.

Although the unit was expanding to include a green component, as already mentioned, its focus was still almost exclusively on black skills. A green phase during initial training was largely an introduction to fieldcraft for the non-combat arms volunteers. Within the unit, there was also tension between those who favoured retaining the exclusive black role and police culture, and those who wanted to push JTF 2 to be more akin to a military organization such as the British SAS and U.S. Delta Force. External events provided the catalyst for change.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, millions watched their television screens mesmerized as events unfolded in New York City. In the early morning hours, a passenger jet had ploughed into the top stories of the World Trade Center (WTC) in the financial core of the city. As most were trying to absorb what happened, a second large commercial airliner came into view and slammed into the twin tower of the WTC. It would only be a short time later that both towers collapsed onto themselves and crumpled to the ground, killing all those inside. A third aircraft slammed into the Pentagon, killing and injuring hundreds more, and a fourth hijacked jetliner, heading for Washington, D.C., slammed into the ground in Pennsylvania, short of its objective, failing on its mission due to the bravery of its passengers. In total, almost three thousand people were killed in the attacks .

Within days, it became clear that the Americans would take military action to strike at the terrorists who planned and conducted the attack and those that supported and abetted them. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization, sheltered in Afghanistan by Mullah Omar and his Taliban government, quickly became the centre of attention. Not surprisingly, the Americans, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), paramilitary forces, and US SOF, in conjunction with the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban resistance movement, quickly launched an offensive to oust the Taliban and capture bin Laden and his associates.

The Canadians quickly moved to support their American allies. The CAF mobilized to send ships, aircraft, and ground forces in support of the U.S. mission, titled Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Part of the CAF force package was a special operations task force (SOTF) that deployed as part of OEF and was under operational control of the American commander of the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command. Their tasks included direct action, special reconnaissance, and sensitive site exploitation.[100]

The JTF 2 based SOTF was deployed in theatre from December 2001 to November 2002.[101] At the time, JTF 2 was largely an unknown quantity and its role in theatre was initially marginalized. “They were curious because they [Americans] didn’t really know us,” conceded one member of the Task Force. He explained, “At the beginning, people said, ‘Who the f--- is JTF2?’”[102]

However, it took only one mission to demonstrate their skill sets, and very quickly they became a force of choice. According to U.S. military officials, the JTF 2 SOTF had conducted “[forty-two ] reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as [twenty-three ] direct action missions.”[103] Tasks included “snatching senior Taliban officials,” manning high-altitude observation posts, and combing mountain cave complexes.[104] Their performance earned them the trust and respect of the U.S. commanders in theatre. As stated earlier, the American SOF commanders at first were, quite frankly, reluctant to use them. By the end of the tour, the JTF 2 SOTF had become the designated coalition theatre direct-action reserve force, with American sub-units allocated to it under tactical control (normally Rangers or 82nd Airborne and aviation assets). In the end, the JTF 2 SOTF executed more missions than any other coalition SOF force assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force — South (CJSOTF-S ).

In fact, U.S. Navy commander Kerry Metz, director of operations for CJSOTF-S , told Congress, “We were fortunate to have the finest special operations … and we challenged our operators to conduct missions in some of the most hostile environments ever operated in.” He explained, “We had special reconnaissance teams operating in the mountains of Afghanistan above 10,000 feet for extended periods without resupply.”[105] The CJSOTF-S commander, Rear Admiral Bob Harward, simply acknow­ledged, “his JTF 2 team was his first choice for any ‘direct action’ mission.”[106]

Unquestionably, JTF 2’s participation in OEF was a critical turning point in its evolution and CANSOF history. JTF 2’s participation, or, more important, impact in theatre bolstered Canadian credibility. “We had to shoulder our way into the international SOF community,” explained Colonel Clyde Russell, the CO of JTF 2 at the time, “but once we got our seat at the table, now we can hold our own.”[107]

Participation in OEF also finalized the debate back at Dwyer Hill in Ottawa. JTF 2 was now a Tier 1 SOF organization. One JTF 2 detachment commander explained, “9/11 put us full throttle into the warfighting game and allowed us to pass a number of hurdles that would have taken years in a peacetime environment.”

Lieutenant-General Michael Day, one of the Canadian OEF SOTF commanders and a former commander of Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM) assessed, “We progressed the unit in matur­ity decades that first year [in Afghanistan].”

