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2 The Korean War

At 04.00 local time on 25 June 1950 the Communist North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched an unprovoked attack on South Korea across the 38th Parallel with eight combat divisions, one of which was armoured. It came as a complete surprise, unpredicted by any Western agency and must rank as one of the greatest intelligence failures of the modern era¹ although it was not to be the worst in that eventful year. The South Korean Army lacked tanks, artillery and air support and was forced to retreat to the south along roads choked by large numbers of civilian refugees. News of this aggression reached Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in New York at 03.00 local time, some fourteen hours after the attack. He called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council immediately and, by unanimous agreement of the nine member nations who were present and who voted,² the Council placed the blame for the conflict squarely on the North Korean Government. The Secretary-General called on the aggressor to end hostilities immediately and withdraw its forces north of the 38th Parallel but the North Koreans took no notice.

Triumph and Cossack off the coast of Japan in May 1950 during exercises with the USN. The aircraft in Fly 1 with their wings folded are Seafire FR 47s. (Author’s collection)

The Origins of the War

Korea had gained independence from China in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War but was annexed by Japan in 1910 and subsequently exploited ruthlessly.³ The Allied leaders’ wartime conference at Cairo in December 1943 had discussed Korea and the UK, USA and China had minuted that ‘in due course Korea shall become free and independent’. This policy was re-affirmed by the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 but this straightforward intention was complicated when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan a month later in August. In September Korea was occupied by Soviet forces in the north and United States’ forces in the south and an ad hoc agreement between the two powers fixed the 38th Parallel as the line of demarcation between them. In December 1945 an agreement was reached in Moscow for the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state with a democratically-elected government under the initial ‘trusteeship’ of the four signatory powers who had guaranteed the nation’s independence, the UK, USA, USSR and Nationalist China. The Chinese Communist regime subsequently accepted the agreement and stated its intention to adhere to it in principle. Significantly no agreement emerged on the method of implementing this aim and the UK and USA took the matter to the United Nations. In 1947 two UN Resolutions were passed calling for democratic elections to be overseen by a UN Commission. The Soviet authorities flouted them, however, and all the Commission could do was monitor elections south of the 38th Parallel where a National Assembly was established and the Republic of Korea established in 1948. Shortly afterwards, the area of Korea under Soviet occupation north of the 38th Parallel proclaimed itself to be the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea but, since the UN Commission had not been allowed to monitor the elections that were claimed to have taken place, it recommended against recognition of the People’s Republic and identified South Korea as the only legal Korean government. The UN General Assembly subsequently endorsed this view.

The UN Commission continued to strive for unification under the terms of the Moscow Agreement but in a report dated 8 September 1949⁴ its Chairman stated that it was hopeless to attempt to gain access to, or even to communicate with North Korea. The report described the North as ‘the creature of a military occupation’ that denied its population any chance to express their opinion upon its claim to rule. Communication between the two Koreas broke down completely but US troops were removed from South Korea in June 1948, leaving only a small military advisory group. There could be no verification of when Soviet forces left the North but by 1949 they had equipped and trained a North Korean People’s Army, of over 130,000 combat troops equipped with 500 Soviet tanks and 132 aircraft. Neither the North nor the South had a significant navy.

Korea in 1950.

Reactions

The US President, Harry S Truman, waited until 26 June, giving the UN Security Council time to discuss the matter, before stating his position swiftly and unambiguously. He ordered US sea and air forces to support South Korean military forces and immediately sought international support from other heads of government for armed intervention to counter North Korean aggression. There were credible fears that this was but the first step in a major offensive in the Far East now that the Communists had emerged victorious from the Chinese civil war and the President ordered the Seventh Fleet to prepare to meet any potential attack on the Nationalist-held island of Formosa. C-in-C Pacific was ordered to form new carrier battle groups as quickly as possible for deployment to the western Pacific. On 30 June President Truman ordered a naval blockade of the whole Korean peninsula and authorised General Douglas MacArthur to send combat troops to Korea and to carry out air strikes against targets in Korea both north and south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur had, in fact, ordered the first attack on the North a day earlier on his own initiative.

The US Army still maintained an occupation force in Japan under MacArthur who had his headquarters in Tokyo. He was immediately placed in supreme command of all United States’ forces in the region. These comprised four US Army divisions that were being used for constabulary duties as an occupying power and were not equipped or trained for combat on the scale now required of them. The USAF units placed under his command included about 400 aircraft which were intended for the air defence of Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam and there were a small number of warships forming US Naval Forces Far East under its Commander, Vice Admiral C Turner Joy USN (COMNAVFE). These comprised a light cruiser, four destroyers and six minesweepers. Further away but immediately available was a Seventh Fleet strike carrier task force which included the USS Valley Forge, a heavy cruiser and eight destroyers under Vice Admiral Arthur Struble USN. There was also a British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan under Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson of the Australian Army but by June 1950 this had been reduced to a single Australian infantry battalion, a single RAAF fighter squadron and a small naval contingent based ashore in Kure Dockyard under a Commander RAN. The BPF had, initially, maintained a sizeable naval force in Japanese waters and in 1946 this had comprised two British or Australian cruisers, several British and Australian destroyers or frigates and an Indian frigate. Such numbers could not be maintained through the manpower crisis, however, and from mid-1947 ships were not replaced as they left Japan, the last to leave being the British frigate Hart on 18 December 1947. A number of ships from the Far East Station and Australia continued to visit Japanese ports whenever possible, however, both to provide a Commonwealth presence and to practice operations with the USN. Having failed to anticipate or prevent the conflict, the UN had at least condemned North Korean aggression and, within a week, taken steps to defend the south. On 7 July 1950 MacArthur was named as the supreme commander of all Allied forces allocated to the UN in the Far East in addition to those of the US. His line of responsibility, however, remained directly to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than to the UN General Assembly for this wider role.

The British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, announced British support for the UN in the House of Commons on 27 June 1950. On 28 June he announced that warships of the FEF were to be placed at the disposal of the US authorities to operate on behalf of the UN. The Canadian Government offered naval support on the same day, followed by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, who were some nine hours ahead of GMT, a day later on 29 June. The Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Station, Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, who flew his flag at a shore headquarters in Singapore, had elected to deploy substantial units of his fleet to Japanese waters in the late spring and early summer under the tactical command of Rear Admiral William Andrewes, Flag Officer Second-in-Command Far East Station (FO2FES), who flew his flag in the cruiser Belfast.⁵ Whilst there, the British task force formed part of the occupation forces and came under the command of Vice Admiral Turner Joy USN. It had maintained close contact with its American counterparts and had carried out joint exercises using USN signal procedures. The British task force included the light fleet carrier Triumph with 800 (Seafire FR 47) and 827 (Firefly FR 1) NAS embarked, the cruisers Belfast and Jamaica, two destroyers, three frigates and a number of auxiliaries including tankers and a hospital ship.

When fighting began on 25 June 1950, Belfast was visiting Hakodate in northern Japan. FO2 heard of the invasion that evening, ordered the ship to raise steam immediately and sailed at 01.30 on 26 June on his own initiative to position himself further south where he would be available to meet any eventuality. The C-in-C ordered another cruiser, Kenya, together with further destroyers, frigates and auxiliaries to raise steam in Singapore and Hong Kong and prepare for operations off Korea. In his subsequent report of proceedings (ROP) FO2 said that he wished to concentrate his ships without delay since it seemed probable that any action would be off South Korea and that, should the Soviet Union intervene, the best place for his task force would be further to the south.⁶ Later on 26 June Admiral Brind signalled COMNAVFE offering the use of British warships for any humanitarian mission he might require. Later still he warned FO2 by signal that his ships might be required to engage North Korean armed forces in order to implement the UN Security Council’s Resolutions.

Allied Preparations

After a rough but fast passage, Belfast arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base at noon on 27 June and Admiral Andrewes drove immediately to meet COMNAVFE in Tokyo where he found that the latter had just come from a meeting with General MacArthur. Both were deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation in South Korea but Admiral Joy advised that since all British and Commonwealth citizens had already been evacuated, there was no requirement for a humanitarian operation. However, since the Soviet reaction to the mobilisation of UN forces was uncertain, he thought it best for the British task force to concentrate south of Japan having taken on fuel and, as far as possible, provisions. On 28 June Admiral Brind received a signal from the Admiralty authorising him to ‘place the Royal Navy at present in Japanese waters at the disposal of the United States’ Naval Commander for Korean Operations (Vice Admiral C T Joy) in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions’.⁷ The early meeting between COMNAVFE and FO2 meant that the two admirals understood each other’s views and they now had the authority to move quickly. On 29 June COMNAVFE ordered Admiral Andrewes to deploy his ships immediately to join USN task groups. Jamaica with the frigates Black Swan and Alacrity joined Admiral Higgins USN in the cruiser Juneau off the east coast of South Korea. FO2 himself, now back in Belfast, in company with Triumph and the destroyers Consort and Cossack and the newly-joined HMAS Bataan joined Task Force 77, which included Valley Forge, off Okinawa. From this position the carriers could be used to defend Formosa or Okinawa if necessary or to strike at targets in Korea. All Commonwealth ships adopted USN signal procedures and the joint task forces were able to work well together from the outset. Admiral Andrewes wrote in his report ‘it all seemed so familiar as it was just what we had done so often before during the exercises in March with very similar forces’. It was also only five years since the US and British Pacific Fleets had worked together so successfully in the final phase of the war against Japan.

