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Notes
Оглавление1 1 Some claim (e.g. Schoonenboom 2018) that objectivity is possible with a multiple realities perspective. I reject this view as it seems to entail multiple truths, even if there is a strong degree of convergence in truth claims from different researchers using different methods.
2 2 Peirce however sees truth as the inevitable result of converging lines of enquiry. These lines not only converge on each other but on the Real. In some respects this position is similar to the argument in this chapter if we hold that lines of enquiry require criteria for the making of assertions concerning truth and falsity.
3 3 ‘Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.’ (James 1907, p. 34).
4 4 The redundancy view does not exclude the meaningful use of such statements as ‘What you say is true’ where there is anaphoric reference to the interlocutor’s statement, or ‘All the propositions of Physics are true’, where a collectivity of propositions are referred to.
5 5 There is a separate question as to whose judgement prevails. Often, this is a question of authority or power (Alexander 1992).
6 6 This is similar to what Kölbel (2005) calls ‘soft truth’.
7 7 Here we should recognise that understanding is one of the primary tasks of the educational researcher.
8 8 See Wittgenstein (1953), II, xii.
9 9 Is storytelling a form of lying? Brice-Heath (1983), in her study of two different communities, showed that how storytelling is conceptualised (and hence encouraged or discouraged) may well vary between subcultures within the same society. What is indisputable though is that there is some practice going on, whether it be described as ‘lying’ or ‘storytelling’.
10 10 In admitting this, we do not have to commit ourselves to the view that all we see is ‘bare behaviour’. For a start, it is clear that intentionality plays a role (Taylor 1968).
11 11 Indeed, within our own culture religion is very often dismissed as irrational because it does not conform to scientific criteria for establishing truth. On the wider issue, see Evans-Pritchard 1936; Winch, P. 1964.
12 12 Such a phenomenological approach does not entail that each perspective is a purely subjective experience dependent on the deliverances of the senses, although it depends on them. It is also a ‘world view’ with its own coherence and logic developed through the synthesising powers of the mind (Schutz 1932, 1976). These considerations do not, however, make such a reality objective in the sense that there are commonly held criteria for determining the truth or falsity of propositions.
13 13 This form of chronic aspect perception should be distinguished from what Wittgenstein calls ‘continuous’ aspect perception, which is related to an exercise of the will (Arahata 2015).
14 14 It is difficult to understand the aims of German vocational education without understanding the way in which know-how can be expressed both as Fähigkeit and Fertigkeit, a distinction not readily available in English. But it is also a distinction that might with profit be adopted when considering English vocational education.
15 15 A notorious example is the extrapolation of characteristics of effective schools from observation of schools with high contextual value-added (CVA) scores. Quite apart from questions about causality, it is difficult to see how to separate the normative commitments about ‘good practice’ (Alexander 1992) from genuine observation.
16 16 See for example the ‘progressive’ commitments of Leeds City Council and the more sceptical approach taken by the researchers into the Primary Needs Programme (Alexander op. cit.).
17 17 Clark (2011) for a contrary view. Clark is wrong to think that values and norms in use cannot be investigated empirically.
18 18 Although, as Lewis Carroll demonstrated through the story of Achilles and the Tortoise, such proofs depend on shared presuppositions (Carroll 1895).
19 19 While Levi is right to deny that Ad Baculum is a genuine form of argument, since its content is nothing more than a threat, it may nevertheless be rational to respond to threats by acquiescence.
20 20 Following Wilson (1959) a principle of charity is often recommended to researchers, in which subjects of research are assumed to be (constitutively) rational unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. Although this is a useful principle, it can be misused if, for example, it is interpreted so as to take our ability to tolerate inconsistencies as a counter-instance. See Evans-Pritchard’s (1936) discussion of the inheritance of witchcraft substance for example (also discussed in Winch, P. 1964).
21 21 Although that authority will usually be contextually circumscribed (Salmon 1984).
22 22 For more discussion see Newton-Smith (1981), Rosenberg (2012).
23 23 Perhaps echoing Hume’s identification of the primary sources of political allegiance in long habituation and legitimate succession (Hume 1739–40) Treatise of Human Nature, Bk III).
24 24 We need to remind ourselves of what this can involve. Conducting a randomised control trial (RCT) is to investigate phenomena in a very particular way, abstracting from many of the features of phenomena as we ordinarily perceive them. Other forms of interventions study such as field and natural experiments are different again. Interviewing subjects to gain their perspective on phenomena is another way of doing so, while observing processes over an extended period of time is yet another. We should be wary of homogenising the different ways in which we engage with the world in carring out research by lumping them all together as ‘looking at reality’.
25 25 A truth in the sense that it is never in experience contradicted. See Locke Essay on Human Understanding.
26 26 But this does not mean that we lack resources for discussing such issues. A useful starting point might be the distinction between formal, non-formal and informal learning, for example.