Читать книгу Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan - Combat Studies Institute - Страница 13

LTC Warren Richards (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM operations officer, was on a training exercise in Hungary when the United States was attacked. Subsequent erratic flight schedules delayed his return to Norfolk for two weeks. While Richards was stuck in Hungary, Mulholland, 5th SFG commander, learned that he had to form a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to control SOF operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in northern Afghanistan. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) had never directed an SFG to be prepared to assume that mission.

Figure 24. Afghanistan.

While SOCJFCOM’s mission had been to “facilitate joint integration . . . to enhance SOF effectiveness” and to be “prepared to form a JSOTF to conduct special operations,” it had an inherent task to train prospective commanders and staffs of new JSOTFs. Shortly after reaching Norfolk, Richards and four soldiers left for USASOC headquarters, Fort Bragg, to assist that staff in meeting the 5th SFG’s mission requirements as a JSOTF. From his experience as a Special Forces officer and as a SOCJFCOM trainer, Richards knew that the 5th SFG headquarters would need help in three areas.

One of the problems it would encounter was the lack of local area network (LAN) equipment it would need to function as a JSOTF. Thus, identifying the specific requirements and requisitioning the necessary equipment became a top priority. Richards, the USASOC information management staff, and experts from the 112th Signal Battalion identified and resourced equipment for the LAN for $500,000.

A second shortcoming was personnel. To function as a JSOTF, an SFG headquarters staff would require an additional 120 people. Those people can come from a variety of sources, but unless the “drafted” soldiers have trained with that particular JSOTF, basic issues such as SOPs and familiarity with the staff principals would delay actions. The unit staff also had to integrate the new augmentees into its everyday functions. Joint staff training, therefore, was the third problem that faced the group.

While Richards’ team was at Fort Bragg, retired Special Forces COL Dave Rasmussen and eight SOCJFCOM soldiers were working with SOCCENT headquarters in Tampa. RADM Calland had called COL Findlay earlier, asking for assistance in converting his headquarters from a peacetime to a wartime footing. Rasmussen ascertained that “they had a problem” in that key SOCCENT staff positions were predominantly filled by Navy SEALs who had little experience with other service operations and staff procedures. Since Calland’s guidance from CENTCOM was contained in a PowerPoint briefing, his staff struggled to develop a plan to employ SOF troops. Rasmussen was concerned that the SOCCENT staff was more focused on getting into the theater than in preparing plans or requesting additional personnel to meet their staffing requirements. The best Rasmussen and his trainers could do was to develop a phased implementation plan that supported CENTCOM guidance before accompanying the staff into the theater. The former Special Forces colonel and 12 trainers from SOCJFCOM departed the Persian Gulf staging base in early December, quite frustrated with the situation.

Figure 25. LAN connectivity to the K2 “Snake.”

It was a different story for a third SOCJFCOM group at Fort Campbell. For two weeks, LTC Jack Walters (pseudonym), chief observer trainer, and 11 other staff members conducted seminars to educate the 5th SFG staff on the intricacies of JSOTF functioning. Walters used his considerable Special Forces experience as a commander and staff officer to advise the staff on the additional functions a joint headquarters would require. The staff quickly realized that, in addition to performing the wartime functions of a group headquarters it would also be the communications hub for the attached joint subordinate units, arrange the logistics support for the other service units, and coordinate all planning for joint operations.

Communications were a major problem because most of the message traffic had to be conducted over a classified LAN, and there were insufficient terminals in the 5th SFG’s staff sections for adequate coordination. More hardware quickly resolved this problem. Findlay and his officers emphasized to Mulholland that internal staff communications were only part of the problem he faced. While an SFG commander controls his own communications, a JSOTF commander does not. Findlay stressed that external communications requirements could overwhelm the 5th SFG’s signal staff. One problem was video teleconferences (VTCs) because higher-level commanders and staffs commonly use them, but VTCs are a practice that could be virtually unknown to an SFG commander.

The staff was also responsible for long-range planning, but that function often became secondary because of the press of the new day-to-day operational business. Still, Mulholland would have to focus on ARSOF tactical operations and, as the JSOTF commander, develop and execute the special operations campaign. COL Findlay was especially concerned about longrange planning. The commander “cannot be the guy to do the coordination between current and future operations,” he warned. To do both required a J3 staff with more personnel than those authorized in the SFG S3 section. Unfortunately, SOCCENT used all 120 augmentees to fill its battle staff. None were available for the 5th SFG or NSWG-1.

Another outstanding problem was security classifications on potential operations in Afghanistan. Soldiers in ODAs have Secret clearances, but they were not authorized access to Focal Point information. Operations in Afghanistan were classified under the focal point system. Special Forces soldiers who had to conduct those operations were not authorized to have the vital information they needed for planning. A similar problem was the level of security classification on messages from higher headquarters to COL Mulholland. Most messages were classified Top Secret. This time, it was the limited number of personnel with Top Secret clearances in the Special Forces battalions that severely limited access to information. Again, this meant that the soldiers in the ODAs were not authorized the necessary information. With no solution coming from higher headquarters, Mulholland determined that the restrictions the classification process imposed were unrealistic and would endanger his soldiers’ safety. He decided that the ODAs had a “need to know” and directed that they receive all necessary information.

Richards, Walters, and Findlay realized that “Mulholland was way over-tasked.” In response, Findlay recommended to RADM Calland that he designate the 5th SFG the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) and that SOCCENT either be the JSOTF or that he establish a JSOTF from other assets. The SOCCENT commander elected to continue with the 5th SFG as a JSOTF. While the designation ensured that the 5th SFG would receive special operations air assets and improve its position in the joint environment, both Mulholland and Richards knew that the 5th SFG could not, because it had never been a long-term JSOTF, function as such without experienced joint staff help.

That experienced help came in the form of Richards, Walters, and 13 others from SOCJFCOM. Richards deployed to Afghanistan with the 5th SFG advance party in early October to help establish the JSOTF. The other SOCJFCOM soldiers arrived with the main body. COL Mulholland used the SOCJFCOM personnel as his J2, J3, J4, assistant J6, and chief of the joint planning group. They also assisted the rest of the nascent JSOTF-North staff with its functional areas. Without standing up a separate ARSOTF, the JSOTF staff was responsible for isolating all Special Forces detachments to be inserted, for resupplying those detachments, for controlling subordinate unit communications, and for tracking the movements and tactical operations of those detachments in the combat zone 24 hours a day.