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ОглавлениеPREFACE: THE KASHMIR DISPUTE AND THE CONFLICTS WITHIN CONFLICT ETHNOGRAPHY
Since 1947, the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir have experienced three interstate wars between India and Pakistan (1947–1949, 1965, and 1971), the undeclared Kargil War of 1999, frequent border clashes, and an active antistate armed conflict in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir State that began in 1989 and is ongoing. Pakistan and India consider the greater Jammu and Kashmir region a disputed territory; both claim a historical and cultural right to political rule over its entirety, and both states claim that their sovereignty has been violated by the other’s “occupation” of its territory. After bilateral nuclear tests in 1998, security and policy analysts began to discuss the Kashmir Dispute as more than a regional security problem; they began looking at the contested military Line of Control (LoC), where troops of the Indian and Pakistan armies engage in regular exchanges of heavy artillery and light arms fire, as a potential nuclear flashpoint. Invoking the specter of an outright war between India and Pakistan and the potential for increased regional instability in South and Central Asia, the international community once again turned its attention to Kashmir.
Kashmiris, however, have had their attention on the international community for decades. The phrase “Kashmir is now the most dangerous place on Earth” became a media trope during the Kargil War—and it has endured through the rise of the War on Terror, concerns about the nuclearization of Middle Eastern states like Iraq and Iran, and border tensions between North and South Korea.1 But those reporters, who stood gesturing toward the militarized border with trepidation, were standing in a place where people have lived for more than three generations caught between the gunsights of two opposing armies. People from the Indian Jammu and Kashmir State, Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the diaspora of “overseas Kashmiris,” particularly in London and New York, had worked with United Nations commissions since 1948. They also had been actively involved in documenting human rights abuses by state and paramilitary organizations since 1990. But while the appeal to human rights is relatively uncontroversial, knowing whose rights to champion over decades of oscillating hot and cold war is less so. Which victims should we protect? Against which perpetrators? As the international community became more involved in organizing humanitarian interventions around the world in the post–Cold War era, why the international community intervened to protect the victims of one conflict and not another became part of debates within Kashmiri communities.
In refugee resettlement villages across Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), these debates became especially heated during the late spring of 1999, at the beginning of the Kargil War, when it was discovered that members of jihadist organizations, under the umbrella of the United Jihad Council and working with the Pakistan military, had occupied strategic posts on the Indian side of the LoC. Residents of AJK began preparing for an invasion by Indian troops by evacuating their families and supplying the camouflaged defense bunkers dug into the fields during previous wars and periods of border conflict. During the day, the sounds of gunshots reverberated off the mountains as villages retrained their defense committees. In the city of Muzaffarabad, the wail of ambulances announced the frequent arrival at the government hospital of casualties from the LoC. The atmosphere was tense, because many people believed a full-scale war was imminent. That belief produced both anxiety and hope: anxiety for the inevitable hardship and grief of warfare, and hope that a war would bring the international attention that would at last result in the resolution of the Kashmir Dispute.
Hajji Mohammad Rashid was an elder council member for a refugee village near the LoC whom I visited often during my fieldwork. He could not read, but he watched Pakistani, Indian, and international news programs on satellite TV and listened to the BBC and Voice of America–Urdu on the radio. In the spring of 1999, he was interested in what the American public thought about military interventions that were justified in terms of protecting civilians from widespread state and (un)civil violence, particularly the “humanitarian” military interventions in East Timor and Kosovo. He offered his own perspective as well; he was critical of an overreliance on direct intervention to resolve chronic conflict:
Now the NATO has been dropping bombs on Kosovo. I have seen all these things on the BBC dish. So many people are suffering; it is by the grace of God that something is done. But your people are very modern and depend too much on machines. I think that this bombing would not be necessary now if you had remembered that a free market is not the same thing as a just society.
