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148. Prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it resides in the intellect; but it is also classed among the moral virtues, since its object is the direction of human acts to their right end.

149. The moral virtues are those habits that perfect the will and the sensitive appetite with reference to their immediate and respective objects; that is, they are habits concerned with acts as means to the Last End. They make the act good, and make good also him who performs it; and they are thus superior as virtues to the intellectual habits.

150. There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the other moral virtues hinge on them.

151. The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man's affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

152. Causes of Virtues.—The causes of virtue are three: (a) nature, which is the cause of the inchoative intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the theoretical and practical principles that are naturally known, and of the inclinations to virtue that arise from an individual's bodily constitution; (b) practice, which is the cause of perfected intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the good habits that are formed by repeated acts (e.g., knowledge obtained through study, temperance fixed in the character through continued effort); (c) infusion from on high, which is the cause of the virtues that surpass nature (i.e., of the theological virtues and of the moral virtues that are concerned with our acts as ordered to the supernatural).

153. Properties of the Virtues.—From the definition of virtue given above certain properties result.

(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard, it does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden mean.

(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the guidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without the right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four moral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be together. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he who has charity has also all the other infused virtues.

(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees of excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase and decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different species, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.

(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in the life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat changed in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion of the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do not rebel.

154. The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what is not due to one's condition.

155. Without charity one may possess certain other virtues. (a) Thus, one may have the natural or acquired moral virtues, as is the case with many pagans, but such virtues are imperfect, since they do not direct their subject to the Supernatural End of man; (b) one may have the supernatural or infused virtues of faith and hope, as is the case with Christians who are not in the state of grace. Even such faith and hope are imperfect virtues, and are not meritorious.

156. Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most excellent, since they deal directly with man's supernatural end; (b) By reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the appetites, they are more properly principles of action.

157. The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man's actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

158. In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

159. The Complements of the Virtues.—The virtues are habits that supply the soul with an internal guide (prudence), and with inclinations to follow its direction (moral virtues). But there is also a higher Guide who speaks to the soul, and it is necessary that the inclinations of virtue be carried out in a suprahuman mode. Hence, the virtues are completed by certain adjuncts. These are: (a) the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are habits infused into the soul, making it sensitive to the guidance of the Holy Spirit and docile under His direction; (b) the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, which are acts that grow out of the virtues and have a special spiritual sweetness attached to them; (c) the Beatitudes, which are activities of special excellence having a corresponding special reward attached to them, The acts are produced by the infused virtues and the Gifts, especially by the Gifts.

160. There are seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are divided as follows:

(a) There are the Intellectual Gifts, which make the soul more responsive to the light which the Holy Spirit sheds upon truths held by faith. These Gifts assist the intellect, first, in its apprehension of the mysteries of faith, that it may be made to grasp more clearly what it believes (Gift of Understanding); secondly, in its judgments, that it may be illuminated so as to adhere to the principles of faith and depart from their opposites, whether there be question of judgments about divine things (Gift of Wisdom), or created things (Gift of Knowledge), or human actions (Gift of Counsel);

(b) There are the Appetitive Gifts, which make the soul more ready to follow divine motions and inspirations. These Gifts aid the irascible affections by giving them a confidence of victory over every peril and by assuring safe arrival at the term of life (Gift of Fortitude); they aid the will in its social relations by leading to a filial love and devotion toward God (Gift of Piety); they assist the concupiscible affections by filling them with a reverence of God's majesty and a horror of offending Him (Gift of Fear of the Lord).

161. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are superior to the moral and intellectual virtues, for these virtues perfect the powers of the soul that they may be always ready to follow the guidance of reason, while the Gifts make the powers of the soul docile to the guidance of the Holy Ghost.

162. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are inferior to the theological virtues, for these virtues unite the soul to the Holy Ghost, while the Gifts only make the soul ready to receive His illuminations and inspirations.

