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1A. User boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are present.

1B. Resource boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger social-ecological system are present.

2A. Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.

2B. Appropriation and provision: Appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits.

3. Collective choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying its rules.

4A. Monitoring users: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.

4B. Monitoring the resource: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the condition of the resource.

5. Graduated sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly violates a rule.

6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users or with officials.

7. Minimal recognition of rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized by the government.

8. Nested enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers.

Source: Elinor Ostrom “Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems,” Prize Lecture, 2009 ©The Nobel Foundation

These principles have emerged from the communities studied themselves. By contrast, rules imposed by authority upon local groups by distant governments often are counterproductive because the authorities in question do not have sufficient information or legitimacy (the privatization of natural resources also suffer from many limitations, to begin with their injustice).

In the Ostromian framework of analysis, we clearly see the importance of the relationship – fundamental, but often neglected – between resources and trust, or natural and social capital. Economist Partha Dasgupta has also insisted on the importance of institutional trust in the management of natural resources exploited in common. In environmental governance systems, it is critical that participants are properly informed on future gains from social cooperation.¹⁵ Mechanisms of trust and mistrust are also at the heart of international environmental governance, starting with climate negotiations (see on this point, Finus 2008).¹⁶ The governance of the commons can be sustainable only if it acknowledges distributional issues and justice principles. We now turn to their study.