He shared some thoughts about what did make a just society before talking about the tensions in his own village that accompanied such debates. He was particularly concerned about the number of young men who were joining militant organizations to fight in what they called the “Kashmir Jihad”:
Some people say that we in this village should not call ourselves refugees since we are living in our very own Kashmiri homeland, but what this is, it is the practice of the Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, who said, that “he who steps even over the threshold to provide a moral life for his family, he is a refugee and therefore a defender of his people.” I tell this thing to the young men when they are overtaken by emotion to join the jihād [armed struggle]. I tell them that hijarat [protective migration] is also a sunnat-e-rasūl—an honorable practice of the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him. I tell them, “Become educated, work hard, study Qur’an Sharif, honor your mother by marrying well, educate your children, especially your daughters.” I tell them, “There are many ways to defend human rights and to fulfill your duty to humanity and to your nation.”
Hajji Mohammad Rashid’s attempts to convince young men not to join militant organizations point to three historical transformations in the regional political culture. The first is a change in the terms that people use to talk about their experiences of political violence and to express the value of resettlement and re-creating enduring social ties after periods of warfare and civil conflict. Among displaced Kashmiri Muslims in Pakistan and AJK, the historical response to political violence and to violence-related forced displacement has been the bodily practice of hijarat and the production of the muhājir (one who has done a hijarat, a refugee) as a social and political identity category within the postcolonial nation-state. The experience of political violence in the current conflict, however, is increasingly incorporated into social life through the concept of jihād, with the production of the mujāhid (one who fights in a jihād, a warrior) as a valued political subject.2 A second transformation reflects a concurrent shift in conceptions of sovereignty in Kashmiri political culture that has shifted the terrain of struggle from the territory of Islam to the bodies of Muslim people, a concern that people expressed by referring to the concept of human rights. Finally, there has been a corresponding evolution in how young men become mujāhids; the practice of jihād is increasingly regulated not by Islamic institutions, but by Muslim individuals and refugee families.
CONDUCTING AND PRESENTING ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN A TIME OF WAR
In this book, I investigate these transformations, focusing on the time period of 1947 (when the first refugees from Jammu and Kashmir were displaced into Pakistan) to 2001. I conducted ethnographic research in Kashmiri refugee communities between March 1999 and September 2001. I returned to Pakistan for field visits and archival research in 2003 and early 2005, and then, weeks after I returned to the United States in 2005, a massive earthquake quite literally changed the landscape of AJK. Several of the refugee camps where I had worked slid off the mountainside into the river, and all of their surviving residents were displaced into new camps. I returned to AJK a month after the earthquake and then again in 2006 and 2008. Earthquake relief and reconstruction effort changed the political and economic terrain of AJK as well as its landscape. Many militants refocused their struggle as a “humanitarian jihād,” and the work of international humanitarian and development organizations that came to AJK for the first time opened up new spaces for civil engagement.3
September 2001 became a turning point in the scholarly as well as popular literature on jihadist movements and political Islam; it framed how we examine the “global” and “jihād” in ways that essentialize “Islamic” culture and misunderstand the relationship between Islam as a religious tradition and the social production of Muslims as political actors. By focusing on how Kashmiri Muslim refugees and militants negotiated Islamic and global values before they were widely assumed to be diametrically opposed, I hope to engage readers in this story of how people struggle, in very human and very modern, if discomfiting ways, with the problem of political violence so wrapped into the normality of everyday life as to be almost banal.
It has been my experience that, after presenting a scholarly paper or giving a public lecture, one of the questions will begin, “I appreciate your project to humanize Islamic militants, but. . . .” Such questions initially confounded me, and I’ve learned over the years that it helps if I am forthright about the process by which I came to do this research and eventually to the arguments that I present in this book. So first, I have never aimed to humanize Islamic militants. As I see it, the people who engage in violent politics by any name—militants, mujāhids, jihādīs—are always already human. They are members of communities and, like other people, the question of how they are socialized toward or away from violence (and whether that violence is seen as criminal or is sanctioned) is a core political and cultural question.
Second, I did not set out to study militants at all; I set out to work with refugees and other victims of the Kashmir conflict. I had worked in Indian Jammu and Kashmir State on a humanitarian mission from 1995 to 1996. During that time, I conducted hundreds of interviews with men who had been detained and interrogated during the anti-Indian insurgency. I decided to complete my training as an anthropologist rather than become a professional humanitarian worker because my observations in the detention centers convinced me that peacemaking in the Kashmir region would eventually have to grapple with the ways that experiences of violence have been incorporated into the political cultures of the regions that are a part of the Kashmir Dispute. I knew that I couldn’t work in refugee camps in Pakistan without being willing to engage with militants, but a good field researcher has to be willing to be surprised. It surprised me to discover, for example, that youths from refugee resettlement villages had also become involved in jihadist organizations. I became increasingly uncomfortable with the assumed “deterrent effect of public exposure” in the anthropological literature of political violence.4 I also discovered that public exposure—breaking the silences that obscure political violence—rather than charting a path toward peace actually underpins the social reproduction of political violence as a jihād in Kashmir.
