Читать книгу Educational Explanations - Christopher Winch - Страница 23

We began by offering a criterial conception of truth which preserves objectivity in educational research. The alternative of a substantive theory such as the correspondence theory which purports to explain what truth is was rejected on the grounds of circularity. A criterial conception does not explain what truth is, but invites us to consider the various ways in which truth claims are assessed, including in EER as well as in the practices which EER investigates. A criterial approach demands in turn that we rely on a ‘thin’ categorial framework which allows us to comprehend the conceptual as well as empirical diversity that is constitutive of the universal human phenomenon of education. This categorial framework does not absolve researchers of the hard work of understanding educational practices and beliefs, nor of developing concepts adequate to describe them, but it provides a foothold for beginning such investigations which, at their best, involve both hermeneutic and empirical considerations.

We considered perspectivalism involving ‘multiple realities’ relating to multiple participants in practice as an alternative point of view. Both this chapter and the previous one argued that such perspectivalism involves both acknowledgement of a perception-independent reality but also of a conception-dependent categorial framework for making sense of diverse perspectives.

We then considered whether or not the presupposition of rationality was adequate for making sense of such diversity or whether the acknowledgement of commonality in a categorial framework was able to bear the diversity of educational phenomena to be encountered. Rationality is not a monolithic concept, but its different facets, provided they are carefully respected, do allow us to comprehend diversity within a human unity.

Finally, objections to a criterial conception of truth adequate for EER were considered.