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Early Years

January 9, 1834, was an historic day upon which a select committee of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada enthusiastically recommended approval of a petition under consideration. This petition called for the granting of a charter to construct a railway from the town of London to the head of Lake Ontario. Supporters of the petition included many progressive and influential citizens of London, Hamilton, and all points between, including Allan Napier MacNab, Edward Allen Talbot, Colin C. Ferrie, James Belle Ewart, James Hamilton, Mahlon Burwell, James Ingersoll, George J. Goodhue, and Jasper T. Gilkison. In fact, seventy-six sponsors affixed their names to the petition, including one man who was member of Parliament for the London district and chairperson of the select committee that approved the petition: Mahlon Burwell!

The result was the incorporation of the London and Gore Railroad Company on March 6, 1834, “for the purpose of constructing a single or double track wooden or iron railway or way commencing at the town of London and extending to the harbour in Burlington Bay at the head of Lake Ontario … and also the navigable waters of the Thames River [Ed. note: up to Chatham] and Lake Huron.” The inclusion of a clause authorizing the use “of steam or the power of animals, or any mechanical or other power” indicated that railways were still in their infancy at this time and that steam locomotives had yet to prove their superiority. Naturally, the railway was allowed to cross any watercourse or road, provided that the watercourse or road was restored to its original state, and usefulness was not impaired. This was especially emphasized for the Grand and Thames Rivers. As will be seen in the next chapter, the successor Great Western Railway did not always behave in this prescribed manner. Capital stock was established at £100,000 ($487,000 U.S.) with a proviso that it could be increased to £200,000 ($975,000 U.S.) in the event of extending the works to the Thames River or Lake Huron. Construction was to be commenced within two years of passage of the act and was to be completed between London and Burlington Bay within ten years and from London to the Thames River and Lake Huron within twelve years of passage of the act (Upper Canada Statutes, 4 William IV, chapter 29, assent date March 6, 1834).

Promoters of the new company immediately set to work, with the Montreal Gazette (May 3, 1834) reporting:

We perceive by the True Patriot that the first meeting of the friends of the London and Gore Railroad was held in London on Monday, April 7 [1834]; and we rejoice to find that stock on the amount of four or five hundred shares [£10,000–12,500] was taken up before the meeting adjourned…. When it is considered that every landholder within ten miles of the intended road must be greatly benefitted by its completion, and that the produce of the finest and most fertile country in America must in a few years be of little value, unless some such improvement is effected, we are not at all surprised to hear that the farmers are coming forward to take up stock….

Unfortunately, the promoters found themselves unable to attract necessary capital, despite a modest objective of £100,000. Despite a lack of capital, enthusiasm continued unabated. In 1836 Elisha Johnson, civil engineer, was engaged to conduct a preliminary survey of the route and report to the directors.

In his “Report of the Engineer upon the Preliminary Surveys for the London and Gore Rail Road,” dated 1836, Johnson gushed with some of the most eloquent prose ever to grace the pages of an engineer’s report. He not only assured the directors that the proposed route was remarkably straight and level, with no serious physical barriers to overcome, but predicted that “the rude features of an unfrequented wilderness” would be transformed “as if by enchantment” into a “diversified and profitable cultivation … with thickening throngs of active, useful, and intelligent families.”

The eloquent engineer concluded his report with a plea that the directors pursue what he considered their divine mission:

The Creator of the world has stretched out between Canada and the United States the most magnificent series of internal waters that anywhere adorn His footstool. From these waters he has, for ages, sent forth his dews, and his rains to clothe the vast interior with lavish fertility…. Can you doubt or hesitate as to the task assigned you? Were the richest bounties of the physical world designed to go forever unimproved and unenjoyed by him to whom dominion is given over all the world?

A variety of newspapers extolled the merits of the proposed route, as did travellers and visitors to Upper Canada. One of the most famous examples of the latter, Anna Jameson, considered this railway

One of the grandest and most useful undertakings in the world — in this world I mean. The want of a line of road, of an accessible market for agricultural produce, keeps this magnificent country poor and ignorant. Here all grain, all fruits which flourish in the south of Europe might be cultivated with success — the finest wheat and rice, and hemp and tobacco…. If there were but a railroad … there is no calculating the advantages that must arise from it.

The pressing need was for money, not enthusiasm. For this reason, the company approached the government for financial assistance. In 1837, with the aggressive support of Allan MacNab, and convinced that the colony, as a whole, would benefit from its construction, the legislature approved a loan of £200,000 ($975,000 U.S.) (Upper Canadian Statutes, 7 William IV, chapter 61, assent date March 4, 1837).