Over several years of fieldwork, I began to understand that “victim” is an unstable political category. It is an easier moral category—and a much more comfortable place to locate compassion than “perpetrator”—but the long history of conflict in the Kashmir region has made many victims and many perpetrators, and many who are both victims and perpetrators. Peacemaking will have to deal not only with the pasts of all of them, but also with all of the parts of their pasts. Peacemaking will also have to engage the transformations of political culture, including the democratization of violence, that are the outcomes of decades of people grappling with normalized violence in the disputed borderlands.
Conduct and Confidentiality in the Ethnography of Armed Conflict
I am often asked how it was possible to conduct research among Islamic militants as a female scholar. In many ways, my gender has been an asset rather an impediment. Azad Jammu and Kashmir is a high-surveillance society and the frontier of an active conflict zone. No one can object to political vigilance in a security zone without bringing suspicion upon himself, but harassment of women is not socially acceptable in a context explicitly circumscribed as “Islamic.” It was possible, therefore, for my interlocutors to critique political surveillance as a transgression of gender propriety and to include me in domestic spaces that are resistant to state oversight. It was in part because I could move in family networks that I was able to learn how Kashmiri refugees negotiate public and domestic spaces and how much the legitimacy of the practice of jihād depends on the family.
Many female anthropologists describe being treated as an “honorary man” in such situations, but I was never an honorary man. My presence as a female researcher was always explicitly discussed, balanced with the fact that I was going to be “a professor” and write “a book.” Several influential elder men and religious leaders who generally do not meet with non-kin women publicly announced that they had decided to speak with me out of a shared “seeking-after-truth,” even if the kinds of knowledge we sought were quite different. I do not, however, wish to imply that the gender of a researcher conveys a right to access. I found that the more my Kashmiri hosts negotiated me into the circumscribed domain of the family, the more a critique of my morality became a part of the state’s political project of surveillance. Eventually, the security agencies’ surveillance of my conduct as a researcher came to focus on “discovering” whether I was providing sexual favors to AJK government officials or local hosts in exchange for their assistance in my field research. That line of investigation illustrated that gender surveillance and political surveillance can each be transmogrified into the other . It also meant that my efforts to conduct myself in a way that was socially acceptable by my host communities’ standards, rather than my gender per se, was what allowed me a continued place in their homes.
There were other ways that my identity allowed me to cultivate ethnographic access in a wide variety of contexts. I did not inherit the restrictions on sociality that come with having a presumed position in the social order, because I don’t have a natal kinship network in Pakistan or Jammu and Kashmir. I found that people were eager to speak with me, because in me they saw access to a broader international public. So, being a non-Muslim Euro-American woman, on the one hand, helped me initiate relationships that granted ethnographic access to the diverse social worlds of Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan. On the other hand, anthropologists sometimes overestimate the extent to which our interlocutors replicate the markers through which we recognize ourselves. I have actually on several occasions during fieldwork been assumed to be a person of South Asian descent. For example, I had difficulty convincing residents of one refugee village that I was angrez (a white foreigner) because someone had seen me in the market and had determined from my bodily comportment that I was likely Muslim, perhaps from an overseas Kashmiri family. Another time, I was detained by the Rawalpindi police on suspicion of being an Afghan prostitute; the evidence against me was that I was “obviously” Afghan and driving an automobile without a male escort.
