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4

RECONSIDERING THE LRA–GOVERNMENT DYNAMIC

‘People say that Kony is uneducated, but the uneducated man has killed people for the last fifteen years; what have the educated done to solve the problem of war in Acholi land?’¹

Introduction

The situation in Northern Uganda is generally presented as a war between two actors, the LRA and the Government of Uganda. There is, though, little consensus on the nature of the two parties, particularly the LRA, or the reasons for their involvement. Under the various labels of ‘madmen’, ‘religious fundamentalists’, ‘messengers of God’, ‘criminals’, ‘bandits’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘dogs of war’, at least four characterisations of the LRA are discernible; the LRA as a an irrational organisation without political purpose (e.g. Bramucci, 2001: ii, Weeks, 2002: 9), the LRA as seeking to install a Christian fundamentalist government in Uganda (e.g. USDS, 2002: 124, IRIN, 12 September 2002), the LRA as a personality cult (e.g. Vlassenroot and Doom, 1999: 19–22), and the LRA as proxy warriors for the Sudanese Government and thus as legitimate targets in the wider ‘war on terror’ (e.g. Vlassenroot and Doom, idem, New Vision, 7 February 1998, The Monitor, 11 December 1997). What links these otherwise conflicting representations is an implicit model of the LRA as the aggressor and of the GoU as reacting to aggression, active in the search for solutions, and focused on the protection of its citizens.

Looked at in quantitative terms alone, the UPDF should have been easily capable of dealing with the LRA and protecting civilians. Compared with the LRA's guessed size of 1,000–5,000, it numbered at least 50,000–60,000 troops (excluding ethnic militias), of whom at least 20,000 were deployed in the north. It had its own track record as a rebel group to inform its understanding of the LRA, and it had military successes against other insurgent groups, most pertinently the ADF in western Uganda in the late 1990s. At various times it had collaborative support for military activity inside Sudan from both the SPLA² and the Government of Sudan. And it had ‘non-lethal’ support from the U.S., including military training and information, as well as the room for manoeuvre created by Uganda's international reputation and the global ‘war on terrorism’.

Notwithstanding all these advantages, it did not provide adequate protection to its civilian population in the north, let alone root out the LRA. Museveni himself, on a visit to Amuru protected village in 1998, reportedly said ‘I am very sorry to find you in such a situation. I am sorry to find you not in your homes. The fact that you are still suffering is the fault of the army and government’.³

Explanations for such failures centred on a lack of resources (e.g. The Monitor, 3 February 1998, ‘UPDF weak to fight rebels – Minister’, see also Weeks, 2001: 32), to which could be added context-related question-marks over the UPDF's capacities, including the effects of HIV/AIDS on troops, donor pressure to reduce defence expenditure, and low morale reflected in what the UPDF refers to as ‘individual indiscipline’ and numerous instances of drunken incompetence (see Chapter 5). Many saw the problem as one of vested interests, ‘another case of the phenomenon identified by David Keen in the “Benefits of Famine” – enough people do well out of the war that it continues until there is nothing left’.⁴ As early as 1994, Betty Bigombe, in negotiations with the LRA, warned that ‘There are many who do not want peace to prevail. There are those people who are benefiting from the war. There are others who think that if this thing ends, they will have nothing to lean on’. (See Annex B.)

Gersony argued in 1997 that ‘Corruption at officer levels has also limited the army's commitment and morale and has filtered down to the enlisted ranks’ (1997; 35).⁵ Behrend felt that, for Government and rebel soldiers alike, the war had become a mode of production ‘which was more profitable than peace’ (1998; 116), and even NRM members made allegations ‘that the commanders who are sent to the regions are only interested in doing business and not defending the people from Joseph Kony's brutality’.⁶ The national papers also reported on specific instances of corruption. These included embezzlement of monies intended for fuel ‘for military operations against Joseph Kony rebels’,⁷ the diversion of supplies (including medicines) from the UPDF to the LRA,⁸ and the payment of salaries to ‘ghost soldiers’.

These various constraints on the UPDF's capacity, however, could not explain why the UPDF was only selectively unsuccessful; why did they manage to deal with groups such as the ADF, but not the LRA? For many people, Museveni's apologies rang hollow and the real question was not the Government's military capacity to solve the situation in the north, but its political will. In short, as the quotation with which I open this chapter implies, the reality of a war in which the uneducated survive well beyond expectations and the educated perform seriously below expectations, demands that the standard presentation of the LRA-GoU war needs revisiting, starting with the nature and motivation of the two parties concerned.

This chapter therefore first assesses the considerable ambiguities about the LRA's composition, numbers and civilian support base, and then look at its modus operandi. Survival strategies, internal organisation, and political messages are scrutinised, and the 1994 Peace Talks between the two parties are examined (drawing on an account developed from two primary sources (see Annex B)), for further evidence of the LRA's political position. The Peace Talks also exemplify the position of the Government, which is further considered through a scrutiny of subsequent initiatives to deal with the LRA, including the 1999 Nairobi Peace Accord, the 2000 Amnesty Act, Operation Iron Fist and the 2004 referral to the International Criminal Court.

The findings suggest that the LRA did present a military challenge, indeed was more organised than derogatory terms such as ‘rag-tag army’ would imply, but was a self-limiting force which it should have been possible for the Government to deal with decisively; it was resilient but not invincible. The 1994 talks demonstrate a power-play between Government and LRA in which the LRA attempts to maximise the recognition and validation given it, the Government makes strenuous efforts to minimise these by seeking to humiliate and belittle the LRA instead, and the LRA eventually resorts to violence. As such, the talks were an instance of ‘war-talk’ rather than peace talks, and set a precedent for subsequent initiatives and dynamics that, under the same guise of a wish for peace, in essence created the space for further militarism and the dynamics of social torture.

The LRA's Ambiguities

Anyone attempting to assess the role of the LRA in northern Uganda is faced with a number of ambiguities, particularly concerning its composition and the extent of civilian support and links with the LRM. They are also faced with a media which fuels rather than resolves these ambiguities.

Composition