Читать книгу This is Philosophy of Science - Franz-Peter Griesmaier - Страница 46

This completes our discussion of the use of evidence. We discussed the role of evidence in theory generation and seen that much of this role there depends on a scientist’s psychology and other factors. Theory confirmation, on the other hand, is supposed to be independent of such psychological factors. However, there are certain logical complications that afflict the relation between theory and evidence (e.g., the raven paradox). Popper’s falsificationism has promise to help with some of those problems. Whether his picture of science as a process of critical inquiry that discards theories one by one can be generally accepted is doubtful. The question will be revisited in Chapter 15. But for now we delve further into evidence to consider the ways in which it can be evaluated and why sharing it with fellow scientists doesn’t necessarily resolve disagreements among them.