Читать книгу The economic policy of the european union in the context of the covid-19 crisis - Francisco Jesús Carrera Hernández - Страница 11

The new instruments introduced to deal with the pandemic include a certain modulation of the traditional rules of economic governance of the European Union. In the case of the measures approved by the ESM in 2020, I have already indicated that we are witnessing a form of aid that does not fully correspond to the usual pattern of action of this mechanism, by reducing to a minimum the conditionality imposed on the States that request it and making surveillance more flexible, applying the normal or standard system of the European Semester.

Something similar has happened in the case of the SURE. Ideally, the Regulation by which this instrument has been created follows the traditional rules in aspects related to decision-making. There is a true intergovernmental component, which rests on the Council. Pursuant to the same, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Member State concerned, is responsible for approving, by a qualified majority, an Implementation Decision granting financial assistance, a Decision that settles out all aspects of the loan. Subsequently, the loan agreement between the Member State and the Commission will be concluded, an agreement that is managed through the European System of Central Banks.

However, unlike what has happened in other cases in which financial assistance has been provided to a Member State, there is no conditionality nor is there a reinforced surveillance system to monitor compliance. When art. 3 of the SURE Regulation refers to the “conditions for the use of the instrument”, it does not impose the need for economic reforms in the beneficiary State. This provision refers to other types of conditions: that the State has been greatly affected by the pandemic from an economic point of view and that it has used the funds received for a specific purpose54. This is the basic control to be carried out by the European Commission55.

In the case of the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism, the issue is more complex and requires a more detailed explanation, although, compared to the ESM, it can be advanced that the approach of the RRM is very different, insofar as we are dealing with an instrument that falls within the strict framework of the EU and the European Semester.

Indeed, for the application of the RRM, the applicant Member States must prepare the Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP), specifying a series of milestones and objectives that entail a program of reforms and investments to be carried out. Where appropriate, they may additionally incorporate a loan application, accompanied by an attached plan of reforms and investments. These RRPs can be submitted together with the National Reform Programs as a single integrated document, generally within the framework of the European Semester.

The RRPs are evaluated by the European Commission in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. The evaluation is approved, if necessary, by the Council through an Implementation Decision (art. 19). This procedure is the result of the agreement reached at the European Council of July 2020 which, unlike the Commission’s initial proposal, has given the Council a specific weight in the evaluation of the RRPs. This is not unusual, however, if we compare it with the procedure foreseen in the SURE and with other measures adopted within the framework of the European Semester.

However, unlike the SURE, the RRM incorporates a conditionality that has a double dimension.

On the one hand, the Member States must respect the milestones and objectives specifically set out in the RRPs. If the definition of these milestones and objectives is essential for the European Commission’s evaluation of the RRP and the Council to approve such an evaluation, their fulfillment also becomes a condition for the Commission to authorize disbursements.

Thus, if the evaluation carried out by the Commission on compliance with the milestones and objectives set in the Council’s Implementation Decision is negative, payments are suspended until the Member State adopts the necessary measures (art. 24). This suspension will entail a proportional reduction of the financial contribution (and of the loan) if the Member State fails to act within six months of the suspension and it may lose all the aid (including pre-financing) if it does not make tangible progress towards the achievement of milestones and objectives within eighteen months of the approval of the Implementation Decision by the Council.

As can be seen, the powers of the European Commission in this respect are very relevant. However, the agreement reached on the occasion of the July 2020 European Council, called the “emergency super brake”, which reinforces the power of the Member States over the Commission in case of application, must be taken into account. Its content has been incorporated into the Regulation establishing the MRR (paragraph 52 of the preamble of R2021/241).

The “emergency super brake” comes into play if, exceptionally, one or more Member States consider that there are serious deviations from the satisfactory fulfillment of the relevant goals and objectives. In such cases, any Member State could request the President of the European Council to refer the matter to the next European Council and “the Commission will not take any decision on the satisfactory fulfillment of the goals and objectives or on the approval of payments until the next European Council has debated the issue exhaustively”. This implied introducing a new intergovernmental and delaying element full of inaccuracies in the dynamics of the European Semester, which could be used by any Member State distrustful of the respect of conditionality by the beneficiary Member State, although, contrary to what the wishes of the frugal States, without vetoes.

