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War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Taliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. As the rays of the early morning sun reflected from the twin towers of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11), few Americans had heard those names. Within hours, however, few Americans would not recognize those names. Not since 1941 had a foreign power directly attacked the United States. Just as one generation of Americans can recall where it was on 7 December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was bombed and another remembers 22 November 1963—the day President John F. Kennedy was assassinated— so, too, will another generation of Americans recall where it was on the morning of 9/11.

President George W. Bush characterized the 9/11 attacks as “acts of mass murder” and pledged “to find those responsible and bring them to justice.” Unequivocally, he declared that the attacks were “acts of war.” Within 24 hours, intelligence reports had linked bin Laden to the attacks, and congressmen and military officials were calling for retaliation.While Secretary of State Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offensive to garner support for U.S. offensive action, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prepared an order to mobilize reservists and members of the National Guard. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that the military was “entering into a campaign against terrorism.” On 14 September 2001, the U.S. Congress approved a joint resolution that authorized “the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden had become America’s “public enemy number 1” and the focus of an unprecedented worldwide manhunt with Afghanistan the center of attention.

Having been regarded as a “backwater” country by U.S. government departments and agencies, designating Afghanistan as a top priority after 9/11 did not yield instant gratification, even with America’s vast information resources and technology. The geography and demography posed significant challenges to operations in Afghanistan. Mountains that rise to almost 17,000 feet cover two-thirds of the country, and high desert plateau dominates the rest. Only 15 percent of the land can support agriculture. There are three major languages and 30 minor languages spoken. Religious divisions between the majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shi’a Muslims are further complicated by different tribal cultures and historic rivalries. Centuries of oppression, 80-percent illiteracy, famine conditions as a result of seven years of drought, and general lack of infrastructure would hamper diplomatic and military options designed to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorists and drive the Taliban from power. Of no small import were the millions of unmarked land mines strewn all over the country during the 10-year Soviet occupation.

Figure 1. Extensive mountainous terrain.

History also had made Afghanistan a difficult battleground. Whether it was involved in the “Great Game” played by Russia and Great Britain or a newer regional power version that involved the Russians, Iranians, and Americans, Afghanistan had been a geopolitical pawn for more than a century. Its neighbor, nuclear-armed Pakistan, could not be ignored nor could that nation’s nuclear-armed rival to the east, India. Within Afghanistan, perpetual ethnic infighting, tension between the extreme fundamentalists and the more moderate branches of Islam, primary loyalty to ethnic regional warlords rather than to a nation, a common willingness to sell military service to the highest bidder, and a tradition of violent overthrows of any “national” governments were legacies that U.S. diplomats and soldiers could not disregard.

“We will rally the world,” declared the president, and Powell immediately launched a diplomatic offensive to garner the support of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “We’re building a strong coalition to go after these perpetrators,” Powell told reporters. Within days, U.S.government officials had received words of support from Russia, China, NATO, and the European Union. The tangible evidence was the commitment of British, Australian, and New Zealand military forces to join America in the fight against terrorism. Iran’s position was questionable, but British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw obtained a pledge that the Persians would not interfere with the coalition’s efforts. On 22 September 2001, the United Arab Emirates severed all diplomatic ties with the Taliban, and three days later, Saudi Arabia followed suit. Pakistan refused to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime. Coalition support of the war on international terrorism proved invaluable.

American relations with Pakistan had always been and would continue to be extremely delicate. Although the United States had a long history with Pakistan that included surrogate support of the mujahideen, the Pakistanis provided recruits and equipment and recognized the Taliban government. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a leading figure among the leaders of the growing coalition, knew that Pakistani cooperation would be critical. The day after the attacks on the United States, President Musharraf had pledged his “unstinted cooperation.” Powell provided Musharraf with a list of exactly what support the United States wanted. The sometimes violent internal reactions to Musarraf ’s commitment indicated how tenuous his power was, especially after the Taliban had threatened invasion if the United States was permitted to launch attacks against Afghanistan from Pakistan. A strong diplomatic push from State Department officials convinced Pakistan to send envoys to meet with Mullah Omar to urge him to turn bin Laden over to the United States. A similar demand from the UN followed. On 21 September, the Taliban rejected the UN demand and a week later informed Pakistan that it would not surrender bin Laden. As the only country maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban, Musharraf did not want Pakistan to become an international pariah. At the same time, U.S. government officials needed to exploit that link to convey messages to the Taliban and quietly urged the Pakistanis to maintain ties. The United States prevailed until the war was well on its way. On 22 November 2001, Pakistan ordered all Taliban diplomats out of the country, and the embassy closed.