163. There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22–23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man's life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

164. There are eight Beatitudes enumerated by our Lord. (a) Some of these are acts that surpass the virtues as regards the use of external goods and the government of the passions. Thus, it is lawful to have possessions, but the poor in spirit despise them; it is lawful to exercise the irascible passions according to reason, but the meek under divine guidance keep themselves in tranquillity; it is lawful to rejoice according to moderation, but the mourners, when this is better, refrain from all rejoicing. (b) Other Beatitudes are acts that surpass the virtues of justice or liberality to one's neighbor. Thus, those who hunger and thirst after justice not only discharge their obligations, but they do so with the greatest willingness; the merciful bestow their bounty, not only on their friends and relatives, but on those who are most in need. (c) Still other Beatitudes are concerned with the acts that most fit one for the contemplation of divine things, namely, that in oneself one be pure or heart or free from the defilements of passion, and that one be peaceful with reference to others. (d) The final Beatitude is the crown of the others; for one is perfectly attached to poverty of spirit, meekness, etc., when he is prepared for their sake to suffer persecution.

165. The rewards promised to the Beatitudes are conferred, not only in the life to come, but also in the present life. But they are not necessarily temporal or corporal rewards (such as riches, pleasure, ete.), but spiritual beatitude, which is a foretaste and figure of the eternal joy to come.

166. All the Beatitudes may be called Fruits of the Holy Ghost, since they are the outgrowth of the indwelling Spirit and are filled with spiritual sweetness. But the Beatitudes are really more excellent than the Fruits, since they are works of more than ordinary excellence; whereas every work of virtue that gives delight may be called a Fruit of the Holy Spirit.

Art. 3: BAD HABITS OR VICES (Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 71–89.)

167. Definition.—A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is an act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or it is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.

168. Divisions.—There are various divisions of sins. Thus:

(a) according to the kind of delight that is taken in evil, sins are either spiritual (e.g., vainglory) or carnal (e.g., intemperance);

(b) according to the person who is more directly offended by evil, sins are either against God (e.g., heresy, despair, blasphemy), or against one's neighbor (e.g., theft, calumny), or against oneself (e.g., intemperance, suicide);

(c) according to the greater or less gravity of the evil, sins are either mortal (e.g., blasphemy) or venial (e.g., idle thoughts);

(d) according as the evil is done by acting or not acting, sins are either of commission (e.g., theft) or of omission (e.g., failure to pay debts);

(e) according to the progress of a sin, there are three stages: first, it is a sin of the heart when it exists only in the mind, as when one entertains a wish for revenge; secondly, it is a sin of the mouth, when it is manifested in words, as when one uses contumelious language; thirdly, it is a sin of work when it is carried out in act, as when one strikes another in the face;

(f) according to the manner in which they deviate from the golden mean, sins are either of excess (e.g., extravagance) or of defect (e.g., miserliness);

(g) according to the manner in which its guilt is contracted, sin is either original (i.e., the loss of grace inherited from Adam) or actual (i.e., the stain derived from one's own wrongdoing; sec 272 sqq.).

169. Mortal Sin.—A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good, thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.

170. The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged mortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in the opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from God and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.

171. The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of society, of one's neighbor, or of oneself.

172. The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the character of the act and without exception, when the good which is injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus, the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence. Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter when the amount stolen is small.

173. The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there be full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be said to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount of deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great moment.

174. Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or distracted with many things.

175. Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter, a sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When without one's will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as happens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence of drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain, etc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there is no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act. Those who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is sinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or the uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act; likewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence, do not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what they do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have taken second thought on its immorality).

176. Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if afterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly afterwards one cannot be sure what was one's state of mind at the time.

177. Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not required that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not necessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for advertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary, (b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the commission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the beginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special malice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just what the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of sacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is mortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence for grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to the fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will the malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit (i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense against God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of punishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one perceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the meaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.

178. The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full consent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God except through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there has not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under violent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full advertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).

179. Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin the person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of grave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the sinful suggestion—e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was fully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept from an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if after the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to whether consent was given.

180. Venial Sin.—A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however, as to forsake God as one's Last End or to prefer self-will to the divine friendship.

181. The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).

182. The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).

183. The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full or partial when the matter is light.

184. The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent may be either full or partial when the matter is light.

185. Imperfections.—The description of venial sin just given indicates that it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of lighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes of moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:

(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of good acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed. Since man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in the good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a transgression or a sin;

(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions, are acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are contrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass that is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a good reason for staying away;

(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary, are acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed to some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary distractions.

186. Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful (e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt); (b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).

187. Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight offense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of some change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose, circumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).

188. A change in the object makes venial sin mortal: (a) when that which is light matter objectively is apprehended subjectively as grave matter (e.g., a person tells a small lie or commits a trifling theft, thinking these to be mortal sins); (b) when that which is light matter by itself becomes knowingly grave matter through the additions that are made to it (e.g., a thief steals small amounts frequently with the intention of having a great amount of ill-gotten money after a time).