The money was never received nor was any attempt made to begin construction. The unsettled political and economic conditions in Upper Canada occasioned by the Rebellion of 1837 and the financial crisis (panic) of that year, combined with a continued interest in canals, brought any progress on the railway to an abrupt stop. With neither public nor private funds available, promoters of the London and Gore, and other railways in the colony, had no choice but to temporarily abandon the project. In the near term, prospects for the railway were bleak indeed. However, the dreams of those behind it lingered on.

In 1845 the London and Gore Railroad Company was revived with the incorporation of the Great Western Rail Road Company, which had an extended route (from some point on the Niagara River through Hamilton and London to Point Edward at the foot of Lake Huron and to the Detroit River). This was done in order to avoid a lapse in the act of 1834. Capital stock was increased to £1.5 million ($7.31 million U.S.) maximum. Construction had to begin within four years of passage of this act and had to be completed within twenty years of the passage (Province of Canada Statutes, 8 Victoria, chapter 86, assent date March 29, 1845).

The reasons for the reinvigorated enthusiasm and more ambitious plan embodied in the 1845 act was closely related to significant developments in Britain and the U.S. during this period.

The changing trade policy of the mother country between 1846 and 1849 had profound effects upon railway development in Canada West (Ontario). Colonial produce, formerly sheltered by Britain’s preferential tariff structure, became exposed to the competition of foreign traders as Britain removed the tariff structure. In addition, exports from the U.S. Midwest, which had used the St. Lawrence route in order to gain freer access to British markets, would now enjoy equal treatment even if exports left from U.S. ports on the east coast. Bitter resentment boiled up in Canada, especially among Montreal merchants and St. Lawrence shipping interests, due to the major disaster of the loss of British preferential tariffs. This resentment culminated in the famous “Annexation Manifesto.” However, farmers in Canada West continued to be prosperous as they increasingly looked southward, rather than overseas, for trading opportunities.

The reason for this southward “gaze” is readily apparent. In 1845 the U.S. government enacted legislation that allowed Canadian produce to be exported in bond (i.e., in sealed freight cars) to U.S. ports without paying U.S. import duties. As a result, by 1850 the volume of wheat from Canada West exported via U.S. east-coast ports was more than fifteen-fold that exported via the St. Lawrence route. Thus, with the removal of the British preference, both farmers of the U.S. Midwest and Canada West began to depend on American transportation facilities to move their produce to eastern seaports.

Between 1831 and 1842 a maze of short railways had been built in New York State between Buffalo and the eastern seaboard. Although originally built to serve only local interests, by 1843 these lines collectively provided a through route from Buffalo to Albany, from which additional lines were built to access Boston and New York City. This railway network was hampered by disunity of management and restrictions arbitrarily imposed by the state of New York. For example, one component road, a potential competitor for the state-owned Erie Canal, could not carry any freight! The others were required to pay the equivalent of canal tolls on all freight handled. Pressure was obviously being exerted upon the state legislature to lift these restrictions.

In 1846 a group of eastern-U.S. investors headed by John M. Forbes of Boston bought the partially completed Michigan Central Railroad from the state of Michigan. Running from Chicago to Detroit, this line was expected to capture a major share of traffic to/from the U.S. Midwest. The Forbes group realized that it shared a common problem with the New York system ending at Buffalo. It needed a linking railway running through Canada West from the Niagara River to the Detroit River, a route much shorter and more economical than any line south of Lake Erie.

This is the point at which the London and Gore Railroad, originally projected as a portage road and a road for local transportation needs, emerged as a vital link in a great railway chain stretching from Chicago to Boston.

A few weeks following passage of the 1845 Great Western Railroad Act, Sir Allan MacNab, the line’s first president, and James Belle Ewart sailed for England in high hopes of attracting the capital needed to start construction.

The new purpose of the line was clearly evident in the prospectus circulated in England:

The Great Western Rail Road is designed not only to facilitate the internal traffic of the Province of Canada, for which its route possesses eminent advantages, but also to form a connective link in the great chain of Railway from the city of Boston, on the Eastern coast of the United States, to the Mississippi River, thus drawing over it an immense and increasing foreign traffic.

Prospective shareholders were assured that no other route could compete with the Great Western. Navigation on Lake Erie was hindered by winter ice for several months each year and was dangerous at all times. Competing railways south of Lake Erie would be at least 125 miles longer while there was no competing railway north of Lake Erie. (The ruinous competition with the Grand Trunk and Canada Southern Railways could hardly have been anticipated at this early date!)

