Читать книгу The Officer's Manual - Buonaparte Napoleon - Страница 9

MAXIM VIII

Оглавление

A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.

NOTE

In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem, indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak, surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.

Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity, but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers, and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune balanced his imprudence.

Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon something; all his arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly – and at the moment of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does not change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he does change them, in presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”

It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.

The Officer's Manual

Подняться наверх