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The arrival of the railway as a practical and relatively inexpensive mode of transportation was the nineteenth-century technological equivalent of the comp­uter and the Internet in the last quarter of the twentieth century. However, at least early on, it turned out to be a double-edged sword. The way that people lived and worked, their interactions with the world around them, and their economic base were transformed forever. Although steam transportation on water revolutionized the maritime industry, its effect was not nearly as transforming as that of the railway industry, at least on a national basis. However, the demands of railways placed unforeseen burdens on the rudimentary engineering of the time. Every year demands upon engineering and materials increased, as trains became heavier and faster. This, in turn, quickly exposed the absence of the scientific method in the design and maintenance of structures, roadbed, and equipment and the crudeness of materials. When early trains failed, they often did so in a spectacular fashion. The Great Western Railway of Canada as a pioneer railway had more than its share of spectacular failures. However, the vast majority were caused by a combination of failures of physical plant, as described above, and profound human error by workers and managers alike.

Human behaviour and morality were profoundly different in the Victorian era compared with today. These differences should be understood so that the reader can judge North American railway practices in the 1840s to 1880s using accepted norms of the period. Judging our ancestors using the norms of today is unfair. However, it should be stressed that this should not be used to excuse egregious behaviours, a few of which will be exposed in this book.

The Landscape in Victorian Canada

Railway promoters who were also parliamentarians were compelled by the politics of the day to at least put on the appearance of great concern for the public welfare while engaged in the very act of seeking to enrich themselves. They would always present themselves as lawmakers having the development of Canadian resources and expansion of the nation’s wealth at heart.

To understand the large and important role that legis­lators assumed as personal beneficiaries in the original promotion of railways, it is only necessary to examine the lists of incorporators of the first railways.

The seventy-six promoters of the London and Gore Railroad Company, chartered in 1834, were headed by Allan N. MacNab and comprised a large contingent of politicians at all levels of government. This line ultimately became the Great Western Railway, the subject of this book, and was headed by MacNab as president. Although an obscure name today, in his time MacNab was a conspicuous individual — member of Parliament for many years, speaker of that body, knighted, becoming the equivalent of prime minister in 1854, and raised to a baronetcy in 1856. His was a commanding presence to be sure. As further evidence of his importance in pre-Confederation Canada, his daughters married into British titled aristocracy.

The Great Western was not unique in this regard. The directorate of the Grand Trunk Railway was a “who’s who” of some of Canada’s most illustrious individuals. These included John Ross, member and speaker of the Legislative Council, solicitor general of Upper Canada, and stockholder in the Grand Trunk. He became the road’s president through the all-powerful influence of the English contractors controlling the stock (Peto, Brassey, Jackson, and Betts) and remained so until 1862. Francis Hincks, Grand Trunk incorporator and promoter, became inspector general (analogous to finance minister), the equivalent of prime minister, and was knighted. In fact, of the nine Canadian directors, four were cabinet ministers and eight of nine were, in truth, nominees of the all-powerful English contractors. Most of these individuals were also stockholders.

Politicians, whether or not they were also railway officials, would not hesitate to use their political clout to assist “their” railways. For example, in 1852 MacNab attempted to press legislation banning all railway competition of the Great Western in southern Ontario west of Toronto. He failed because, by that time, Grand Trunk forces had become dominant in the legislature. Francis Hincks materially assisted the Grand Trunk by shepherding successful passage of the Guarantee Act in 1849 and then, in 1851, modifying the act to limit its application to trunk lines like the Grand Trunk (see chapter 1).

Lines were granted government loans and in some cases paid off neither interest nor principal. Between November 1852 and June 1855 the Canadian government loaned the Great Western a total of £770,000 ($3.75 million U.S.). In 1868–69 Finance Minister Rose accused the Great Western of using $1.225 million in a totally illegal way — to construct a railway in the United States (i.e., the Detroit and Milwaukee Railway). He further asserted that fully $4 million was eventually used to complete the road, build other lines, and run a cross-lake steamship service from Grand Haven, Michigan, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In contrast to the Grand Trunk, almost all of the government loans were paid back by the Great Western.

From 1853 through 1858 the Grand Trunk benefitted from the “relief” granted it by the Canadian government as it lay “destitute,” to the tune of £3.115 million ($15.17 million U.S.), fourfold that of the Great Western. Relief was in the form of guaranteed provincial (Canada) debentures under the Guarantee Act. Despite this “cash infusion,” the financial position of the Grand Trunk worsened and the interest and principal of these loans were forgiven. And, in another half century, the Grand Trunk would again appear before the government asking for “relief”! The only difference would be the amount requested, which would be astronomical.