On December 16, 1845, a Hamilton newspaper announced that a public dinner would be given in one week in honour of MacNab and Belle Ewert “as a testimonial of congratulation upon the successful completion of the object of their mission.” There appeared to be good reason to celebrate: of the company’s authorized capital of £1.5 million ($7.31 million U.S.) (60,000 shares), MacNab and Belle Ewart had no difficulty selling the 55,000 shares reserved for British investors to eleven London financiers, including George Hudson, the celebrated English railway “king.” The remaining 5,000 shares were reserved for Canadian investors.

Unfortunately, the British railway boom collapsed before even the small first installments (5 percent down) had been paid on many of the reserved British shares. This financial panic caused the stock of Britain’s own London and Northwestern Railway, considered very solid, to fall 50 percent (£220 to £110) within one year. In addition, it proved impossible to sell the 5,000 “Canadian” shares. The provincial government resisted MacNab’s pressure to furnish the loan of £200,000 ($975,000 U.S.) promised in 1837, nor would it agree to provide one million acres of Crown land at a low price. This land was destined for British paupers imported by the company to provide an inexpensive labour force. Another component of this scheme was the plan to call on the British government to provide a loan in return for being relieved of the burden of these paupers. It is uncertain whether the British government would have agreed to this plan, but in any event the Canadian government’s refusal to co-operate doomed the plan. The attitude of British investors at the time was summed up by civil engineer Walter Shanley:

Of the Great Western Railway I hear nothing but that English capitalists are unwilling to embark in it, not knowing how soon Canada may be a repudiating State.

The latter statement refers to the bitterness caused by the repeal of the Corn Laws, culminating in a movement by some Canadian elements in support of annexation to the U.S.

Nor were Canadian railways alone in the doldrums. John M. Forbes, in response to MacNab’s request for funds, wrote “At this moment it is impossible to get subscriptions to any Rail Road, however promising.”

In 1846 the charter of the Great Western Rail Road Company was amended to afford “a just and proper protection to the English shareholders of the company in respect of their shares.” A corresponding committee of up to eleven English members was to be created in England to serve as a protector of English shareholder rights. However, it actually also became de facto the group that made all important managerial decisions for the railway while the board of directors in Canada had to have virtually everything it did approved by the corresponding committee. Financial accounts for the company were to be maintained in England. with copies being sent to the directors in Canada. In truth, this document made Canadian shareholders and Canadian directors subordinate to English shareholders and the corresponding committee, respectively (Province of Canada Statutes, 9 Victoria, chapter 81, assent date June 9, 1846).

Despite the fact that financing the Great Western remained a problem, there were advances on other fronts. Charles B. Stuart, chief engineer of the Great Western, produced a report on September 1, 1847, which dealt with the final location of the main line and final specifications for everything from roadbed to bridges and buildings. He indicated that of the entire distance between the Suspension Bridge and Windsor of 228 miles, over 217 miles was perfectly straight. He was pleased to state that he knew of “no other case in this country or elsewhere comparable with this, and it is doubtful whether another location of the same extent can be found on the Continent, so well adapted to the attainment of high velocity, and great economy of transportation.”

Stuart felt that there was no doubt that, although it would cost £1,218,520 ($5.93 million U.S.) to build, the Great Western would prove a profitable investment for its promoters. Everywhere along the line, roadbed property was being provided free of charge while municipalities had promised sites for depots and freight sheds. However, municipalities were providing next to nothing in terms of financial support. For example, in 1845 Hamilton’s municipal council voted to provide £25 ($122 U.S.) in funds upon receiving the company’s request for aid. Using Stuart’s estimate of £4,332 ($21,100 U.S.) per mile, this £25 would finance the construction of thirty feet of track!

On October 23, 1847, the time had arrived for turning of the first sod in London, Ontario. In the words of the Globe (October 27, 1847):

Daylight broke on the eventful morning in all the splendor of an October day in Canada…. From a very early hour the streets of London gave evidence of a holiday. The shops were decked out in their best style … and innumerable wagons filled with the hardy lords of the soil, and their merry families, poured into the town.

Per Talman in 1948:

On that day, something less than ninety-nine years ago, Colonel Talbot turned the first sod which represented the beginning of construction of the Great Western. The fact that the survey was changed and that the railway did not go over the place he marked does not detract from the importance of the occasion. Talbot turned sod in a vacant lot on Richmond Street where the Hyman tannery stands today and, of course, the Great Western came through on the present line of the C.N.R. When he turned the sod, Talbot is reported to have said “I slept on this spot fifty-five years ago when my best friend was a porcupine. What a change has occurred since! Now I see different beings around me, no porcupines with bristles but in their place a company of half-civilized gentlemen.” Talbot possibly was slightly under the influence of alcohol at the time for his speech. No reporter recorded what the half-civilized bystanders thought of Talbot’s remarks.