The First Carrier Strikes

Valley Forge and Triumph formed Task Group 77.3 which was commanded by Rear Admiral Hoskins USN, Commander Carrier Division 3 (COMCARDIV3). Planning for strikes against targets in North Korea began as the force moved north-west into the Yellow Sea and the first strikes by aircraft from the two carriers were flown off between 05.45 and 06.15 on 3 July 1950. Valley Forge launched eight Corsairs, twelve Skyraiders and twelve Panther jet fighters to strike at the North Korean capital Pyongyang which was beyond the radius of action of the USAF B-29 bombers based in Guam. B-29 units were ordered to deploy to airfields in Okinawa but it took considerable time to move their support, weapons, maintenance and spares infrastructure into place, without which the aircraft were useless. Of course, these were all things the aircraft carriers carried with them as they moved, enabling them to choose their ideal launch positions for strike operations. Triumph launched nine Fireflies and twelve Seafires to attack the airfield at Haeju and adjacent railway bridges. Seafire FR 47s were notoriously difficult to maintain and 800 NAS did well to get all the squadron’s aircraft serviceable for the strike. The Seafires were armed with 3in rockets and the Fireflies with 500lb bombs. The two carriers had been allocated separate target areas to take into account the shorter radius of action of the British aircraft but also to spread the impact of their strikes for which the enemy was totally unprepared. The geographical separation of strike targets for aircraft of differing performance or command structure was to become a major feature of strike warfare over Korea in the years ahead. The North Korean Air Force was felt to pose a negligible threat but TF 77 was only 100 miles from Communist Chinese airfields in the Shantung peninsula and 220 miles from Soviet airfields at Port Arthur. The Panthers’ task was to defend the area against both North Korean fighters and any others that might intervene. They shot down two airborne North Korean Yak fighters and destroyed a further nine by strafing them on the ground. Both strikes proved to be successful and all their aircraft returned safely although several had been hit by small-arms fire. Later in the day both carriers ‘aircraft struck at railways in their respective target areas.⁸ Because the full extent of Communist aggression was not yet clear, these strikes had been planned as a one-day operation but in view of the deteriorating situation in South Korea, TG 77.3 was ordered to remain in action to continue the strikes as long as practical, again showing the flexibility of carrier-based aviation. The greatest priority for strike operations was given to attacks on railway facilities that were being used in support of the NKPA’s drive to the south.

The first British aircraft was lost on 28 July 1950 when Commissioned Pilot White RN of 800 NAS, on combat air patrol (CAP) over the task group in his Seafire, was ordered to intercept a radar contact that was not showing the correct IFF⁹ response. The contact tuned out to be a USAF B-29 bomber and as White flew up alongside it, one of the gunners opened fire and shot him down ‘for no very apparent reason’.¹⁰ He managed to parachute into the sea, suffering from burns, and was rescued from his dinghy by the USN destroyer Eversole which returned him to Triumph later in the day. When informed of the incident COMNAVFE said that ‘the calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted’; Mr White’s comments were not recorded. It is significant to note that although the RN and USN were familiar with each other’s equipment, the USAF had clearly not been adequately briefed about its Allies’ equipment. After the initial strike operations, FO2 detached from TF 77 with Belfast and his two destroyers and returned to Sasebo Dockyard which Commonwealth warships were to share with their USN counterparts as a forward base throughout the conflict.

Blockade

On his arrival FO2 was able to have further discussions with COMNAVFE who confessed that both he and General MacArthur had been surprised by the UN decision to defend South Korea but were convinced of the correctness of the decision. Rear Admiral Higgins USN joined their discussions and COMNAVFE instructed the two rear admirals to set up a blockade of northern Korea as TF 96. TG 96.5 under Higgins, comprising largely USN ships, was to cover the east coast and TG 96.8, comprising largely British and Commonwealth ships under Andrewes, was to cover the west coast although ships of both task groups could move to the other coast when necessary. This command structure worked well and lasted until the end of the conflict in 1953. COMNAVFE gave clear instructions for the conduct of the blockade which included notes on international law and directions for the treatment of ships that attempted to evade interception. In October 1951 the west coast task group was re-designated as TG 95 with separate elements including the British carrier and its destroyer escort, blockading units, minesweepers and other activities.

There were immediate concerns about the possibility of Soviet submarines from Vladivostok being used to support the NKPA offensive and, after a signalled discussion between Admiral Brind and Admiral Forrest Sherman, the US Chief of Naval Operations, authorisation was given to attack unidentified, submerged submarines inside the designated war zone. The first open-water naval engagement occurred on 2 July 1950 when Jamaica was operating off the east coast with Admiral Higgins’ task group. Four fast patrol boats attacked the group and were engaged by gunfire. Three were sunk and the fourth made off to seaward, zigzagging at high speed. The first action off the west coast occurred on 12 July when the Cossack was engaged by NKPA field guns while she passed inside the Techong islands. She returned their fire at an initial range of 5000 yards, subsequently opening to 8000 yards and destroyed two enemy guns for the expenditure of 140 rounds of 4.5in ammunition, suffering no damage herself. FO2 issued his own instructions for the implementation of the west coast blockade on 8 July. His object was to dominate the coastline occupied by the NKPA; prevent any infiltration by sea into coastal areas held by the South Koreans and to provide naval gunfire support against any enemy target at sea or on land. His initial dispositions centred on three task units, each comprising a cruiser and several destroyers or frigates, the latter having the advantage that they could operate close inshore to engage targets inland. During the conflict a number of warships were used for shore bombardment including, once, the maintenance carrier Unicorn.

The objects of the British and US patrol areas were obviously similar but their methods differed because of the dissimilar geography of the east and west Korean coasts. The east comprised steep cliffs with a narrow coastal strip along which both road and rail communications ran. The terrain was so mountainous that in 1140 miles of railway track there were 956 bridges and 231 tunnels, making the route particularly vulnerable to interdiction by gunfire and commando raids as well as air strikes. There were few islands off the east coast. On the other hand, the west coast had shallow seas and a number of islands surrounded by extensive mud flats and heavily silted river estuaries. The enemy frequently attempted to move supplies in small junks close inshore where larger warships were unable to operate. In August when Triumph left TF 77, she joined the west coast blockading force where her aircraft made a big difference by locating and destroying these junks in large numbers.

Inchon – A Triumph of Amphibious Warfare

As soon as operations to support the South Koreans were authorised, General MacArthur decided to mount an amphibious assault against Inchon, Seoul’s seaport on the west coast, in order to outflank the NKPA and exploit the UN’s naval superiority. For this daring operation the UN assembled a remarkable total of 230 ships from the USA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, South Korea and Japan and prepared the run-down 1st US Marine Division for combat operations in only a few weeks. The US Army initially opposed the plan and the USN was hesitant because of the poor hydrographical conditions at Inchon, among them a tidal range of 33ft and other factors that limited a landing to one of only three days in the autumn of 1950. MacArthur over-rode the opposition and selected 15 September 1950, declaring that an amphibious assault was the most powerful tool available to the UN and the only one that could strike hard and deep into enemy territory at such short notice. The landings, supported by carrier-borne aircraft and naval gunfire, proved to be a first-class example of both amphibious warfare and Allied co-operation and, once commenced, the result was never in doubt. The NKPA had not believed it possible that the UN could mount such an assault so soon, nor that the US would risk landing its marines on the treacherous beaches of Inchon. Once the decision to land was taken, the USMC and Navy led the way and MacArthur said of them that ‘their star never shone brighter’. The NKPA was forced to retreat to prevent the forces that were encircling the southern port of Pusan from being isolated and captured.

British and Australian Aircraft Carriers in Action

HMS Triumph – July 1950 to September 1950

After joining TF 77, Triumph’s Fireflies flew constant anti-submarine patrols and two Seafires were held at readiness on deck alert to intercept unidentified aircraft if necessary. Aircraft from both carriers flew low round the task force to allow gunners to recognise unfamiliar shapes but, as we have seen, one of 800 NAS Seafires was shot down in error by a USAF B-29.¹¹ To prevent any further misidentification, all RN and RAN aircraft were painted with black and white ‘invasion stripes’ on their fuselage and wings as an aid to identification and a Union flag was painted prominently on Triumph’s flight deck when the ship entered Sasebo for a replenishment period. On 15 July 1950 Triumph re-joined Valley Forge for a series of strikes from an operating area off the east coast. To free the longer-ranged USN aircraft for strikes 827 NAS flew anti-submarine patrols and 800 NAS concentrated on flying CAP sorties over the task force. On 19 July 1950 Triumph’s Sea Otter search and rescue (SAR) aircraft landed in the sea to rescue a USN Corsair pilot; the last recorded occasion on which a British amphibian carried out an operational rescue using this technique. After this Triumph suffered a leaking stern gland and had to return to Sasebo Dockyard for repairs which took two days. She was back with TF 77 on 24 July, however, and resumed her defensive flying task. By the end of the month more USN carriers arrived in TF 77 and Triumph was re-allocated to FO2’s west coast task group and her aircraft immediately improved the group’s ability to locate and engage small junks operating close inshore.

A Firefly FR 1 being ‘waved-off’ from Triumph with three other aircraft closing the ship to ‘slot’ into the visual circuit. After Commissioned Pilot White was shot down in his Seafire by a USAF B-29, RN aircraft were painted with the conspicuous black and white identification stripes seen here and a large Union flag has been painted on the flight deck. (Author’s collection)

There were no combat casualties at this stage but deck landing on a straight-deck carrier always had the potential to be hazardous. On 29 August a Firefly missed all the arrester wires on landing and went into the barrier. The propeller blades broke up as the engine was shock-loaded to a standstill and a large piece of one of them flew up, bounced off the bottom of the flying control position (Flyco), smashed through the operations room scuttle and struck the commanding officer of 800 NAS, Lieutenant Commander I M MacLachlan RN who was there to discuss his squadron’s flying programme. His injuries, unfortunately, proved to be fatal despite all the medical team could do and he was buried at sea that evening off the coast of South Korea. Lieutenant T D Handley RN, the squadron’s Senior Pilot, took over command. On 5 September Triumph moved to the east coast and replaced the American carriers while they carried out underway replenishment of fuel and ammunition. Later in the month she moved back to the west coast to act in support of the 1st Marine Division’s landing at Inchon. By then, the ship’s two months of intensive operations had depleted the number of serviceable aircraft within the air group and the surviving aircraft were proving difficult to maintain. There were no replacement Seafire FR 47s or Firefly FR 1s left in the FEF reserve stock, her stern gland was still giving trouble and so, after Inchon, FO2 decided reluctantly that she had reached the end of her operational usefulness and ordered her withdrawal. She had only eleven serviceable aircraft left and Theseus was already on her way from the UK to replace her. On 25 September, after she had returned to Sasebo for further temporary repairs in dry dock, COMNAVFE signalled ‘On the departure of HMS Triumph from the Command of the Naval Forces Far East, I take pleasure in saying to the Captain, the Officers, the Flying personnel and the Crew of this splendid fighting ship “Well done”. Your enthusiastic and effective efforts have contributed immeasurably to the United Nations’ cause in Korea.’¹²

Fireflies from Triumph photographed over Inchon. One aircraft is visible above the causeway leading to the small island. (Author’s collection)

