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The German Navy

The Admiral’s Navy

IN ADDITION TO GERMANY losing land and colonies and having to pay immense reparations to the Allies, the Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany’s military forces to a minimum after WWI. Conscription was abolished and the new voluntary German armed forces was to be no more than 100,000 men, ‘devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within its territory and control of its frontiers’. No aircraft, tanks or submarines were allowed. The General Staff and all similar organisations were dissolved and military schools shut down. The navy was reduced to eight 11-inch pre-Dreadnought capital ships, eight obsolete cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and torpedo boats, thirty-eight minesweepers and a handful of other smaller vessels.¹

In January 1921, all naval conditions of the Versailles Treaty had been met, and the German Imperial Navy was history. To try to heal the wounds and restore morale, the highly decorated Admiral Paul Behncke, who had led the Third Battle Squadron at Jutland, was recalled from retirement and appointed Commander-in-Chief. There was no lack of volunteers to fill the positions in the new Reichsmarine and it was not uncommon to choose between thirty to forty highly qualified applicants for each position. Some of these talents were put to active use in developing technologies that would get round the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Limitations in gun size were sought to be overcome through rockets and quick-firing guns; radar was developed, as were new welding techniques, diesel engines were tested and so on. In parallel, a substantial modernisation of the German merchant fleet and the early start of construction of replacement ships ensured that the specialist workforce in the yards remained active, maintaining their skills through the crisis.²

To help him reinstate discipline and self-respect in his men, Admiral Behncke called Konteradmiral Erich Raeder and tasked him with reorganising the officer corps as inspector of naval education.³ Like the rest of the German officer corps, Raeder was irked by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, but had no option but to adhere to them officially while waiting for better times. Meanwhile, he circumvented the abolition of staff colleges by making his own ‘course for assistants to commanding officers’ based on private notes and files, gradually expanding it from two weeks to a full eighteen months. Simultaneously, he sought to achieve a closer relationship between the line officers and the branch officers, while specialist training for petty officers and enlisted men created confidence and loyalty in the ranks. All involvement in party politics was banned and several of the ways and customs of the Imperial Navy were reintroduced, particularly those that could underpin the pride of the navy and its place in society. By 1924, Behncke retired, considering he had achieved what he had been asked to do, passing command of the Reichsmarine to Admiral Hans Zenker.

In 1927, the light cruiser Emden entered service as the first new-build ship after the war. She was robust and functional, but a top speed of 29.5 knots and single 15-cm guns in shielded mountings made her obsolete from the day of her launch. The Design Office used the definition of standard displacement in the Washington Treaty, announcing her as displacing 5,400 tons empty, some 600 tons less than allowed. In fact, she exceeded 6,950 tons, well over the limit of the Versailles Treaty. The Allied Control Commission failed to appreciate this and, once played, the trick was further exploited in all future designs until altogether ignored. The ambiguity between tons and long tons was also used to the full.⁴

Admiral Erich Raeder was made Chef der Marineleitung in October 1928 and would remain C-in-C of the German Navy for fourteen years. (Author’s collection)

The three K-class cruisers laid down in 1926 were radically new designs compared to Emden. Building was quick; Karlsruhe and Königsberg were launched in 1927 and Köln in 1928. Completion was delayed, though, largely for financial reasons, and the cruisers were commissioned between February 1929 and January 1930. Displacing 6,650 tons standard, they were an undeniable breach of the Versailles Treaty. These ships were a major step for the Reichsmarine, with 15-cm guns mounted in three triple turrets; 68,000-horsepower diesel engines gave them a comfortable 32.5 knots in calm seas, but an inherent structural weakness of the hull and lack of rigidity compromised stability in heavy seas, hampering operational efficiency in spite of extensive alterations. A further two modified K-design cruisers, Leipzig and Nürnberg, followed, similarly armed but with the same weaknesses, restricting their use.

