Читать книгу How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute - David Groten - Страница 9

Over the last two decades, the Asia-Pacific has turned into the most dynamic and fastest growing region in the world, accounting for almost 50 percent of the total global trade volume. Apart from its unprecedented pace of economic development, the Asia-Pacific features severe political discord among its highly heterogeneous nations, not least by virtue of a variety of looming and ongoing conflicts, profound political tensions, and power shifts. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute constitutes the region’s major and most complex territorial conflict, its vast relevance and implications exceeding the Asia-Pacific by far. It represents a maritime space roughly encompassing around 1,400,000 square miles geographically located between the People’ Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. According to rather pessimistic estimates, USD 3.37 trillion in trade transited the South China Sea in 2016 (Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2017). This number reflects 21 percent of global trade and 39.5 percent of Chinese total trade², thereby strikingly demonstrating the SCS’s international and strategic significance. The SCS dispute itself, inextricably linked to the region’s long and conflict-prone history, substantially evolves around conflicting claims to legal status, border delimitation and ownership of both numerous territorial features (islands, reefs, rocks, islets) and adjacent maritime zones. Even though the dispute had already erupted in the 1970s and witnessed numerous standoffs and contentious changes of ownership between the 1980s and mid-1990s, it remained below the radar of global politics and international attention for quite some time. This has successively changed as of 2009, triggered by a deadline for SCS claimant parties to submit their claims for an extended seabed hydrocarbon continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In subsequent years, particularly from 2012 onwards, the general situation in the SCS has further aggravated. This was manifested by multiple diplomatic, political and military incidents³ and [14] countless endeavors by various actors to defend their interests and to support their disputed claims. As a result, the risk of conflict escalation has been significantly increasing ever since just as security dilemma dynamics while the feasibility of effective conflict management has been declining. It was during this time that the SCS dispute started to attract considerable scholarly and political attention worldwide.

A close analytical look at the conflict-prone course of events reveals several dimensions and factors that have somewhat facilitated the dispute’s rapid exacerbation, thereby accounting for the ongoing failure to effectively mitigate tensions at the same time. The first and most crucial of these dimensions is the unprecedented economic, political, but also the military rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in past decades, which has not only shaken the entire region but global politics at large. While the PRC had represented a rather low-profile regional player until the early 2000s, it has started to occupy a much more active, strategic and confident role thereafter, particularly since the second half of the 21^st century. As China has turned into a global power, a core regional player and an increasingly credible and visible foreign policy actor, it remains to be seen whether it will continue to constitute a (regional) status quo power or eventually become a revisionist power and (regional) hegemon. In any case, the PRC’s rise has affected the situation in the SCS in a crucial and sustainable manner. For instance, Beijing’s increasingly bold and committed stance on the SCS led to a substantial consolidation of the other claimant parties’ positions. Apart from general uncertainty in regards to China’s future intentions and objectives in the region, a range of specific measures adopted by the government in Beijing has generated serious concerns and fears among its neighbors. Examples for such measures include the initiation of a sweeping artificial island transformation and land reclamation project, the relocation of an oil platform to disputed waters, and the remarkable upgrade of the PRC’s military (especially maritime capabilities) and other capacities. As a result, driven by such uncertainty and spurred by severe trust deficits, worst-case scenario policies and arms race dynamics⁴ have been witnessed that strongly fuel regional security dilemma dynamics and, ultimately, further complicate the SCS dispute.

[15] The second dimension involves the direct clash of Chinese and U.S. interests in the SCS. Despite its non-claimant party status to the dispute, the U.S. regional footprint is profound, not least given its close ties with several claimant countries, substantial troop deployment, its active participation in various regional dialogue formats and institutions, and its leadership role in multiple regional military exercises and operations. In a similar vein, the Obama administration proclaimed its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy in 2011 with the key objective of maintaining (or even expanding) its prominent position in East- and Southeast Asia. That said, the clash of the world’s two major powers in the SCS region considerably contributes to the dispute’s scope, level of significance and extra-regional relevance. This, too, is all but conducive to effective and sustainable conflict management, let alone conflict resolution.