On the other hand, additionally, the application of the RRM is linked to the respect of a set of variables contemplated in arts. 17 and 18 of the Regulation, in principle in terms of coherence. Thus, according to art. 17.3, coherence is required when drafting the RRP with the set of challenges and priorities established in the recommendations made to the Member State during the European Semester procedures (Stability and Growth Pact, economic imbalance procedure, etc.)56. Therefore, the Member State must draft its RRP explaining, among many other issues, “how the recovery and resilience plan contributes to effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations, including fiscal aspects thereof and recommendations made pursuant to article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 where appropriate, addressed to the Member State concerned, or challenges identified in other relevant documents officially adopted by the Commission in the context of the European Semester” (art. 18.4.b).

Ultimately, there is a (con)fusion between the set of measures recommended or decided concerning the requesting States within the framework of the European Semester and the milestones and objectives set out in the RRP. The consequence is twofold: the conditionality of the RRM turns out to cover a broad spectrum and, temporarily, the surveillance of the Member States within the framework of the European Semester is reinforced in the event of being beneficiaries of the aid provided for in the RRM.

This link between the European Semester and the receipt of aid under the RRM is reinforced by the provisions contained in art. 10 of the Regulation. Under the umbrella of linking the RRM to good economic governance, the suspension of commitments and/or payments related to this instrument has been foreseen in the following situations:

First, under the excessive public deficit procedure, the Commission “must” present a proposal to suspend payments or commitments if a Member State fails to take effective measures to correct its excessive deficit unless there is a serious economic recession across the EU.

Second, under the excessive macroeconomic imbalances procedure, the Commission “may” submit a proposal for suspension: if the Council adopts two successive recommendations because the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan (art. 8.3 of the Regulation on the PMI) or if the Council adopts two successive Decisions confirming the non-compliance of the Member State because it has not adopted the recommended corrective measures (art. 10.4 of the Regulation on the PMI).

The solution indicated in the previous paragraph has also been encountered in other situations.

In cases where a State has received aid under the medium-term financial support mechanism for the balances of payments of the Member States, if the Commission considers that the Member State has not adopted the measures agreed under Regulation 332/2002, not only will this State not receive the aid agreed under this instrument, but it could also see the aid from the RRM suspended.

In the case of the Eurogroup States, the same solution has been envisaged when the affected State does not adopt the measures provided for in art. 136.1 of the TFEU (measures to strengthen the coordination and supervision of its budgetary discipline and to prepare the economic policy guidelines), both under the procedure of art. 121 of the TFEU and the excessive public deficit procedure of art. 126 of the TFEU. And, in the event of being subject to a reinforced supervision procedure (for example, for having requested financial assistance from the ESM), when it does not comply with the macroeconomic adjustment program provided for in Regulation 472/2013.

In short, unlike the first agreed measures (SURE, ESM), the RRM reintroduces the conditionality for the receipt of the aid provided for in this instrument. However, the receipt of this aid is not linked to the implementation of the reinforced surveillance procedures already foreseen in Community regulations. The RRM introduces a new specific surveillance system, which also serves to reinforce compliance with the measures agreed in relation to the Member States in the framework of the European Semester or any other procedure applicable to them.

Finally, it should be noted that, unlike the suspension of payments provided for in art. 24, the Decision to suspend payments agreed in the art. 10 of the RRM Regulation falls within the competence of the Council, at the proposal of the Commission. However, with regard to the suspension of commitments, the powers of the Commission are again strengthened with the introduction of a reverse qualified majority voting system in the Council. The Commission proposal is thus deemed adopted unless the Council approves an implementing act rejecting it within one month. This is a figure already present in the “six-pack + two-pack”.