In parallel with cruiser design, the building of a modern destroyer force was initiated through the six ships of the Type 23 or Raubvogel-class.⁵ The first, Möwe, was launched in March 1926. Destroyers were, according to the Versailles Treaty, capped at a maximum of 800 tons, but it soon became clear that an effective warship could not be designed within this constraint. The Raubvogels displaced 924 tons standard and a full 1,290 tons loaded. Armed with three 10.5-cm guns, six torpedo tubes and capable of a fair 34 knots, they were primarily designed for torpedo attacks but also equipped for mine-laying and coastal escort duties. Six subsequent ships of the slightly larger and faster Type 24 or Raubtier-class were commissioned between October 1928 and August 1929.⁶ All these vessels were later reclassified as torpedo boats – Torpedoboote Type 23/24. Initially painted black like the torpedo boats of the Kaiserliche Marine, they became a common sight in the Baltic and the German Bight, testing tactics and new operational concepts, often together with the K-class cruisers, giving valuable experience to men and officers. True destroyers would not be available for several years.

The 6,650-ton light cruiser Karlsruhe carried 15-cm guns mounted in three triple turrets. Her 68,000 horsepower diesel engines gave her a comfortable 32.5 knots in calm seas, but, like her sister ships, she was unstable in heavy seas. (Author’s collection)

On the battleship side, the first replacement was possible in 1922, and planning started in 1921. Designing an efficient fighting vessel with 28-cm guns within the 10,000-ton displacement limit created endless problems, and one concept after another was rejected. Admiral Zenker kept the pressure on the design teams, though, and in the spring of 1927, they eventually presented a workable plan for a 10,000-ton ship with six 28-cm guns, high endurance and capable of 26 knots The Reichstag voted the first building credit in early 1928, against considerable political opposition, and the keel of Deutschland was laid down in February 1929. Meanwhile, a high-level conspiracy was uncovered, involving the unauthorised use of military funds. Admiral Zenker was forced to resign and Raeder was called to Berlin to become Chef der Marineleitung on 1 October 1928. He would remain C-in-C of the German Navy for an unprecedented fourteen years.

At the time of Raeder’s appointment, several clandestine projects existed, including a Submarine Development Bureau set up in 1922 in Holland, disguised as a Dutch shipbuilding firm funded by the German shipbuilding industry.⁷ In addition, a core of would-be officers and engineers was kept active and up to date on key naval tactics and technologies, camouflaged as civil servants and academics. Raeder changed none of this. Instead, towards the end of 1929, he addressed senior officers, telling them that he remained convinced of the vital importance of the North Sea to Germany and that there would be a role for the German Navy on the high seas. Greatly encouraged, his officers began to prepare for a future very different from that of coastal defence envisaged ten years earlier.

Panzerschiff Deutschland carrying out stability tests in Wilhelmshaven 1935. (Author’s collection)

In the midst of the crippling economic crisis, Deutschland was launched on 19 May 1931. The launch was watched by 60,000 spectators, including Reichspresident Paul von Hindenburg in his full imperial field marshal uniform, flanked by Raeder and other naval and civilian dignitaries. Deutschland was the first German ship to carry triple turrets and aircraft catapults but, above all, she was the first capital ship in any navy with solely diesel propulsion: four engines per shaft. A new phase for the German Navy was emerging.

The Third Reich

On 30 January 1933, Hitler took his seat as chancellor for a right-wing coalition government in Berlin. His followers celebrated with torches and large parades all over the country. The Weimar Republic was dead and things would never be the same.

Admiral Raeder met with his new head of state for the first time on 2 February, when Hitler addressed senior officers of the navy and army during a dinner.⁸ In a two-hour speech, Hitler announced that he was about to embark on a massive rearmament programme that would reunite the nation and end the unemployment crisis. In a subsequent private meeting some weeks later, Raeder was assured that there would be no war with Britain, Italy or Japan. The build-up of the Kriegsmarine would have to be scaled within the framework of a ‘German continental policy’ so as not to provoke Britain, and a professional relationship should be sought with the Royal Navy.

Raeder appears to have struck a friendly note with Hitler at first. Both men were too private and reserved for any kind of friendship, but it seems that in the early years the Führer was willing to listen to Raeder and to a large degree accept his advice in naval matters. Arguably not a cynical National Socialist like many of the others in the senior officer corps, Raeder nevertheless used the powers of the Nazi regime to the utmost for his navy, realising that he could not have one without the other. Nevertheless, he was largely able to keep the navy out of the politics of the Reich, focusing on naval matters. Most probably he believed – or at least hoped – that the sharp edges of the new regime would wear off with time.⁹

In August 1934, the ageing President Hindenburg died. The war hero was given a pomp-filled state funeral in the best of German traditions. Just before the ceremony, Hitler declared himself president in addition to chancellor, combining the two offices of state with full dictatorial powers. A few days later, all officers of the Wehrmacht were paraded and directed to pledge an oath of allegiance to Hitler in person.