— J.J. Talman, Western Ontario Historical Notes 6(1) (March 1948), 3

A public dinner followed, at which sixteen toasts were made.

As 1848 came to an end, there must have been many who doubted whether the dream first conceived in 1833 would ever be fulfilled. Fortunately, the fortunes of the Great Western (and several other railways in Ontario) would improve markedly in 1849. In April 1849 Francis Hincks, inspector general, introduced the Guarantee Act into the Legislature of the Province of Canada. This measure clearly stated that there was a need for government assistance to allow the construction of railways in rural areas where capital was scarce. The assistance took the form of a guarantee of interest at 6 percent on not more than 50 percent of the bonded debt of railways over seventy-five miles long, after the completion of at least one half of their mileage. Obviously, Sir Allan MacNab temporarily abandoned his role as leader of the opposition to help shepherd the bill to pass unanimously (Province of Canada Statutes, 12 Victoria, chapter 29, assent date May 30, 1849). Although the Guarantee Act could not benefit a railway until it had completed at least half of its mileage and could not benefit lines less than seventy-five miles long, it was an all-important first step in the long story of government guarantees and subsidies for Canadian railways. Its usefulness was further restricted in 1851 by Hincks’s decision to restrict the act to lines forming part of the province’s trunk system, in an attempt to help his Grand Trunk Railway (Province of Canada Statutes, 14 & 15 Victoria, chapter 73, assent date August 30, 1851). Luckily, the Great Western was considered to be the western extension of the trunk line in 1851, and thus it continued to receive aid under this act (Province of Canada Statutes, 14 & 15 Victoria, chapter 74, assent date August 30, 1851).

In 1849 an act was passed that repealed the act of 1846 and placed Canadian and British Great Western Railway shareholders on an equal footing (Province of Canada Statutes, 12 Victoria, chapter 156, assent date May 30, 1849).

Of more immediate value to the Great Western was a bill introduced in 1850, which allowed municipalities to subscribe to the stock of railway companies (Province of Canada Statutes, 13 & 14 Victoria, chapter 129, assent date July 23, 1850). Earlier apathy gave way to exuberant largesse on the part of municipalities. The counties of Oxford and Middlesex and municipalities of Galt and London each purchased £25,000 ($121,750 U.S.) stock subscriptions, while Hamilton purchased £50,000 ($243,500 U.S.) in stock.

Railway fever seems to have infected the entire province. Commercial distress had disappeared and new confidence and initiative were rising to the fore. The struggle for responsible government had been fought and won, constitutional strife no longer dominated the country, and Canada was on the fast track to becoming an independent nation. In the 1850s, in the words of Sir Allan MacNab, railways became the politics of Canadians. By the end of the 1850s Canada was far different from what it had been in 1850. By 1860 Canada had shed its pioneer status and had become a full-fledged member of the great world of commerce and finance.

Contemporary newspapers revealed this radical new enthusiasm for railways:

Railroads! Railroads! The Canadian world is at last thoroughly alive on the subject of Railroads. Every newspaper teems with the proceedings of public meetings, with discussions as to the best routes, urgent appeals to capitalists to lend their aid … and confident predictions as to the advantages to be reaped from them. Opposition seems to have died away, and there seems to be an unanimous desire to build the roads, some way or other; the prospect that something effectual will at last be done seems really good.

— Globe, November 26, 1850

Referring specifically to the Great Western, the Canada Directory gushed that it would

pass through the finest portion of the Province, and when completed must necessarily be the great highway for the travel, and for the transport of a large portion of the produce of the North Western States of the American Union, as well as of Western Canada.

— Lovell’s Canada Directory for 1850–1851

This sudden and complete change in attitude regarding railway construction was, in great measure, due to deliberate promotion by its advocates — the MacNabs, Buchanans, and Galts in Parliament, and Keefers outside of Parliament:

Old Winter is once more upon us, and … our rivers are sealed fountains, and an embargo, which no human power can remove is laid on all our ports…. The animation of business is suspended, the life blood of commerce is curdled and stagnant…. On land, the heavy stage labors through mingled frost and mud…. Far away to the South is heard the daily scream of the steam whistle — but from Canada there is no escape: blockaded and imprisoned by Ice and Apathy, we have at least ample time for reflection; or if there be comfort in Philosophy may we not profitably consider the PHILOSOPHY OF RAILROADS.

