Читать книгу The British Carrier Strike Fleet - David Hobbs - Страница 12
Оглавление4 Invention, Innovation, New Aircraft and Rebuilt Ships
During the Second World War the Admiralty’s Directorate of Naval Air Warfare (DNAW) introduced a monthly journal called Flight Deck with the first edition appearing in August 1944. On its first page there was a message from the First Sea Lord Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham who said that ‘the future of the Navy depends largely on a vigorous air arm and it is essential for all of us to acquire full understanding of its activities if the Navy is to maintain its great traditions of enterprise and efficiency’.1 Vice Admiral Sir Dennis Boyd, the Fifth Sea Lord and Board member responsible for air matters, endorsed this message with his hope that the Journal would be of service ‘to the Navy as a whole and particularly to those who are concerned, in any capacity, with the provision and use of aircraft which are the spearhead for the Navy’s attack and defence’. Despite its importance and undoubted success, the journal ceased publication in January 1946 amid the austerity that followed the end of the war and demobilisation.
It left an important gap, however, which was filled by a revitalised Flight Deck, introduced as a quarterly journal by DNAW in the winter of 1952. The incumbent Fifth Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Anstice, said that the new Journal was ‘to provide up-to-date information for those who fly our aeroplanes and for those who, though not aviators, are concerned with the operation of aircraft and should be aware of their capabilities. The whole of the Navy of today is included in this latter class.’2 The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, added that ‘Progress in the air is rapid. It affects all naval activities and it is essential that all officers should fully appreciate developments and the effect they will have on naval warfare.’ This edition had, as its opening article, an extract from a lecture delivered by Vice-Admiral Sir Maurice Mansergh to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in 19523 Mansergh had previously commanded the 3rd Aircraft Carrier Squadron and, between 1949 and 1951 had been the Fifth Sea Lord and Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff responsible for air matters.
The Task of Naval Aviation
Mansergh began by stressing that aircraft had become ‘part and parcel of the daily round and common task of the Navy’ like guns, torpedoes, boats or ‘any other manifestations of naval life’. The ‘Air’ was now included in the term ‘Sea Power’. By 1952 the RN had emerged from the post-war manpower crisis but faced an uncertain future. British politicians focused their attention at the time the procurement of atomic weapons and the retention of powerful land forces in Germany to defend Western Europe, if necessary, against Soviet forces from behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ as the Cold War developed. The need for sea power to maintain trade and vital lines of communication was not forgotten but was undoubtedly given a lower priority. Mansergh’s lecture to RUSI was intended to emphasise the continuing need for a powerful navy to a wide and informed audience but the fact that an extract was printed in Flight Deck showed the importance placed by the Admiralty on making its own officers aware of the important role sea power still had to play. Interestingly, Mansergh did not claim that naval aviation was a panacea but noted the effective achievements of RAF Coastal Command in the recent Battle of the Atlantic together with the extensive minelaying operations carried out by Bomber Command. Arguably, he even over-stated some of their achievements in order, perhaps, not to be accused of a partisan approach. The combination of land-based and carrier-borne aviation was accepted as relevant and important by the Admiralty but, as we shall see in later chapters, similar views were not held in other Government departments.
Carrier-borne aircraft were described by Mansergh as vital in the performance of three main fighting roles. In order of importance these were:
(a) Anti-submarine warfare.
(b) The air defence in depth of fleets at sea and convoys of merchant ships.
(c) Air strikes against surface ships and land targets.
A further important role was identified as the tactical or close support of land forces, the task being performed very successfully by the light fleet carriers in the Korean war zone at the time, but this would have to be carried out by the aircraft designed for tasks (b) and (c) above. The role did not, therefore, merit inclusion in the list of main tasks and in addition to the fighting roles there were a number of subsidiary requirements for naval aircraft to perform including the training of aircrew and ship’s companies in the use of their anti-aircraft systems.
The anti-submarine role was believed to require an aircraft with relatively long endurance, able to carry out visual and radar searches for ‘snorkelling’ or surfaced submarines so that they could be avoided by surface forces or attacked. The same aircraft was to be able to localise a dived submarine with sono-buoys and to attack it, when possible, with a homing torpedo or depth charges. The new Fairey Gannet was designed from the outset to be a ‘hunter/killer’, able both to search for and strike at an enemy submarine in the same sortie at a significant range from the carrier. Mansergh was one of the first to draw attention to the important role that was becoming apparent for helicopters in this field. He said that the board was interested in the capability being shown by these innovative aircraft as ‘short-range search aircraft able to deal with the submarine that eludes the normal search and gets towards a position from which it could attack’.4 In this role, he said, it would have to deal with submerged submarines and would have ‘a sono-buoy receiver and good communications with surface craft; later it might carry an anti-submarine weapon’.
Air defence was described as the ability to hold, or seize, command of the air in areas threatened by enemy air attack and through which surface forces or convoys must pass. Mansergh broke this broad requirement down into two distinct categories. In the first he noted the need to defend convoys by destroying shadowing aircraft which might be working with submarines and a shore headquarters with the potential to order air strikes. The second involved the defence of the strike fleet by preventing weapon release by anything up to full-scale, escorted air attacks in waters that were within range of the enemy’s highest-performance bomber and fighter aircraft. Attacks of this kind could be expected in all conditions of light and weather and so this second category was further divided into two. Under good weather conditions by day the Admiralty felt that pilots had less need of interception aids5 and could be brought into visual contact with the enemy by direction officers using the carrier’s radar. In bad weather or at night, the fighter needed to be fitted with air-intercept radar with an observer trained as a second crew member to operate it and guide the pilot into cannon range of the target,6 say 250 yards down to 100 yards depending on whether the target was manoeuvring.
The best aircraft for the defence of convoys was thought to be a two-seat, radar-equipped fighter of good performance but not necessarily as good as the fighters required for the air defence of the fleet. These would have to be of the highest performance and the need to intercept high-speed bombers before they could release their weapons was felt to be sufficiently obvious to need little stress. Achieving that high performance might need endurance to be sacrificed and that had led the Admiralty to consider deck-launched interception7 rather than the maintenance of CAP. Lessons from the Pacific War had shown the need for airborne radars capable of detecting enemy attacks made beneath the fleet’s radar coverage and this requirement was to be fulfilled by the transfer of fifty Skyraider airborne early warning aircraft to the RN by the USN under the NATO mutual defence assistance programme (MDAP). Although the ideal fighters for fleet air defence and convoy defence were not identical, the need to reduce the number of different aircraft types in service meant that a single type of night fighter would have to be procured for both roles and in the short term, the de Havilland Sea Venom would be used for the task. The day fighter was to be the Hawker Sea Hawk.
The strike role was the least well advanced at the time, following the cancellation of the large, specialised aircraft types in 1946. The ideal strike aircraft was to be capable of attacks on ships and land targets and also capable of the close support of military forces in amphibious operations and, when necessary, further inland. The only dedicated strike aircraft in service in 1952 was the Blackburn Firebrand and delays developing its intended successor, the Westland Wyvern, meant that it would be already be considered obsolescent when it eventually achieved operational capability.