On 2 November 1934, Raeder was told by Hitler that it was of vital importance that the German Navy should be increased as planned, as no war could be carried out if the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia. As a start, Raeder suggested that six submarines that had already been partly prefabricated abroad should be brought back to Germany for assembly. Hitler hesitated but eventually approved, and from February 1935, fifteen years after Germany was supposed to have been militarily restrained forever, preparations for submarine construction were taking place behind heavily guarded gates at the Deutsche Werke in Kiel.

In a public speech on Heroes’ Memorial Day, 16 March 1935, Hitler announced the Versailles Treaty annulled and declared the resumption of Germany’s rights as a sovereign power. Compulsory conscription and military service for all young men was reintroduced and the rebuilding of the German armed forces commenced officially. Two months later, the Reichsmarine was ominously renamed the Kriegsmarine, leaving little doubt that the rearmament had but one purpose.¹⁰ A few weeks later still, the German Air Force, Luftwaffe, came into official existence under the personal command of Hermann Göring.¹¹

In May 1935, British Foreign Secretary John Simon and his deputy, Under-Secretary of State Anthony Eden, travelled to Berlin to meet Hitler, on his invitation. To their surprise, they were told that Germany was now equal to Britain in air strength, and Germany claimed the right to build a naval force equal to 35 per cent of the Royal Navy’s tonnage in all classes.¹² The British government, after consulting with the Admiralty, decided this was a relatively moderate demand. Accepting the German demand would, in its opinion, prevent another arms race and become an acceptable basis for stability – all the more so as it would make Germany build conventional capital ships rather than continue developing new ship types for which the Royal Navy was not prepared. Consequently, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign affairs adviser and special envoy to London, was invited to the Foreign Office on 4 June for further discussions and, after some fine-tuning of the wording, the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was signed on 18 June 1935.¹³ At a stroke, Germany had secured international sanction to build large surface ships and submarines:

Battleships:	8 totalling 187,000 tons
Heavy Cruisers:	5 totalling 50,000 tons
Light Cruisers:	10 totalling 66,000 tons
Aircraft Carriers:	3 totalling 45,000 tons
Destroyers:	38 totalling 52,000 tons
Submarines:	44 totalling 18,100 tons.14

The allowance for submarines, ignoring the fact that Germany had already started building them, was 45 per cent of the British fleet, which could be extended to parity, provided due notification was given with appropriate opportunity for discussion. The higher ratio for submarines was based on the Royal Navy having relatively few, around fifty-five, at the time. That they were offensive weapons had not been forgotten, but it appears that the British negotiators considered the number of submarines in question small in absolute numbers and manageable with the technology at hand.

‘The happiest day of my life,’ Hitler rejoiced when the message came through that the treaty had been ratified in London.¹⁵ His understanding of naval strategy was limited and he did not at all see that the limited resourses intended for the Kriegsmarine had now been locked in a manner that suited the Royal Navy. It appears that Hitler saw the treaty as a political agreement, ensuring that there would be no war with Britain in the short term, rather than as a technical agreement on weapons systems and tonnage.

Raeder saw the treaty as the end of the dishonour inflicted on Germany at Versailles. In his mind, it was proof of Hitler’s sincerity when he claimed that he had nothing but peaceful intentions towards Britain. Some years later he wrote: ‘The Führer hoped until the last moment to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944–45. At that time, the navy would have had available a fleet with a strong submarine superiority, and a much more favourable ratio in most other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the High Seas.’ In his memoirs after the war, he modified this to state that up until the outbreak of the war, ‘the Naval Treaty [with Britain] in 1935 made the basis for all efforts and deliberations within the Kriegsmarine. An armed conflict with England was not taken into consideration.’ Trying to achieve too much too fast once the shackles were off, however, made research, testing and development suffer. This would backfire on the Kriegsmarine when the war started and several of the ships and their advanced tackle were continually plagued by inherent technical problems and flawed construction.¹⁶