British warships in Sasebo in either late September or early October 1950. Furthest away, Triumph is secured to a jetty with Belfast to starboard of her. The ships at moorings are, from left to right, the hospital ship Maine, Theseus, which had just arrived, and Unicorn. The ship in the right foreground surrounded by lighters is the armament stores issuing ship RFA Fort Rosalie. (Author’s collection)

HMS Theseus – October 1950 to April 1951

Theseus was serving with the Home Fleet in 1950 with 17 CAG comprising 807 (Sea Fury FB 11s) and 810 (Firefly FR 5s) NAS embarked and in August the decision was taken to bring her ship’s company and squadrons up to war complement and deploy her to the FEF as a replacement for Triumph. She also embarked a Sea Otter amphibian for SAR duties and sailed from the UK on 18 August 1950 for a brief work-up in the Mediterranean after which she arrived in the war zone in early October. Her first period of operations began on 8 October in the Yellow Sea off the west coast of Korea¹³ flying searches and tactical missions in support of the advancing UN forces’ left flank. However, on 27 October the wire reeving in her single catapult’s pulley system was found to be badly frayed and, therefore, not safe to use. Consequently, during her second operational period, aircraft had to be flown without bombs, rockets or drop tanks, relying on a free take-off from the deck which limited the number of aircraft that could be ranged for take-off. It also meant that six Fireflies had to be disembarked to Iwakuni to reduce the size of her deck park. By the end of October the defeated NKPA had been driven back into northern Korea close to the Yalu River and with less urgency for continued operations, Theseus returned first to Sasebo and then sailed for repairs in Hong Kong Dockyard. While she was on passage, the ship’s engineering department managed to re-reeve the catapult, a major and unprecedented achievement at sea. Deadweight launches were carried out off Hong Kong, followed by live launches to prove its restored efficiency.

When Theseus left Korean waters it had been thought that the war was nearly over and other warships had been withdrawn at the same time but the massive and totally unexpected Chinese offensive across the Yalu River in December 1950 began a new phase of the conflict which forced UN forces to retreat to the south. The lack of any warning that such an offensive was being prepared was the second significant failure by Allied intelligence agencies. Theseus, therefore, returned to the war zone to begin a new period of operations with her squadrons brought back up to their full numbers in the bitter winter of 1950. Despite atrocious weather conditions she maintained 95 per cent aircraft serviceability and flew 338 sorties in seven days. Notwithstanding the widely-held view earlier in 1950 that her piston-engined fighters were obsolescent, they proved to be the ideal aircraft for the task confronting the RN and the emerging generation of jet fighters could not have done as well in the circumstances. Their targets included railway bridges and rolling stock, trucks and enemy troops on the march. During the critical month of December 1950 Theseus spent twenty-three days at sea and flew 630 sorties during which her aircraft expended 38,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition and fired 1412 rocket projectiles. These figures were way beyond the ship’s normal outfit and the RN armament supply organisation did a superb job replenishing her stocks at sea from RFA armament stores issuing ships at the end of a very long supply chain.

A Firefly FR 5 photographed from another aircraft over North Korea. It has just dropped bombs on a target and smoke from them can be seen at the top of the picture. (Author’s collection)

Theseus entering Sasebo for the last time on 20 April 1951 with sailors spelling out her name on the flight deck. (Author’s collection)

During January 1951 she flew sixty sorties in a single day, a record at the time for a light fleet carrier, targeting railways, trucks and junks. On 18 January 1951 the Admiralty announced that 17 CAG had been awarded the Boyd Trophy for its operations off Korea.¹⁴ At the end of January the Sea Otter was disembarked and replaced on board by a USN S-51 helicopter for SAR duties. On 2 February a run of 1463 accident-free deck landings ended when a Sea Fury landed heavily and broke its undercarriage but a day later a new record of sixty-six sorties in a single day was achieved. Theseus’ tenth and last war patrol off Korea began on 8 April 1951; this was off the east coast in company with the USS Bataan,¹⁵ one of the USN light carriers that replaced the British carriers on task when they went into harbour for a period of rest and replenishment. The two carriers were intended to deter a possible Chinese attack on Formosa but Theseus managed to maintain reconnaissance sorties off the west coast by flying aircraft across the peninsula. Her targets in the east included railway marshalling yards in Wonsan. On 17 April she moved back to her more familiar area off the west coast and on 20 April 1951 she entered Sasebo for the last time with members of her ship’s company spelling out her name on the flight deck. On 25 April she sailed for the UK and arrived on 29 May 1951. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, the First Sea Lord, came on board at once to present the Boyd Trophy.

Glory in Korean waters with Sea Furies and Fireflies ranged aft. (Author’s collection)

Replenishing liquids at sea. Glory and HMAS Bataan taking on fuel from RFA Wave Premier using the method perfected by the BPF in 1945. (Author’s collection)

HMS Glory – April 1951 to September 1951

Glory had been serving in the Mediterranean Fleet during 1950 but late in the year she was ordered to make preparations to relieve Theseus in the Far East. Her 14 CAG, comprising 804 (Sea Fury FB 11s) and 812 (Firefly FR 5s) NAS, was disembarked to RNAS Hal Far in Malta where its aircraft and personnel were brought up to war strength and worked up to a high state of operational efficiency. Meanwhile the ship returned to Devonport and paid off on 16 December. She re-commissioned with a full war complement on 29 December 1950 and returned to the Mediterranean, arriving in Malta on 2 February 1951. A work-up with squadrons embarked lasted until March, after which she sailed for the Far East Station, arriving in Sasebo on 23 April where she took on board personnel, aircraft, stores and ammunition from Theseus and Unicorn. The USN S-51 helicopter detachment was embarked for SAR duty. Glory sailed for her first period of operations on 26 April 1951 off the west coast, her aircraft attacking railway lines bridges, enemy logistics and junks. In addition to these offensive sorties, Sea Furies maintained a CAP over the task group and Fireflies flew anti-submarine patrols.

A Sea Fury FB 11 bombing a bridge in North Korea. One of its bombs can be seen falling on the left-hand side of the picture, slightly above the small, circular crater with water in it. The photograph was taken by his wing-man who had things other than photography on his mind and is, unfortunately, of poor quality but it is just possible to see the steam from a train which has just crossed the bridge at its right-hand extremity. The bombs might, therefore, hit the bridge while rolling stock is still on it. (Author’s collection)

An exhausted crane landed on Glory during a war patrol off Korea and is seen here standing on the cockpit of a Sea Fury FB 11, which is armed with 500lb bombs outboard of the drop tanks. Kind-hearted sailors fed it on milk and kippers for several days and it eventually flew off revived and happy! (Author’s collection)

The SAR helicopter saw its first use on 14 May 1951 when Stoker McPherson fell overboard and was subsequently winched to safety, the first time such a rescue had been carried out from an RN ship. During her first operational tour of duty off Korea, Glory carried out nine war patrols, during one of which her aircraft achieved a new light fleet carrier record of eighty-nine sorties in a single day’s flying. Between April and the end of September 1951 Glory’s aircraft had flown 2875 hours in 107 days at sea with only nine accidents. The tally of targets destroyed included 679 junks, 794 ox-carts¹⁶ and 236 railway wagons for the expenditure of 1450 500lb bombs, 9242 rocket projectiles and 538,000 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition. On 22 September 804 NAS completed its 1000th accident-free deck landing and for much of this period it had maintained 100 per cent serviceability. By September the ship was badly in need of a refit and it was decided to carry this out in Her Majesty’s Australian Dockyard at Garden Island in Sydney, Australia and she berthed in Kure on 27 September to hand over to HMAS Sydney.

HMAS Sydney 3 – September 1951 to January 1952

The RAN had formed its own Fleet Air Arm in 1948 with considerable help from the RN and Australia’s first aircraft carrier, HMAS Sydney, had only arrived at her new home port in 1949. The need to withdraw Glory for a refit in Australia posed a problem for the Admiralty since Ocean, the next light fleet carrier intended for service in the war zone, would not be ready to deploy until May 1952. To fill the gap the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, asked the First Naval Member of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, if it would be possible for ‘Sydney to relieve Glory for two or three months operational flying if the Korean business is still going’.¹⁷ Collins supported the idea and put it to the Australian Government which approved the deployment in May 1951. This was a substantial increase in the nation’s commitment to the war and a significant development in Australian history since only three nations, the UK, USA and Japan, had previously deployed aircraft carriers in combat operations. For the deployment Sydney embarked elements of 20 and 21 CAGs and sailed for the war zone after a work up with 805 and 808 (Sea Fury FB 11) and 817 (Firefly FR 5) NAS embarked. She secured alongside Glory in Kure Dockyard, Japan on 27 September 1951 to transfer aircraft, stores and the USN S-51 helicopter detachment for SAR duties. Sydney sailed for her first war patrol on 3 October 1951 and sent her aircraft into action from a position off the east coast two days later. On only her fifth day of operations she equalled the record number of eighty-nine sorties flown in a single day set by Glory. Judged by the standards of her peers with their recent extensive wartime carrier-operating experience, Sydney had started well and continued to do so.

A Firefly FR 5 on HMAS Sydney’s catapult with its engine running but not quite ready to launch. The ship’s USN S-51 ‘plane-guard’ helicopter has just launched and taken up its position off the port bow. (RAN)

A replacement Firefly FR 5 being lowered onto HMAS Sydney’s flight deck in Sasebo. (RAN)

On 14 October she had to stand out to sea to avoid Typhoon RUTH and although she managed to avoid the epicentre, high winds and seas destroyed six aircraft in her deck park. Replacement aircraft were provided from the RN Aircraft Holding Unit (AHU), at Iwakuni and Sydney began her second war patrol on 18 October. During this period she flew 474 sorties which included the provision of close air support for the Commonwealth Division which formed part of the UN land forces in Korea. Rear Admiral Scott-Moncreiff had succeeded Rear Admiral Andrewes as FO2FES on the latter’s promotion and he flew his flag in Sydney during her third war patrol which began on 4 November so that he could gain first-hand experience of carrier operations. Her aircraft carried out a number of strikes on rail targets that were synchronised with other Allied air arms. After a brief respite, Sydney took part in Operation ‘Athenaeum’ from 18 November, a series of co-ordinated attacks by aircraft and naval gunfire against Hungnam, a transport hub on Korea’s east coast. She resumed operations off the west coast during early December and then spent Christmas 1951 in Kure Dockyard.

Aircraft storm-lashed on HMAS Sydney’s flight deck while she rides out Typhoon RUTH.

