Читать книгу Critique of Rights - Christoph Menke - Страница 13

1 1. William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, trans. by John Kilcullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24. Above all, one should consult Michel Villey’s classic essay “La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam,” Archives de philosophie du droit, IX (1964), 97–127. Part of this text appeared in a posthumously published book that gathered his lectures from the 1960s, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, ed. by Stéphane Rials (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 2006), 220–68.

2 2. Ockham, Letter to the Friars Minor, 29.

3 3. Richard Tuck refers to Jean Gerson as the first person who provided “an account of ius as a facultas” (Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], 25 f.). The central figure in his history of natural rights is Grotius.

4 4. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 13. On the role of glossators and the reception of Roman law see also Michel Villey, “Le ‘jus in re’ du droit romain classique au droit moderne,” in: Conférences faites à l’Institut de Droit Romain en 1947 (Paris: Sirey, 1950), 185–227, here 189; Helmut Coing, Zur Geschichte des Privatrechtssystems (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1962), 38–41. In addition, Brian Tierney emphasizes the disruptive moments in the formation of canonical law; Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150–1625 (Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), esp. ch. 2.

5 5. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book I, ed. by Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 136–8.

6 6. Francisco Suárez, Tractatus de Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore: Abhandlung über die Gesetze und Gott als Gesetzgeber, 2.17.2, in: Opera omnia, ed. by M. André and C. Berton, vol. 5 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–78), 159–62.

7 7. [Tr. – “law” and “right” are in English in the original here, following Hobbes’ usage.]

8 8. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 91.

9 9. Hobbes, Leviathan, 200.

10 10. [Tr. – “right” is in English in the original here, equated with ius, and thus the subjective sense of right that is otherwise consistently rendered throughout “a right,” “rights,” “claim,” or “subjective right” and must be distinguished from “law” or “right” as prevalent system of laws, which Menke immediately goes on to do in the very next lines.]

11 11. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, trans. by William Holloway (Madras: J. Higginbotham, 1867), 6. For the historical background of this terminological suggestion, see Alejandro Guzmán Brito, “Historia de la denominación del derecho-facultad como ‘subjetivo’,” Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos, XXV (2003), 407–33.

12 12. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63 [Tr. – translation modified]. In what follows, I am using the term “claim” in a manner different from its juridical usage. I take it to mean a legitimate claim and thus to be coextensive with the capacity to put others under obligations.

13 13. [Tr. – “law” and “right” are in English in the original here.]

14 14. [Tr. – “law” and “right” are in English in the original, following Hobbes’ usage. In keeping with Hobbes’ distinction, Gesetz is translated as “law” here and Recht is translated as “right.” I switch back to translating Recht as “law,” as noted below, where Menke draws a parallel between Gesetz and Recht in his discussion of Strauss’ interpretation of Hobbes.]

15 15. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 156.

16 16. Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 156.

17 17. In the passage omitted with ellipses we find: “in other words, because Hobbes’s political philosophy, as the harshest critic which that philosophy has recently found … is itself based … on assumptions representing an extreme form of individualism: an individualism more uncompromising than that of Locke himself” (Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 157). Strauss here refers to Charles Edwyn Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1925), 25. For Strauss’ argument, see Leander Scholz, Der Tod der Gemeinschaft: Ein Topos der politischen Philosophie (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 32–7.

18 18. [Tr. – Here and elsewhere Anspruch, which I generally translate as “claim,” is equated by Menke with Recht in the “subjective” sense of “a right.”]

19 19. Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 160.

20 20. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 181.

21 21. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 182.

22 22. [Tr. – I now return to translating Recht as “law,” due to Menke’s parallel here of Recht and, in the Hobbesian context, Gesetz.]

23 23. “If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or the safeguarding of those rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism was Hobbes” (Strauss, Natural Right and History, 181–2). Hannah Arendt sees the fundamental assumption of the French Revolution, which for this reason can or must be called “liberal” in comparison to the republicanism of the American Revolution, as rooted in the view that “these rights [Tr. – i.e., the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen] indeed were assumed not to indicate the limitations of all lawful government, but on the contrary to be its very foundation” (Arendt, On Revolution [London: Penguin, 1963], 148).