189. It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may coalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as just explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere multiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal and venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts are slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but do not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass every Sunday.

190. The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held as of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a) directly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence (e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b) indirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love for virtue.

191. The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially sinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful, when the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then intended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80). Example: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow hatreds.

192. The circumstances of an act that is only venially sinful in itself also make the act mortally sinful, when there is grave malice in such circumstances. Cases of this kind are the following:

(a) The circumstance of the person committing the sin sometimes changes the malice from light to grave. Example: Unbecoming levity in one in authority may cause serious disrespect for his office and thus be gravely sinful;

(b) The circumstance of the manner in which an act is performed may change it from a venial to a mortal sin, as when the sin is committed out of contempt, or is so coveted that it would be preferred to a grave obligation. Examples: One who violates a law of lesser moment, not because he regards it as bad, but because he wishes to show his disregard of all law and authority; or one who is so attached to games of chance that he is prepared to steal a large sum rather than give them up.

193. The serious harm that is foreseen as a result of venial sin also changes the malice from slight to serious. Examples: One who jokingly annoys another, knowing that this will provoke grave dissensions; or one who tells small lies to persons who are known for their uncharitable distortions and exaggerations; or one who agrees to take too much strong drink knowing from experience that this invariably leads to serious excess.

194. Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave offense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of full consent in the subject.

195. A change in the object makes a mortal sin venial: (a) when that which is grave matter objectively, is apprehended through inculpable, or only venially culpable ignorance as light matter (e.g., when an uninstructed child thinks that a serious calumny is only a venial sin); (b) when a sin whose character is serious but whose matter is divisible is small as to matter (e.g,, to be absent from a small part of the Mass on Sunday); (e) when a law whose obligation is grave will cause more than slight inconvenience in a particular case, and thus becomes of light obligation for that case (e.g., to miss Mass on Sunday because of a difficulty that was not unsurmountable, but yet considerable).

196. Lack of sufficient advertence or of full consent makes a mortal sin venial; (a) when without serious fault one does not advert to a gravely sinful act (e.g., a desire of revenge); (b) when without serious fault one does not know or does not think about the grave malice of what one is doing (e.g., to repeat a story, not knowing or not remembering at the time that it is a serious calumny); (c) when on account of considerable excitement, fear or other disturbance, one gives only partial consent to an act that is mortally sinful (e.g., when one, on being suddenly insulted, replies with a serious imprecation).

197. The Distinction of Sins.—There are three kinds of distinction of sins: (a) sins that differ according to theological species, that is, according as they turn or do not turn the sinner away from God as his Last End. There are only two theological species of sin, viz., mortal and venial; (b) sins that differ according to moral species, that is, according to their essences, or the various kinds of finite good to which they turn the sinner. There are many moral species of sins, for example, infidelity, uncharitableness, etc.; (c) sins that differ according to number, but agree according to moral species (e.g., two distinct acts of uncharitable hatred).

198. The criteria for the specific distinction of sins are two:

(a) that which makes sins to differ specifically is the difference of the objects to which they tend, inasmuch as these created goods are out of harmony in specifically different ways with the standards of morality (e.g., pride and gluttony); (b) that by which we recognize the specific difference of sins is the opposition they have to virtues or laws that are specifically different. Thus, pride is opposed to humility, gluttony to temperance—two different virtues.

199. The following rules assist us in recognizing specific distinctions of sins. (a) Those sins are specifically different which are opposed to virtues that are specifically distinct. Thus, infidelity and despair are different in species, because opposed to faith and hope, which are two distinct species of virtue. (b) Those sins are specifically different that are opposed to specifically different objects of one and the same virtue—that is, to functions of the virtue, or to laws concerning it that have intrinsically different motives. Thus, sins of murder, theft, and false testimony, though opposed to the same virtue of justice, are specifically distinct, since they contravene obligations of that virtue whose purposes are morally distinct. (c) Those sins are specifically different that are opposed in specifically different ways to the same object of the same virtue, one opposing that object by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus, miserliness and extravagance are specifically distinct sins, because one falls short of, while the other goes beyond, the golden mean that is found in liberality.