Innovation – The ‘Rubber Deck’
Deck landing trials with Sea Vampires highlighted the limitations imposed by the slow acceleration rates of early jet engines8 and changes in both carrier technology and deck landing technique were obviously needed. Scientists predicted that the next generation of fighters designed for supersonic performance could add further problems with swept wings designed for high performance at altitude leading to much higher landing speeds. To make matters worse, ‘high-speed’ wings were expected to be too thin to accommodate the substantial undercarriages needed to absorb the impact velocities of heavier aircraft deck landing at unprecedented speeds. The one good feature of jet operation, apart from the obvious high-speed performance, was that they used distillate fuel with a higher flashpoint than avgas which could be stored in integral hull tanks like fuel oil, allowing much greater quantities to be stowed in carriers. That said, jet fuel was only refined in the USA at the time and had to be purchased with scarce dollars. Costs dropped, however, after the emergence of civilian aircraft, such the de Havilland Comet, when aviation turbine fuel began to be refined in the UK.
For a while in 1946–7 it seemed that if no radical solution was forthcoming the operation of jet fighters would only be possible in very small numbers. One solution that was taken very seriously came from Mr Lewis Boddington, the Head Scientist at the new Naval Aircraft Department (NAD), at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. He proposed transferring the pneumatic absorption of the deck landing from the aircraft to the carrier, in other words operating aircraft without undercarriages. Although extreme, his idea was based on the logic that catapults and arrester wires, the other devices that allowed short take-offs and landings, were built into the carrier and not the aircraft. It had the additional merit that undercarriage-less fighters would be some 15 per cent lighter than their conventional equivalents and this could be translated into higher performance. The obvious drawback was the inability of aircraft without wheels to move under their own power after landing either on a carrier deck or an airfield ashore. The Admiralty was sufficiently concerned about the problem that it devoted money, manpower and resources to evaluate the concept at the height of the post-war economic and manpower crisis.9
With the possibility that landing speeds up to 135 knots might be necessary, downwind carrier approaches were flown by Sea Vampires to evaluate the problems of deck landing control officers (DCLOs) and a flexible deck, more commonly referred to as a rubber deck, was built ashore at RAE Farnborough. Boddington proposed that aircraft flew a low, flat approach well above stalling speed to pass just over the rubber deck with the hook down. The pilot was to treat each approach as a potential miss until he felt the retardation as his hook took the single arrester wire rigged across the deck. Shore trials were flown by Lieutenant Commander Eric ‘Winkle’ Brown DSC AFC RN who flew a modified Vampire prototype, TG 286, and several Sea Vampire F 21s. The latter had a conventional undercarriage but were built with a strengthened fuselage capable of withstanding the impact of wheels-up landings. Judging the right height over the rubber deck which was raised about 2ft above the surrounding surface was not easy and both TG 286 and the rubber deck were damaged in one approach that dropped too low but the trials were generally sufficiently successful to move forward to sea trials.
In 1948 Warrior, which had recently returned to Portsmouth from loan service with the RCN, was fitted with a rubber deck made out of hosepipes laid athwart-ships over the conventional flight deck between the two centreline lifts; they were filled with compressed air and covered by a rubber membrane on which the aircraft landed. The surface was lubricated for landings by hosing fresh water onto it. A single USN Mark 4 arrester gear was fitted over the rubber deck with the actuating pistons situated fore and aft alongside it. It had a maximum pull-out of only 160ft which meant that a high minimum wind over the deck was required for every recovery. Warrior’s first rubber deck trials took place in November 1948 and the first landing was carried out by Lieutenant Commander Brown in TG 286 at an indicated air speed of 96 knots into a 35-knot wind over the deck which gave an entry speed into the wire of 61 knots. Once landed, the aircraft was lifted by ‘Jumbo’ the mobile crane so that its undercarriage could be lowered and it could then be manoeuvred on the conventional area of flight deck forward of the rubber deck as normal. From there it carried out a free take-off and returned to RNAS Lee-on-Solent where the trials aircraft were based. All subsequent landings were flown by Sea Vampire F21s which were heavier and capable of being launched by catapult. A DLCO, or ‘batsman’ as he was more commonly known, was positioned on the flight deck aft to monitor approaches and wave aircraft off if they appeared to go low. He did not give a ‘cut’ signal since the aircraft was intended to ‘fly through’ the wire. There were problems on two occasions when the arrester wire struck the aircraft’s booms which forced it out of the hook. In both cases the aircraft made contact with the deck and slid along it but the application of full power allowed them to climb away safely.
Subsequent trials included landings at higher entry speeds with retardations measured between 1.8 and 3.1g and deliberate off-centre landings. On 25 November 1948 Sea Vampire VT 805 was launched by Warrior’s BH 3 hydraulic catapult, the first time the RN had launched a jet-propelled aircraft with a nose-wheel undercarriage from one of its aircraft carriers. Further trials were carried out in March 1949; this time with two USN Mark 4 arresting gears mounted in tandem with the wire carried around the moving crossheads of both allowing a pull-out of 290ft and an entry speed up to 120 knots. Five pilots with varying degrees of experience flew the aircraft this time in addition to Lieutenant Commander Brown. The USN sent observers to witness these trials including representatives of the Military Requirements, Ship’s Installation Division and the Naval Air Material Center. As late as November 1952 a classified report by these agencies spoke optimistically about the project10 but by then it was really moribund.
A number of safe landings had demonstrated the ability of undercarriage-less aircraft to land on a flexible deck but they also demonstrated the fundamental flaw in the concept quite clearly. Conventional landings by wheeled aircraft onto straight-deck carriers averaged about two per minute at the time. At closing speeds of about 60 knots this meant that as the first aircraft took a wire, the second should be turning finals 1000 yards astern. Taking this distance as an acceptable minimum, Boddington argued that aircraft with a closing speed of 110 knots should be able to recover, theoretically, at the rate of one every 16 seconds, about four per minute. Assuming that the wave-off signal for a deck that was not yet clear was left until the following aircraft was in to 200 yards, this allowed 12 seconds to clear the rubber deck after each landing. The reality was that it took five minutes to clear each aircraft off Warrior’s rubber deck, lifting them by crane while their under-carriages were pumped down.11 Given the number of aircraft embarked, even in the light fleet carriers, a landing interval of five minutes was never going to be acceptable and NAD produced a number of ingenious ideas to overcome the problem but none was ever likely to be a practical success at sea. They included a hydraulically-lowered ramp forward of the rubber deck down which the aircraft could be hauled by a wire, quickly attached to a ring on its nose by an aircraft handler who ran out to it as it stopped. After the recovery the ramp would be raised to form part of the flight deck again. Another proposal was a system of wires to pull aircraft onto side lifts which would strike them down into the hangar rapidly. The least unlikely idea was to split the deck with a nylon barrier; as aircraft slithered to a halt a handler would attach a wire cable to the nose, the barrier would be lowered and the aircraft pulled quickly forward and the barrier raised in the style of conventional straight-deck operations. Once in Fly 1, the jumbled mass of aircraft on their bellies could be sorted out in slower time, lifted by crane on to trollies and re-spotted, but this would have taken a long time. The faster recovery time would have been achieved at the expense of a very slow re-spot that would still have degraded a carrier’s ability to generate sorties.