24 24. [Tr. – “separates … from” and “set apart” are translations of trennt … von and getrennt, respectively, which Menke is repeating for emphasis but which I’ve had to vary in their rendering to avoid awkwardness in English. Readers should here note that Menke intends “set apart” to refer back to “separates” for emphasis.]

25 25. [Tr. – “law” and “right” are in English in the original. See note 15.]

26 26. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in: Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, ed. by J. Waldron (London: Methuen, 1987), 46–76, here 53.

27 27. Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 144.

28 28. [Tr. – Menke cites two editions of this work by Kelsen at various points throughout. There is an English translation, but it does not contain everything that Menke cites. I have therefore followed Menke in citing both German editions as he does, and on occasion provide the pagination for the English translation, where possible.] Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, ed. by Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 53.

29 29. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 57.

30 30. Benedict de Spinoza, The Complete Works, trans. by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 685 (ch. 2, § 8 of A Political Treatise).

31 31. Manfred Walther, “Grundzüge der politischen Philosophie Spinozas,” in: Michael Hampe and Robert Schnepf (eds.), Baruch de Spinoza: Ethik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006), 215–36, here 222.

32 32. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 45.

33 33. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 45.

34 34. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 90. In “Toward Perpetual Peace,” Kant speaks about the fact that “in the state of nature, there can be nothing other than private right” (Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, trans. by David L. Colclasure [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006], 106). The state of nature is thus without right in the sense that no “public right” exists in it, as a legally secured process established by legislation (Toward Perpetual Peace, 109). According to Kant, it is not a state without law, since it would then also be one without private law.

35 35. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 44.

36 36. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 71. Also, see 56–8.

37 37. For an analysis of rights as elements in legal relationships see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2001). Hohfeld shows that rights can be respectively defined in four distinct ways through their opposite and correlative (Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 12ff.).

38 38. Alexandre Kojève, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, trans. by Bryan-Paul Frost and Robert Howse (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 40.

39 39. [Tr. – “right” and “law” are in English in the original here.]

40 40. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 58 and 61, respectively. On the problematic of the concept of reflex, see p. 64, as well as note 6, and pp. 125–7 in this volume.

41 41. [Tr. – “right” and “law” are in English in the original here.]

42 42. Cf. Rolf Göschner, “Dialogik der Rechtsverhältnisse,” in: Rechtsphilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, ed. by Winifred Brugger, Ulfrid Neumann, and Stephan Kirste (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008), 90–110, here 93 and 97. Yves Charles Zarka has shown that – in contrast to a reductive critique of subjectivism and atomism in the bourgeois theory of rights – Pufendorf and Leibniz already understood rights in the context of intersubjective legal relationships; see Yves Charles Zarka, “L’invention du sujet de droit,” in: L’autre voie de la subjectivité: Six études sur le sujet et le droit naturel au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Beauchesne, 2000), 3–32. However, at the same time, rights in bourgeois law are authoritative instances of subjectification. For more on this, see part III of this book.

43 43. Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, 18. This does not mean separating them from each other: private law only obtains the “reality of its existence” (19) through public law. For a more explicit treatment of this issue, see Savigny’s excursus on the political presupposition of private law in this same work.

44 44. Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, 271.

45 45. Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, 18.

46 46. This already holds true for the first basic definition of the modern character of rights: that they are supposed to assure or secure self-preservation and are thus enabling [ermöglichend]; see pp. 49–60 in this volume.

47 47. Franz Böhm, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft,” Ordo, 17 (1966), 75–151, here 76. Marx formulates the same thesis as follows: “In Roman law, the servus is therefore correctly defined as one who may not enter into exchange for the purpose of acquiring anything for himself (see the Institutes). It is, consequently, equally clear that although this legal system corresponds to a social state in which exchange was by no means developed, nevertheless, in so far as it was developed in a limited sphere, it was able to develop the attributes of the juridical person, precisely of the individual engaged in exchange, and thus anticipate (in its basic aspects) the legal relations of industrial society, and in particular the right which rising bourgeois society had necessarily to assert against medieval society. But the development of this right itself coincides completely with the dissolution of the Roman community” (Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy [London: Penguin, 1973], 245–6).

