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Introduction
The Transition Challenge
ОглавлениеAs we said in the Preface, we believe a book on the company's role in transitions is needed because failed transitions represent an urgent problem that has received too little attention and that must be solved. The costs of transition failure are very significant…not only financially but also in career impact and company reputation. It is time to address this problem because the record of success of CEO transitions is dismal and it is getting worse.
According to one study, 15.3 percent of CEOs left the 2,500 largest global public companies in 2005, and 70 percent more than just a decade earlier.2 The turnover range for chief executives of large North American corporations hovered around 10–11 percent in the mid-to-late 1990s, and then shot up to an average of 14 percent between 2000 and 2007.3 Only 269 SEC-reported companies had to manage a CEO transition in 1999; in 2008, 1,484 companies managed a CEO transition.4 In 2003, the Harvard Business School estimated a 40–60 percent failure rate of U.S. executives.5
Almost half of CEO departures are forced by the board (it was 46 % in 2008, for example).6 Not surprisingly, the number of CEOs forced to step down has affected the average tenure rate at this level. The majority of CEOs today have been in their positions for less than five years. When each of us became involved in this area, a CEO being fired was very rare, and most stayed in their positions for 10 or more years. The data also show that the first segment of a CEO's tenure is the most treacherous. A Fortune article in February 2012 estimated that 40 percent of executives who are hired into a job from outside or are promoted fail within the first 18 months. It reaffirms the 18-month rule that has been well known in the leadership advice area. It fact, this article notes that the failure rate has “stood at about 40 % for at least fifteen years”;7 our experience affirms that it has been in effect much longer. In 2005, research from a management consulting firm found that about one-third of new managers and senior executives leave new positions within 18 months.8
CEOs who depart after 18 months on the job cost small-cap companies an estimated $12 million each. For large-cap companies, the figure is $52 million. Some research estimates that these departures add up to a minimum loss in the United States of $14 billion each year.9 Other research shows that a failed leader transition can cost 10 to 20 times the executive's yearly compensation.10
And this represents only the obvious, visible costs. Even more damaging are the long-term effects on the company's ability to operate effectively and to innovate well enough to meet ever-changing customer needs and competitive challenges. When a new leader is hired, he inevitably redefines priorities, imports new ways of operating, and often is charged with an agenda to change strategic direction. But when he founders and is then replaced by the next leader who repeats the same drill, the resulting disruption and confusion risks pulling the company into a negative cycle that will be difficult to reverse.
Transition failure also levies a cost on the company's reputation externally in the eyes of customers, investors, and analysts, and importantly, internally in ways that affect employee motivation. The reputations of once-proud companies such as Hewlett-Packard have suffered greatly because of the transition mismanagement of their boards. Also, collateral damage of transition mistakes by the company includes injury to the careers of the talented, capable executives who fail after taking over the organization and the loss of key talent.
It is likely that the problem of higher turnover in senior positions won't go away any time soon, and that attention on it will increase. New U.S. government regulations as well as rules of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require boards to develop a succession plan that is available to shareholders, who have become increasingly restive and demanding about CEO selection. But while the result has been more scrutiny by the media and shareholders on the selection of new CEOs, little or no attention is paid to the details of preparations made by the company, standards for getting ready for a new leader, or guidelines for the organization to maximize success once an offer has been accepted.
It is never a sure thing when someone takes on a job at the top. For one thing, the person chosen is often assuming more responsibility than he has ever had and facing strategic, operational, political, and personal challenges that are tougher and more complex than he has ever faced. And not only is this true of CEOs but also of the people selected as designated successors. Only about 25 percent of those next-in-line executives hired from the outside succeed in the CEO job, and only about 50 percent of those who have been promoted from within.11
Why are success rates not better? One answer is that people chosen as new leaders do not do a good enough job at preparing for and managing their entry into the top spot. Both experience with leadership transitions and research conducted at the Harvard Business School confirm that leaders who fail within a couple of years of assuming a top-level position make the same handful of mistakes:12
● They fail to use wisely the time between accepting the position and Day 1 in their jobs.