The problem with the ‘rubber’ deck and undercarriage-less aircraft is shown clearly here. Once the aircraft had come to rest, it had to be hauled onto the trolley in the foreground by a cable attached to a winch. To make matters worse, the trolley had no brakes, which made it difficult for handlers to manoeuvre. In the time it took to clear this aircraft from the landing area as many as ten conventional fighters could have landed-on and taxied into Fly 1. (Author’s collection)
The idea of separating launch and recovery decks was the best thing to emerge from this spate of design concepts. The idea of canting the landing deck to port of the ship’s centreline so that so that aircraft could be pulled off it into Fly 2 led directly to the brilliantly simple idea of the angled deck. This was a period of innovative thought like none that had gone before it and bright ideas continued with the result that the rubber deck was not finally abandoned until 1954. Some major problems were never addressed, among them the need to have rubber ‘mats’ available at airfields throughout the world where carrier-borne aircraft might have to divert. Another was the problem of landing undercarriage-less aircraft with pylons fitted with unexpended weapons or drop tanks which could be damaged on landing as well as ripping up the rubber deck. NAD made a final proposal in 195212 in an attempt to revive the concept. This suggested designing aircraft with ‘taxiing wheels’ which could be lowered after landing to allow the aircraft to taxi or be moved without needing trollies. The design effort required for such a unique aircraft requirement and the weight and complexity of adding an undercarriage, complete with brakes, on which it could not land, was utterly impractical and was rejected by both the RN and USN and the rubber deck experiment was officially terminated in 1954. In the event, carriers with angled decks, better aircraft design and the rapid evolution of turbo-jet engines solved what had been perceived as the major problem of landing-on high performance aircraft. Although the rubber deck experiments seem bizarre in hindsight, they certainly show the extreme lengths to which the Admiralty was prepared to go in order take its fighters into the supersonic era.
Invention – The Angled Deck, Steam Catapult and Mirror Landing Aid
Jet aircraft with their higher landing speeds needed a longer pull-out once they had taken an arrester wire and space had to be left for both conventional and nylon barriers to protect aircraft parked in Fly 1. By 1951 the amount of parking space left was becoming significantly smaller, limiting the number of aircraft that could be parked after a single land-on and thus the size of the maximum deck-load strike that any given carrier could recover in a single operation. The newer and heavier aircraft in prospect would virtually eliminate the space available for Fly 1 and so, if the RN was not to be forced to return to the clear deck techniques of the 1920s, a solution had to be found. Lateral separation with landing and parking areas alongside each other was not possible on existing ships and would call for unacceptable beam dimensions in new designs. It was a serving naval officer who came up with the simple but elegant solution. Captain D R F Campbell DSC RN was serving as the Deputy Chief Naval Representative at the Ministry of Supply (MoS), in 1951 and he was inspired by some of the concept designs put forward during the rubber deck trials in which the landing area had been offset from the centreline to allow aircraft to be pulled clear once they had landed. Campbell worked with Lewis Boddington to put forward the very practical idea of radial separation. By rotating the axis of the landing deck by a few degrees off the centreline of the ship from a point in the centre of the round-down at the after extremity of the flight deck, several positive and attractive benefits were achieved. Even a slight angle brought the forward edge of the landing area to the edge of the flight deck at a point well aft of the bows, significantly lengthening the space available to bring aircraft to rest after they caught a wire. The area to starboard formed a larger and safer Fly 1 which could be used for parking aircraft after a land-on and the sum of the length of the two areas was greater than the length of the original flight deck. Even better, the angled deck gave pilots a clear deck with no barrier in front of them since aircraft parked in Fly 1 were parked to starboard of the wingtip safety line, clear of the line of flight. If his aircraft’s arrester hook missed all the wires, the pilot simply opened the throttle and climbed away for a further circuit.
The Naval Air Department at the RAE used a model of an Illustrious class carrier in a water tank to demonstrate the advantages of the angled deck, known initially in the RN as the ‘skew deck’ and in the USN as the ‘canted deck’. Model fighters have been used to show the space made available in the offset Fly 1 for parking, an aircraft taking an arrester wire and even one on a stick to show it turning downwind. (Author’s collection)
The concept was demonstrated by photographing a model carrier with an angled deck floating in a tank and by flying trials on Triumph. An angled deck was painted into place with its centreline extending from the starboard quarter to a point on the port deck edge abreast the island, angled 8 degrees to port of the ship’s centreline. In February 1952 examples of all RN aircraft in service and being developed took part in flying trials which involved approaches to Triumph’s angled deck which terminated in low overshoots ordered by the DLCO. No actual ‘touch-and-go’ roller landings were carried out because of concerns that the undercarriage might snag one of the arrester wires, which were still aligned with the axial deck, and might thus cause an accident by snagging a tyre13 but the trials were very successful. No difficulties were experienced flying circuits to the angled deck, the new constant-power approach down a steeper glide slope proved easy and pilot confidence was greatly improved by the lack of a barrier ahead of the landing area. Concerns about potential snags with drift if the wind was not quite down the angled deck and with funnel smoke were found, in practice, to be of no consequence.
The USN was kept fully informed at every stage of the new development,14 quickly appreciated its value and adopted it immediately. Trials similar to those in Triumph were carried out on to a deck painted onto an Essex class carrier in the spring of 1952 and in the summer, another Essex class ship, the USS Antietam (CV-36), was fitted with a full 10-degree angled deck and the arrester wires realigned to line up across the new landing area. The first-ever arrested landing on an angled deck was carried out by her captain, Captain S G Mitchell USN, flying a North American SNJ Harvard on 12 January 1953 and a series of trials with a variety of aircraft types followed. These included a visit to Portsmouth in the autumn and RN trials which included a large number of arrested landings by operational RN aircraft. DLCOs were embarked to give height corrections for aircraft on finals and the cut for piston-engined aircraft. Known initially as the ‘skew deck’ in the RN and the ‘canted deck’ in the USN, the simpler term ‘angled deck’ was soon adopted by both and the concept was adopted immediately. The only delay was caused by the significant amount of dockyard work needed to build the port-side sponson that supported the forward end of the new landing area and to re-align the arrester wires. Since its invention all carriers built or modified to operate fixed-wing aircraft in every navy have been fitted with angled decks.
The second important invention of this period was also the work of a man with wartime naval experience. Commander C C Mitchell RNVR had proposed the development of a slotted-cylinder catapult to the Admiralty in the 1930s but, with the minimal requirement to catapult the light naval aircraft of the time, the existing hydraulic catapults had been deemed adequate and the idea, although recognised as sound, was not progressed. With the greatly increased weight of naval aircraft in 1945 and the prospect of even heavier jet aircraft in the near future, however, the BH 5 hydraulic catapults to be fitted in Eagle and the 1943 light fleet carriers were recognised as being at the end of their development potential15 and Mitchell resumed work on his more powerful catapult. He was able to hasten development when he found that the Germans had used a similar catapult to launch V-1 ‘flying-bombs’ and he acquired components through the British Intelligence Operational Survey Team. The result was a prototype catapult in which rams were driven along parallel cylinders by steam pressure. A cradle linked the rams so that they ran along their cylinders together and provided the structure on which the towing shuttle was fixed. This ran along a slot at flight deck level, pulling the aircraft forward by means of a wire strop which was looped at either end onto hooks on the underside of aircraft.16 Rubber seals ran along the tops of the cylinders which were forced open by devices on the leading edges of the cradle and resealed behind it to allow its passage without significant loss of steam pressure.17 High pressure steam was provided from the ship’s boilers and stored in large accumulators at up to 4000 psi.