Figure 2. Pakistan government building.

Equally as important as creating a coalition of nations to fight the al-Qaeda and drive the Taliban from power was creating an alliance among the anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan. Former Soviet Army Lieutenant Igor Lisinenko, a wounded Afghanistan veteran, warned, “the Afghans will stop fighting each other and join together to fight you.” American diplomats, mindful of the Soviet experience, began weaving their way through the maze of tribal, subtribal, factional, and religious relationships that had characterized Afghanistan for centuries. In Washington, a representative of the Northern Alliance living in exile met with U.S. officials who recognized the importance of building a strong relationship. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld understood that the Northern Alliance could “be useful in a variety of ways.” To avoid offending Pashtuns who were not well represented in the Northern Alliance, Rumsfeld reminded officials that ties had to be forged with “tribes in the south.” An alliance that included all Afghan tribes was critical to dispelling the appearance of favoritism, that a foreign power was supporting one group, or that another foreign army was invading Afghanistan. In the forefront of every major military decision was the political goal of providing the Afghans with the environment and opportunity to establish a stable government after the Taliban was forced from power. Powell made that clear in a late September 2001 pronouncement: “We are interested in a multiethnic Afghanistan.”

Figure 3. Tribal factions, regions, and leaders.

Ironically, just as Leonid Brezhnev had done in 1980 to justify the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter—“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense”—to establish secure footing for additional coalition support. The difference in September 2001 was that the community of nations saw through the Soviet chimera of foreign invasion while the rubble of the World Trade Center towers provided glaring evidence to UN diplomats in New York. Calmly, systematically, and methodically, U.S. government leaders were “dotting the i’s” and “crossing the t’s.”

“Dead or Alive” was the order issued at the Pentagon on 17 September 2001. That was how badly the president wanted bin Laden brought to justice. This was no idle threat. Two days earlier at Camp David, President Bush met with his national security team to review options for responding to the terrorist attacks. CIA Director George Tenet proposed a plan to capitalize on the Northern Alliance’s opposition to the Taliban. U.S. ground forces would link up with those fighters to attack terrorist supporters in and around cities of northern Afghanistan. According to the president, Rumsfeld “understood the utility of having the CIA involved” and “quickly grasped” the essence of the plan “to mate up our assets with the Northern Alliance troops.” Then the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Henry Shelton presented three military options. The first two consisted of cruise missile and manned bomber attacks; the third combined cruise missile and manned bomber attacks with placing American “boots on the ground”—inserting Army Special Forces troops.

Figure 4. Map depicting the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Afghanistan.

President Bush ordered development of Shelton’s third option. According to National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice afterward, “Probably the most important conclusion that he [Bush] came to was that this military action . . . had to look different from what the United States had been doing over the past ten years or so. It could not just be an air campaign. It could not just be a cruise missile campaign. There had to be boots on the ground. We had to have a ground presence to demonstrate our seriousness. Probably that insight governed more of what we did than anything else.” As the American news media bandied about on courses of action, Russian veterans of Afghanistan shared their experience and opinions.