A third and somewhat interconnected dimension concerns the overall changing balance of regional (but also global) power in favor of China and to the detriment of the United States during the last decades. This shift was facilitated by the 2008 global economic crisis, which hit the U.S. much harder than the PRC. While China has not replaced the U.S. as a regional hegemon just yet, at least not in terms of political or military capacities, it is increasingly challenging the latter’s regional status, thereby increasing the U.S.’ costs of regional cooperation and curtailing Washington’s regional outreach. This development has been further consolidated by the decision of the administration of Donald Trump to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), a region-wide free trade project with the U.S. in the driving seat (and excluding the PRC), to impose different rounds of trade tariffs on Chinese goods, as well as its general preference for unilateral approaches and policy measures. Both, decisions like these, and the current administration’s growing unpredictability have sparked concerns by U.S. allies and partners about U.S. regional commitment, a development likely to assist the PRC in its endeavors to expand its regional influence. Beijing’s visions to accomplish a “China-ASEAN community of shared future” (PRC Gvt., 2017a) and to propel its Maritime Silk Road project connecting China with Southeast Asia, are two prominent examples already foreshadowing this process. At this stage it is unclear as to whether Washington will approve of, let alone support such developments in the future or whether it will rather do its bit to cling to its previous regional impact and its key position in terms of regional integration and cooperation, a scenario which certainly would not fail to leave its mark on the SCS either.

Fourth, Southeast Asia lacks any kind of multilateral and appropriately institutionalized framework of cooperative security structures in which all relevant SCS stakeholders could jointly discuss sustainable approaches to [16] mitigate the dispute, thereby alleviating the risk of (unintended) conflict escalation by generating trust, establishing clear rules of conduct, fostering cooperation and bridging omnipresent perception gaps. To be sure, a number of formats and institutional frameworks have already been set up in recent years. At the same time, Beijing does no longer categorically reject any debate on the SCS as it used to in the past. It has commenced hosting a seminar on ‘Maritime Risk Management and Cooperation’ within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) framework, a multilateral dialogue format dealing with preventive diplomacy and confidence building. Similarly, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus (ADMM) is increasingly tackling issues of maritime security as are the Information Sharing Center (ISC), the China-Southeast Asian Countries Marine Research and Environmental Protection Cooperation Forum and many others. Moreover, a few non-binding mechanisms between the PRC and the U.S. on the prevention of maritime incidents have been launched as well. The majority of these mechanisms and institutions, however, remain mere ‘talk-shops’ (Acharya, 2005) due to their often voluntary, non-binding and ad-hoc nature⁵ and their mostly reactive and operational instead of future-oriented and comprehensive approach. Additionally, while certain progress has already been made on the path toward a Binding Code of Conduct (BCoC), its adoption is still not in sight⁶. Equally, China and Vietnam agreed upon the establishment of political high-profile dialogue on the SCS⁷, albeit this success had already been preceded by several drawbacks⁸ in bilateral relations. Similarly, Beijing and Manila set up a biannual China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM) in May 2017. Despite such progress, security cooperation is still by far not keeping up with economic cooperation (Staack, 2016). Likewise, there are still no institutionalized, let alone multilateral and comprehensive, cooperative [17] security structures available that are capable of effectively addressing the omnipresent risk of conflict escalation.

Fifth, a substantial lack of consensus among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), individual ASEAN Member States, the U.S., and China on the desired means and procedure of conflict resolution or conflict management prevails. The U.S. traditionally aims to play a leading role in the matter, several ASEAN states tend to advocate multilateral approaches to conflict management within a framework attended by all relevant parties (including the U.S.) or even compulsory legal arbitration and ASEAN as a regional organization is divided on this issue. The PRC, in turn, is taking a somewhat opposite point of view by strictly preferring to address its various disputes in the SCS in a bilateral manner, essentially by means of dialogue and negotiation with the individual state concerned. At the same time, it opposes any kind of internationalization of the issue in multilateral fora (e.g. the East Asia Summit), seeks to prevent a common position by ASEAN against China and Chinese claims, and widely rejects U.S. participation as well as the introduction of binding measures, sanctions and compulsory arbitration on questions of territorial sovereignty.

In total, these five dimensions mirror the polydimensional character of the SCS dispute, thereby accounting for the fact that, despite some short-term progress on one or two of these levels, the situation continues to be highly complex, intertwined, contested and fragile. Mutual provocations may recur at any time, ultimately capable of triggering policy measures resulting in further undesired and destabilizing political outcomes. Hence, effective and serious dispute management, let alone dispute resolution still remain a pipe dream.