The hydraulic catapult had used a short piston which activated miles of wire-rope reeving in pulleys which translated the piston stroke into movement of the shuttle. Maximum acceleration was reached after less than a third of the shuttle’s travel and the wire pulleys were a constant source of unserviceability. The new slotted-cylinder, or steam, catapult, on the other hand, not only had a greater energy potential but accelerated more smoothly to reach a maximum at two-thirds of the shuttle’s travel. The Admiralty immediately saw the potential of the design and awarded a development contract to the Scottish engineering firm of Brown Brothers and Co which Mitchell joined when he was demobilised from the RNVR. After extensive trials with a development catapult ashore, the prototype steam catapult, BXS1, was built into a new structure on the deck of the maintenance and repair carrier Perseus in Rosyth Dockyard during 1951. Sea trials were carried out first with wheeled trollies known as dead loads which could be accurately weighed, controlled and increased with varying amounts of water. Next came surplus aircraft with their outer wing panels removed. These were run up to full power and then launched without a pilot at increasing fuel weights. Although not expected to fly very far, some of them flew for surprising distances before they crashed into the sea to add more aircraft to the number of wrecks on the sea bed. Finally, manned operational aircraft were launched at their maximum take-off weight. The catapult structure covered the deck as far aft as the island and, since Perseus had never been fitted with arrester wires, aircraft had to fly ashore to land after being launched. The aircraft had to be craned on board every day from lighters off Rosyth Dockyard.
The whole series of trials were carried out in conditions of strict secrecy and proved to be completely successful. A total of 1560 catapult launches were made from Perseus, of which 1000 were dead loads and the remainder unmanned surplus aircraft, mainly Seafires and Sea Hornets, and the balance of manned operational aircraft including Sea Vampires.18 As with the angled deck, the USN was kept fully informed and had observers on Perseus throughout the sea trials. The RN made the ship available for USN sea trials and she arrived in the USA in December 1951. A further 140 launches were carried out using USN dead loads and operational aircraft;19 the data was found to correlate well with RN reports and the USN acquired the manufacturing rights for its own steam catapult production as part of the benefits of MDAP. Work began in the USA in April 1952; the first catapult was installed at NAS Patuxent River in December 1953 and the first launch from an operational carrier took place on 1 June 1954 when the USS Hancock launched a Grumman S2F-1 Tracker. Despite the Admiralty’s enthusiasm, however, British industry was not capable of such rapid development and the first British steam catapults went to sea in Ark Royal in February 1955.
The raised structure containing the prototype BXS-1 steam catapult on Perseus can be seen clearly in this overhead image. A Sea Hornet is positioned on the catapult with the strop attached to the shuttle and there is a second aft of the structure with its wings folded that has not yet been manned. The aircraft parked aft are a Sturgeon, Avenger and Sea Fury. A Sea Fury parked aft of the island is partially obscured by the mast. (Author’s collection)
The third major problem in 1951 was the recovery of jet fighters at increasingly high speeds. A Sea Vampire made a series of downwind approaches to Illustrious during trials which confirmed that DLCOs, no matter how experienced, were unable to appreciate errors in height or line quickly enough to signal them in time for the pilot to make corrections. The new steeper approach with power on meant that the DLCO was not even required to order the cut and so there was nothing left for him to offer although there was no replacement system in prospect.20 Once more the solution came from a serving naval officer, Commander H C N Goodhart RN, who was Captain Campbell’s assistant at the MoS. He had an engineering background and had flown Hellcat fighters during the Second World War. His solution was to place a large mirror facing aft by the port deck edge with a source light 150ft aft of it to project its light into the mirror. By tilting the mirror back slightly, an ideal pre-determined but adjustable glide slope indication was shown to pilots on final approach with the reflected ‘blob’ of light, soon to be known universally as the ‘meatball’ or simply ‘the ball’, in between green datum bars of projected light on either side of the mirror. If the ball appeared exactly between the datum bars, the pilot’s eye was exactly on the glide slope. If it appeared high he was high and if it appeared low he was low. Reaction-time lags were reduced to those of the pilot himself and potential misinterpretation of hand signals were eliminated. By adjusting the brilliance of the source lights, the pick-up range of the mirror could be increased or decreased. In practice two or more source lights were installed so that the failure of any one would not render the sight useless.
The equipment was known as the deck landing mirror sight (DLMS), and the Admiralty tasked RAE Farnborough with the production of prototypes for evaluation ashore and at sea as soon as possible. The first mirror was installed on Illustrious in October 1952 and comprised a convex, polished steel sheet on wooden backing with reflective metal datum bars. Whilst crude, it showed promise and a more effective sight was designed by Mr D Lean of the RAE. This comprised an aluminium-faced mirror with aft-facing green lights as datum bars and it had a gyro stabilisation system to cancel out the effect of ship pitch. It was installed on Indomitable in June 1953 and sea trials were carried out with landings made by a variety of operational aircraft.21 These were witnessed by RCN, USN and USMC observers and some of the landings were flown by American as well as British pilots. The exact point where the hook would hit the deck could be selected with considerable accuracy by adjusting the tilt of the mirror and the trial proved extremely successful. The sight solved the problem of giving pilots of aircraft with high approach speeds adequate glide slope information and also meant that the number of arrester wires could be reduced from an average of twelve in 1950 to just four with complete safety, thus reducing both the amount of installed flight deck machinery and the number of technical ratings needed to maintain it. The reduction in the number of wires meant that those fitted could be sited further forward, nearer the centre of pitch and further from the round down giving greater clearance for the tail hook in rough weather. The new angled deck and mirror sight together not only made deck landing safer, they made it easier. Within the space of two years, at a time of financial and manpower stringency, the RN had carried forward a revolution in carrier operating techniques that was of as great a significance to naval warfare as the design of the revolutionary battleship Dreadnought fifty years before. The new inventions were adopted by every carrier navy and are still the basis of most fixed-wing operations in 2015. Dreadnought had rendered all her predecessors obsolete but existing carrier hulls could be reconstructed to incorporate the new technology.
A pilot’s-eye view of a real angled deck, in this case Centaur’s. The mirror landing aid is clearly visible to the left with a black wind break shielding it. The reflected ‘meatball’ is slightly higher than the six datum lights, three on either side of the mirror, indicating that the photographer, probably in a helicopter, is higher than the ideal fixed-wing glide-slope. Note all the aircraft parked neatly to starboard of the wingtip safety line. (Author’s collection)
Royal Navy Aircraft in 1952
The Hawker Sea Hawk had made progress by 1952 and was undergoing intensive flying trials at RNAS Ford. It was powered by a single Rolls-Royce Nene centrifugal-flow jet engine and capable of 520 knots, clean, at low level. Its primary armament comprised four 20mm front-guns in the nose under the cockpit with 200 rounds per gun and 1000lb or 500lb bombs could be carried on underwing hardpoints. Alternatively up to four 3in rockets with 60lb warheads could be carried on rails under each wing. Drop tanks could be fitted to the underwing hardpoints to extend endurance to 3 hours 50 minutes at economical speed. It was expected to be the last sub-sonic, straight-wing day fighter in naval service and the first two squadrons were to be available to replace Attackers by mid-1953.22 Subsequently one Sea Hawk squadron was expected to be formed every three months until a total of nine operational units were in service.