Individual accounts of every sortie would make this a very long narrative but I will include several within the accounts of individual carrier operations that are illustrative of overall Commonwealth carrier operations. For example, on 26 October 1951 Firefly WB 393 of 817 NAS was hit by anti-aircraft fire while attacking a railway tunnel near Chaeryong, north of Haeju. The pilot, Sub Lieutenant N D MacMillan RAN, managed a successful forced landing in enemy territory and both he and his observer, Chief Petty Officer J Hancox RAN, got out of the wrecked aircraft and took cover in a ditch, keeping NKPA soldiers that had encircled them at bay with their Owen submachine-guns. Sydney had a section of Sea Furies in the area and these were instructed to provide top cover, strafing enemy troops to prevent them from capturing the downed aircrew. Sydney herself was 75 miles away and her captain, Captain D H Harries CBE RAN, had doubts about the wisdom of sending her USN helicopter to rescue them because of fears that it might not locate the crash-site and clear enemy territory before nightfall. The crew insisted that they be given the chance to try, however, and Harries approved the sortie. Meanwhile Meteor jet fighters of 77 Squadron RAAF joined the Sea Furies in giving top cover. By 17.15 the jets had to go but the Sea Fury pilots, Lieutenants Cavanagh and Salthouse RAN, elected to remain, despite their low fuel state, another advantage of the piston-engined Sea Fury over the early generation of jet fighters. At 17.25 the SAR helicopter arrived, having flown at a speed considerably above the maximum quoted in the S-51’s aircrew manual. As it landed the observer, Chief Petty Officer Gooding USN, jumped out and shot dead two NKPA soldiers who had crawled to within fifteen yards of the wrecked Firefly. An hour later the helicopter with the two rescued aircrew on board, and still escorted by the Sea Furies, landed at the Allied airfield at Kimpo just as darkness fell.

Sydney sailed on 28 December for her sixth war patrol during which emphasis was placed on the defence of small islands off the west coast held by South Korean forces. Her seventh and last patrol began on 16 January 1952 and when she entered Sasebo for the last time on 26 January, FO2 described her work in the Korean war zone as being ‘quite excellent’. She had flown a total of 2366 sorties in forty-three operational flying days, an average of 55.2 per day, and her expenditure of ammunition amounted to 154 500lb and 1000lb bombs, 1197 rocket projectiles and 73,440 rounds of 20mm ammunition. All replacement aircraft, ammunition and stores came from RN stocks. She lost fifteen aircraft in action and three pilots killed.

HMS Glory – February 1952 to May 1952

On 1 February 1952 Glory arrived in Hong Kong after her Australian refit to take over aircraft, stores and equipment from Sydney. She had the same squadrons embarked as in her previous deployment and arrived in Sasebo on 5 February, beginning a war patrol off the west coast a day later. Her tasks included reconnaissance in support of the UN blockade, close air support for the army ashore, especially the Commonwealth Division, and the defence of small Allied-held islands including Chodo and Paengyong-do. On 9 February Fireflies operating in the strike role armed with 1000lb bombs blocked a railway tunnel north of Haejin and Sea Furies spotted for a bombardment by the cruiser Ceylon. When she returned to Sasebo for a break, she was relieved off the west coast by the USS Bairoko, one of a number of USN escort carriers now operating in the war zone. Glory was able to resume her combat routine quickly and her operations were recognised by the UN command as making a significant and very visible contribution to the Allied war effort.

On 1 March 1952 Lieutenant Fraser’s Sea Fury suffered an engine failure as he ‘slotted’ to starboard of Glory to join her visual circuit. The USN helicopter was already airborne as a planeguard and was able to winch him out of the water in seconds. He actually stepped onto the carrier’s deck two minutes later, in less time than it would have taken him to complete the circuit and land in his own aircraft! After a replenishment period in Kure, Glory sailed with FO2 embarked on 12 March to take part in a number of Allied deep-penetration raids against targets in the Anak area which were intended to destroy enemy logistical targets on the ground. On 17 March 1952 she flew the maximum number of sorties possible in order to defend Allied troops against a Communist attack on Sok-to. 804 NAS flew sixty-five sorties and 812 NAS a further forty, a combined total of 105, setting a new record for a light fleet carrier. Both squadrons maintained their aircraft at 100 per cent serviceability. From 1 April both Sea Furies and Fireflies regularly carried 500lb bombs on armed reconnaissance sorties and successful attacks were carried out on enemy warehouses at Kyomipo and Simpo. On 4 April Glory’s aircraft flew a number of close air support missions north of the Imjin River in support of the Commonwealth Division and two days later they bombed and destroyed an important rail bridge north of Chinnampo. On 9 April her aircraft gave close air support to the 1st US Marine Division.

Tugs ‘cold-moving’ Glory towards the Captain Cook Dry Dock during her 1951 refit in HMA Dockyard Garden Island in Sydney. (RAN)

After a brief spell in Kure to take on replacement aircraft and stores from Unicorn, Glory sailed for the fifth war patrol of her second period of operations on 17 April 1952. On 22 April Fireflies destroyed an enemy ammunition dump in the centre of the village of Singsongdong and Sea Furies destroyed a factory near Pyongyang.¹⁸ On 27 April Sea Furies accurately bombed and dropped one span of the important railway bridge near Sariwon, an appropriate end to this period of operations. On 1 May 1952 Glory left the Korean war zone for Hong Kong where she transferred pilots, aircraft and stores to Ocean. During her two tours off Korea, Glory had flown 4835 sorties for the loss of twenty-seven aircraft and nine aircrew. Her running total of ammunition expenditure now amounted to 886,300 rounds of 20mm ammunition, 126 1000lb bombs, 3114 500lb bombs and 13,098 rocket projectiles. By then targets destroyed totalled 796 junks, 1001 ox carts and 308 railway trucks.

A Sea Fury FB 11 being ranged on Glory’s after lift. The squadron duty officer, in battle-dress, is monitoring the move. (Author’s collection)

HMS Ocean – May 1952 to October 1952

Ocean had been serving in the Mediterranean Fleet until January 1952 when she was relieved by Theseus, showing how tight the programming of operational aircraft carriers remained in the RN during this period. She arrived in Hong Kong in May with 802 (Sea Fury FB 11s) and 825 (Firefly FR 5s) NAS, which had transferred from Theseus in April, embarked.¹⁹ Ocean was commanded by Captain C L G Evans DSO DSC RN, one of the top-scoring RN fighter pilots of the Second World War, a man determined that his ship and its squadrons would set an outstanding example of carrier capability. She sailed for her first war patrol on 10 May 1952 and operated off the west coast. Only a week later, on 17 May 802 NAS flew seventy-six sorties and 825 NAS flew forty-seven, creating a new light fleet carrier record of 123 sorties in a single day during which 90 tons of bombs were dropped. A second war patrol began on 29 May and on 8 June she arrived in Kure to take on replacement aircraft from the AHU at Iwakuni. During her third period of operations she anchored off Inchon on 15 June to be visited by Field Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis, the Minister of Defence, who had come to study RN carrier operations and to visit the Commonwealth Division ashore.

A deck-load strike of Sea Furies and Fireflies ranged on Ocean. (Author’s collection)

On 24 June 1952 Ocean joined the USN carriers of TF 77 to carry out combined strikes against North Korean power stations and electrical installations. She often sailed with Unicorn in company during this period so that the maintenance carrier could act as a spare deck for aircraft that had to recover with an emergency, allowing her own finely-balanced tempo of strike operations to continue without interruption. Unicorn also embarked detachments from 802 NAS to provide CAP over the task force, further freeing Ocean to concentrate on strike operations. From 11 July 1952 Ocean and her aircraft played an important part in Operation ‘Pressure Pump’, a combined offensive against the North Korean capital Pyongyang by RN, USN, USMC, USAF and RAAF aircraft co-ordinated by the US 5th Air Force. Ocean contributed thirty-nine sorties to a grand total of 1254; her target was a large railway marshalling yard thought to contain crated MiG-15 fighters in railway wagons which were successfully hit and destroyed. Later in July she continued to attack interdiction targets including railway bridges as well as all the usual carrier tasks.

On 1 August Ocean arrived in Kure to take on replacement aircraft and aircrew. The latter included the first five RNVR pilots to arrive in the Korean war zone, a vindication of the system of aircrew reserve training established in the late 1940s which was now providing a flow of competent replacement pilots. By then communist MiG-15 jet fighters were being deployed into North Korea and on 9 August 1952 a flight of four Sea Furies from 802 NAS was attacked by one from a section of MiGs. This MiG-15 was shot down by the flight’s leader, Lieutenant P Carmichael RN, the first occasion on which a jet fighter was shot down by any British armed forces and, again, the incident emphasises the versatility of the Sea Fury as a practical strike fighter aircraft. Flying operations were curtailed on 16 August by Hurricane KAREN and after it had passed Ocean returned to Kure for a replenishment period. Her impressive list of achievements continued in the next war patrol; five bridges were destroyed by bombing on 28 August and three more a day later. The squadron ROPs show that they had reached a peak of operational efficiency during this period and one of Ocean’s innovations was the extensive use of pre-dawn launches for interdiction missions. None of the British carriers carried out night missions during the Korean War, principally because the light fleet carriers lacked the manpower to sustain operations by both day and night. The nights also gave the squadron maintenance personnel a chance to work on their aircraft to repair damage and carry out routine maintenance. However, the enemy used the hours of darkness to move men and supplies towards the front line in trucks with dimmed headlights. By carrying out night launches, Ocean’s aircraft could position themselves to interdict vehicles that were still on the move in the open in the twilight before dawn. They could then recover to carry out a conventional day landing. At first this technique proved very successful but by the time Glory relieved Ocean in November 1952 the enemy would devise methods to counter it.

A further, typical, war patrol began on 13 September and during it Ocean’s aircraft flew 749 sorties in nine days, an average of eighty-three sorties a day, maintaining 100 per cent serviceability. The last of the railway bridges between Pyongyang and Chinnampo were destroyed on 16 September while attacks on trucks and other transport continued. After her ninth war patrol she was visited by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Roderick McGrigor, who congratulated the ship’s company on their achievements. She sailed for the last war patrol of this deployment on 23 October 1952 and on 28 October Sea Furies accurately bombed and destroyed sluice gates at Yonan with 1000lb bombs and destroyed more rail bridges. On 30 October a short service was held on the flight deck for the eight aircrew who had died during Korean operations and wreaths were dropped into the sea in their memory. 802 and 825 NAS were subsequently awarded the 1952 Boyd Trophy for their operations.