Unlike discussions of my gender, discussions about other aspects of my identity were rarely conducted in my presence, and I know less about how people resolved their anxieties about who I was. I was told on several occasions by members of militant organizations that they had used their networks to confirm that I had in fact visited members of their organization in Indian prisons when I was doing humanitarian work. Some of my interlocutors expressed a fear that I might not be a real scholar, but rather an intelligence agent for my government. The idea that the hand of the U.S. government might knock on the door of a village in the mountains of Kashmir might sound far-fetched to some readers, but for many Kashmiri refugees the presence of the state in their lives has been felt on their bodies. After 2002 particularly, the visible U.S. military presence in South Asia and the cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani governments on practices of rendition has made the possibility that the U.S. government is now a part of the surveillance network in AJK a commonly accepted belief. These were mere hints that people were worried about how I would use their stories and, thus, also a testament to how much people were willing to risk to be in dialogue with a global public about who they are and who they hope to become.
To members of the various communities in which I worked, some of the stories recounted in this book are well known, and their tellers will be easily recognizable. I also assume that the places and groups with whom I worked are a part of any records that the state’s intelligence services might have made of my research activities. The political situation, however, changes continuously, making it impossible to predict how people will be affected by the future use of their accounts. Markers like where people come from, where they resided when I met them, and where they are now may currently be transparent to some state authorities and obscure to others. Many of the refugees, and militants, whose stories I recount or reference explicitly, declared their intentions to return to their home properties in parts of Jammu and Kashmir administered by India. Several of my interlocutors now live in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Some organizations of which people were members when I met them are now on the terrorist watch lists of various countries. A number of former jihadists now work for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in postearthquake reconstruction efforts or as policy analysts overseas. For these reasons, I have changed all names and most of the specific places mentioned in this text, even though many people said they wanted their names and their stories to be explicitly linked in the publications that would result from my research.
Lies, Secrets, and Conflict Ethnography
In the practice of jihād as an armed struggle, the normative prescription is that it must be organized, conducted, and evaluated publicly; being a mujāhid is an honorable, if difficult, undertaking. On the other hand, people in AJK are well aware of the international equation of jihād and terrorism; the international disapprobation of religiously legitimated violence and the state of insecurity and paranoia about spies made its secretive practice at least potentially legitimate. Certain forms of knowledge production (such as surveys or interviews conducted independently of participant observation) are not good research methods in contexts where dissimulating about one’s objectives, activities, or beliefs is necessary to one’s survival or an integral part of the production of political society. Working in a conflict zone or high-surveillance society makes explicit that which is an inherent part of all ethnographic research—the recognition of both conscious and unconscious misrepresentation as an integral part of social and political life.5 Ethnographic observations of and participation in social processes and relationships makes available to anthropological analysis the production of social and political power through conflict and even dissimulation.
Anthropologists recognize that, when conducting ethnographic research in conflict zones and high-surveillance societies, ethnographers have to make accommodations that include acknowledging limitations on where one can go, what questions can be asked, and what one can eventually write about given the dangers of research and the need to protect our interlocutors.6 This recognition was fundamental to reformulating anthropological research on political violence, but it largely ignored the problem of “open secrets”—information that is widely known, and yet which people claim not to know. The importance of open secrets was a conceptual focus of older sociological writing on the conduct of politics and was recuperated in anthropology by Michael Taussig with the concept of “public secrecy,” which took up the challenge of considering the work that “not knowing” does in processes of political violence.7 What remains, however, is the problem of how one is taught what must be “not known,” because the management of dangerous knowledge is embedded in social relationships.
Despite my years of living and working in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir before I began ethnographic research, and despite a rigorous human subjects review on maintaining the confidentiality and safety of my interlocutors, I had to be taught what constituted dangerous knowledge for them. Indeed, my attention was repeatedly drawn to the ways that people teach each other the things they need to not know in order to go about the work of living, and especially to how women passed and managed dangerous knowledge in domestic spaces. This recognition led to the arguments that I make in this book, and to the theoretical interventions that I outline in the introductory chapter. I thus suggest that conflict research needs to shed analytic light on the practices by which people reproduce dangerous knowledge as public secrets in order to better theorize the social production of all forms of modern political violence. For this reason, I have endeavored to make the moments in which secrets, lies, and uncertainties shaped my research a part of the ethnographic description and interpretive work of this book. By focusing on the social practices of managing dangerous knowledge as an analytic problem, rather than as a methodological one, I first recognized the centrality of the family as the site of social production of jihād among Kashmiri refugees in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.