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To be sure, the overall significance of international respect in a given country is rooted in that country’s social realities and particularities such as its political system³⁹, its identity and culture, the nature of its relationships with other countries and its (relative) rank and position therein. That said, this section, by taking a specific glance at the cultural dimension, seeks to provide a brief overview of the concept of face and its role in Chinese culture. Face is defined by Goffmann as “an image of self-delineated in terms of approved social attributes (1967, p. 5). As such it is closely related to respect. That said, Leung and Chan (2003), building upon concise preliminary research by Goffmann (1972) and King (1993), define face as “the respect, pride, and dignity of an individual as a consequence of his/her social achievement and the practice of it” (p. 1575). Similarly, Ting-Toomey & Kurogi label it a “claimed sense of favorable social self-worth that a person wants others to have of her or him. It is a vulnerable identity-based resource because it can be enhanced or threatened in any uncertain social situation” (1998, p. 187). What is peculiar in this regard is the implied belief that face needs very much are subject to change, depending on the cultural context as well as the social relationship at work. Brown & Levinson (1978) further distinguish between positive and negative face, the former denoting someone’s claim over its self-ascribed self-image, the latter representing claims to territory and other claims not directly associated with self-image concerns. Ultimately, the concept of face bears a close resemblance to respect and related terminologies such as dignity, honor, prestige and status. At the same time, however, certain differences remain. As Ho (1976) sums it up, “the claim to face may rest on the basis of status, whether ascribed or achieved and on personal or non-personal factors; it may also vary according to the group with which a person is interacting. Basic differences are found between the processes involved in gaining versus losing face” (p. 867). Building upon these definitions, face-work is required in order to appropriately consider and save someone else’s face needs in a given social framework. Face-work, thus, can be understood as “a set of communicative behaviour that people use to regulate their social dignity and to support or challenge the other’s social dignity” (1998, p. 188) or as “the use of a complex package of [39] social skills to protect one’s own face and the face of others” (Leung & Chan, 2003, p. 1575).

While face is indeed of Chinese origin, it is by no means solely attributable to Chinese culture. Instead, it is somewhat applicable to non-Chinese cultural settings, especially to Asian⁴⁰ cultural backgrounds, but also non-Asian ones. Preliminary research, yet, suggests that Western-style culture tends to be comparatively bad at face-work (Reischauer, 1962), hence frequently underestimating or simply disregarding the much more significant role of face in other, say Asian cultural settings. This observation is also shared by Techau who maintains:

“Like duty, honor, and pride, respect is almost a non-word in Western culture. These terms have a very reduced meaning in Western political discourse, having been relegated to the realm of the semisacred that is invoked only in Sunday sermons or when honoring fallen soldiers” (Techau, 2013, para. 9).

Moreover, while a truly universal phenomenon, its conceptualization and question as to how to engage in effective face-work is very much country and culture-specific. That said, face is traditionally deeply rooted in Chinese society and culture. Unlike predominant Western conceptions, the role of Chinese face is less subject to the individual human being and strongly associated with Confucianism⁴¹ instead. The latter, guiding China’s political philosophy and identity, is frequently held responsible for China’s view of the world and itself within a predominantly relational context (Ho, 1976; Ho, 2016; Hu, 1944). Against this backdrop, Hwang & Han argue as follows:

“Chinese face is often tightly linked with vertical relationships and close others. Its operation follows a compelling principle of reciprocity. In contrast, Western face emphasizes the separateness of an individual. A person is not required to assume responsibility for the behaviour of relatives or family members. Social interactions abide by the principle reciprocity, but they tend to maintain the individual’s autonomy” (2010, p. 481).

Further illustrating the importance of such vertical relationship context in Chinese culture⁴², Figurette stresses that, in line with Confucianism, “unless [40] there are at least two human beings, there are no human beings” (1972, p. 7). The principle of reciprocity is an indispensable prerequisite of the Chinese face conception. According to Leung and Chan (2003), Chinese face-work, in addition to reciprocity, encompasses three further dimensions: respect, response and reputation. According to this definition, respect is a core element of face and comprises of aspects of each of the three remaining dimensions⁴³.

Prevailing, yet sparse (English-language) literature approaches the subject of face and the role of face-work in China from different angles. Leung & Chang (2003) for instance adopted an economic point of view, scrutinizing the signs of face-work in business negotiations with China. Zhai (2004) and others studied the role of respect in social and interpersonal exchanges and relationship development, largely on the level of the individual human being. Other studies examined the role of face-work and face-negotiation strategy in conflict management with or by China (cf. Wilmot & Hocker, 1998). Ting-Toomey & Kurogi elaborate upon the link between face-work and conflict as follows:

“[F]ace influences conflict behavior, because, in any conflict situation, conflict parties have to consider protecting self-interest conflict goals and honoring or attacking another person’s conflict goals. On top of incompatible goals, intercultural conflict parties typically use their habitual conflict scripts to approach the conflict situation. Intercultural conflict often involves miscommunication between members of two or more cultures over incompatible identity, relational, process, and substantive conflict issues” (1998, p. 188).