The Kriegsmarine – Built for War

Deutschland was commissioned on 1 April 1933, less than three months into Hitler’s chancellery. She was classified by the Kriegsmarine as a Panzerschiff or ‘armoured cruiser’ and easily recognisable with her compact, low silhouette. Officially within the 10,000-ton limit, Deutschland was actually close to 15,000 tons when loaded. It was intended she should outgun all faster ships and outrun all with larger guns, but a maximum speed of only 28 knots would make the latter somewhat of a challenge, even if few Allied capital ships in commission at the time could actually catch her. The British Admiralty looked at Deutschland with concern, but she was far from the fierce warship she was conceived to be. Fast but not really fast enough, with unreliable engines and poor performance in heavy seas, she and her sisters never achieved what was expected in the Atlantic. Up to seven similar ships were originally planned, and the future Admiral Scheer, which had been approved by the Reichstag in May 1931, was launched on the day of Deutschland’s commissioning. The third ship, Admiral Graf Spee, had been laid down six months earlier and construction was well under way at Wilhelmshaven. Otherwise similar to Deutschland, the two ‘Admirals’ had some differences in superstructure design, carried more armour and were somewhat heavier.¹⁷

The diesel engine room of Graf Spee. (Author’s collection)

Rather than building further Deutschlands, Raeder decided proper capital ships were needed and sent the engineers of the Design Office back to the drawing board. Redesign took time, though, and only in May and June of 1935 were the keels of battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst laid down at Deutsche Werft in Kiel and Kriegsmarine-Werft in Wilhelmshaven, respectively.¹⁸ Their 35-cm gun-turrets could not be completed in time and, to avoid delays, it was decided to mount three upgraded triple 28-cm turrets as a temporary solution. Both turret types had the same base diameter and neither draught nor stability of the ships would be adversely affected through a later upgrade. After the start of the war, there was never an opportunity to take the ships out of service for refit, and they were destined to spend their careers with 28-cm turrets – over-armoured and under-gunned.¹⁹

Twelve 15-cm guns and fourteen 10.5-cm multi-purpose guns in twin mountings constituted the secondary armament. Sixteen 37-mm guns in twin mountings and ten 20-mm single mounted guns made up the light A/A armament. The 28- and 15-cm guns were directed by an advanced fire-control system with stereoscopic rangefinders in armoured cupolas, while a sophisticated new high-angle (HA) system with stabilised directors controlled the 10.5-cm heavy flak guns. The light flak operated individually. Diesel engines of sufficient power for the displacement in question were not available, and high-pressure steam turbines were chosen for propulsion. This would confine them to the North Atlantic without extensive tanker-support, but a range of 6,000–7,000 miles at 19 knots was still considerable.

Battleship Gneisenau. Her intended 35-cm guns could not be completed in time and, with her sister Scharnhorst, she was destined to spend the war with 28-cm turrets, over-armoured and under-gunned. (Author’s collection)

Gneisenau was commissioned in May 1938, while Scharnhorst would take until January of the following year to be completed. During the winter of 1938–39, both were equipped with an ‘Atlantic’ clipper-bow after initial trials of Gneisenau showed the forecastle to be very wet even in moderate seas. Other than adding a superbly graceful line to both ships, this did little for the wetness of the forecastle, which continued to be a problem. Further testing of Gneisenau also resulted in improvements to Scharnhorst’s propulsion system, giving a full knot in speed advantage for the latter – 31.65 versus 30.7 knots on trials. At this stage, the ships displaced some 38,700 tons fully loaded. Both had radar installed in early 1939.²⁰

Germany’s first aircraft carrier, Graf Zeppelin, was launched in late 1938, but the work was suspended in 1940 and Raeder was never to have a carrier.²¹

The torpedo boats commissioned in the late 1920s were inadequate for support of the growing number of capital ships and Deutsche Werke in Kiel received the contract for four destroyers in April 1934. A further twelve were contracted at other yards during the following year. These Zerstörer, known as Type 34 or Maass-class, were large, powerful ships, 2,200 tons standard and 3,150 tons fully loaded. The first two, Z1 Leberecht Maass and Z2 Georg Thiele, were launched on 18 August 1935. Completion took time, though, and Z1 was not commissioned until January 1937.