● They do not read the political situation well enough to understand the relationships, coalitions, and alliances most important to their success.
● They fail to understand the culture well enough or adequately manage it to follow their direction.
● They misread the capacity or willingness of the people they inherit to implement needed changes.
The net result of such missteps is that new leaders do not achieve notable successes within their all-important first 18 months. That in turn limits the commitment of a critical mass of people to support their agendas. Ultimately, the person at the top in this situation never attains the loyal followership needed for effective leadership.
We believe that the person assuming the senior spot can do much to succeed once in the top position if she moves quickly to avoid or resolve these common mistakes. But there is a second answer to the question of why more leaders do not succeed: that the organizations that have hired or promoted them have not done their part to ensure success. Until the company that hires or promotes leaders into its top positions does its part, the problem of transition failures will not be solved.
By “the company,” we mean the major players who most determine its strategy, how it operates day-to-day, who is hired and who stays, how its various parts are expected to coordinate, and its culture. In particular, the players on the company's side of the transition equation who have the most significant roles in determining whether a transition at the top is successful are the board of directors, the CEO, the chief human resources officer, and the other key senior managers who report to the CEO.
When we refer to “leadership transition” we mean the process of maintaining strategic, operational, and cultural continuity as one leader passes the mantle of authority to a successor. That process spans the steps and events from before the winning candidate accepts the company's offer to the point that a critical mass of followers assign their loyalty to her as the established leader.
Because there are different paths to the top, there are various types of transitions. The CEO might be promoted from within after many years with the company, be hired directly from the outside into the CEO position, or come to the top position from the board of directors, either temporarily as a permanent leader is found or intending to stay. Also, the leader might become CEO through a planned transition, where he is hired into a high-level position (for example, as chief operating officer or division president) and moves up by way of a predetermined, managed process. While examples we use cover a range of possibilities, this book concentrates on planned transitions because they are more complex and include steps that are necessary in other types of handoffs.
Thinking through what that process should be for any particular transition situation should include a thorough understanding of why so many handoffs at the top fail.
2
C. Lucier, P. Kocourek, and R. Habbell, “CEO Succession 2005: The Crest of the Wave,” Strategy+Business, May 30, 2006, accessed November 13, 2014, http://www.strategy-business.com/article/06210?pg=all
3
N. Stoddard and C. Wycoff, “The Cost of CEO Failure,” Chief Executive, December 12, 2008, accessed January 13, 2015, http://chiefexecutive.net/the-costs-of-ceo-failure
4
J.C. Wilcox, J. Eichbaum, and M. Tonello, “The Role of the Board in Turbulent Times: CEO Succession Planning,” The Conference Board, August 2009, accessed January 13, 2015, https://www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1681
5
Ray B. Williams, “CEO Failures: How On-Boarding Can Help,” Psychology Today, May 2, 2010, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201005/ceo-failures-how-boarding-can-help
6
Tonello et al., “The Role of the Board.” p. 4.
7
Anne Fisher, “New job? Get a Head Start Now,” Fortune, February 17, 2012, accessed January 13, 2015, http://fortune.com/2012/02/17/new-job-get-a-head-start-now/
8
Ray B. Williams, “CEO Failures: How On-Boarding Can Help,” Psychology Today, May 2, 2010, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201005/ceo-failures-how-boarding-can-help
9
N. Stoddard and C. Wycoff, “Pick a CEO Who Truly Fits the Company,” Forbes.com (April 9, 2009, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/09/ceo-succession-planning-leadership-governance-fit.html
10
C. Dierickx and J. McGill, “The Dark Side of CEO Succession,” Chief Executive (May 11, 2007, accessed January 13, 2015, http://chiefexecutive.net/the-dark-side-of-ceo-succession
11
D. Ciampa and M. Watkins, Right from the Start (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 3.
12
Ibid.