A Sea Fury FB 11 from Ocean over North Korea. (Author’s collection)

Throughout the Korean War the light fleet carriers had to be prepared, at short notice, to concentrate with the bulk of the FEF in order to defend Hong Kong against a Communist attack and frequent exercises were carried out to test the Colony’s defences. One of these was Exercise ‘Tai-Pan’ on 4 November 1952 when Ocean and Glory combined to simulate attacks against Hong Kong’s air defences. At the time the Colony was defended against air attack by RAF de Havilland Vampire fighters based at Kai Tak, all of which had been transported to their new base by Unicorn and light fleet carriers operating in the ferry role. On completion of the exercise, Ocean was relieved by Glory which was to carry out its third and last war deployment.

HMS Glory – November 1952 to May 1953

In May 1952 Glory had returned to the Mediterranean Fleet and, on her arrival in Malta on 26 May she disembarked her squadrons which subsequently returned to the UK in Theseus to be disbanded. She embarked 807 and 898 (Sea Fury FB 11s) NAS, which had been embarked in Theseus for the Fleet’s summer cruise and showed her versatility by taking part in a major Mediterranean Fleet visit to Istanbul in July 1952 in company with the Canadian light fleet carrier HMCS Magnificent, the cruiser Cleopatra and the destroyers Chevron and Chivalrous.²⁰ On 22 July Egyptian Army officers led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a coup which toppled the government of King Farouk who abdicated on 26 July and left the country in his yacht for Naples. Glory formed part of a concentration of the Mediterranean Fleet off Tobruk from where it could act to defend the Suez Canal and other British interests if necessary. The diplomatic crisis eased during August and after a spell anchored off Cyprus, she returned to Malta on 15 August and flew off her temporary air group.

On 1 September 1952 she embarked a new air group comprising 801 (Sea Fury FB 11s) and 821 (Firefly FR 5s) NAS and began an extensive work-up prior to rejoining the FEF. She returned to Hong Kong on 23 October and on 4 November took part in Exercise ‘Tai Pan’ with Ocean to test the Colony’s air defence organisation. Two days later, having taken on aircraft and stores from Ocean, she sailed for Sasebo and on 10 November 1952 she sailed to begin the first patrol of her third period of operations in the Korean war zone. By then peace talks had been making slow progress for more than a year and both the type and number of targets in enemy-held territory that could be attacked were strictly limited although anti-aircraft fire remained intense. At first Glory’s aircraft continued to use the pre-dawn interdiction tactic introduced by Ocean but they found that the enemy had reacted to it with a simple but effective air-raid warning system. This comprised warning fires lit rapidly on the ground under the aircraft as they flew inland; looking behind them, Glory’s pilots could see a long line of fires, about a mile apart, that led Communist fighters to the strike’s position. Like the Soviet Air Force, the North Koreans used night fighters in tight radar-controlled ‘boxes’ and this technique lent itself particularly well to indicating the position of strikes to defensive fighters. To make the enemy’s warning system more difficult, strikes flew at low level but the season of winter fog made this tactic impractical on most days.

After taking on replacement aircraft from Unicorn in Sasebo, Glory relieved the USS Badoeng Strait off western Korea on 28 November 1952. Much of the tasked flying was now intended to support Allied forces on the islands of Chodo and Sok-to as the NKPA tried to gain territorial advantage before a potential ceasefire but bad weather hampered operations Glory sailed for her last period of operations in 1952 on 15 December. Unfortunately her SAR helicopter was lost, together with its crew, a day later. It was an RN Dragonfly flown by Lieutenant A P Daniels RN and Aircrewman E R Ripley and was caught by a strong crosswind while taking off and crashed over the starboard side into the sea. Strike sorties concentrated on blocking railway tunnels and on 20 December a Firefly carried out the 10,000th deck landing since Glory had left the UK in May 1951. She left the operational area on 26 December to take on replacement aircraft from the AHU at Iwakuni which were ferried out to her by lighter.

A further war patrol began on 4 January 1953 with the emphasis placed on bombing attacks on villages where intelligence sources believed enemy troops to be billeted. Numerous cuts were also made in the railway network. A further patrol began on 19 January with similar tasking and on 6 February she began her sixth war patrol. Intelligence had warned of a possible pre-armistice submarine offensive against Allied warships and there were heightened anti-submarine precautions including visual searches by Fireflies and an enlarged screen of destroyers. Rivers and the ground froze so hard in January 1953 that trucks could drive round any damage inflicted on roads. It was well known that railway bridges could be repaired quickly and so attacks were directed at railway lines in the most inaccessible parts of their routes. Thirty-three such cuts were made in the month and, at first, repair rates were encouragingly slow but as NKPA engineers became aware of the tactic, repairs were made more quickly. On 5 January a Sea Fury, piloted by Lieutenant D G ‘Pug’ Mather RN, was hit by enemy fire after an attack on a railway line north of Chaeryon.²¹ His aircraft caught fire and he bailed out but the remainder of his section was unable to see where he landed and for 90 minutes aircraft searched for him without success. A USAF helicopter, escorted by two Sea Furies, was sent to the scene but, unfortunately, it was forced to turn back by bad weather and Mather was taken prisoner by the NKPA. He was tortured but eventually released after the armistice. One of the escorting Sea Furies, flown by Sub Lieutenant B E Rayner RN, lost radio contact and disappeared without trace and later in the day a Sea Fury flown by Sub Lieutenant B J Simonds RNVR spun from 3000ft and exploded on hitting the ground. Lieutenant Foster RN made a wheels-up landing in his Sea Fury at Pengyong-do with a rough-running engine and electrical failure. A day later a Firefly flown by Lieutenant W R Heaton RN was hit by ground fire and ditched north of Kirin-do. He was rescued from his dinghy by a USAF helicopter from Pengyong-do. On 10 February a section of Sea Furies was attacked by MiG-15s but the communist fighters failed to gain an advantage in their first firing pass and, unable to get into a firing position in a turning fight, they broke off the action and withdrew at high speed. After further replenishment in Kure, Glory sailed on 25 February for a further period of operations in some of the worst weather encountered during the entire war. Targets included troop concentrations and lorry convoys. As part of a pre-armistice ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, leaflet raids were carried out over the larger villages and towns in the north.

Pre-dawn strikes against lorry convoys resumed in March and war patrols with high-intensity rates of flying followed in March and April. On 5 April 1953 Glory equalled the record set by Ocean of 123 sorties flown in a single day. It could have been exceeded but the sensible decision was taken to equal it rather than risk lives by chasing statistics. As it was, the achievement required every pilot to fly four combat sorties in the day and Commander ‘Air’, the Flight Deck Officer and the Landing Signals Officer to fly two each. Weapons expended included 104 500lb bombs and 384 rocket projectiles fitted with the new shaped-charge warheads for use against hardened targets. Targets destroyed included seven road and railway bridges, twenty-eight buildings and five ‘exploding’ ox-carts with four further bridges and three gun positions damaged.

On 19 April Glory sailed for her tenth war patrol during this period of operations. By now sick and wounded prisoners of war were being exchanged at Panmunjon and target restrictions were particularly tight but close air support for the Commonwealth Division was given when requested. Her last war patrol began on 5 May; this was the eleventh of this tour of operations and her twenty-fifth overall. The Commander Seventh Fleet had signalled all carriers in theatre that the war was drawing to a close and no unnecessary risks were to be taken by aircraft attacking heavily-defended targets. Her last day of operational flying was 14 May 1953 after which she returned to Sasebo to pass personnel, aircraft and stores to Ocean which had arrived to relieve her. Since leaving the UK in May 1951 she had made an unrivalled contribution to the Korean War. This involved steaming 157,000nm and flying 13,700 sorties, 9500 of which were operational over Korea, using a million gallons of avgas. The ship had used 25,000 tons of furnace fuel oil. Her aircraft had destroyed seventy bridges, 392 vehicles and forty-nine railway trucks for the loss of twenty aircrew. The expenditure of ammunition amounted to 278 1000lb bombs, 7080 500lb bombs, 24,238 rocket projectiles and 1,441,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition. Once she had handed over operational duties, Glory returned to the UK, arriving in Portsmouth on 8 July 1953 to be de-commissioned for a major refit.

HMS Ocean – May 1953 to July 1953

Ocean returned to the Korean War zone in May 1953 after a spell in the Mediterranean. She had a new air group embarked which comprised 807 (Sea Fury FB 11s) and 810 (Firefly FR 5s) NAS. After a few days in Sasebo she sailed for a war patrol on 19 May and provided close air support for the Commonwealth Division as well as interdicting enemy troop movements. She returned to Sasebo on 31 May but had been unable to disembark her Sea Furies to Iwakuni as planned because of fog and low cloud. This was unfortunate as they were intended to carry out a fly-past over Allied ships in harbour to mark the forthcoming Coronation of HM Queen Elizabeth II. Not to be put off, fourteen Sea Furies were launched from Ocean while she lay at anchor in Sasebo using Rocket-Assisted Take-off Gear (RATOG), so that they could carry out a fly-past from Iwakuni. This had never been done before and provided as great a spectacle for the ships in harbour as the subsequent fly-past a day later. On Coronation Day, 2 June 1953, Commonwealth ships dressed overall, there was a parade in Ocean’s hangar and the fly-past took place as planned.

Ocean sailed again on 8 June with tasking limited to close air support for the Commonwealth Division as the front line stabilised prior to the armistice. A replenishment period in Kure was followed by a further patrol but fog limited the number of close air support sorties that could be flown. A further operational period was carried out in early July and three Fireflies were disembarked to K6 airfield at Pyongtaek as night fighters to counter interdiction raids by North Korean aircraft that were too slow for jets to intercept. They proved to be a successful deterrent although no enemy aircraft were shot down. On 27 July 1953 the armistice was finally signed at Panmunjon but Ocean carried out a further four patrols off the west coast of Korea to monitor ceasefire arrangements and ensure that there were no infringements of the armistice terms. She left the area for Hong Kong flying her paying-off pennant on 31 October and was relieved as the FEF carrier by HMAS Sydney. On arrival back in Devonport in December she paid off for a refit.