— T.C. Keefer, Philosophy of Railroads (Montreal: John Lovell, 1850)

The eloquent Keefer, a famous civil engineer, assured Canadians that the resources of Canada were on a par with American states in which railways had been built:

There is a greater amount of unemployed capital amongst our agricultural and trading population than is generally supposed; and of fixed capital and absolute wealth, there is more than sufficient … to warrant the construction of all the roads proposed. A very considerable class of the stockholders in New England roads are farmers, with investments from £50 to £500.

— Keefer, Philosophy of Railroads

Keefer warned Canadians of the consequences if the “chilling influence of popular apathy, ignorance, and incredulity” continued. Without a doubt, such promotional literature played a significant role in generating railway fever in the 1850s.

This railway mania proved to be a mixed blessing to the Great Western, for with it appeared the possibility of a competitor in the guise of the Niagara and Detroit Rivers Railroad Company. This line was also planned to run through southwestern Ontario to unite New York and Michigan railroads. As such, it posed a serious threat to Great Western aspirations. When its promoters petitioned Parliament for a widening of its powers in 1850, Great Western interests vigorously opposed the bill. It was eventually defeated by only one vote! Hincks made it clear to the directors of the Great Western that its rival would receive its charter at the next session of Parliament unless it began construction. Spurred on by this warning, but still without its finances fully in order, the Great Western looked south to the United States. Directors of the Great Western were hoping that American enthusiasm for their project would be translated into dollars.

They were not disappointed! Their plea for funds coincided with the abolition, by the New York state legislature, of canal tolls charged on freight transported by railroads. This was expected to result in a tremendous increase in freight traffic along the New York chain of railways. New York Central and Michigan Central interests united in support of the Great Western, “the only link wanting in the most profitable chain of roads that have ever been constructed.” Erastus Corning, president of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad and soon to be the first president of the New York Central, persuaded the New York state legislature to allow New York railroads to subscribe to Great Western stock. Several lines immediately subscribed for substantial amounts, Corning’s road alone subscribing $200,000.

On May 5, 1851, Great Western officials met with interested American businessmen in Niagara Falls. John M. Forbes opened the meeting with a blunt pronouncement that the time had come to complete the Great Western, provided that U.S. interests lend their aid to the tune of $1 million. Expressing the hope that the New York roads and Michigan Central would furnish $800,000 to $850,000 of the $1 million goal, he reminded the stockholders of these lines that “the large amount of already-invested capital to be materially benefitted by its construction calls loudly upon the rest of the links in this great chain to render their aid in making up the balance necessary for its early completion.”

In March 1851 the Detroit Free Press had published “An Appeal to the Citizens of Michigan,” urging them to take action on behalf of the Great Western. Concerned about the potential devastating effects of railways being built south of Lake Erie, the writer warned:

Unless we move ourselves … we may rest assured that in less than three years Michigan will be far behind all of her sister states of the West as to facilities for trade and commerce. It is well known that thousands upon thousands are prevented from even visiting us in the summer season by reasons of fear of crossing Lake Erie, while in the winter we see no one who is not compelled by absolute necessity to come here. We have complained of the travel and emigration passing by us, but the past is nothing to what the future will be…. The rich and fertile lands of the northern portion of our state will remain an uncultivated wilderness, while the surrounding states will flourish like a garden.

This gloomy prophecy was contrasted with the benefits to be derived by the speedy completion of the Great Western, whose

effect upon the state would be almost magical…. We shall have no winter to close up our navigation. No seasons where we cannot reach our great market — no time where we are shut out from our intercourse with New York…. The tide of emigration which has so long passed by us, will pass through our state. Under such a stimulus we may expect our population to double in the next ten years.

On September 17–19, 1851, a Railroad Celebration was held in Boston. A special committee was appointed with the mayor and eight aldermen, and the president and thirteen fellow members of the Common Council. This committee reported:

in their opinion, the time has come when the Great Western Railway of Canada may be completed, provided that the parties who are interested on the American side, will lend them aid by a subscription of stock to the amount of one million dollars.

This pronouncement appeared to be a virtual carbon copy of Forbes’ May 5 comment. The consistency in the message should not be lost by the reader.

These appeals brought a favourable response from American capitalists in Detroit and elsewhere and, within a year, private subscriptions totalled over £210,000 ($1 million U.S.). Together with the $800,000-plus in aid from interested U.S. roads, the longstanding financial woes of the Great Western were finally over. For their assistance, three Americans were admitted as directors: Erastus Corning, John Forbes, and John W. Brooks (the latter being superintendent of the Michigan Central).

It was time to build a railway!