Against this background, this book holds that traditional analytical variables such as security, power and economic objectives neither provide fully-fledged accounts of the increase in tensions in the SCS in the recent decade, nor comprehensively account for China’s modification of its SCS approach as of mid-2012, nor represent a promising and sufficient point of departure with respect to sustainable SCS dispute management in general. Therefore, it is argued, special emphasis should be placed on alternate cognitive variables, the significance and role of respect dynamics in particular. In this vein, it is contended that alleviation of tensions and consolidation of cooperative efforts in the SCS would only be viable if stakeholders involved were to take into closer consideration each other’s respect expectations and related needs⁹ and, simultaneously, do not perceive their very own respect [18] needs and motives to be violated. While such respect-sensitive diplomacy may help to avoid the arousal of disrespect experiences and steadily reduce gaps in recognition and perception, a lack of respect sensitivity is anticipated to generate policy preferences and ultimately suboptimal policy responses impeding cooperation and stability in the SCS.

In so doing, a special focus is placed on the People’s Republic of China and its SCS policy. This case study is selected as China represents the primary and most influential claimant party to the dispute and is crucial for the future course of the dispute. Its collective respect expectations and disrespect experiences are assumed to essentially shape its policy preference formation and decision-making processes, thereby directly and particularly determining the future of the SCS in the decades to come. Essentially, the future of the SCS dispute is inextricably linked to the future position assumed by the PRC. Accordingly, the project’s research question reads as follows: ‘Are respect dynamics playing a substantial role in China’s approach toward the South China Sea dispute? To what extent is the perception of due respect (or disrespect) – as reflected in external behavior – shaping Chinese foreign policy preferences pertaining to the SCS?’ That said, in order to operationalize Chinese respect dynamics, elite discourses by leading Chinese foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs) between 2010 and 2016 are subject to scrutiny¹⁰. Three hypotheses guide the analysis and ultimately structure the discussion of the research question. In Hypothesis I, discursive manifestations of Chinese self-perceived status in Southeast Asia (and beyond) and national identity conceptions are examined in order to determine as to whether these correspond to China’s SCS policy and to qualify whether or not they have been subject to change over time (2007–2016¹¹). Hypothesis II seeks to identify respect and disrespect experiences on the Chinese side and critically reflects upon respect expectations manifested in expert discourses on the SCS between 2010 and 2016. This identification process is conducted by means of a fixed set of clearly defined indicators. Hypothesis III then traces and subsequently qualifies policy recommendations provided and policy measures and attitudes advocated by Chinese FPTT scholars relating to Beijing’s stance on the SCS dispute. In so doing, it is established as to whether or not patterns of a causal link between respect dynamics, on the one hand, and a specific degree of cooperation [19] suggested by FPTT scholars can be observed. This serves the purpose of determining whether disrespect collectively experienced on the Chinese side can account for the shift in Beijing’s SCS policy from restraint, low profile, stability and cooperation toward a much bolder, proactive and assertive approach that has been occurring in recent years. At the same time, implications of a potentially widening gap between Chinese self-evaluated status and identity conceptions and the extent to which these are actually viewed as adequately recognized by other SCS stakeholders on the type of policy recommendations put forward are subject to investigation as well. Moreover, the scope of critical reflection of Beijing’s conduct, on the one hand, and sensitivity and consideration pertaining to external countries’ needs and concerns (empathy), on the other hand, that is manifested in such elite discourses is scrutinized. In so doing, aforementioned deliberations and hypotheses are systematically applied to two sub-case studies, namely Chinese elite discourses on U.S. conduct in the SCS (sub-case I) and Philippine conduct in the SCS (sub-case II), respectively. Taken together, the sub-cases embody the case study design of this research.

In a nutshell, the book is structured as follows. The first chapter sketches the research interests and relevance underlying this project. Consecutively, the theoretical chapter (2) first and foremost outlines this project’s conceptualization of respect as an analytical variable of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. In addition, it elaborates on the traditional role of respect, face and face-work in Chinese culture. Furthermore, it sets out the hypotheses and their respective links to the conceptual framework and discusses several issues of theoretical operationalization. Ultimately, the special relevance of Chinese think tanks as research subjects is elaborated upon. Chapter three provides for a brief introduction into the SCS dispute, its historical background and conflicting claims therein. Subsequently, chapter four represents the very heart of the analysis, namely the actual theory-guided examination using qualitative content analysis (QCA)¹², including a detailed discussion of the hypotheses. In addition, the empirical results are streamlined and a detailed response to the research question is provided, including a critical assessment of likely limitations of the outcomes’ explanatory power. Thereafter, chapter five reflects on a set of empirical and theoretical implications that can be derived from this project’s findings and, further, puts forwards several recommendations with regard to the future of the SCS conflict and the role of respect dynamics in such conflicts at large. Finally, chapter six contains several concluding remarks while presenting a number of proposals for future research and discussion.