The aircraft selected to replace the Sea Hawk was the Supermarine N-113D.23 Treasury sanction was given for the MoS to procure 100 fighters to meet Specification N113 in 1952; the first was expected to fly in 1954 and the first squadron to be formed in 1956. The N113 was a swept-wing, twin-turbojet engined development of the Supermarine Type 508 and was intended to intercept enemy bombers at viable ranges when launched from a deck alert. To achieve this, its outstanding feature was to be an exceptional rate of climb in the region of 20,000ft per minute up to an operational ceiling of 49,000ft. Armament was to include two 30mm Aden cannon in the nose and, eventually, air-to-air missiles.
In the short term, the de Havilland Sea Hornet NF 21 was to be replaced in the night and all-weather fighter role by the de Havilland Sea Venom, a developed version of the Venom night fighter in service with the RAF, and built to Specification N107. Powered by a single de Havilland Ghost jet engine, the first fifty were to be built to FAW 20 standard with AI Mark 10 radar and the first prototype, WK 376, flew in April 1951. Carrier trials were carried out in Illustrious in July 1951 but entry into service, intended for 1953, was delayed by the discovery of weaknesses in the undercarriage and arrester hook mounting.24 In the event the more highly developed FAW 21 was the first to embark operationally in 1955. It was equipped with AN/APS-57 radar supplied by the USN under the MDAP and known as AI Mark 21 in RN service. The standard armament for both versions was four 20mm cannon in the nose and bombs and rockets could be carried under the wings.
In the longer term, the Admiralty had issued Specification NA38 for a more advanced two-seat, twin-engined all-weather fighter with transonic performance to the MoS in 1952 and this had been accepted and passed to de Havilland for tender action. The Admiralty had hoped that the requirement could be met by a development of the de Havilland DH 116, a comparatively small, high-performance aircraft with a single re-heated turbojet engine which was at the design study stage. By 1952, however, the Admiralty was advised by the MoS that the firm’s design capacity was insufficient to cope with the work required to take the DH116 forward and it had been abandoned. As an alternative, the MoS recommended that the DH110 be considered25 and an investigation into its possible application to meet NA38 was carried out in 1952. It proved to be a much larger aircraft, with a wingspan of 50ft against 42ft 10in and a maximum weight of 46,700lbs compared with 15,000lbs. It did, however, have the advantage that it could be stowed more densely in a hangar since, with its twin-boom layout, aircraft could be parked nose under tail. The DH110 was also expected to carry a substantial weapons load, making it suitable for the strike role. If adopted it was expected to be in service from ‘about 1957’ but, as with other aircraft, this was to prove optimistic since too few prototypes were procured and the firm lacked both design and testing capacity during a period of frantic activity.26
By 1952 the Gannet had been given ‘super priority’ status and 210 were on order for the RN. It was described as a ‘single package’ anti-submarine aircraft, able to search for submarines over a wide area with ASV-19B radar and visually, localise a target with sono-buoys and attack with a homing torpedo or depth charges. Fears that the Gannet might prove too heavy to operate from escort carriers in any future conflict led to specification M123D for a light anti-submarine aircraft which could be produced easily and economically in quantity during an emergency and operate in rough weather from small, slow carriers. Short Brothers were awarded a contract to produce a simple aircraft of rugged construction which emerged as the Seamew. Very much in the tradition of the late-war Swordfish III that operated from MAC-Ships, it was expected to fly in 1953.
The Westland Wyvern S4, the first production version of the long-delayed strike fighter, was expected to equip an operational squadron in 1953. About the same weight as a DC-3 Dakota airliner, the Wyvern was a big aircraft and it had considerable problems with engines, propeller control units and the airframe which delayed it by years. Its Armstrong Siddeley Python turbo-prop engine was actually the third power unit to be tested in its airframe. It was expected to be able to carry a single Mark 17 torpedo, three 1000lb bombs or a variety of weapons under development when it came into service.
In the longer term, Specification NA39 called for a two-seat, twin-turbojet engined strike aircraft that was eventually to emerge as the Buccaneer. It was to incorporate all the lessons of Korean operations and carry a weapon load of 4000lbs over a radius of action of 500 miles from its parent carrier. Maximum speed at sea level was to be ‘at least 580 knots’ and it was to be capable of attacking at extremely low level under enemy radar coverage. Preliminary discussions with the MoS informed the Admiralty that production aircraft were unlikely to reach squadrons before 1959. Another new specification, NA43, was written for an anti-submarine helicopter of about 15,000lbs maximum weight, a considerable size for 1952. It was to be capable of carrying both dipping sonar, known at the time as asdic, and a homing weapon or the equivalent weight of depth charges. Preliminary discussions with the MoS indicated that the requirement could best be met by a version of the Bristol Type 173,27 a prototype of which was flying in 1952. The Supermarine Sea Otter biplane amphibian was withdrawn from service by 1952 and replaced in carriers and naval air stations by a licence-built version of the Sikorsky S-51 helicopter known as the Westland Dragonfly.
Aircraft supplied by the USN under MDAP arrangements continued to fill an important place in the RN, both in reality and theory since it was believed that in the event of war with the Soviet Bloc the British aircraft industry would struggle to cope with orders for the RAF and the RN would have to rely heavily on Lend-Lease American aircraft as it had in the Second World War. For this reason British carrier specifications continued to require the ability to operate USN types but new aircraft such as the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior with a wingspan of 72ft 6in and a maximum weight of 82,000lbs were viewed with alarm. The RN expected to receive 100 Grumman TBM-3E Avengers in 1953 which were to replace Barracudas and Fireflies as a stop-gap until sufficient Gannets were available. They were to be modified for the anti-submarine role to British standards by Scottish Aviation at Prestwick.
Also in 1953, the RN expected to receive twenty-five Sikorsky HO4S-3 helicopters equipped with dipping sonar which it intended to use in trials to evaluate the short range anti-submarine role and twenty Hiller helicopters to be used for pilot training. The most important aircraft delivered under MDAP was the Douglas AD-4W Skyraider which equipped the re-formed 849 NAS in July 1952 in the airborne early warning role. Known as the Skyraider AEW 1 in British service, its AN/APS-20C radar could detect a destroyer-sized surface ship at about 120 miles and a four-engined bomber in flight at about 60 miles. About fifty of these aircraft were to be supplied, some of which were to be used as spares. The RN operated these aircraft in a very different way from the way they were used in American service. In the USN the AD-4W flew with a single pilot and one or two technicians in the rear seats who were responsible for maintaining a data link that transmitted the radar picture back to the parent carrier where it was interpreted. They could not interpret or make use of the radar picture themselves but the pilot did have a small screen in the front cockpit. In the RN, the two rear seats were occupied by specialist observers, trained as fighter controllers and able to interpret the radar picture for both surface and air searches,28 acting in effect as a flying operations room.