Even bribery was an accepted method for influencing decisions. Isaac Buchanan, wealthy Hamilton merchant and legislator, assumed control of the Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway (a component of the planned Great Western competitor known as the Great Southern Railway) by issuing a $100,000 bribe to obtain the removal of three opposing directors of the company. Mr. Buchanan then sought to gain control of the other component of the Great Southern (i.e., Amherstburg and St. Thomas Railway) by another $100,000 bribe. At this time, he also approached the Great Western and sought to force it to buy the Great Southern at an exorbitant price. Fortunately, he was caught and a select committee of the legislature investigated the incident. Although it thoroughly castigated Buchanan, other cases of corruption were not exposed in the committee’s report despite clear proof being disclosed in the evidence itself and in legislative debates.

In an era rife with bitter competition between individuals and firms for privileges, power, subsidies, and traffic, railway companies had “sturdy representatives in Parliament” (i.e., lobbyists who were politicians) who sought to cripple or destroy their opponents. If one line was felt to be unduly favoured with government loans, grants, subsidies, mail contracts, or favourable legislation, aggrieved parties sounded the battle cry. The same politics were noted at the provincial and municipal government levels. At these two levels, competing companies used every available means, whether honourable or ethical or otherwise, to deny letters of incorporation or grants-in-aid.

The two most bitter foes in the 1850s through 1870s were the Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada and the Great Western Railway Company of Canada, as will be discussed in chapter 2.

Early organizers of Canadian railways had an astonishing record of extracting money from municipalities in the form of bylaws providing bonuses. From the town of Port Hope (population 3,000), a bonus of $740,000 was obtained. The towns of Niagara, Brockville, and Cobourg, with respective populations of only 2,500; 4,000; and 4,000, were influenced to give corresponding bonuses of $280,000; $400,000; and $500,000. The cities of Ottawa and London, each having a population of below 10,000, were coerced into providing bonuses of $200,000 and $375,000, respectively. Brantford, with a population of not more than 6,000, handed over $500,000. These are just a few examples of small and poor municipalities being corrupted or compelled to mortgage future generations to line the pockets of railway contractors and owners. Even on the smaller scale seen in Canada, the moniker of “robber baron” could readily be applied. However, the railway contractors and owners were not the sole perpetrators of these legal, though unethical, methods. All bylaws involving the granting of municipal bonuses had to be approved (“made legitimate”) by the governor-in-council as required under the Railway Loan Act. It is difficult to fathom how a responsible individual could allow municipalities to beggar themselves in the “railway lottery” process. There was even one village allowed by the governor-in-council to provide a bonus to the extent of $300 per town resident!

Samuel Zimmerman: “One Bold Operator”

Samuel Zimmerman was a true Canadian enigma. Described as “one bold operator,” his occupations included railway contractor, financier, manipulator, showman, philanthropist, and scamp (i.e., scoundrel). He lived life on a grand scale and was able to balance the cut-throat tactics of business and extravagant hospitality. As a railway contractor, he routinely subcontracted the work and never took pride in a job well done, unlike the great civil engineering firms of the period, such as Grand Trunk builders Peto, Brassey, Jackson, and Betts. There were few his equal in “railway morality” — the unsavoury ethics characterizing transportation politics of the era. Unfortunately, the Great Western Railway would interact frequently with Zimmerman, much to the detriment of the railway.

Zimmerman was involved with the Great Western Railway from early in its existence. His sale of the remaining block of his land holdings in Clifton (Niagara Falls, Canada) to a partnership that included Roswell Gardiner Benedict was to pay dividends that he could scarcely believe years later. Benedict, being the same age as Zimmerman, arrived in Canada about 1847, after employment as a civil engineer on several U.S. railways in New York and Ohio. The two met during the Welland Canal project. Benedict’s appointment as assistant to the chief engineer of the Great Western Railway resulted in Zimmerman’s firm securing lucrative contracts for building the eastern section of the road. Later, when Benedict became the chief engineer, he certified the shoddy work of Zimmerman’s firm, approved dubious claims for cost overruns, and arranged early work completion bonuses on work completed considerably late! The Benedict-Zimmerman collaboration was a synergistic one that was to have a substantial negative impact on the Great Western Railway for years to come.

The Great Western, having witnessed firsthand the Zimmerman business “technique,” tried to distance itself from further dealings with him. The company certainly tried to shy away from him. When the railway proposed the Hamilton-to-Toronto extension, the British home office awarded the contract to the British firm of George Whythes (which had already successfully built large portions of two major British railways). Zimmerman may have lost the contract but he was not to be totally denied. Before legislative approval of the extension could be secured, Zimmerman’s political “friends” had obtained for him a £10,000 “fee” along with a commitment that his firm would be contracted when the Komoka-to-Sarnia extension came due.

In 1855, the Great Western realized that traffic was overwhelming the single track line and began arrange­ments to double-track the entire line. Apparently resigned to the inevitable, the railway enlisted the aid of Zimmerman’s firm. His price for securing the necessary legislative approval to double-track the line was the contract itself. By supreme irony, the act that made its way through the legislature with Zimmerman’s “stamp of approval” was to indirectly lead to his premature death on a frigid late afternoon in March 1857.