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz lectured statesmen and commanders that “the most far-reaching act of judgment” that they “have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who studied Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, concluded that Soviet leaders failed to heed Clausewitz’s warning: “Our armed forces came prepared for the Cold War, for general battle, and they were completely ineffective.” Lieutenant General (LTG) Boris Gromov, who had commanded the Soviet 40th Army, agreed with Golts: “For the Americans, introducing land forces would not lead to anything good,” he predicted. Other Soviet officers speculated on the value of committing American ground forces to fight in Afghanistan and what they would encounter. A ground war would be “useless” warned General Makmut Goryeev. Former infantry battalion commander Ruslan Auslev predicted, “The American army will meet with fanatical resistance.” GEN Tommy Franks, who commanded the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), knew full well the history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and made it clear that he did not intend to repeat those mistakes. “The Soviets introduced 650,000 troops,” he said. “We took that as instructive, as a way not to do it.”

It would not be done that way. On 15 September 2001, when President Bush, as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, told “everybody who wears the uniform to get ready,” Washington Post reporters had already speculated that Special Forces were “certain to be at the center of the action.” Rumsfeld acknowledged that when the war against terrorism began, “a lot of the effort . . . will be special operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White seconded that acknowledgment. He warned America’s adversaries “to watch carefully, for you are about to see our finest hour.” At a joint session of Congress on 20 September, Bush spoke passionately about grief, anger, resolution, and justice. “The Taliban is committing murder,” he declared, and as “heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20th century . . . they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.” U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) would push the Taliban into that grave.

Some background history is necessary to better understand who and what constitutes the ARSOF today. ARSOF traces its heritage to the very foundations of America. During the French and Indian wars in the 1750s, Major (MAJ) Robert Rogers led his rangers on daring raids deep into French territory. Brigadier General (BG) Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox,” attacked unsuspecting British troops in the Southern colonies during the Revolution using unconventional tactics far different from those that European armies experienced. Union and Confederate raiders, on land and at sea, harassed rear areas, destroyed rail lines, cut telegraph lines, and disrupted sea commerce during the Civil War. During World War II, the U.S.-Canada 1st Special Service Force, “Darby’s Rangers,” and “Merrill’s Marauders” achieved results far out of proportion to their numbers in North Africa, Italy, France, and Burma. Having realized the need to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines, Major General (MG) William J. Donovan created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to conduct raids and train partisans for guerrilla operations in Europe and Asia. In 1952, the dedicated efforts of Colonel (COL) Aaron Bank, BG Robert McClure, and COL Russell Volckmann resulted in the formation of the Army Special Forces and the transformation of the Army’s Psychological Warfare School into the Special Warfare Center. Training concentrated on infiltration techniques, foreign languages, small-unit tactics, intelligence collection, and counterinsurgency operations. In September 1961, the Special Forces adopted the Green Beret as their official headgear. From 1956 until 1971, Army Special Forces served in the Republic of Vietnam and earned a heroic reputation in American military history.

Figure 5. BG McClure, COL Volckmann, and COL Bank.

In 1980, less than a year after the debacle of Desert One in Iran, Army Chief of Staff GEN Edward Meyer directed the enhancement of the ARSOF’s capabilities. Two years later, the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was activated to coordinate the training, equipping, and organizing of the Army’s SFGs, Ranger battalions, Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), and Psychological Operations Group (POG). This was the beginning of a major Army effort to broaden special operations capabilities—an effort that resulted in a third Ranger battalion and a regimental headquarters, the 3rd SFG, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and the 528th Special Operations Support and 112th Special Operations Signal Battalions. In 1989, the U.S. Army consolidated 1st SOCOM, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), and the Reserve Special Operations Command under a major command—the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USASOC became the Army component of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that was activated in 1987. As one would expect, ARSOF trains and conducts operations worldwide year-round, having done so since its inception.

Thus, USASOC forces were conducting scheduled training exercises in the United States and overseas when America came under attack on 9/11. Small elements from the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) headquarters and the signal and support battalions were in the Middle East for Exercise EARLY VICTOR, supporting the 5th SFG and preparing for Exercise FOAL EAGLE in Korea. The 5th SFG was also preparing for Exercise DESERT SPRING in the Persian Gulf region. One battalion of the 3rd SFG was training in Africa. Ranger companies were conducting small-unit training, including standard parachute assaults. Unit staff officers were planning for the cycle of spring 2002 exercises. The commander of the 9th PSYOP Battalion was at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Arkansas, and other PSYOP soldiers were preparing to deploy to the Middle East for the annual BRIGHT STAR exercise. Aircraft from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) were supporting in the Persian Gulf region and at JRTC, and staff planners were attending an exercise conference in New Mexico. The headquarters staffs at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were going about their daily routine. For ARSOF soldiers, it was just another day.