200. Sins are not specifically distinct: (a) when they are opposed to the same virtue in ways that are physically, but not morally, contrary. Thus, sins of omission and sins of commission are physically opposites, but they are not morally so, unless they offend against different moral objects in the ways explained in the preceding paragraph. Hence, to steal and to refuse to pay debts, to take and to keep what belongs to another, are not specifically different sins; whereas to violate two distinct precepts about the same virtue, one a command and the other a prohibition, is to commit two species of sin, one by omission, and the other by commission;

(b) when they are opposed to the same virtue with reference to commands that differ in their lawgivers, but not in their motives. Thus, God, the Church, and the State all forbid theft; but he who steals is not therefore guilty of three sins, for each lawgiver forbids theft from the same intrinsic motive, viz., because it is an injury.

201. One and the same act contains in itself many sins, when it has many malices specifically different. Thus, he who kills his parents violates two commandments relative to the virtue of justice; he who steals from a church is guilty of theft and of sacrilege.

202. Sins that are multiplied numerically within the same species are committed in three ways: (a) by purely internal acts, that is, acts that are completed within the powers of the soul and do not tend to execution in some external act (e.g., unbelief, envy, pride, delight in the thought of sin, etc.); (b) by internal acts that are not completed in the will, but tend to execution in some external act (e.g., the purpose or desire to injure another, to lie, etc.); (c) by external acts that are performed or neglected by the bodily faculties under command of the will (e.g., theft, quarrels, lies, omissions of duty, etc.).

203. Acts may be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, there is one act when the agent moves or puts into action a power of the soul or body only once (e.g., to steal from a church). Physically, there are many acts when the agent exercises different operative faculties, or the same one different times (e.g., to put one's hand many times into a money box in order to steal the entire contents).

(b) Morally, there is one act when a single physical act does not contain more than one species of morality, or when several physical acts are united as parts of one whole by reason of the intention of the agent, or the nature of the acts themselves. For example, the wish to steal is morally one act. The intention to steal, the decision to use certain means to accomplish this intention, the various attempts made, and finally the carrying out of the plan—all these form morally but one act, since the acts that follow are only the development of the original intention. Similarly, several curses hurled at another form morally one act, if all are uttered under the influence of the same passion of anger. Finally, acts of spying on another, of entering his house without permission, and of taking his property unlawfully, are morally one act, because the first acts are naturally the preparation for what follows.

204. Morally, there are several acts when a single physical act contains several species of malice (as when one steals from a church), or when there are several physical acts not united by any bond of common purpose or natural subordination (as when one steals on different occasions because an opportunity suddenly presented itself, or as when one misses Mass on different Sundays).

205. Objects of acts may also be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, an object is one when it has its own proper individuality different from that of others. Thus, each coin in a pocket-book is physically one thing, each member of a family is physically one person. Objects are physically many, when they include more than one distinct thing or person. Thus, physically a pocket-book contains many objects, as does also a family.

(b) Morally, objects that are physically many become one, if they are not such as to require morally distinct acts in their regard, and if they form according to prudent judgment parts of an integral or collective whole. Otherwise, these objects are morally many. Example: Missing Mass for a whole year constitutes, morally speaking, many objects, since it implies many independent external omissions, or morally distinct acts. A box of ordinary coins, though it contains many individual pieces of money, is commonly regarded as one integral object; and likewise religious, civil, domestic, and financial bodies, though each is made up of many members, are each, morally speaking, but one person. The possessions of different proprietors, however, are not one moral object; neither do the individual, personal rights of the members of one group constitute a single object.

206. It is clear that two sins specifically different in malice are also numerically different (e.g., a sin of theft and a sin of calumny). The rules that follow will pertain only to sins that are of the same species, but that differ numerically within the species (e.g., two distinct sins of theft, two distinct sins of calumny).

207. The rules for the numerical distinction of sins within the same species suppose: (a) that the distinction be not taken from the object, which gives the specific difference, but from the repetition of acts with regard to one object, made either actually (by different acts) or equivalently (by what is equal to different acts); (b) that the distinction be not taken from a physical but from a moral consideration of the acts.

208. Three rules of numerical distinction will be given, one for each of the three following hypotheses: (a) many distinct acts are concerned with morally distinct objects of the same species; (b) many distinct acts are concerned with what is morally one object; (c) one act is concerned with what are physically many, but morally one object.