48 48. As Richard Tuck explains, we should also note why Grotius was in a position “to treat the law of nature as totally to do with the maintenance of people’s rights”: “Rights have come to usurp the whole of natural law theory, for the law of nature is simply, respect one another’s rights” (Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 67).

49 49. Niklas Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau des Rechtsbewußtseins für die moderne Gesellschaft,” in: Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), 45–104, here 47. This is directed against the theory of subjective right’s self-conception: according to Michel Villey (to whom Luhmann refers), rights are necessarily subjective because they are grounded in the subject: it is “a right which emanates from the person, which is inherent in the person, which is its attribute [ … ]. To be precise: subjective right is a quality of the subject, one of its faculties, more precisely a franchise, a liberty, the possibility of acting” (Villey, “La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam,” 101).

50 50. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 46.

51 51. See chapter 5 in this volume.

52 52. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), esp. ch. 2: “Legal Formalism.” For the quotes that follow, see the overview in Weinrib, Idea of Private Law, 10f., and ch. 5, “Correlativity,” in particular.

53 53. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1989), 64.

54 54. It is only for this reason that the exchange relationships between these two persons can be binding for a third party. Every third party is obligated to recognize the new arrangement reached between the two persons in question (instead of saying, for example, that an item has been abandoned and can thus be appropriated by anyone the moment a person relinquishes his item – which occurs in every act of exchange).

55 55. And thereby ultimately on a difference of power, according to Nietzsche, since the demand for “equivalence” (which breeds a creature capable of promises) succeeds exogenously through “a stronger power” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 75).

56 56. Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law, 8. This methodologically corresponds to the argumentative flow in Hegel’s theory of abstract right: from the (property) claim of the individual person to the (contractual) relationship between two persons with each referring to the corrective authority of the third; see G.F.W. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 73f., 10 f., 130f. (§§ 41f., 71f., and 103f.).

57 57. Regarding Cicero’s definition of ius civile, Villey writes: “What is to be defined is civil law, ius civile. According to Aristotle, the nature of law in the strict sense is political. [ … ] The actualization of law presupposes a judge (dikastēs). A procedure is necessary, institutions which can only exist in a city. True law was only exercised within the same actual city, and Aristotle called it dikaion politikon, which was translated into Latin as ius civile” (Michel Villey, Le droit et les droits de l’homme [Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 2008; 1st edn 1983], 57f.).

58 58. Following Weinrib, Florian Rödl discusses the “a-historical” character of private law, in “Normativität und Kritik des Zivilrechts,” Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, Supplement 114 (2007), 167–78, here 174. For a critique of this thesis see the discussion of Weinrib’s interpretation of Aristotle in the next chapter, note 9.

59 59. Weinrib, Idea of Private Law, 23ff. According to Weinrib, private law is free of any “political aspect” because it has no extrinsic purpose (Idea of Private Law, 212).

60 60. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 2.

61 61. Niklas Luhmann, “Zur Funktion der ‘subjektiven Rechte’,” in: Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts. Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1999), 360–73, here 361. At a – systematically – later point, the category of the subject will nevertheless become indispensable for the analysis of the understanding of rights in bourgeois law.

62 62. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 46.

63 63. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 49.

64 64. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 51.

65 65. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 73.

66 66. Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte: Zum Umbau,” 54.

67 67. “De iustitia et iure,” (I.I) in: The Institutes of Justinian, trans. by Thomas Collett Sandar (London: Longmans, Green, 1878), 5.

68 68. Villey, Le droit et les droits de l’homme, esp. chs. 1 and 9. For a critique of the “German” critique of Roman law, see Le droit et les droits de l’homme, 55.