Within hours of the 3,052 Americans being murdered at the World Trade Center in New York; at the Pentagon in Washington, DC; and in a Pennsylvania field, the posture of the U.S. military changed to full alert, and preparations for war began—threat and defense conditions had been raised to the highest levels based on the multiple terrorist attacks. CENTCOM, whose area of responsibility (AOR) spanned the Middle East and Eurasia, cancelled all official travel in the region, and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) cancelled all regional exercises. U.S. intelligence agencies focused maximum effort on identifying the perpetrators of the attacks and heading off follow-up assaults. Federal buildings and U.S. defense installations quickly instituted stringent access procedures to inspect vehicles and to verify the identity of all personnel seeking entrance. The thorough implementation of these increased security measures initially resulted in lengthy waits at entry checkpoints and traffic backups that affected both the installations and the surrounding civilian communities. Within a 10-mile radius of Fort Bragg, there were major traffic delays. USASOC soldiers were issued weapons and ammunition and joined other Fort Bragg soldiers to close access roads, install traffic barriers, stretch concertina wire, and guard family housing areas and headquarters. Although all soldiers receive some basic infantry skills training, many found themselves on guard duty, having never performed that role. In several support units, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with previous infantry experience taught their troops how to walk a guard post, to challenge anyone who approached them, and what to do when faced by a perceived threat. “Force Protection” had real meaning, and unit commanders scrutinized security measures to protect soldiers and their families, units, and installations. Shortages of critical equipment were sent directly to Department of the Army. The “lock down” at Fort Bragg, home of USASOC and the 82nd Airborne Division, “America’s Guard of Honor,” pulled national media reporters like a magnet.

The Washington Post had speculated on 15 September that Special Forces would be at the center of America’s response. While individual National Guardsmen and Army reservists were being mobilized openly and tight security measures were being followed at U.S. military installations nationwide, CENTCOM and its regional special operations headquarters—the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT)—were summoning operations and logistics planners to Tampa, Florida, from USASOC to develop plans to retaliate against the terrorists. Less than a week after 9/11, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld gave the battle against terrorism a name—Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). By 5 October, commanders had decided on possible courses of action. Staffs worked to prepare documents necessary to implement any of the courses of action being considered so that when the JCS made decisions, the implementing commands of CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and USSOCOM could issue warning orders, operation orders, supporting plans, and overseas deployment orders. As it turned out, Rumsfeld personally set the date to begin infiltrations into Afghanistan.

Figure 6. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld names the operational efforts.

The JCS designated CENTCOM as the supported combatant command. CENTCOM was to “fight the war,” and Franks was in charge. All other defense commands would furnish what CENTCOM requested. That headquarters implemented the guidance of President Bush. SOCCENT rapidly became the focus for military operations. Franks’ mission was to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its infrastructure and then to provide military support to humanitarian operations. To accomplish these tasks, the CENTCOM combatant commander had to build a force that allowed for credible military options, conduct initial combat operations and establish the conditions for follow-on operations, build coalition military support and execute decisive combat operations, prevent the reemergence of terrorism, and provide support to humanitarian relief efforts. The SOCCENT commander, Rear Admiral (RADM) Bert Calland, recognized that his command had to get SOF with their unique capabilities into Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda.

SOF across the spectrum would be needed. Since unconventional warfare (UW) would be a major part, Army Special Forces, those with the most training and experience, would be supported by Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) elements. Since PSYOP would support all aspects of the CENTCOM war campaign, Franks established a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) to coordinate PSYOP efforts. With winter approaching, the Afghan people’s needs had to be considered. Humanitarian assistance would be a major undertaking. That meant Army CA would have a major role. As during the war against Iraq (Operation DESERT STORM), U.S. air power would play a major role in combat operations.

