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The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

698. Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.—(a) Granted that St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically, and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the only thing that gave him anxiety.

(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question—that for liberty and that for law—before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two sides.

(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to get the truth as nearly as possible.

699. General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.—all of which principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.

(b) Practical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the law or liberty is is possession, whether the degree of probability on one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?

700. Replies of the Equiprobabilists.—(a) The old (i.e., probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor Probabilism, if one is impartial in one's use of them, and willing to use them against as well as for liberty.

(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to the best of one's ability which side appears to be more probable or to have the presumption in its favor.

701. Probabilism.—The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a comparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal probability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b) unlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or uncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.

702. A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make it seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are conclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others, or on the calculus of probabilities.

703. Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative, according as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered alone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists admit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is solidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We have solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives are or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man—that is, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain or uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after reasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion likely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the arguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its nature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the doctors who have defended an opinion.

704. Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a lesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing arguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not attack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability. Example: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to authority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does not diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn from the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is direct opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less probable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one side, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side may be true.

705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions are present:

(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure writer, it is only slightly probable.

(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St. Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses (e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.

(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly, if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side, the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth. Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions.

706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.

707. Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion solidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:

(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as would appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by quality rather than quantity—by the learning, prudence, impartiality, and independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If five distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same conclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special reputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an opinion, the argument from authority is strong;

(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as suffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an uneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent, confessor, or teacher.

708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.

(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on either side—that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.), whether the doubt be of law or of fact.

(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but he is uncertain of the author's standing as a theologian, and he realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his ideas solidly probable.

(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own, is probably excused from Mass. But the word "probably" makes him uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.

709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see 656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative doubt:

(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is not forbidden is lawful.

(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal, making no undue delays.

(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question, one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example: Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age; but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications that he is of that age.

710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one must decide against liberty:

(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example: Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if necessary he must secure a dispensation.

(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.

711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty. But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable, one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.

(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example: The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.

(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation change one's relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr. Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers. Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said Compline.

712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:

(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples: While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but, thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209) supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins, but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is solved by obtaining a dispensation.

(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that the Church does not require more.

713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then, though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.

714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give such rules as the following:

(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must decide for obligation.

(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use the principle that what was done is to be held as rightly done. Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly, should decide for validity.

(c) In negative doubts of fact, use the principles that one should judge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be taken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors that which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to think that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may decide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is no good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the negative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a question about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a person has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced, the presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in possession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age of sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the negative, since the law has been in possession.

715. Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended, we pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in any and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or unlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability against an opposite probability.

(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in probability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was explained above (see 712).

(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the question be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is probability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think that a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it goes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain persons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of law, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason to think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or dispensed from it.

(c) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether the law in question be natural, divine or human—that is, in every case of law where invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).

716. The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he who follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a practically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the opinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this thesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given Probabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists; (b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the superiority of Probabilism in practice.

717. Extrinsic Arguments.—(a) The Church gave explicit approval to Probabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which Probabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit approval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system from the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527–1581), down to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of Probabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules of law as the following in the Decretals: "Things that are odious should be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely" (Rule 15); "Where the law is doubtful, follow the minimum" (Rule 30); "Where the lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should be against him" (Rule 57); "The kinder interpretation should be given penal laws" (Rule 89).

(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been scientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors solved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the great theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same principles as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was formulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among Catholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been growing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today to have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some of the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not confined to any particular school or body.

718. Objections of Equiprobabilists.—(a) The praise given to St. Alphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the Saint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more than one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676–1689), has expressed a dislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more than toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the external forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience. (b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been formulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more ancient system that is represented today in a milder form as Equiprobabilism.

719. Answer of the Probabilists.—(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism in his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old age, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not free, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope who expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from any official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by Probabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or forbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere toleration.

(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a systematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the 16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither can make much of the argument of priority in time. As for Equiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher Rassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692–1775).

720. Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.—(a) Theoretical Argument.—An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its cessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable. Therefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any obligation.

(b) Practical Argument.—Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on confessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained above (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh probabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by liberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied, requiring only that one be convinced that one's opinion is really probable, and that one use it in good faith.

721. The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving cases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:

(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not been clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the proposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be brought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).

(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who is subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one is a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law unwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is lawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.

722. The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:

(a) As to the proposition that "an uncertain law does not oblige," the use of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of the whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is uncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide for obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher law; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the mercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise, and God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should expose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears to them to be of doubtful obligation.

(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an incomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of vincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will maintain that vincible ignorance excuses.

723. The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that "an uncertain law does not oblige," cannot render law nugatory, since there is question here only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance. Neither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see 249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it is true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It does expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law about which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not obliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under the intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all uncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided by any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more probable opinions may be false.