209. First Rule of Numerical Distinction.—Many sinful acts, each of which is concerned with an object that is distinct in number (morally speaking) from the objects of the other acts, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are acts and objects numerically distinct. Example: He who fires distinct shots and unjustly kills three persons is guilty of three murders.

210. Second Rule of Numerical Distinction.—Many sinful acts, all of which are concerned with an object that is (morally speaking) one and the same in number, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are acts numerically distinct according to moral estimation.

211. When the acts concerned with the same object are purely internal, they are multiplied numerically, according to moral estimation, in the following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced by an act of the will. Example: He who hates in the morning, repents at noon, and returns to his hate in the afternoon, commits two sins of hatred;

(b) when they are repeated after having been voluntarily discontinued, if the interval between the two acts is so considerable that the second act is not a mere continuation of the first. Example: He who in his mind reviles an enemy passing by, then turns his attention to his work and thinks no more about his anger, and later, seeing his enemy again, reviles him mentally a second time, commits two sins;

(c) when they are repeated after having been involuntarily discontinued, if a notable period (say, three hours) intervenes between the two acts. Example: He who thinks thoughts of hatred until he falls asleep, or until he is distracted from them by something unusual going on about him, or by the entrance of a visitor, commits a second sin of hatred, when he returns to the same thoughts, if the interruption was so long that there is no moral connection between the two acts.

212. When acts tending to the same object are internal, but directed towards completion in some external act, they are multiplied numerically, in moral estimation, in the following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced. Example: He who decides to steal, but repents for his sin, and then again decides to steal, commits two sins;

(b) when they are repeated after voluntary discontinuance, if the interval is not merely momentary. Example: He who thinks over a plan to acquire money unjustly, and then deliberately turns his thought away and gives all his attention to lawful affairs, but later resumes the dishonest planning, commits a new sin;

(c) when they are repeated after involuntary discontinuance, if the interval is notable in view of the external act desired, and nothing external was done that could serve as a link to unify the two acts. Example: A burglar plans a robbery that could easily be carried out at once, but he takes no steps to execute his plan, and soon forgets about it. A month later, passing the house he had intended to rob, he remembers his plan and carries it out. Two distinct sins were here committed.

213. Involuntary discontinuance does not, however, separate the acts into two distinct sins: (a) if the interval was brief in view of the external act that was desired (e.g., if the burglar above mentioned had forgotten his plan for a few days only before he renewed it and carried it out); (b) if something had already been done by reason of the first act (e.g., if the burglar, after resolving to rob the house, had procured keys or tools for the purpose, and had kept them with this in mind, although he allowed months and years to pass without making any attempt to fulfill his design).

214. When the acts tending to the same object are external, they are multiplied numerically in moral estimation, and make distinct sins as follows: (a) if the internal acts from which they proceed are numerically distinct sins (e.g., if a burglar attempts to rob a house, but leaves his work unfinished because he becomes conscience-stricken or is interrupted, and later makes another plan and another attempt, there are two sins); (b) if the external acts are of such a kind that no internal intention can make them morally one act, even when one follows directly upon the other (e.g., missing Mass on Sunday and again on the following day, a holyday, makes one guilty of two distinct violations of the law).

215. In the following cases, however, distinct external acts with reference to the same object do not multiply the number of sins: (a) when these acts form a part of one moral whole, and are intended as such by the agent (e.g., one who reads a forbidden book, but divides it into parts, reading only so many pages a day); (b) when these acts have to one another the relation of means to a common end, and they are intended as such by the agent (e.g., various preparations made for robbery).

216. Third Rule of Numerical Distinction.—One sinful act, internal or external, that is concerned with objects that are physically many, but morally one, makes but one sin in number. Example: He who steals a purse that contains ten bills commits one sin; he who calumniates a family of ten persons commits one sin; he who steals what is the common property of three proprietors commits one sin.

217. When the objects are not morally one of themselves, they may become so through the belief of the one who acts, since distinct malices are not incurred except as apprehended (see 588–592). Example: He who tells three different lies against a neighbor (e.g., that he is a thief, a drunkard and a liar), commits one sin of calumny, if he has in mind general injury to reputation, but does not think at the time of the special injuries contained in his calumny. Likewise, he who calumniates before ten persons commits but one sin of calumny, if, being in a passion, he thinks only of the harm he wishes to cause and not of the number of persons who are present.