With the potential of aircraft being shot down during the air campaign, Calland established the Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (JSOTF-North) to recover downed aircrews. Anticipating that ground operations, humanitarian assistance, and UW would follow initial air attacks, the 5th SFG was tasked to serve as the JSOTF-North. Since an SFG doctrinally would direct only the ARSOF assigned to a joint task force (JTF), the 5th SFG had not trained for this expanded role and did not have the personnel and equipment necessary to perform as a joint field headquarters. Considerable augmentation from the other military services was required, more equipment was needed to accommodate different requirements of the other services, and a “cram course” on joint staff functions facilitated the rapid transition to a JSOTF headquarters. In late December 2001, Calland established JSOTF-South to integrate coalition forces with American SOF conducting direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions in southern Afghanistan. This JTF was built around the headquarters of Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1). Together, these two JTFs would maintain pressure on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan. Rather than deploy his SOCCENT headquarters to a staging base near Afghanistan, Calland established his base in a Persian Gulf country to maintain theaterwide situational awareness. “My job is AOR wide,” the rear admiral said.

As the supported combatant command, many headquarters assisted CENTCOM. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and its Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) immediately began planning the logistics support required for any military operation in Afghanistan. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) sent training teams to the 3rd and 5th SFGs to help staffs identify other service augmentees, to coach JTF operations procedures, and to provide experienced joint staff officers to facilitate the necessary rapid standup of the JSOTF headquarters. In addition to the military, numerous U.S. government departments and activities were called on to support the war, and soldiers were called on to coordinate with those staff elements.

The primary USASOC mission was to provide ARSOF to fight and support the war effort. COL Phillip McGhee, the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM), met daily with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration (DCSFDI) under the direction of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to brainstorm requirements and funding; to provide additional equipment and vehicles to deploying ARSOF units; to identify the training, instructors, and facilities needed to produce more ARSOF soldiers faster; to increase flying hours for the 160th SOAR; and to identify internal sources of funding for immediate needs while the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) was appropriated to fund the war in Afghanistan.

The DCSRM staff, major subordinate commands (MSCs), and major subordinate units (MSUs) began daily meetings on 9 October 2001 to discuss plans to finance the war, what requirements had funding priority, reporting systems, and the approved use of DERF funds from USSOCOM. LTG Bryan D. Brown’s guidance on DERF funds for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM was very specific: “Along with this funding comes the responsibility to comply with guidelines related to spending and accounting for expenditure of these dollars. . . . My guidance to you is succinct—Do What’s Right! I will personally review selected DERF expenditures on a weekly basis.” Needless to say, the $69 million DERF appropriation did not expire on 30 September 2001, but the fiscal year (FY) end close for FY 01 was a success.

Figure 7. LTG Bryan D. Brown encourages soldiers.

Training soldiers to fill the ARSOF ranks is the primary mission of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). Without war pending, this is a difficult task. Two sobering realities are that units scheduled for deployment are filled to full strength, and during war, casualties have to be replaced. Thus, reconstituting SF detachments would severely impact the SF training cadres.

With the prospect of a lengthy special operations campaign, manpower was critical. Special operations soldiers cannot be mass-produced quickly. Enlisted soldiers who volunteer for SF duty, on average, have been in the Army for four years. Officers must have three and onehalf years of service. The individual training necessary to produce an SF soldier requires approximately six months. All SF-qualified soldiers then undergo four to six months of language training. Many then attend advanced training in underwater operations or military freefall parachuting. Special operations aviators must have three to four years’ flying experience before volunteering for the 160th SOAR. The pilots and air crewmen undergo six months of intensive training to attain basic mission qualification status. Then they must have one and one-half to two years of SOF flight operations experience before they are considered fully mission qualified to fly all special operations missions. On 2 December 2001, the U.S. Army directed all soldiers with military occupational specialties (MOSs) of SF, special operations aviation, and other aviation specialties to be retained on active duty involuntarily. This directive resulted in one officer, 13 warrant officers, and 983 enlisted soldiers being retained on active duty beyond the date they otherwise would be eligible to retire, resign, or be released from their enlistments.