HMS Unicorn – June 1950 to July 1953

Unicorn had been re-commissioned in 1949 to ferry aircraft, stores and equipment to the FEF so that a light fleet carrier could be fully supported on station.²² She was in Singapore Dockyard undergoing a refit to prepare for her passage back to the UK when the Korean War broke out and, with the BPF a recent memory and no British base nearer to the war zone than Hong Kong, it was clear that earlier lessons applied directly to the new conflict. Unicorn was ordered to remain in the FEF to form the nucleus of an air train to support the fleet’s operational carriers but the best method of employing her had to be given careful consideration. She could operate at a forward base as she had done at Leyte Gulf and Manus in 1945 or she could land her aircraft repair department to RNAS Sembawang in Singapore and operate as a replenishment carrier. The latter alternative was decided to be the more flexible and efficient and was the one adopted, although she retained a light repair and maintenance capability. She sailed from Singapore on 11 July, arriving in Sasebo on 20 July to transfer seven Seafires and five Fireflies to Triumph.

The range of capabilities Unicorn offered were quickly realised and the light fleet carrier Warrior was re-commissioned in the UK to provide further support by ferrying aircraft, stores and personnel to Singapore. In August 1950 Unicorn was in Hong Kong Dockyard being loaded with stores as diverse as aircraft engines, rum, flour and ammunition when the British Government took the decision to commit ground troops to the conflict. She proved to be capable of embarking the headquarters of 27 Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and loading their vehicles tightly into her lower hangar. The cruiser Ceylon embarked the 1st Battalion of the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders. The two ships entered Pusan, the last port in UN hands, on 29 August to unload their military force. After that Unicorn returned to Singapore Dockyard to complete the refit that had been interrupted by the outbreak of war before returning to the war zone in December with a further 400 troops and their kit in addition to replacement aircraft for Theseus which had replaced Triumph. As in the BPF she provided a spare deck for new pilots to practice their deck landing technique, leaving the operational carrier free to concentrate on its primary role.

Unicorn receiving a rousing welcome from US armed forces, including a military band, as she arrives in Pusan with men of the Middlesex Regiment and their vehicles, the first British troops to arrive in Korea. (Author’s collection)

In early 1951 she ferried Meteor jet fighters for 77 Squadron RAAF from Hong Kong to Iwakuni, an airfield across the bay from Hiroshima, and later in the year she continued to ferry RAAF Meteors into the war zone in addition to large numbers of replacement Sea Furies and Fireflies for the RN. She also ferried RAF Vampire fighters for Hong Kong which bolstered its defences against potential communist aggression. For a while Unicorn acted as an accommodation ship for Commonwealth naval personnel in Sasebo and she had the distinction of being ‘adopted’ by the Middlesex Regiment after her continuous close association with the Regiment ferrying in replacements for the battalion fighting in Korea. She sailed north of the 38th Parallel to bombard North Korean coast-watchers with her 4in guns and retains, at the time of writing, the distinction of being the only aircraft carrier of any nation to have carried out a bombardment of enemy targets on shore under wartime conditions. She often used the Shimonoseki Strait to pass between Honshu and Kyushu and, despite careful checks on the state of the tide, she struck power cables stretched between the islands on 2 October 1951 because they were covered in ice and snow in the unseasonable cold weather prevailing at the time which caused them to sag much lower than normal. Replacing them took weeks and Unicorn invariably sailed south of Kyushu after that. Later in October she had to sail in order to ride out Typhoon RUTH, encountering 100-knot winds and waves 50ft high.

Unicorn was too important to be spared from the FEF but she had been away from the UK for over two years on 24 November 1951 when she was re-commissioned in Singapore Naval Base with a new ship’s company that had steamed Warrior from the UK. Unicorn’s former ship’s company steamed Warrior home. Changing ship’s companies on station in the Far East was to become commonplace a decade later but it was a novel concept in 1951. After a short refit she resumed her varied duties and continued to support the operational carriers. In March 1952 she played the part of a light fleet carrier with a small embarked air group to test the air defences of Hong Kong in Exercise ‘Vortex’. In April the Middlesex Regiment presented her with the Regimental March and a special Regimental Order of the Day, both of which were mounted on the quarterdeck next to the ship’s battle honours board. The only other British warship to have been similarly honoured by an Army unit in the modern era was the battleship Vanguard which had a close relationship with the Royal Artillery.

Unicorn sailed on several war patrols with Ocean during 1952, acting as a spare deck to recover unserviceable aircraft and to maintain CAP with ‘borrowed’ Sea Furies. After a further refit she was in Singapore dressed overall to mark the Coronation of HM Queen Elizabeth II. On 17 July she sailed with replacement aircraft for Sasebo and, while on passage, she picked up a ‘Mayday’ signal from the SS Inchkilda saying that she was being attacked by a pirate gunboat. Unicorn went to her aid immediately and closed the scene with all armament manned and circled the pirate vessel at 3000 yards with all her medium and close-range weapons trained on it. This was too much for the pirates who re-boarded their vessel and fled at high speed. Inchkilda was returned to her master to go about her lawful business and Unicorn proceeded to Sasebo. A day later the armistice that ended the conflict was signed and Unicorn eventually sailed for the UK in October 1953 after four years away and two separate commissions in the Far East. During the Korean War, Unicorn spent 500 days at sea, steamed 130,000 miles and handled some 600 replacement aircraft. She also ferried 6000 troops and passengers into the war zone. She arrived back in Devonport on 17 November and reduced to reserve.

Unicorn at Kure in Japan delivering Meteor fighters for 77 Squadron RAAF. (Author’s collection)

Lessons Learned by the Carrier Air Groups

The static nature of the war by 1952 led Glory and Ocean to plan flying operations on a programmed, rather than a reactive, basis.²³ This was easier for the running of the ships and it was found that sixty sorties per day could be flown without undue strain for protracted periods. Every evening at about 17.00, a programme was worked out for the next day’s flying which consisted of a number of fly-offs known as Events. Event ‘A’ would fly off and approximately two hours later Event ‘B’ would launch, allowing Event ‘A’ to land on, and this carried on throughout the day. During the day the ship operated in an area bounded by a circle of 15 miles diameter with its centre at Point ‘Oboe’. The ship’s area of responsibility was subdivided into smaller operational areas with the aim of covering each at least once every other day. Each area had a primary target and this was duly attacked unless a more promising opportunity target appeared. Blockade enforcement was undertaken by armed coastal reconnaissance sorties and the threat to friendly islands was countered by attacking adjacent mainland targets. Railways were kept out of use by continuous interdiction and aircraft were always included in the Events for close air support tasking by outside agencies. Close air support could take several distinct and different forms.

Before every sortie, pilots and observers were briefed on the amount and types of anti-aircraft fire, known at the time as ‘flak’, that the enemy was known to have in the areas in question, their location, tactics and camouflage. The NKPA had guns ranging from 88mm to 12.7mm but made no use of tracer and only limited use of radar control at first. NKPA radars were believed to be pirated versions of British wartime sets designed for anti-aircraft fire control. Predicted fire was encountered around Pyongyang and the airfield at Yongdang Dong where Soviet forces were believed to be based. NKPA and Chinese People’s Liberation Army flak made extensive use of terrain and camouflage and was tightly disciplined. Troops in the open would remain absolutely still when attacked and then engage aircraft as they pulled away with massed, concentrated small-arms fire which was often very effective. Units on the move would post anti-aircraft sentries on hills which would fire warning shots when Allied aircraft were seen. Heavy anti-aircraft guns were deployed in batteries of four or eight dug into diamond-shaped positions. To attract UN pilots and make them waste ammunition, dummy targets ‘reasonably well camouflaged’ were set up, many of which formed the basis of flak traps and cables were often slung across valleys to catch low-flying pilots. Several measures were adopted to counter these tricks; phony camouflage was looked at carefully, reported and only attacked after careful photographic reconnaissance and analysis. It was normal to fly at 3000ft in transit, above the danger of small-arms fire and never attack targets more than once. Line astern formation was never used in attacks as the enemy could easily shift accurate fire onto the second and subsequent aircraft after the first had made its pass. Instead, converging attacks from different angles were made to disperse anti-aircraft fire and flak suppression was carried out by specialised sections of Sea Furies. These countermeasures resulted in fewer aircraft being hit and more damage inflicted on targets.

Captain Evans of Ocean warned his pilots not to regard MiG-15 jet fighters, when they were first encountered over Korea, as ‘something legendary as we had done with Rommel in the desert’ after claims on Radio Tokyo that they were shooting down Allied aircraft.²⁴ Lieutenant Carmichael’s flight encountered a group of MiGs at 06.00 on 9 August 1952. His number 2, Lieutenant Haines called ‘MiGs at five o’clock’ but Carmichael did not see them himself at first. His number 4, Sub Lieutenant Ellis, called a break and the Sea Furies all turned towards the enemy aircraft and good hits were obtained by Carmichael and others on two MiGs, one of which went down trailing smoke and flame and the other broke away, clearly damaged. The remaining enemy aircraft broke off the engagement to escort the damaged aircraft away after the first MiG crashed. Carmichael considered the main reason for his flight’s success was the ruggedness and dependability of the Sea Fury. His men had kept a good lookout and used their aircraft to better advantage than the enemy, taking their opportunity to knock down a superior aircraft. Despite their piston-engined fighters’ supposed limitations, they had not been intimidated by the enemy and the skill and experience of the Sea Fury pilots was, clearly, also a significant factor.

All bombardment spotting by RN aircraft used American procedures regardless of the ship carrying out the shoot. Some were pre-briefed, some impromptu and some briefed whilst the aircraft were in flight to the target area. A special card was printed for pilots’ guidance with the correct procedure sequence, definitions and terms. It was found to be extremely useful. Cruisers with their 6in guns and fire control systems were the most accurate and pilots preferred to spot for them; destroyers’ 4.5in guns were less accurate and frigates with their small 4in guns were the least accurate of all. Their usual inaccuracy led to them being used to engage area targets although they were sometimes used against enemy guns. The most frustrating discovery was that, in general, American ships did not know the American procedures and nor did their pilots. There were a number of cases of Sea Fury pilots having to give lectures on bombardment procedure to a USN ship whilst actually flying over the target! 1:50,000 scale maps were used for spotting and found to be satisfactory; gridded photographs were not used.

