Читать книгу Cyber Mayday and the Day After - Daniel Lohrmann - Страница 7

While this 2035 Mayday scenario is just fiction, the bombardment of daily security incidents is beyond eye-opening in real life. With the ongoing digital transformation, which accelerated even faster in diverse areas of society and every corner of the globe during the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of cyber emergency incidents has been felt from hospitals to high schools, from elections to electric grids, from main street retailers to Wall Street bankers, and from small-town PTA meetings to United Nations Security Council meetings.

The following quotes are very real, coming after an unprecedented barrage of cyberattacks hit global governments and businesses in 2020 and 2021:

 President Joe Biden: “We've elevated the status of cyber issues within our government,” President Biden said in a national security speech at the State Department. “We are launching an urgent initiative to improve our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace.”¹

 U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell: When we talk about cyber risk, what kind of scenarios are we looking at? U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell responded to host Scott Pelley, as part of a 60 Minutes interview, “All different kinds. I mean, there are scenarios in which a large payment utility, for example, breaks down and the payment system can't work. Payments can't be completed. There are scenarios in which a large financial institution would lose the ability to track the payments that it's making and things like that. Things like that where you would have a part of the financial system come to a halt, or perhaps even a broad part.”Powell continued: “And so we spend so much time and energy and money guarding against these things. There are cyber attacks every day on all major institutions now. And the government is working hard on that. So are all the private sector companies. There's a lot of effort going in to deal with those threats. That's a big part of the threat picture in today's world.”Pelley: “How have we gotten away with not having a disaster like that?”Powell: “You know, I don't want to jinx us. I would just say we've worked very hard at it. A lot of us have worked very hard at this and invested a lot of time and money and thought. And worked collaboratively [sic] with our allies and with other government agencies. But there's never a feeling at any time that you've done enough or that you feel safe.”²

 FireEye CEO Kevin Mandia during U.S. Senate testimony on the Solarwinds breach: “Early in our investigation, we uncovered some tell-tale signs that the attackers were likely working for and trained by a foreign intelligence service. We were able to discover and identify these signs in reliance upon our catalog of the trace evidence of thousands of computer intrusion investigations conducted over the last 17 years. We record the digital fingerprints of every investigation we have undertaken with great rigor and discipline, and we are often able to use this catalog of evidence in order to attribute the threat actors in many of the incidents we respond to.“Based on the knowledge gained through our years of experience responding to cyber incidents, we concluded that we were witnessing an attack by a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities. This attack was different from the multitude of incidents to which we have responded throughout the years. The attackers tailored their capabilities specifically to target and attack our company (and their other victims). They operated clandestinely, using methods that counter security tools and forensic examination. They also operated with both constraint and focus, targeting specific information and specific people, as if following collection requirements. They did not perform actions that were indiscriminate, and they did not appear to go on ‘fishing expeditions.’“Such focused targeting, combined with the novel combination of techniques not witnessed by us or our partners in the past, contributed to our conclusion that this was a foreign intelligence actor. Therefore, on December 8, 2020, we publicly disclosed that we were attacked by a highly sophisticated threat actor – one whose discipline, operational security, and techniques led us to believe it was a state-sponsored attack utilizing novel techniques… .”³

 Microsoft president Brad Smith: “The Russians did not just want to get inside the houses of the victims. They wanted to find the most interesting valuables, which to them meant reading, examining, and in some cases taking data and information. Just as they used many ways to initially attack their victims and open a back door, they also used a variety of ways to compromise identity.“It is important to understand this aspect of the attack: Unlike some attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities in software, this attack was based on finding and stealing the privileges, certificates, tokens or other keys within on-premises networks (which together is referred to as ‘identity’) that would provide access to information in the same way the owner would access it. This approach was made much easier in networks where basic cybersecurity hygiene was not being observed – that is, where the keys to the safe and the car were left out in the open.”⁴

 SolarWinds CEO Sudhakar Ramakrishna: “We believe that the entire software industry should be concerned about the nation state attack as the methodologies and approaches that the threat actor(s) used can be replicated to impact software and hardware products from any company, and these are not SolarWinds-specific vulnerabilities.“To this end, we are sharing our findings with the broader community of vendors, partners, and users so that together, we ensure the safety of our environments.”⁵

 Federal chief information security officer Christopher J. DeRusha: “We are at a crossroads for the nation's cybersecurity. The SolarWinds incident exposed gaps in our cybersecurity capabilities and risk management programs, not just in the federal government, but in some of the most mature and well-resourced companies in the world. This event should serve as both a wakeup call and a galvanizing opportunity for the federal government and industry to come together and tackle these threats with renewed resolve. This collaboration is critical, as private-sector entities have primary responsibility for the defense and security of their networks. The government must communicate threat assessments to inform private-sector security operations and ensure common situational awareness.“This incident comes amid a series of aggressive and high-profile attacks on federal systems, attempted theft of the data used to develop the COVID-19 vaccines, ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals, and new technology and security challenges that arose with the rapid shift to remote work. These myriad challenges underscore the importance and urgency of modernizing federal IT and strengthening U.S. cybersecurity capabilities.”⁶

 U.S. Senator Ben Sasse (R-Neb.) after a critical U.S. fuel pipeline system was shut down by a cyberattack in early May 2021: “There's obviously much still to learn about how this attack happened, but we can be sure of two things: This is a play that will be run again, and we're not adequately prepared. If Congress is serious about an infrastructure package, at front and center should be the hardening of these critical sectors.”

 Australian prime minister Scott Morrison: “Based on advice provided to me by our cyber experts, Australian organizations are currently being targeted by a sophisticated state-based cyber actor.“This activity is targeting Australian organizations across a range of sectors, including all levels of government, industry, political organizations, education, health, central service providers, and operators of other critical infrastructure.”⁷