While Department of the Army instituted “stop loss” to freeze retirements, resignations, and end-of-enlistment releases of SF-qualified personnel and ARSOF aviators, SWCS developed a plan to continue training SF-qualified personnel with a reduced military cadre. SWCS mobilized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) augmentees; prepared to hire contractors as instructors; evaluated the impact of shortened courses of instruction; and made contingency plans for additional housing, classrooms, and transportation for an increased student load. The plan, fortunately, did not have to be implemented fully. Several CA officers’ courses were conducted to meet critical needs in the Army Reserve units. Because of a shortage of SF soldiers, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command increased its efforts and initiated a program to recruit for SF “off the street,” just as they do for Army Rangers.

Mobilizing Army reservists, National Guardsmen, ARNG SFGs and aviation maintenance units, and USAR PSYOP and CA units was a major task for USASOC and its subordinate commands, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC); the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC); and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). The SWCS accelerated initial training programs for ARNG SF soldiers and increased refresher training class sizes. USASOC used USAR training battalions to qualify approximately 300 CA soldiers in their MOSs. In addition, USASOC exercised an approved contingency plan to activate 36 USAR CA instructors. That decision enabled SWCS to double the number of CA and PSYOP enlisted soldiers the school could train. The quality of training that Army special operations soldiers received had prepared them well for the rigors and dangers of combat.

ARSOF staff and unit training with conventional Army forces had to be reduced during the war buildup. Normally, ARSOF train at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The special operations group and battalion staffs are rotated regularly through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. These realistic training experiences give commanders and staffs the opportunity to “fight” their units in a variety of environments, getting performance feedback that will enable the leaders to capitalize on the experience and improve their capabilities under combat conditions. Overseas deployment orders caused the rescheduling of one JRTC exercise and the cancellation of another. Three BCTP exercises were cancelled; one was conducted but with reduced numbers. No exercises were scheduled for the NTC.

In addition to field exercises in the United States, the ARSOF regularly trains with foreign militaries. Thirteen JCS-scheduled annual overseas exercises to increase military-to-military contact and train at unit level were cancelled because of the terrorist attacks. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program differs from the JCS overseas training exercises in that its purpose is to familiarize American SOF with how their counterparts in other countries operate. According to former Department of Defense (DOD) spokesman Ken Bacon, JCETs allow American SOF “to build up relationships with the military in other nations.” Twenty-one exchanges were cancelled because of the attacks. While these invaluable foreign exchanges could not be supported, responsibilities and obligations associated with mobilizing USAR and ARNG units filled those voids.

USASOC, as do most other Army commands, has a mobilization table of distribution and allowances (TDA) that allows the headquarters in wartime to augment its staff with USAR and ARNG officers, warrant officers, and NCOs. On 14 September 2001, President Bush authorized the activation of 10,000 USAR and ARNG personnel. From those numbers and based on the TDA, six personnel reported to serve on the USASOC and subordinate command staffs on 23 September, and another 98 arrived over the next few months. USASOC also mobilized the two ARNG SFGs, one PSYOP company, one CAB, one aviation maintenance company, a transportation company, a quartermaster company, an ordnance company (attached to the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion [SOSB]), and two military history detachments from September 2001 through April 2002. The mobilization had some problems. Some individuals were mobilized before the USAR units that were to in-process the soldiers had been mobilized. Highly motivated USAR and ARNG soldiers reported to USASOC headquarters, but they could not be put to work until they had been officially brought onto active duty. There were staff issues concerning responsibilities and standing operating procedures (SOPs) to administer the individual and unit federal service activations. These problems were resolved as the command settled into a war posture. All that became reality within three weeks of 9/11.