One of the most concise theoretical works on the subject is Hu’s article ‘The Chinese Concepts of Face’ (1944). Therein, she identifies and distinguishes between two terms that “on the physical level both mean face” (1944, p. 45), yet slightly differ with respect to their respective sets of criteria: mien-tzu and lien. The former and much older notion, mien-tzu (or mianzi), dates back to the 4^th century B. C and refers to social reputation (or prestige) acquired through achievement and success and, thus, always requires an external environment as well as some kind of deliberate intent of the ego (e.g. self-maximization). The latter, lien, goes back to the Yuan Dynasty (1277–1367) and is associated with “the respect of a group for a man with a good moral reputation” (1944, p. 46), a man with decency and integrity; the external environment’s regard of the ego and with it the relational context matter. Both terms have in common that face can be maintained, decreased or lost. Contrariwise, only mien-tzu can be increased by means of appropriate conduct:

[41] “That lien and mien-tzu constitute separate concepts is well shown in the difference of reaction to the expressions ‘to have no lien’ and to have no mien-tzu. The former is the worst insult, casting doubt on the integrity of ego’s moral character; the latter signifies merely the failure of ego to achieve a reputation through success in life. Again, ‘to want mien-tzu’ is by no means the opposite of ‘not to want lien’. As explained before, the latter means that society considers ego’s action a deliberate flaunting of moral standards in order to obtain practical advantages […]. As soon as the motive behind ego’s actions becomes apparent in this case, he is shamed by loss of lien” (1944, p. 61).

Despite their rather marginal differences, both terms vastly overlap with and closely relate to one another. For instance, loss of lien, being the loss of moral reputation by society in ego’s character, is unforgivable and will make it significantly more difficult to maintain mien-tzu. However, the significance of both lien and even more so mien-tzu is not constant but contingent on the social status and context of ego. According to Hu, “[a]ll persons growing up in any community have the same claim to lien, an honest, decent ‘face’; but their mien-tzu will differ with the status of the family, personal ties, ego’s ability to impress people, etc.” (1944, p. 62). Similarly, the amount of lien is related to an actor’s social rank or status and the degree to which lien is considered important by the actor itself:

“The higher he ascends the social ladder, the wider the circle of eyes fastened upon his career, the more he must try to impress people. ‘Loss of lien’ must be avoided, of course; a question regarding the integrity of his moral character would cause him to sink low in the esteem of his group“ (1944, p. 63).

Applying these lessons to the collective level of the Chinese political elite, it can be argued that the latter rather depends on lien and can be expected to have more to lose (increased sensitivity) since the average people expect the political elite to behave particularly responsibly, not least as any “irresponsible behavior in ego will arouse doubts as to his competence in maintaining his status” (1944, p. 62). Any allegedly irresponsible politician or government official who does not take his obligations and duties seriously and does not demonstrate integrity is not to be trusted because he does “not have enough concern for lien” (p. 62). Corruption constitutes a practical example thereof. Several surveys and opinion polls⁴⁴ in recent years have shown that Chinese [42] citizens indeed regard corruption to be one or even the major problem in Chinese politics to date⁴⁵.

If face is consciously denied or at least not appropriately recognized by another party by adequate face-work, a negative effect on a given actor’s face and, ultimately, its self-worth conception results: As Hu puts it: “Deliberately […] make a person ‘lose lien’ is termed non-consideration for so-and-so’s mien-tzu” (1944, p. 62). Just as discussed in the previous section on the concept of respect, deliberate non-consideration of an actor’s self-evaluated needs is associated with a non-confirmation of its self-worth conception, hence causing strong discontent and adverse cognitive effects that may affect preference formation and response patterns. Likewise, in the absence of both, respect and face, actors may seek to obtain and secure an adequate amount of face/respect, if necessary in a proactive and assertive manner. Qin Yaqing, CIIS author and president of the prestigious China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), further specifies this dynamic as follows:

“[T]he protection – or saving – of one’s mianzi is extremely important in building and maintaining self-esteem. When a Chinese person feels that they have lost mianzi, their self-esteem will be hurt, and balance in emotion and even in life will also be lost. Therefore, Chinese do not only maintain mianzi passively; they also try to elevate mianzi proactively” (2011, p. 52).

However, unlike deliberate affronts, unintentional non-consideration of an actor’s face needs can be quite difficult to identify by others, particularly by actors from other cultural backgrounds. This is due to the fact that “what a sensitive person feels as ‘loss of lien’ may be regarded as no more than ‘looking bad on his or her mien-tzu’ by an outsider” (1944, p. 62). Qin Yaqing distinctly underscores this argument, thereby also pointing to the dual perception character of Chinese face at large:

“Mianzi is relational in nature for it is significant only in social relations. Mianzi is obtained only when one is socially recognized. It is self-perceiving and other-giving. It is both about how Chinese perceive themselves and how they feel other people perceive them. There is no mianzi without social recognition. Mianzi is very important among Chinese people and within the relational Chinese society. It concerns not only one’s social status in a relational society, but also the possibility of being accepted by others and even the privileges one is entitled to in the social process of interaction” (Qin Yaqing, 2011, p. 52).

Ultimately, both the relevance of face-work in Chinese culture and the close resemblance between face and respect further underpin the prospect that inadequate consideration of Chinese respect needs (and vice-versa) indeed impedes the establishment of trust and cooperation as general political [43] preconditions for effective conflict management in the SCS. Subsequently, the following section outlines the theory-guided hypotheses and elaborates on a number of questions guiding the critical discussion thereof.