Quite simply, the operation planted the seeds of CANSOF growth and maturation. “It allowed us to move into a kinetic mode,” asserted Day, “it showed the connection of the counterterrorism/hostage rescue piece to the expeditionary capability.” It not only revitalized the unit, but it also revealed a very potent international capability.[108]

“Stepping out onto the world stage was our first big show,” commented Colonel Russell. “From a strategic perspective,” he added, “it opened the eyes of the grownups [to] how SOF can be used as a bit of a strategic place marker in a crisis.” Russell explained, “we had a small footprint but a large impact. The country got a lot of credit.”

Consistently, CANSOF leadership attest to the fact that JTF 2’s participation in OEF in 2001–2002 was a seminal event for the unit and CANSOF. “9/11 and Afghanistan allowed CANSOFCOM to grow into a mature combat capable force,” explained Lieutenant-General Day, “It was instrumental in shaping our ability to field kinetic forces, which we now use to leverage our ability to shape a theatre.”[109] He concluded, “our first deployment will remain the defining moment of who we are.”

The CANSOF commanders were not the only ones who recognized the importance of JTF 2’s first combat deployment. On December 7, 2004, George Bush, the president of the United States, awarded the JTF 2 component of the CJSOTF-S (later called Task Force K-Bar ) a Secretary of the Navy, Presidential Unit Citation. American officials sent the request for Canadian approval prior to its actual presentation to the CAF members. DND issued a press release the following day to announce the presentation. The Canadian governor general congratulated JTF 2 on the award on December 10, 2004, through a media advisory.

The narrative of the citation read:

For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in Afghanistan from 17 October 2001 to 30 March 2002. Throughout this period, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force — SOUTH/Task Force K-BAR , operating first from Oman and then from forward locations throughout the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan successfully executed its primary mission to conduct special operations in support of the U.S. efforts as delegated to Commander US CENTCOM through the JFSO Component Command JFSOCC to destroy, degrade, and neutralize the TB and AQ leadership and military. During its six month existence, TF K-Bar was the driving force behind myriad combat missions conducted in Combined Joint Operation Area Afghanistan. These precedent[-]setting and extremely high-risk missions included search and rescue, recovery die ops, non-compliant boarding of high interest vessels, special reconnaissance, hydrographic reconnaissance, SSE [Sensitive Site Exploitation], DA missions apprehension of military and political detainees, destruction of multiple cave and tunnel complexes, identification and destruction of several known AQ training camps, explosion of thousands of pounds of enemy ordnance and successful coordination of UW operations for Afghanistan. The sailors, soldiers, [a]irmen, Marines, and coalition partners of CJSOTF (S)/TF K-Bar set an unpre­cedented 100 percent mission success rate across a broad spectrum of special operations missions while operating under extremely difficult and constantly dangerous conditions. They established benchmark standards of professionalism, tenacity, courage, tactical brilliance, and operational excellence while demonstrating superb esprit de corps and maintaining the highest measures of combat readiness.[110]

In the aftermath of the award, the Canadian leadership took the opportunity to heap praise on the shadow warriors. “This citation from the U.S.,” announced Bill Graham, the MND, “signifies the outstanding counterterrorism and special operations capability that has been developed by the Canadian Armed Forces.” He added, “JTF 2 has played a critical role in Canada’s contribution to the war against terrorism and will continue to be an important part of our domestic security.”[111]

Similarly, General Ray Henault, the CDS at the time, asserted, “The presentation of the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation to members of JTF 2 brings important recognition to a group of incredible CAF members whose accomplishments normally cannot be publicly recognized in the interest of national security.”[112] He concluded, “Canadians should be very proud of this specialized Canadian military unit.”[113]

The importance of the mission and the recognition of the CANSOF contribution was also evident in the governmental decision to increase the size and capability of JTF 2. The MND quickly realized the strategic impact, at a relatively low cost, that even a small SOF task force could achieve. As such, he pushed for expansion.[114]

Despite the great effort and incredible results, the JTF 2 initial deployment to Afghanistan ended rather quickly. By late 2002, with the Taliban largely routed and the country entering what appeared to be a period of relative calm, Canada withdrew all of its forces from Afghanistan. However, it returned the following year as a contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. As part of the redeployment, Canadian SOF also maintained a footprint in the form of a Joint Liaison Team-Afghanistan (JLT-A ) in theatre.