On 8 October 2001, President Bush announced to the American people in a nationally televised address that during the previous night U.S.-led airstrikes struck targets near Kabul and Kandahar. However, to wage a military campaign effectively in the remoteness of Afghanistan, the use of regional bases was critical. Secretary of State Powell, the CJCS during Operation DESERT STORM, clearly recognized that need and, in particular, the critical value of Uzbekistan: “Uzbekistan was [the country] of greatest interest to us . . . because it was a direct line of supply down into the area of the Northern Alliance.” Powell’s focused diplomatic efforts paid off when the Uzbeks granted airspace clearance and permitted coalition support and search-and-rescue forces to be based at Karshi Kanabad. With permission granted, U.S. Air Force cargo planes began to shuttle ARSOF nonstop into Karshi Kanabad (later known as K2) from European bases. Elements of the 528th SOSB, 112th Signal Battalion, and 160th SOAR preceded the advance parties of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), the 96th CAB, and the 5th SFG. The 5th SFG was the nucleus of JSOTF-North that initially provided command and control for combat search and air rescue operations in northern Afghanistan.

Figure 8. Helicopter view of Karshi Kanabad (K2) Air Base, Uzbekistan.

Critical to conducting any military operations is establishing a command and control center, communications network, and logistics base. While the 528th SOSB valiantly labored to convert half of a former Soviet airfield into a usable American facility, the 112th Signal Battalion established critical communications.

Figure 9. The 528th Support Battalion kept the water flowing.

Figure 10. The 112th Signal Battalion established the JSOTF-North communications links.

Figure 11. The 528th Support Battalion soldiers prepared for base camp construction.

Within JSOTF-North headquarters, the 160th SOAR staff coordinated combat search and air rescue missions with Joint Special Operations Air Component Command (JSOACC) planners and with 5th SFG for future combat missions. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that envoys were in contact “with the whole gamut of Afghan factions, including the Northern Alliance,” and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had stated on “Meet the Press” that the United States was attempting to find ways to assist antiterrorist forces. CA detachments prepared plans to provide blankets and food to displaced persons within Afghanistan as soon as the tactical situation stabilized. Concerned that winter would exacerbate survival problems for Afghan villagers who had already faced seven years of famine, U.S. Air Force C-17s began airdropping food on 7 October.

Two days later, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft broadcast radio messages that emphasized an international mission to free the Afghan people from oppressive, fundamental Islamic, Taliban rule. Some messages the Product Development Company (8th Psychological Operations Battalion), JPOTF, prepared were pointed directly at the Afghan populace, urging them to “Drive out the Foreign Terrorists.” These ARSOF precombat activities and the air campaign were preparing the way for ground combat operations.

Figure 12. C-17 Globemaster III taking off from K2 to make humanitarian food drops.

Figure 13. Commando Solo airborne broadcasting platform.

Figure 14. “Drive Out the Foreign Terrorists” leaflet dropped during the air campaign.

During the night of 19 October 2001, the ground war began when nearly 200 Rangers parachute assaulted into Afghanistan from MC-130s, and two operational detachment As (ODAs) from the 5th SFG were inserted into the mountains of northern Afghanistan by 160th SOAR MH-47E helicopters. Those well-orchestrated multiple night combat operations put American “boots on the ground” to launch the ground campaign to root out and destroy the al-Qaeda and Taliban and establish a viable multiethnic government in Afghanistan. War as an instrument of U.S. policy had begun.

Figure 15. 75th Rangers night parachute assault on Objective Rhino.

Figure 16. MH-47E helicopters taxi for preflight checks before night missions.

Figure 17. 160th SOAR—loaded and ready for night operations.

Since it was the efforts of individual ARSOF soldiers and detachments on the ground that made the ground campaign to drive the Taliban from power and successfully provide an environment in which a multiethnic government could be established, the story of the war can be presented most interestingly in a chronological series of “soldier stories.” The first group describes initial preparations for war in the United States by PSYOP and SF staff personnel and two SFGs—the 5th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 3rd at Fort Bragg—with support from the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. These stories are based primarily on recorded interviews with participants.