(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as just remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is judging about one's duty in good faith.

724. The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for Probabilism—that "a law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence or for its cessation"—is defended by the very definition of the term "uncertain."

A thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm assent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the uncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or that which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of opinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but against which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so firmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words, such a law is uncertain.

725. Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The supposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the interpretation of the legal axiom that "a doubtful law does not oblige," should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the terms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other rules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in doubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems more probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only to cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt in the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to admit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other. Thus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to solve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the system deals with.

(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that an opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no opposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its opposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability on the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion held, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable; while greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make one's own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being, and therefore not solidly probable.

726. The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to doubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of the notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence they apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable lawfulness or unlawfulness.

The rules quoted against Probabilism—there are some that might also be quoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism—are opposed to it only in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its sphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and possession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more probable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to be true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed, unfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as it is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can receive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the doubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be refuted.

(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the opinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability; for truth is the agreement of one's judgment with the facts, probability the appearance of such agreement on account of the arguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater probability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is for liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less probable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for even the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of moralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.

727. Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by Probabilists.—Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used (see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater still.

(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if they make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find every sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and dignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow, now one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their interests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling to change or accept instruction.

(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles, will soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content themselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty Probabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.

728. General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these objections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended and followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others, but were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter systems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no detriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.

(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There is no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil, and stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism. But the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of moral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is not rightly understood or not rightly applied.

729. The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:

(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of internal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must seek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent knowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their opinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they are wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.

(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in different instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion that informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion that informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit contrary opinions to be used in the same case for one's advantage (e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to secure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it is invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).

(c) Probabilism does not sanction the use of a probable opinion, unless it has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to be of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve of the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of doubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as gravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently. Example; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion time, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful whether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a doubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion, but it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without cause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.

730. The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus answered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is better; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one ought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is question of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain course is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by exceeding one's authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used when there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for here all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.

731. Compensationism.—Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians, feeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up to then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism, which would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary Probabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it preferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called Compensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion against the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to compensate for this course of action.

732. The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the use of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the doubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting against it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the exercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that suffices for exercising freedom.

733. Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.—(a) Titus, a poor man, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts. He thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents to Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both debts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will be subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very bad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius, the latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are proportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less probable opinion.

(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask pardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes the obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed to bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus decides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if the less probable opinion—that there is no obligation—be followed.

734. The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the two chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:

(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it. If one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one knows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds it as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now, since one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason proportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under probable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for using freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism), but he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain obligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a probable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.

(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will result, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the evil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty against a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs an act from which will probably result the evil of a material transgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of material sin to which one exposes oneself.

735. Criticisms from the Probabilists.—(a) The dictum that a doubtful law obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is no middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty, unless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean, then, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is Tutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in doubt).

(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of good to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct. For there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger, namely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance of the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.

736. Reply of the Compensationists.—(a) The principle that a doubtful law obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law deserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has some better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention to take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism or hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that there are two sides to one's doubt.

(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the burden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation for the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in itself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and great evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits acquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should not become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so great an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then in order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.

737. Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.

(a) From Authority.—Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it cannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was unknown before this new system appeared.

(b) From Reason.—It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in the controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as to obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor, that of sufficient reason or compensation.

(c) From Serviceability.—It is easy to say in the abstract that one should always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in favor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual cases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison of probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use Compensationism is impossible, or impracticable.

738. Reply of Compensationists.—(a) Compensationism is an example of doctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles on which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most ancient authorities.

(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by all moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its application to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an innovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.

(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized its necessity.

739. Practical Conclusions.—From the foregoing discussions one may deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert theologians:

(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you need not hesitate to follow your conscience.

(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but seek truth and decision.

(c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience, 611 sqq.).

740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a "Meliorist," for the better and more perfect is more advisable than what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in higher station higher things are required.

(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a "Certitudinist," that is, one must resolve doubts or slight probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in 661).

(c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist, when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).

(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).

(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).

(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.

(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is less, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the principles of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or Compensationism, according to conviction.

741. As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following rules are generally admitted:

(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral system, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a different moral system; for the Church allows liberty.

(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral system and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should decide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but for what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most advantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a Probabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that are less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always requires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act unwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more profitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation; for those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be recommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be entirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an obligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral Theology, would see is controverted.

742. In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to whether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor himself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the requisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor must prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided therefore by his own conviction.

(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and theologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a well-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the opinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent's opinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it seems more prudent to leave him in good faith.