A Skyraider AEW 1 of 849B NAS lined up on Ark Royal’s angled deck for a free take-off. Note the huge radome for the AN/APS-20 scanner between the main undercarriage legs.
Air Weapons
Work on the 30mm Aden cannon at this time centred on producing a version with a higher muzzle velocity, expected to be in the region of 2500ft per second. As a back-up in case it failed the Hispano Type 825 which had a considerably higher muzzle velocity, was kept in development. Due to the high expenditure of bombs in the Korean conflict, there was a general shortage of bombs both in the FEF and in the UK. The run-down British bomb-manufacturing industry was concentrating in 1952 on the build-up of weapons for Bomber Command’s new V-Force jet bombers and so a number of bombs had to be procured from US sources. Consequently a number of types not usually met in naval service had found their way into the supply chain and had to be modified locally to fit RN aircraft suspension points. Many of these bombs were of cast, as opposed to forged, construction and were therefore unsuitable for use against armoured or hardened targets.29
A Wyvern S 4 of 831 NAS tensioned ready for launch on Eagle’s starboard catapult. It is armed with sixteen 3in rockets on underwing rails. (Author’s collection)
Three new heads for the standard 3in rocket were under development in 1952; these included the Type D anti-submarine solid head with a straight underwater trajectory, the 60lb anti-tank hollow-charge head and a 60lb anti-tank squash head. A 36-round 2in rocket launcher was adopted as a joint requirement with the RAF; initially expected to be used on the Sea Hawk, it did not in fact come into service until the 1960s. Throughout the early 1950s work continued to meet a joint Naval/Air Staff requirement for an unguided air-to-ship strike weapon which was allocated the codename ‘Red Angel’. It was a development of the earlier ‘Uncle Tom’ rocket, had an 11.5in diameter and a 500lb warhead; it was intended for use initially by the Wyvern and later, in developed form, on the NA 39. Difficulties were experienced with the fuze and the flip-out tail fins (it was carried on the aircraft in a tube with the fins retracted). Continuous development setbacks were encountered, not the least of which was the tendency of the missile to break up on entering the water. An assessment of Red Angel’s hitting probability in 1956 decided that from the optimum intended range of 5000 yards it would require a very large number of rockets to be fired at a cruiser-sized target30 to guarantee a hit and these would require an impractically large number of strike aircraft to carry them. Red Angel was, therefore, cancelled.
An even bigger anti-ship bomb was specified in another joint Naval/Air Staff requirement and developed under the codename ‘Green Cheese’. This was to be a rocket-powered bomb weighing 3300lbs at launch with a 1700lb warhead. It was to home onto radar reflections from the target which had, therefore, to be illuminated by the attacking aircraft’s radar throughout the missile’s time of flight until impact. Unsurprisingly, extensive sea trials found that target illumination against a cruiser-sized target was badly degraded by the sea clutter generated in seas associated with winds of Beaufort Scale 7. It was anticipated that the weapon would be carried by naval aircraft such as the Gannet and NA 39 at heights up to 18,000ft and released at a slant range of 10,000 yards from the target. RAF ‘V’-bombers were expected to use the weapon and release it from heights of 50,000ft to slant ranges of 20,000 yards.31 Despite high hopes, this weapon was also cancelled in 1956 because of ‘insufficient money and scientific effort to meet the requirement’. This left the RN with obsolescent 1000lb and 500lb bombs and 3in rockets as its principal conventional anti-ship weapons for the next two decades.
Air-to-air guided weapons were also the subject of a number of Naval/Air Staff requirements which called for both active radar-guided and passive infrared homing guided missiles. There were three radar-guided weapons, the earliest and simplest of which was the Fairey Fireflash, developed under the codename ‘Blue Sky’. It was a visually sighted, radar beam-riding missile intended for use by day fighters in clear weather. The missile itself was unpowered but accelerated off the launch rail by booster rockets; when these burnt out and detached the weapon slowed rapidly and had, therefore, to be fired at close range. It rode down the beam of the gun-ranging radar Mark 2 which was fitted in the RAF Hunter and the RN Scimitar so the nose of the fighter had to remain pointed at the target throughout the engagement. It was always seen as back-up for more advanced projects and, although development was completed by a joint RN/RAF trials party at RAF Valley in 1956, Blue Sky was never taken into operational service and the project was terminated.
‘Red Hawk’ was to be a radar-guided missile intended for carriage on high-speed fighters at heights up to 65,000ft and speeds up to Mach 2 giving the greatest possible tactical freedom to the launching aircraft before and after it was fired. From the RN perspective it was intended to break up massed attacks on the fleet by shore-based Soviet bomber regiments. Weapon aiming was to operate on a radar line of sight allied to a blind prediction sighting system and was to be possible by day or night under all weather conditions. Since Red Hawk was technically complex it was appreciated that its development would take a long time and so an interim version, codenamed ‘Red Dean’ was requested for use by RN and RAF all-weather fighters. This, too, was to be a radar-guided weapon but it was both large and heavy. RN interest was centred on the development of a missile with a maximum weight of 1500lbs; two missiles and their associated guidance system were expected to be installed in a developed version of the DH 110. By 1956 the missile’s designers, Vickers, had actually increased rather than reduced the missile’s weight and the Admiralty had, reluctantly, to withdraw from the joint project when it was appreciated that no naval aircraft in service or projected would be capable of carrying it.32 The Admiralty began to examine the possibility of obtaining other, more suitable, missiles that would give fighters full tactical freedom and selected the USN AIM-9A Sidewinder infrared-homing air-to-air missile for use on the Scimitar in 1957.
The most successful of the British joint missile projects was the de Havilland Firestreak, developed under the codename ‘Blue Jay’. A passive-infrared guided missile, it was intended for use in the DH 110 and P177 fighters as well as in a number of RAF aircraft projects. Its guidance system had the advantage that pilots could ‘fire and forget’ it and did not have to track the enemy aircraft after launch but the drawback was that its sensor had to lock onto the enemy’s heat signature, effectively the jet exhaust, which meant that the missile had to be fired in a cone-shaped area astern of the target at ranges between three and five miles. It had an expanding-ring warhead which cut through the target like a chainsaw as the missile passed close by the target, detonated by a sensitive fuze positioned aft of the sensor in the nose. It did not have to hit the target but, if it did, the kinetic energy of the impact would destroy most aircraft. An operational standard Firestreak hit and destroyed a drone target when first fired in 1956 and operational missiles went to sea with 893 NAS in Victorious during 1958. Firestreak entered service with a variety of training rounds; these including inert rounds for training magazine and weapons supply route handling parties and a practice acquisition round known as a PQR. This was a new concept intended to train aircrew in air-to-air acquisition and target tracking and it comprised the live sensor fitted into an inert missile with no motor or warhead which could be fitted to aircraft repeatedly. Apart from feeding information into the aircraft’s systems, it also fed a recorder which could be used shortly after every air combat training sortie by air warfare instructors (AWI) to debrief aircrew.