218. When the objects are morally one, they may become many through the intention of the one who acts. Example: He who calumniates a family of three persons by saying they are all dishonest, commits three sins, if he intends three distinct injuries (e.g., against the business of one, the religious reputation of another, and the friendship of the third). So also he who steals part of the money in a purse, and later on, having another opportunity, decides to steal the rest, commits two sins.

219. When the objects are not morally one in themselves and cannot be apprehended as such, distinct sins are committed. Example: He who intends to miss Mass all year, foresees at least in a confused way many distinct violations of the law; he who purposes to rob various proprietors foresees at least in a vague way many separate and complete external acts of robbery.

220. Comparison of Sins.—Sins that differ in species differ also in gravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of reason and the law of God.

221. Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against a more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are directly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God) are the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such as murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as theft).

222. Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is worse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue. Thus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the opposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than its opposite rashness.

223. The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:

(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of malice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the species (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve it, or money stolen in a large quantity);

(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence, those who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are less guilty than those who sin in cold blood;

(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse according as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his personal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his office, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is greater if done to a priest, a public official or one's own family, than if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;

(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better instructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give good example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater ingratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin deliberately;

(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are willed, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that are bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).

224. Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other things being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of malice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual sins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong passion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits spiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against God and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the fallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their pride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.

(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they liken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.

225. In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than non-carnal sins.

(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other malice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a non-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both lust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin of theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the non-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious conversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is more harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and causing him some temporal injury.

(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater scandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins. Example: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and deliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or anger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children. Drunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed by those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine religion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same persons. The results of a man's pride (such as ambition, arrogance, luxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the results of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights, extravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).

226. Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said above, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered more serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions, so sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of human conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured, therefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin committed. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse than sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all creatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins committed against things, for persons are the end of things.

227. Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity is: (a) sins against the personality of God—that is, against the divine nature—such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins), infidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of God—that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that belong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ hypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things consecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the sins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy reception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.

228. Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank in gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than sins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against personality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against possessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against wellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that causes another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only diminishes another's goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take away life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the perfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a greater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less claim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one's own salvation than that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one's own family, a benefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or virtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a private individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions that are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal away the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures; it is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his wages.

229. The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in the abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have to their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other factor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the circumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable, and hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these factors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according to gravity given above may be changed or reversed.

(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances, or in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change their respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse than theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft great harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.

(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that change the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is less guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus unintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without malice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a blow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry because he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by defacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the first two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by Titus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from passion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of Balbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus is greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).

230. The Subjects of Sin.—By the subjects of sin we understand the powers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes called the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the sins tend are called their formal causes.

231. Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g., justice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive appetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of vice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive appetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily states, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful (e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason proceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction deliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the other powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed, etc.

232. As was said above (89–93), the external acts of the members of the body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of desire and reminiscent approval.

233. Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one deliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his mind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually present, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who imagines his neighbor's house burned down, and rejoices at the mental picture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any conflagration in the vicinity.

234. The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with thoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a sinful picture represented in the mind.

Thoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight in an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one's neighbor's property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought forms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in the mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as it contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A moralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves of it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read detective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to him, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the plot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger in thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere curiosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction through them.

235. The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc., 70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the sin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at the thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great theft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the circumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice contained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the thought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and sacrilege.

236. The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about sinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of their properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful necessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or without any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on them frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever they are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for pastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as heroes or martyrs.

237. Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts, either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is confined to the second part of the news.

238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.

239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one approves of sin rather than virtue.

240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz., absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.

242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in his heart.

243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.

244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a) There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.) takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be dispensed or changed. Examples: "Would that God had not pronounced against taking the property of others!" "I would stay away from church, if this were not Sunday." Desires of this kind are not sinful on account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or because it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make lawful. Examples: "I would steal, if this could be done safely." "I would blaspheme, if God permitted." These desires partake of the malice of the things that are wished.

245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one wished this as a means to save the neighbor's life, while he still desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.

246. The Causes of Sin.—The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which are without).

247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; (b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults. Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against conscience.

249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one's better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice of virtue.

253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but rather virtue and merit.

254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being overcome by sin.

255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to the sin suggested. This resistance may be:

(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance, while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;

(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;

(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;

(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.

256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave, the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable; otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example: If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its appealing features.

257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is true as regards temptations against purity.

258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a) Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples: Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.