Pilots flying armed reconnaissance sorties were usually given an area or line along which to search and tasked to answer specific questions. For close air support sorties pilots were briefed on the position of Allied forward troops which they plotted on 1:50,000 scale maps. Targets in this static phase of the war were most likely to be dug-outs, bunkers or underground shelters and, therefore, 500lb bombs with 30-second delay fuzes were the preferred weapons. Once close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), pilots reported to a forward air control pilot or ‘Mosquito’ in a North American Harvard aircraft who talked him onto the target with a six-figure map reference and/or accurately dropped smoke markers. Under Plan ‘Victor’, all friendly artillery ceased fire while the attack went in but after experience and discussions with Army officers ashore, RN pilots became confident that they could keep out of the way of shells if warned of the line of fire and ‘Victor’ was used less often. Close air support sorties were generally popular because pilots felt they were directly helping their colleagues in action on the ground. Through necessity the enemy became adept at camouflage and it took time for pilots to get used to their methods. On a number of occasions even experienced pilots had returned with reports that nothing was going on in the area they had covered but analysis of their photographs revealed good targets which had been well concealed. Successive carriers found that enemy movement stopped in their areas of interest by day and that enemy guns would not open fire against ships when aircraft were overhead.

Aircraft Maintenance

It proved difficult to apply consistent lessons to the carriers deployed off Korea because seasonal variations had a significant impact. Fewer hours of daylight and worse weather in winter meant fewer sorties per day but far higher averages could be maintained in summer. There was, thus, no such thing as a standard figure for logistic requirements, aircraft wastage or the consumption of air stores. To achieve an average of seventy-five sorties per day, a number often exceeded by both Glory and Ocean, maintenance personnel had to carry out very quick turnarounds with unserviceable aircraft. If an aircraft could be made serviceable for the next Event, work had to start on it as soon as its engine had shut down and it had been lashed to the deck. This included refuelling, re-arming and re-spotting into the launch range aft within a very tight time frame. It was vital that pilots reported problems immediately so that ‘Snag Parties’ could have the right tools and ground equipment ready together with serviceable spares. There was no time to fetch things from deep storage. Striking down aircraft that needed more extensive repairs in the hangar also needed careful planning. If a series of engine runs would be required to prove an aircraft serviceable, care had to be taken not to lock it into the back of the hangar. It was also important to avoid continually moving aircraft that were actually being worked on by mechanics to enable serviceable aircraft to be ranged on deck. In fact such movements could be rendered impossible if aircraft under repair were on jacks or had a wing spread.

When pilots made their post-flight reports in the aircraft control room (ACR), there was often a lot of congestion as aircraft, electrical and radio snag parties, flight deck marshallers and arming parties with notebooks poised attempted to get the information they needed quickly. Flying started before dawn and ended shortly after sunset, after which the range for the next day’s first two Events had to be moved into position, accurately spotted, fuelled armed and lashed to the deck. Since the ship was darkened it was not possible to carry out routine inspections while these aircraft were ranged on deck. Daily inspections were, therefore, carried out between Events during the day’s flying and this required careful supervision to ensure that aircraft were not lost to the flying programme for this reason alone. Other routine inspections were easier to plan. Daily starred inspections were carried out every six days instead of once per week since this fitted in better with the programming of a war patrol. By doing them on a replenishment day in the middle of a patrol, on return to harbour and just prior to leaving harbour, none fell due on a flying day. Minor inspections were either anticipated or extended and engine changes anticipated to coincide with a period in harbour since every aircraft in any way immobilised in the hangar at sea was one more obstacle to overcome. In harbour there was the luxury of space and the ability to use ‘Jumbo’, the mobile crane, to help speed the work.

After each patrol there was always a heavy programme of ammunitioning and the embarkation of new aircraft, air, naval, armament and victualling stores to be completed and aircraft maintenance ratings were naturally called on to do their part. This was most satisfactorily solved by virtually abandoning all attempts at doing any maintenance on the first day alongside while up to 150 maintenance ratings helped to take in ammunition. From then on no further call was made on the Air Engineering Department (AED), or squadrons for the remainder of the period in harbour. To conserve spares while the ship was on a patrol or even to make them available at all sometimes, it was necessary to rob aircraft with major damage fairly extensively; aircraft thus stripped were known as ‘Christmas Trees’. In nearly all cases the item removed was replaced by the original unserviceable one with the result that aircraft returned to Unicorn were usually deeply unserviceable. The most common items in this respect were arrester hooks, oleos, hydraulic piping, G4F magnetic compasses, oil pressure gauges and artificial horizons. Quite often it was possible to use a mainplane off a damaged Sea Fury to service another aircraft rather than use a new spare. One of the more inexplicable aspects of Korean operations was the constant recurrence of a certain type of defect during a particular patrol, it neither having appeared previously nor subsequently. To the air maintenance sailors, patrols frequently became known by their common defects rather than by any other particular incident. For example there were ‘over-speeding’, ‘spark-plug’, ‘bomb-carrier’ and ‘magneto’ patrols during 1952 but none of them prevented the number of tasked flying sorties from being met.

The Aircraft Holding Unit at Iwakuni

One of Unicorn’s first tasks was to establish an aircraft holding unit (AHU), at an airfield at Iwakuni which was situated on the other side of Hiroshima Bay from the dockyard at Kure. The airfield was administered by the RAAF and apart from acting as an operational base for 77 Squadron with its Meteor fighters, it hosted a squadron of USAF B-25 bombers, USN Neptune maritime patrol aircraft and a small detachment of RAF Sunderland flying boats. It also acted a staging post for Allied transport aircraft and turned round large numbers of flights organised by the US Military Air Transport Service, RAF Transport Command and QANTAS which was contracted to support the Australian armed forces. Like the wartime MONABs, the sailors that set up the AHU had to make do at first with primitive facilities and their first move was to make an office out of engine crates and a workshop in the back of a 3-ton lorry. The ‘team’ comprised a single officer, initially Lieutenant Foster RN, one chief petty officer aircraft artificer, four petty officers and twenty sailors. Its primary task was to hold twenty-four replacement aircraft of which two, one Sea Fury and one Firefly, had to be at 24 hours’ notice for issue to an operational carrier.²⁵ Their workload varied from intense when Unicorn unloaded aircraft or the operational carrier arrived to take them on board and unload ‘duds’ for repair or scrap to dull when neither were present. During the quiet periods the sailors turned to with a will to improve their facilities and help other lodger units at the base. They were, in turn, helped by them whenever necessary. The AHU proved to be a fine example of inter-Allied co-operation throughout the conflict.

SAR Helicopter Coverage

The value of helicopters as combat SAR platforms was demonstrated both on land and at sea during the Korean War. As a ‘planeguard’ during day carrier operations it offered unrivalled efficiency but a destroyer with its sea-boat ready was still needed close to the carrier at night. At different times RN aircrew were rescued by helicopters operating from the quarterdecks of bombarding cruisers at Wonsan and Inchon, from tank landing ships acting as small flight decks close inshore and from USAF airfields as well as from their own carriers. Their morale value was important but the limitations of the Sikorsky S-51 and its licence-built British derivative the Westland Dragonfly had to be appreciated and understood. These included a relatively small radius of action, made even smaller by the strong headwinds often encountered and a reliance on dead-reckoning navigation with its potentially large errors. The ability to fly on instruments was minimal, limiting their usefulness in adverse weather and their VHF radios were limited to ‘line-of-sight’ ranges. For all these reasons, the ubiquity of their basing was a critical factor and some of the aircrew that were rescued would not have been recovered if only the carrier-borne helicopters had been available. The dedication and skill of the USN and USAF helicopter crews to their combat rescue task was worthy of the highest praise.

Destroyers and frigates also formed part of the SAR organisation and were frequently placed in ‘rescue stations’ close inshore where they could move to recue aircrew from Allied aircraft that managed to cross the coast and ditch after being damaged. On 7 April 1951, for instance, the destroyer Cockade was acting as Allied air search and rescue ship in the Yalu Gulf when she was ordered to search for the crew of a crashed US bomber. This involved moving close inshore among shoals in foggy weather and searching in co-operation with a USAF amphibious aircraft which was able to land on the water to pick up the one survivor that was located;²⁶ the rest of the crew were never found. Fortuitously, however, Cockade was able to rescue another US airman who had been shot down in January, concealed by friendly Koreans and brought out to the destroyer in a junk when she was seen to be close inshore.

RAF and British Army Involvement

The Royal Navy provided the only British contribution to tactical air operations throughout the Korean War but the other Services made contributions to the overall UN air effort. The RAF maintained a detachment of four Sunderland flying boats at Iwakuni drawn from 205, 88 and 209 Squadrons which constituted the Far East Air Force Flying Boat Wing based at RAF Seletar in Singapore. They flew daily sorties under naval operational control in support of the Commonwealth warships that implemented the blockade to the west and south-west of Korea.²⁷ Air observation was important for troops on the ground and two units were formed to provide it in 1951. These were 1903 Air Observation Post (AOP) Flight which formed part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. It was a joint unit equipped with Auster AOP 6 aircraft flown by pilots drawn from the Royal Artillery with maintenance personnel provided by the RAF. 1913 Light Liaison Flight was also formed in 1951 with Auster AOP 6 aircraft which were flown by officers and NCOs of the Glider Pilot Regiment²⁸ and RAF maintenance personnel. Both units were disbanded after the armistice.

Screening the Carrier Battle Groups

There was a latent threat, throughout the war, that the Soviet Union would seek to escalate the conflict with attacks on UN warships by aircraft and submarines. It was necessary, therefore, to ensure that a proportion of aircraft sorties maintained defensive anti-submarine patrols and CAP and that a screen of destroyers remained with the operational carrier. The screen was not always made up entirely of RN warships but often included a mix of British, Australian, American, Canadian and Dutch destroyers. Anti-submarine capability had to be maintained at high proficiency but this was not always easy to achieve, given the emphasis on other tasks and the lack of training opportunities. The rotation of destroyers between the war zone and other areas of the FEF helped by allowing ships to take part in exercises and in 1951 Cossack, Consort, Charity and Cockade took part in USN ‘hunter-killer’ anti-submarine exercises off Okinawa that helped to keep standards at a high level. The opportunity was also taken to upgrade destroyers with the latest weapons; Cockade for instance was taken into Singapore Dockyard in March 1952 to have ‘X’ mounting removed and two Mark 6 ‘Squid’ anti-submarine mortars installed in its place with their associated bomb handling room and improved sonar. She returned to the war zone in December 1952 after a work-up.