Work continued on two 18in air-dropped anti-submarine homing torpedoes throughout the early 1950s. The larger of the two was the 2000lb ‘Pentane’ which had a speed of 30 knots and a theoretical maximum range of 6000 yards. It was intended to have a minimum detection range of 1000 yards irrespective of target noise or speed and a maximum depth of 1000ft. Development was slow and the weapon was eventually overtaken by the procurement of lighter, more effective USN torpedoes which led to Pentane’s cancellation. ‘Dealer B’, the lighter weapon, proved more successful and was introduced into service as the Mark 30 in 1954 for use in the Gannet AS 1 and, eventually, the Whirlwind HAS 7 helicopter. It was an electrically-powered, passive acoustic homing torpedo with a length of 8ft 6in and a range of 6000 yards at 12.5 knots. Weight was only 670lb with the air tail and parachute units, intended to keep the weapon stable after release from the aircraft before it hit the water, fitted making it considerably more practical than Pentane, it had a maximum diving depth of 800ft and could be released from aircraft flying at over 300ft at speeds up to 300 knots.
On entering the water the flight in air material detached and the Mark 30 sank to a depth of 20ftbefore activating. It than set up a circular search pattern a depth of 30ft until detecting the sound of a submarine. Trials indicated a homing radius of 600 yards against an ‘S’ class submarine moving at 5 knots but the exact radius depended on the radiated noise caused by target speed.33 When a sufficiently strong signal was detected the weapon automatically increased speed to 19.5 knots.34 To avoid a stern chase developing, a small ‘cone of silence’ was built into the acoustic sensor in the centre of the torpedo’s nose; this established a ‘lead angle’ whilst maintaining contact and caused the weapon to aim slightly ahead of the target until the last seconds. As a passive weapon, it also had the advantage that it could not be detected until it was in the water and actually homing on its intended target. Depth charges and rockets remained the weapons of choice for use against surfaced or snorting submarines.
The development of mines continued for some years after the Second World War and by 1954 a number of different new types were in service. These included the A Mark 12 which had ‘boxed assemblies’ which allowed the firing system to be changed on board a carrier, doing away with the need to embark specialised mines for individual operations. The A Mark 10 was a moored mine intended for use against minesweepers and was to be interspersed with ground mines.
Avionics
As weapons and their tactical use became more complicated in the mid-1950s, aircraft systems also became more expensive and complicated. The gyro rocket bomb sight and naval strike sight intended for use on the Wyvern and NA 39 for use with Red Angel and Green Cheese were given high priority in 1952 but eventually cancelled with those projects. Work on radar ranging for the gyro gun sight continued and was fitted in the Scimitar from 1957. Work started in 1954 on a pilot attack sight intended to give a complete blind firing/visual display allied to varying types of radar for the firing of air-to-air weapons including guided weapons. A new high-frequency radio set, ARI 18032, was introduced in 1954 with gapless cover out to 160 miles specifically for use in the Gannet. Late in the 1950s military aircraft changed from VHF to UHF short-range communications in common with the rest of NATO and a British version of the American AN/ARC 52 radio set was adopted for use.
A Gannet AS 4 of 814 NAS on anti-submarine patrol with its ASV-19B radar dome lowered. The type’s large bomb bay can be seen forward of the radome. (Author’s collection)
Radars were available in a considerable variety by 1954, some of the air-intercept types having been designed for the RRE at Pershore with no specific aircraft type in mind. Those of interest to the Naval Staff included ASV-19B which was fitted to the Gannet AS 1 and ASV-21, an improved version intended for use in the Gannet AS 4 from 1958. The latter had a 150 KW transmitter and a 9in ground-stabilised display on which sono-buoy beacons could be displayed. It was also intended as the target indication radar for the Green Cheese stand-off bomb. It was an ‘X’ band equipment with all round coverage capable of detecting a submarine snort at 12 miles in a calm sea state. AN/APS-20A was the American-designed search radar originally fitted to the Skyraider AEW 1. These sets were being upgraded to AN/APS-20C standard which was capable of detecting a destroyer-sized surface contact at 120 miles. A more powerful derivative, the AN/APS-20E was being procured to equip the future AEW aircraft which emerged as the Gannet AEW 3.
Air-intercept radars included AI Mark 10, a basic set that equipped the Sea Venom FAW 20; it was unstabilised but gave a satisfactory performance. AI Mark 17 was developed as insurance in case insufficient USN AN/APS-57 sets were provided under MDAP to equip the Sea Venom FAW 21. It was an ‘S’ band set with blind firing facilities and was chosen to equip the Sea Venom FAW 53 for the RAN. AI Mark 18 was a more advanced set under development under a joint Naval/Air Staff requirement; its naval application was to be in the DH 110. Progress was divided into two distinct phases, the first for the basic radar with blind fire facilities which was not taken into service and a second with addition of attack and missile firing computers which did, eventually, go into service with the Sea Vixen after 1958.
AI Mark 20 was a speculative set intended to allow single-seat fighters to carry out day and night interceptions at high altitude in clear weather. By 1954 it was realised that visual detection ranges from the cockpits of high-speed fighters at altitude were insufficient to give pilots time to get into a firing position and radar guidance for what had previously been considered as purely visual interception techniques was considered essential. AI-20 was required to be simple enough for a pilot to use without assistance from a specialised observer and was intended to complement radar interceptions when the direction officer initiated the turn onto the enemy’s 6 o’clock position. The Naval Staff planned to use it in later versions of the Scimitar but, in the event, their development was cancelled in 1957.
AI Mark 21 was the UK designation allocated to the American AN/APS-57 air-intercept radar which was, itself, a simplified version of the AN/APQ-35 radar-guided fire-control system. AI 21 lacked target lock-on and blind fire capability but was an improvement over the AI 10 and was fitted to the Sea Venom FAW 21. Another speculative design was AI Mark 23 which was capable of the blind fire control of guns and missiles by the pilot in single-seat fighters. It eventually found an application in the RAF Lightning but was considered for use in developed versions of the Scimitar. Even more speculative was an investigation into the use of infrared sensors for air-intercept purposes. These were seen in the mid-1950s as having less utility than radar but did have the advantages that the necessary ‘black boxes’ would weigh considerably less, take up less volume and require scanners measured in inches rather than feet. These systems were all the result of joint naval and air staff requirements but there was one area where experience led the staffs to specify different equipment, the identification of friend from foe. The majority of aircraft were fitted with the AN/APX-6 transponder which was compatible with the IFF Mark 10 system fitted in HM Ships but the naval staff wanted fighters to be fitted with an air-to-air identification system, FIS-3, which was a simple cross-band equipment working with IFF-10 including simple coding. It would allow AI-fitted fighters to identify appropriate radar contacts as friendly and be of considerable value for fleet air defence work. The air staff and USN favoured ‘Black Maria’, FIS-4, and additional equipment had to be designed into naval aircraft to make the two systems compatible.
Flying Clothing
The rapid development of high-flying, transonic fighters in the early 1950s led to urgent joint Naval and Air Staff requirements for specialised flying clothing to replace the old, accepted equipment. These included a pressure-breathing suit to keep pilots conscious in the event of a cockpit pressurisation failure above 48,000ft. It would allow them to descend rapidly to a safe altitude and recover the aircraft to the carrier. Anti-G suits had been used during the Second World War but now found a wider application to allow fighter pilots maximum G-tolerance while manoeuvring at low level. They would eventually become universal in the form of over-trousers inflated by air pressure as ‘G forces’ increased, preventing blood from being forced into the lower body away from the brain. Individuals varied but anti-G suits could make a difference of 2 or 3 G before blacking out when flying to the aircraft’s limits. Immersion suits intended to keep aircrew warm after ditching had become standard during Korean operations, as had the need for a cover on the new lightweight dinghy to prevent survivors from hypothermia while they waited for rescue. The rescue itself was to be assisted by a new personal radio beacon equipment known as TALBE, an acronym for tactical aircrew locator beacon equipment. This was carried in the life-saving waistcoat and, when activated, sent out a continuous wave signal on which searching aircraft could home.
