Читать книгу The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas - Edward Westermarck - Страница 75

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MORAL ideas are expressed in moral judgments. We have hitherto examined the predicates of such judgments, the import and origin of the moral concepts. Now a much wider field or research remains for us to traverse. We shall direct our attention to the subjects of moral judgments, to the mass of phenomena which, among different peoples and in different ages, have had a tendency to call forth moral blame and moral praise. We shall discuss the general characteristics which all these phenomena have in common. We shall classify the most important of them, and study the moral ideas held with reference to the phenomena of each class separately. And in both cases we shall not only analyse, but try to find an answer to the question, Why?—the ultimate aim of all scientific research. But before entering upon this vast undertaking, we must define the lines on which it is to be conducted. How can we get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large?

In answering this question I need not dwell upon such obvious means of information as direct experience, or records of moral maxims and sentiments found in proverbs, literary and philosophical works, and religious codes. The sources which, from an evolutionary point of view, are of the most comprehensive importance for our study, are tribal and national customs and laws. It is to these sources that the present chapter will be devoted.

We have seen that a custom, in the strict sense of the word, is not merely the habit of a certain circle of men, but at the same time involves a moral rule. There is a close connection between these two characteristics of custom: its habitualness and its obligatoriness. Whatever be the foundation for a certain practice, and however trivial it may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency to disapprove of any deviation from it for the simple reason that such a deviation is unusual. As Abraham Tucker observes, “it is a constant argument among the common people, that a thing must be done, and ought to be done, because it always has been done.”1 Children show respect for the customary,2 and so do savages. “If you ask a Kaffir why he does so and so, he will answer—‘How can I tell? It has always been done by our forefathers.’ ”3 The only reason which the Eskimo can give for some of their present customs, to which they adhere from fear of ill report among their people, is that “the old Innuits did so, and therefore they must.”4 In the behaviour of the Aleut, who “is bashful if caught doing anything unusual among his people,”5 and in the average European’s dread of appearing singular, we recognise the influence of the same force of habit.

1 Tucker, Light of Nature, ii. 593. Cf. also Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, i. 65 sqq.