The threat of air attack from the Soviet Union or China was always present but, fortunately, there was only one such attack on a British warship. The destroyer Comus had covered a landing by a USN reconnaissance unit on the west coast on 21 August 1950 and was steaming about 85 miles west of Kunsan when she was attacked by two North Korean Il-10 ‘Beast’ bombers which dived on her singly from astern.²⁹ The first dropped four bombs that hit the ship on the port side killing one sailor, wounding another and leaving a hole 4ft high by 8ft long on the waterline which flooded the forward boiler room. The second aircraft’s aim was less accurate; it dropped its bombs ahead of the ship and all of them missed. Comus was able to make for Kure under her own power, escorted by her sister-ship Consort and a CAP of USMC fighters. Fears that this might mark the beginning of a Communist attempt to break the blockade led FO2 to order his ships off the west coast to concentrate in order to increase their anti-aircraft firepower and Triumph to maintain a Seafire CAP over them in daylight for the immediate future. The attack proved to be an isolated incident, however, and there were no further attacks on the carrier battle group or any other Commonwealth warship.

Command and Control

It was clear from the outset that the United States would bear the heaviest share of the fighting in Korea and, since there was an existing US command structure in nearby Japan, it was natural that the British and Commonwealth warships in the war zone should fit into it. Operational command was the most significant since the British FEF retained administrative control through its own logistical and type-support infrastructure. This was also able to support the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand ships since they and their equipment were, at the time, all of British design and origin. Personal relations between American and British officers were founded on mutual respect and remained effective and cordial throughout the war.³⁰ Misunderstandings and differences of outlook were inevitable but were always overcome. Many arose simply because of the difficulty found in arranging verbal contact with the American operational commanders, most of whom exercised their commands afloat. In contrast, the three British admirals who acted as FO2FES during the war all exercised their command from Sasebo in Japan, only embarking to ‘get a feel’ for the operational area with a small staff on relatively infrequent occasions. The chief difference between the American and British systems lay in the rigidity of the former at the time. Orders were extremely detailed and direct communication on a junior level with another Service or even another task force were not normally permitted. All communications were expected to go back up the chain of command, through the top and then back down again. The information addressees on signals did not take action until ordered to comply by their superior authority, even when it was obvious that such action would have to be taken. Practically no discretion was left to the ‘man on the spot’. In the British Commonwealth command structure of the time, on the other hand, anticipation and initiative were expected and exercised. USN ships attached to the west coast task force very much appreciated the reduced reliance on signals, instructions and demands for situation reports. Relations between the USN and RN over the coming decades were to benefit greatly from the perceptions of mutual confidence that grew out of the Korean conflict.

Another specific difference between the USN and the RN is worth explaining. In the USN it was a rule that the officer in tactical command of a carrier task force must himself be a qualified aviator.³¹ It was accepted that this might leave the flag officer less expert in anti-aircraft and anti-submarine screening tactics. The RN view was that any admiral, not necessarily an aviator, could command a carrier task force and that his staff would cover any shortfall in personal experience, as they would do on non-aviation matters in the USN. In fact none of the three FO2s that served in the Korean War was an aviator and this made it difficult for the Commander Seventh Fleet to understand how they could command a task force that contained two light fleet carriers. At one stage it was even suggested that the carriers should be taken out of FO2’s task force and placed under the operational command of TF 77, the USN carriers that normally operated in the Sea of Japan. The RN politely vetoed this idea and operations continued as they normally did in RN carrier task forces. This difference was to become an issue in later NATO Strike Fleet operations, however.

The British Perception of the Air Interdiction Campaign in Korea

Complete interdiction of a battlefield has always proved difficult but circumstances in Korea seemed to offer special opportunities.³² The complete blockade enforced by the overwhelming UN naval forces entirely ruled out the possibility of enemy supply by sea and the meagre rail and primitive road communications of North Korea seemed vulnerable to the UN air offensive. Additionally, important road and rail centres on the east coast were close to the shore and vulnerable to naval bombardment. Further, the vulnerability of the rail system seemed to be enhanced, as we saw earlier, by the large number of bridges and tunnels necessitated by the mountainous terrain of the east coast of northern Korea. After the Chinese offensive had been contained, the main effort of UN air operations centred on interdiction of the Communist lines of supply. This was the primary responsibility of the US 5th Air Force, supported by Allied contingents and all available naval and USMC aircraft. The efforts of the USN and USAF were never co-ordinated at theatre level due to the lack of a unified US command structure. It gradually came to be accepted, however, that the USN would deal with the east coast railway and highway systems and the USAF would deal with the west coast where it interacted with RN carrier operations. Except when circumstances dictated other temporary uses of aircraft, this policy continued for twenty months. Immense damage was unquestionably inflicted on the enemy communications systems, and movement by rail or road was confined to the hours of darkness, but the full interdiction of the battlefield was never achieved. Throughout the campaign, the Communists were always able to launch an offensive when they wished, largely because they needed far less supplies than Allied troops.

The causes of this failure, in British eyes, were primarily due to inhibitions accepted by the UN for political reasons, but tactical and operational conditions were also partly to blame. Politically, the ban on attacking Communist sources of supply in Manchuria robbed aircraft of targets that could have been decisive and the static war, accepted during the protracted armistice negotiations, enabled the Communists to keep their strongly-fortified front lines supplied to a degree they could never have achieved in a war of movement reacting to Allied amphibious assaults. The enemy was allowed to fight on his own terms and this negated many of the advantages possessed by the Allied forces. When it was initiated in January 1951 the object of the interdiction campaign was to impede the Communist advance. Though this line of reasoning was justified at the time, it was opposed by Vice Admiral Arthur D Struble, commander of TF 77, who felt his aircraft could be used better to provide close air support for troops on the ground. Continuation of the interdiction campaign throughout the long armistice negotiations savoured dangerously of trying to win the war by the use of air power alone, while the Army and Navy were relegated to relatively static and defensive roles. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this strategy, which certainly suited the Communists, was continued for too long and that better results would have been obtained if a more aggressive strategy had been implemented with the Allied Services working together in close co-operation to capitalise on the UN strengths. With hindsight, had the UN forces continued to exert the mobility and flexibility given to them by their command of the sea, as they had at Inchon in 1950, the enemy would have been forced into a war of movement he could not have sustained and aircraft would have played a critical part in joint operations. This stood more chance than an air interdiction campaign, on its own, of compelling the enemy to accept more satisfactory armistice conditions at an appreciably earlier date.

Logistics

The US Military Sea Transportation Service brought 95 per cent of the US troops that fought on the ground in Korea into the war zone without interruption from enemy action because of the UN command of both the sea and the air above it. In the three years of war the Service delivered five million servicemen, 52 million tons of cargo including ammunition and 22 million tons of petrol and oil. Every US soldier landing in Korea was accompanied by 5 tons of equipment and needed 64lbs of supplies per day to keep him there. For every ton of air freight flown into Korea, 270 tons were delivered by sea and 4 tons of fuel for the transport aircraft’s return trip had to be brought into Korea by sea.³³

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) played a prominent role in keeping the carriers and all the other Commonwealth warships at sea. A total of thirteen tankers and five stores issuing ships were deployed in support of operations off Korea. When FO2 returned to Sasebo after the initial series of carrier strikes he found Admiral Brind’s chief of staff, Commodore G F Burghard RN, waiting for him to discuss ‘the whole gamut of needs and troubles, refit programmes, personnel and logistics’.³⁴ COMNAVFE generously urged the RN to make use of USN facilities in Sasebo but the principal British requirements for oil, food, stores and ammunition were well catered for by the FEF’s own logistic organisation. Later in the war, when fighting intensified and pre-positioned stock in the Far East was used up, there were some delays shipping replacement stock from the UK and the carriers, for instance, had to use USN bombs with their different attachment lugs which had to be modified. There were also shortages of radio and radar valves which caused problems but overall the system worked very well and FO2 commented that the fleet logistic staff ‘almost seemed to possess the power of thought reading’ so well did they meet his ships’ needs.

An Overview of the Carriers’ Achievement

At the outset of the Korean War Admiral Andrewes said that it would be wrong to regard a single light fleet carrier as representative of what naval aviation was capable of achieving in any theatre. Even taking into account the limited nature of air and naval opposition, however, the performance of the British and Australian light fleet carriers between June 1950 and July 1953 was remarkable. The intensity of flying and the hard lessons learned throughout the long campaign, during the whole of which one ship had been deployed on station despite the recent manpower crisis, brought the ships, squadrons and their people to a high level of professionalism and efficiency that was matched in few other elements of the British armed forces. It built upon the experience of the BPF to maintain a highly-effective Fleet Air Arm that was well placed to move onto the new generation of jet aircraft and helicopters as well as the technical innovations that would revolutionise carrier aviation in the next decade.

The light fleet carriers provided the most conspicuous aspect element of the British contribution to Korea and they flew at rates which had never been achieved before. In an analysis of Theseus’ early operations, FO2 calculated³⁵ that she flew 670 sorties in a given period and he compared this with an average of 585 sorties per carrier for the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron of the BPF over a similar period in 1945. These statistics were found to be even more impressive when the analysis revealed that the average air group of a single carrier in the BPF was ‘about 54’ but that Theseus’ air group was only twenty-eight. A later analysis using figures for Glory or Ocean in 1953 would provide even more impressive statistics. The British and Australian carrier operations during the Korean conflict were admitted on all sides to be outstanding but, realistically, this level of achievement was only possible because of the lack of serious naval and air opposition. Had these existed on an appreciable scale, more carriers would have been required to form a task force capable of both offensive and defensive operations on a larger scale. This would have stretched the early post-war RN but would, nevertheless, have been possible. It should not be forgotten that though the enemy had a large but simply equipped Army, it would have found it extremely difficult to locate and fight the carrier task forces the USN and RN could have brought into action had the need arisen.

During the Korean War the RN committed five aircraft carriers and the RAN one to the UN cause out of total of seventy-six warships committed by the Commonwealth governments to the conflict. Their achievements were the result of hard work, much improvisation and operations which had driven many ships, including the light fleet carriers, to the limit of their machinery’s capability; in some cases, such as Theseus’ catapult, it was arguably driven beyond it. The armistice signed on 27 July 1953 ended hostilities that had lasted 1128 days and involved warships from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the UK and the USA.

The seal of royal approval was set on the achievements of the Royal and Commonwealth Navies by the following message from Her Majesty the Queen to the Board of Admiralty which was subsequently signalled to the Fleet. ‘Please express to all serving in the Commonwealth Fleet my deep appreciation of the splendid service they have given throughout the fighting in Korea’, signed ELIZABETH R.