Ejection seats were accepted as vital for all strike and fighter aircraft, including the Wyvern, because manual bail-out was found to be difficult, if not impossible, at high speeds and high altitudes. Early Martin-Baker models required aircrew to separate manually from the seat once it was clear of the aircraft but a new Mark 2 variant was produced from 1954 to meet a joint naval and air staff requirement for automatic separation after ejection. It had a minimum safe height at which the seat could be used of 100ft provided the aircraft had a forward speed of over 90 knots and the canopy was automatically blown clear when the pilot pulled the handle. The development of successive, improved ejection seats has continued to this day and gives aircrew the confidence to fly their aircraft to the limit in combat. Martin-Baker proved to be a world leader in the technology and its products are standardised in the RN, USN and RAF as well as many other air arms throughout the world in 2015.
The most obvious new element in the modernised range of flying clothing was the Mark 1 protective helmet. Increasing aircraft speeds in the late 1940s and early 1950s had led to accidents in which many aircrew had suffered head injuries because the familiar leather flying helmet offered no protection; effectively it was a comfortable way of holding earphones, goggles and the oxygen mask in place and little else. The new assembly, which was also adopted by the RAF, comprised an inner cloth helmet containing the earphones and attachment points for the oxygen mask or the throat microphone worn by helicopter aircrew. Over this there was a leather-lined, hard plastic helmet to protect the head against impact. Initially this was fitted with attachments for goggles but these were soon replaced by a visor on a ratchet which could be pulled down to a position just above the oxygen mask to protect the eyes against wind blast on ejecting. Usefully, tinted visors could be used to protect against the sun’s glare. The Admiralty’s intention was to make the wearing of protective helmets obligatory from 1955 and, despite some initial misgivings about the loss of the familiar leather-helmeted image, the change was popular with aircrew.
Rebuilt Ships
At the end of the Second World War the Admiralty’s attention had been focused on new carrier designs intended to operate the new generation of aircraft. The cancellation of the Malta class and long delays anticipated before the surviving ships of the Audacious and Hermes class could be completed meant that the ‘legacy’ carriers of the Illustrious class would have to be extensively modernised to be of any value if they were retained in service. In the short term the Colossus class light fleet carriers with their greater hangar height and modern facilities were capable of operating the last generation of piston-engined fighters more efficiently economically than the fleet carriers and they continued to do so throughout the Korean conflict. All six ships of the Illustrious group had survived the war but some of them bore the scars of considerable damage and extensive worldwide service.35
Indomitable and Implacable were the only fleet carriers to embark operational air groups in the immediate post-war years, both having undergone limited refits to improve their capabilities. The single-hangar ships had hangars only 16ft high; Indomitable’s upper hangar was only 14ft high and the smaller lower hangar only 16ft. In the last two ships both hangars were only 14ft high. The first four ships could operate aircraft weighing up to 14,000lbs; the last pair aircraft up to 20,000lbs. Aircraft fuel stowage was totally inadequate to support jet operations and the small lifts of the earlier ships, intended to minimise intrusions that would weaken the armoured flight deck, were a significant limitation. Newer carriers had all been designed to operate aircraft weighing up to 30,000lbs with hangar heights of 17ft 6in and these criteria were accepted as the minimum to which the old fleet carriers should be rebuilt. The question of closed or open hangar design had been an issue that had delayed the design of the Malta class but by 1947 the naval staff accepted that the closed option represented the better design philosophy. The decision was influenced by the USN shift to closed designs after experience with typhoons in the Pacific during 1945 and the conclusions drawn from the Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests in 1946 which clearly demonstrated that aircraft needed to be protected from the blast effect of a distant atomic explosion.
A committee under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral G N Oliver, ACNS (Air), considered reconstruction issues and came firmly to the conclusion that only a full modernisation could be justified since this would give the ships a further twenty years of operational life which would keep them effective ‘into the mid-1960s for about half the cost of a new carrier’ for each ship. It was hoped that all six ships could be rebuilt in the order Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, Illustrious, Implacable and Indefatigable, but the committee noted that some had a considerable number of unrectified defects that would complicate their reconstruction. In 1947 the committee recommended the initial full reconstruction of Formidable and Victorious to the Admiralty Board, describing the end result as resembling ‘a fast, armoured, Hermes type’ capable of operating forty-eight aircraft. Board approval was given in January 1948 after Treasury sanction which concurred with the presumption that the modification of existing ships represented better value for money than new construction in the short term. Detailed work on the design, which would have to involve dismantling the hull down to hangar deck level and building a ‘new’ ship on top of the old lower hull, began in February 1948 and was not completed until June 1950. By then both ships had been surveyed and it had been found that Formidable had a distorted flight deck, propeller shaft defects and a considerable amount of internal structure that had been damaged by Kamikaze hits and fire in 1945 but only hastily repaired or painted over. Since March 1947 she had been left in un-maintained reserve and her hull was found to have deteriorated significantly as a consequence. In 1950, therefore, it was decided to modernise Victorious first. She had been running as a training ship until recently and her hull was found to be in far better shape.36
Victorious shortly after the completion of her modernisation in 1958. A Skyraider is lined up on the angled deck for a free take-off and Sea Venoms are parked close to the island and in Fly 4 to port of the angled deck right aft. Sea Venoms were small and much easier to park than their larger replacements. (Author’s collection)
There were good reasons why ships from the early group of the Illustrious class were chosen first. Apart from the fact that that they were the oldest ships, there were three of them and design drawings for reconstruction would, therefore, apply to several hulls. Similarly the last group comprised two ships, making them a more a more attractive prospect; drawings for Indomitable would only have applied to the one hull. The impact of the new carrier technology on Victorious’ reconstruction also had a considerable impact and the design had to be re-cast several times to incorporate steam catapults, a fully-angled deck, mirror landing aids and the large Type 984 three-dimensional radar and its associated comprehensive display system. Eagle, Ark Royal and three of the 1943 light fleet carriers, Albion, Bulwark and Centaur, were all completed to interim standards which meant that by 1956 Victorious had to be completed since she was the only ship designed to take all the new equipment in its optimal form. She was too important to cancel but her reconstruction took eight years and cost more than a new ship would have done. No other ships of her class were rebuilt although Eagle was modernised since she was too large and valuable a hull to discard and the 1943 light fleet carrier Hermes was rebuilt on the slipway to a design similar to Victorious. Plans to modernise the remaining 1943 light fleet carriers to a standard similar to Hermes were discarded after the defence review in 1957, although by then Centaur had been fitted with steam catapults. Her two sisters, Albion and Bulwark, were modified into commando helicopter carriers and both were to give valuable service in the 1960s.