In this act was a clause which freed the Great Western from compliance with other legislation mandating that all trains come to a full and complete stop before crossing all drawbridges. This latter legislation had been passed in response to the disaster in Norwalk, Connecticut, several years prior when a passenger train plunged into open water due to a drawbridge being open, causing forty-six deaths. As will be detailed in chapter 6, had the train on which Zimmerman was a passenger on March 12, 1857, come to a full stop before proceeding over the bridge, it is quite likely that the Desjardins Bridge disaster claiming the lives of Zimmerman and fifty-nine others would never have occurred.

The final chapter in the Zimmerman railway saga would also haunt the Great Western for years, through the creation of a competitor across southern Ontario known as the Canada Southern Railway, this railway lasting well beyond the Great Western itself. Zimmerman, anxious to expand commercial development in the Niagara region where he was an extensive landholder, had acquired two local businesses: the Erie and Ontario Railway and the Niagara Harbour and Docks Company. The former was one of the earliest railways in Upper Canada, originally being a horse-powered portage railway around Niagara Falls. The latter was established below Queenston (i.e., north of the falls). As early as 1853, Zimmerman had attempted to entice the Great Western to purchase these assets. Had the Great Western done so, Zimmerman would have amassed a great deal of money on heavy construction contracts in the Falls area. If the railway refused to buy, Zimmerman threatened to include the Erie and Ontario right-of-way as the initial section of a railway built south of the Great Western main line, providing a substantially shorter route between Detroit and Buffalo, New York. It would also tap the regional traffic that the Great Western desired.

Zimmerman “convinced” then-managing director of the Great Western, Charles John Brydges, of the benefits of purchasing the Zimmerman assets, subject to board approval. The battle surrounding this issue forever soured the relationship between Brydges and Sir Allan MacNab, resulting in MacNab’s eventual dismissal from the board. Fortunately, MacNab’s counsel to disapprove prevailed. He happened to know that the purchase and selling prices for the dock company were £9,000 ($43,830 U.S.) and £179,000 ($871,730 U.S.), respectively. Further, he believed that whether or not the Great Western purchased Zimmerman’s companies, there would be a southern competitor built sooner or later. This view persuaded the board. The Brydges agreement was abrogated and the Zimmerman offer was refused.

As expected, Zimmerman began to promote the threatened new independent southern route. Two projected railways would constitute the major portion of the road: the Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway and Harbour Company and the Amherstburg and St. Thomas Railway. By 1857 the contract for the former was already in hand and his associates formed the majority of the board. The latter line was somewhat of a problem as both the Great Western and Zimmerman had oversubscribed the capital. Citing irregularities in the conduct of the Great Western, Zimmerman held a parallel organizational meeting in an Amherstburg hotel on August 7, 1856. At precisely the same time, the Great Western group held their meeting in the Amherstburg town hall! Two boards and two presidents. Although Zimmerman was to play no role in it, the Canada Southern Railway was destined to play a major role in rail transportation in southern Ontario.

Given the unsatisfactory nature of the work performed by Zimmerman’s firm, it might be reasonable to assume that his company would have to compensate the railway or make extensive and expensive repairs and even lose money on the contract. In fact, the opposite occurred. Why? The work had been done “according to contract” — that is, in a manner to meet legally the minimum standards of performance set out, but also according to a contract mutually agreed upon in advance by the engineer and the contractor, approved by a board of directors composed partly of inexperienced local and/or non-local businessmen and usually also including some of the contractor’s “friends.” According to contract the contractor, on the approval of the engineer, imposed additional unforeseen charges pushing costs well above initial estimates. According to contract the contractor was paid when his work was completed. If not, he would refuse to turn over the tracks, locomotives, and rolling stock until he was paid. Frequently, railway companies would start operations without funds since the money raised by munici­palities would go to the contractor. In addition, contractors frequently were paid in a combination of company bonds (50 percent) and cash (50 percent). It should be remembered that the process just described applied to the majority of contractors of early Canadian railways, not just to Samuel Zimmerman.

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Even with only the brief background presented herein, the reader should come away with the sense that pioneer railway travel in the 1850s through 1870s was in a somewhat chaotic state. It was somewhat akin to the Wild West. These early years were the era of link-and-pin couplers, hand brakes, no effective means of communication between stations, wood fuel, and no signalling equipment. It was an era of a virtual absence of governmental oversight over the railways, even with respect to safety. And it was an era with a broad lack of financial oversight by government and the companies themselves.

However, slowly but surely things got better. Link-and-pin couplers would be replaced by safer couplers. Hand brakes would give way to air brakes, and the telegraph and signals would improve communication dramatically, improving safety as well. Government would step in and begin to regulate critical aspects of railway life, introducing inspectors and the Board of Railway Commissioners. And, although the Great Western would start out “with wobbly knees,” things would improve for the Great Western as well.