Читать книгу Damage Control (Revised & Updated) - Eric Dezenhall - Страница 21

If ever there were a case of failing to differentiate between a nuisance, a problem, and a crisis, it was the bungled 2006 attempt by Hewlett-Packard’s top brass to ferret out boardroom leaks by spying on their own board of directors, among others. In this notorious sin of excess, the cure became worse than the disease.

The scandal’s climax came in the form of congressional hearings in which ten witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination—sinister optics that helped turn a problem (a leaky board) into a crisis (Nixonian dirty tricks).

By most accounts, in late 2005 HP chairman Patricia Dunn set in motion a private investigation that resulted in, among other things, the collection of the private phone records of nine journalists, two HP employees, and seven HP board members. These records were gathered via the use of “pretexting.” Pretexting is gathering information through misrepresentation—in the case of the HP scandal, pretending to be the person to whom those private phone records belonged. As Representative Joe Barton (R-TX) said at the congressional hearing, “Pretexting is pretending to be somebody you’re not to get something you probably shouldn’t have to use in a way that’s probably wrong.” These revelations came to light in early September 2006.

Dunn, who was indicted for fraud and conspiracy the following month, was not fundamentally wrong to be concerned about boardroom leaks. As CEO Mark Hurd said upon her resignation: “The intent of the investigation was proper and appropriate. The fact that we had leaks on the board needed to be resolved.” The problem was that her team appeared to have been obsessed to the point of monomania.

Nor was Dunn wrong to entertain the use of private investigators, a practice that is indiscriminately branded as unethical in today’s scandal climate. Some private investigations, dare we say, are good things. Without investigators, General Motors never would have learned that journalists at Dateline NBC had rigged a GM truck to explode in order to portray an alleged pattern of flammability. Indeed, our own experience has been that private investigations can identify and stop bad actors who have no God-given right to ignore the law in pursuit of their corporate quarry.

The problem with HP’s actions was that they were undertaken without seasoned leadership, and whatever flimsy parameters were set apparently cascaded out of control and came to include tactics and targets that should have been off-limits. In an unheeded e-mail, HP internal investigator Vince Nye wrote to his supervisor, “I am requesting that we cease this phone number gathering method immediately and discount any of its information.”

There is such a thing as overresponding to a threat, which is what HP did when confronted by leaks. While as of this writing the facts of the case are still unfolding, one thing is certain: The operation that was put in place to plug the leaks did more damage to HP than the leaks ever did.

Excess also can reign when companies try to correct a misstep. The resignations of HP’s general counsel, chief ethics officer, and a security manager weren’t considered sufficient by some in the news media. Pundits were calling for a complete housecleaning at HP, unwisely believing that overkill was the answer. In reality, sometimes the best people to lead a company through a crisis are the ones who have already demonstrated strong leadership. Leaving a company in crisis without a leader would likely spin it even deeper into crisis. It should not be the objective of a company under siege to satisfy the bloodlust of the news media or business pundits, who are notorious for equating drastic gestures of self-flagellation with good crisis management.

“Tell it all,” “Get it all out,” went the extreme chants of the scandal’s Greek chorus in the weeks before HP spoke publicly. One problem with these absolutes is that companies in crisis rarely know everything they need to know in order to make immediate and ideal decisions. That’s why it’s a crisis.

Another problem is that complete disclosures, while theoretically desirable, may be admissible in court and can place the company in legal jeopardy. If HP had begun speculating publicly about who did what, innocent people could have been smeared, forcing them to take legal action against the company. Moreover, HP didn’t want to give fodder to prosecutors who were investigating the matter. Herein lies the tension between attorneys, who tend to counsel silence, and communicators, who tend to counsel openness. Who’s right? Both are “right” within the context of their disciplines; however, each crisis has its own special set of considerations. It’s up to the chief crisis officer (usually the CEO) to determine where on the silence-openness continuum public statements must fall.

On Friday, September 22, 2006, HP CEO Mark Hurd held a news conference (but took no questions) in which, for the first time since the affair broke in the press several weeks earlier, he commented at some length on the scandal and announced the resignation of chairman Dunn. Hurd also apologized to those who were spied upon and announced the appointment of former U.S. prosecutor Bart Schwartz to look into the investigative methods that were employed by the company in its attempt to plug leaks. (Presumably, this action will result in a final report on who did what—and pave the way for a clearer policy on corporate investigations.)

Also at the news conference, Michael Holston of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, a law firm HP retained to investigate what actually transpired, reported on the pathology of the scandal, namely that telephone records of employees, directors, and journalists had been obtained via the use of pretexting.

Was Hurd’s news conference held too late? In a perfect world, sure; but in the real world where a leader needs to know what he’s talking about, it was the best of his bad options.

Hurd was criticized for not taking questions, but he was probably wise not to. When legal issues are at stake—especially when information is so limited—open-ended give-and-take with the news media is laden with mines. In the proverbial battle between lawyers and public relations people, the HP press conference was a thoughtful compromise between the two disciplines.

At the time of the congressional hearings on the scandal in 2006, HP’s shares were up 25 percent. Key corporate units, such as HP’s printing products, which had been faltering, have recovered under Hurd. Analysts rightly remain bullish on the stock despite the leak scandal, which, in the end, had nothing to do with the company’s fundamental businesses.