But the winds of change were blowing. On December 24, 2004, the Americans requested Canada to deploy another Canadian SOTF as early as possible. The request affirmed that Canada’s previous SOF contribution to OEF in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 “was highly valued by the United States” Moreover, it confirmed “that relatively small numbers of special operations forces exert a disproportionately large operational impact.”

This was no surprise, since JTF 2’s performance had elicited praise from the American ambassador, Paul Cellucci. He publicly stated, “Canada’s elite Tier 1 JTF 2 is as capable as any Tier 1 [s]pecial [f]orces in the world [and it] makes a significant contribution whenever deployed.”[115]

The request was strongly supported by both the CDS, General Rick Hillier, and the deputy minister, W.P.D. Elcock. They explained, “The deployment of Canadian special operations forces to Afghanistan would make evident our ongoing commitment to an active engagement in the Campaign Against Terrorism and it would also demonstrate our direct burden sharing with our closest allies.”

The deployment was also in consonance with ongoing strategic object­ive for the CAF in the global war on terrorism. The deployment would assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing security and stability in the country and in supporting reconstruction activities; it would assist with the elimination of al-Qaeda , the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militants, as continuing terrorist threats to international peace and security; and it would support efforts to address the humanitarian needs of Afghans.

The high-level support was not surprising. After all, the leadership were now well-versed in the strength of the unit. “One of my first visits,” acknowledged General Hillier, “was to Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2), our special forces unit based near Ottawa, no strangers to me after the many operations.” He explained, “JTF 2 troopers are the Olympic athletes of soldiering, our version of gold medalists, taking on the most difficult missions and tasks with a level of skill and professionalism that has earned the respect of special forces units around the world. Like the U.S. Delta Force or the British Special Air Service (SAS), they get the most dangerous and demanding of missions, from hostage rescues to acting as bodyguards for VIPs (like me!) to operating for long periods of time on their own in enemy territory.”[116]

With such endorsement, the Government of Canada authorized the deployment of a JTF 2 SOTF to Afghanistan in support of OEF on June 1, 2005. Its mission was “to conduct combat operations in the Afghanistan theatre of operations (ATO) in support of U.S.-led operation Enduring Freedom for a period of one year.” CANSOF was back at war.

Later that year, a JTF 2 SOTF was back in country supporting OEF. Although originally committed for only a year, the mandate was continually extended, lasting in the end until the end of Canadian operations in Afghanistan in 2011. Their mission, however, remained largely unchanged. General Hillier affirmed that Canadian SOF had established a presence on Afghanistan battlefields and that they were effective disrupting the Taliban leadership.[117] He declared, “What we want to do is take out the [Taliban] commanders who are engaged in orchestrating, facilitating, paying, leading, planning, and driving folks to attack us or attack the Afghans or attack the innocent.” He added, “And our special forces are focused very much on that.… I said, during a recent speech, that we had removed from the battlefield six commanders who were responsible for the deaths of [twenty-one ] Canadian soldiers.” Hillier explained, “Well that’s changed. We’ve removed seven commanders who have been responsible for the deaths of [twenty-seven ] soldiers.”[118]

Canadian scholars have reinforced Hillier’s declarations. A team studying operations in Kandahar Province noted that “insurgent operations in 2007 were increasingly characterized by lack of co-ordination and poor planning, which could be attributed to the growing effectiveness of ISAF’s special operations forces.” They explained:

SOF units from all ISAF contributor nations in the south were pooled for the task of arresting known bomb[-]making cell leaders [and] drug lords, and a legal case [was] prepared for their arrest[.] Canadian (and other ISAF) SOF troops would [then] be deployed to apprehend the suspect. As often as not, if the target was a Tier 1 Taliban leader, he would try to shoot his way out, with predictable results. Consequently, Taliban command-and -control capacity in the south in 2007 was less effective than the previous fall.[119]

In addition, conventional commanders also spoke to the influence CANSOF was exerting in theatre. A Canadian battle group commander noted the impressive effect SOF had on his area of operations in Kandahar.

The SOF strikes had a chilling effect on the Taliban. In one strike they killed an important leader and [sixteen] of his fighters. The Taliban leadership in Kandahar City felt a lot of pressure from SOF. They were moving every day so we saw a reduction in activity. They [Taliban] were being disrupted — they were on the move, on the run.[120]