Questions were soon raised over the sea-keeping qualities of the new ships – the foredeck was too short and the poor lateral flare of the forward frames was an area of alarming weakness. In spite of extensive use of light alloy, the large superstructure and heavy armament gave the Zerstörer a top-weight issue. Even in moderate seas, the ships were unstable, reducing their combat efficiency significantly as they had to reduce speed to avoid structural damage in heavy seas. Of particular concern was the manhandling of 26-kg 12.7-cm shells and the separate cordite cases on a badly rolling deck. The bows of Z1 to Z4 were rebuilt during 1938, while modifications were made on Z5 to Z8 before launch. Further improvements, including a redesign of the foreship, were introduced for Z9 to Z16, but their basic design remained similar to that of the first ships and little was achieved to alleviate the problems of poor sea-keeping and instability.²²

The last of the first type, Z16 Friedrich Eckholdt, was commissioned in July 1938. By then, the construction of the first six of the improved Type 36 or Roeder-class ships, Z17 to Z22, was well underway at the Deschimag yard, which by now stood at the forefront of Zerstörer construction. The new vessels had an altered bridge design and smaller funnels to reduce top weight, while the forecastle was given improved sheer through a ‘Clipper’ bow, lengthening it by 2 metres (6 feet). Seaworthiness was only marginally enhanced, though. The first of the Type 36 Zerstörer, Z17 Diether von Roeder, was commissioned in August 1938, the last, Z22 Anton Schmitt, three weeks after the war had commenced.²³ Improved destroyer types would be laid down in 1938, 1939 and 1940 but none of these would be operational until well after the fall of France.

Zerstörer Z11 Bernd von Arnim manoeuvring off Wesermünde with some of her sisters. These were powerful and efficient ships, but quickly lost stability and hence fighting efficiency as the seas became rough. (Author’s collection)

In spite of their inferior sea-keeping abilities, the Zerstörer were potentially fierce adversaries, with five 12.7-cm guns in single mountings, four semi-automatic 37-mm A/A guns in twin mountings amidships and six single-mounted 20-mm guns. Two quadruple torpedo mountings and four depth-charge throwers added to the sting. Unlike most British destroyers, the German ones were equipped for mine-laying from the start. On either side, from amidships aft to the stern, rails were built into the deck on which between sixty and seventy-six mines, depending on type, could be carried without any modifications to the ships. The carrying of a full mine-load did not improve the stability of the Zerstörer, though, requiring reasonably benign sea conditions. None of the early German destroyers carried radar, but they had very effective passive underwater sound-receiving devices along both sides as well as active echo-sounders (S-Gerät) to detect submarines.

The main fire-control of the 12.7-cm guns was located on the bridge, above which the main 4-metre rangefinder was positioned. The secondary fire-control station was located just behind the aft funnel. The 12.7-cm shell had a maximum range of 17,400 metres (19,000 yards), and a trained crew could get away fifteen to eighteen shells per minute – in calm seas. The magazines stored only 120 rounds per gun, however, and the stocks were rapidly reduced during combat. Surprisingly, this does not seem to have worried anybody as no modifications were made.²⁴ The foremost 12.7-cm gun was badly affected by breaking waves, even in moderate seas, and could not be operated under adverse conditions.

High-pressure super-heated steam turbines developing 70,000 horsepower gave a maximum speed in excess of 38 knots. These plants were supposedly at the peak of German technology, but, extremely complicated and pressed into service virtually untested, they would never prove their merit. Many of the early destroyers had a notoriously poor serviceability record. On 18 November 1939, for example, of twenty-two destroyers in commission, only five were operational. The remaining seventeen were in harbour with some defect or other, mainly engine related. Range of the Zerstörer was given as 4,400 miles at 19 knots, but trials showed that it was necessary to maintain 30 per cent of the fuel for ballast, due to the stability issue, which reduced the effective range considerably. At the outbreak of the war, the Zerstörer had been assigned to flotillas for tactical exercises but many were still undergoing trials and working up.²⁵

Fast, potent small ships were an attractive alternative for the German Navy bound by restrictions and, after half a dozen test boats, the first S-boats – S7 to S13 – were commissioned in 1934/35.²⁶ These were sleek, wooden, diesel boats displacing 86 tons and armed with two torpedoes and one 20-mm machine gun aft. Development stalled for some time, but enthusiastic officers finally pushed through the approval for further boats and the slightly bigger S18 to S25 were commissioned between July 1938 and December 1939. These had 6,000 horsepower diesel engines, which gave them a top speed of almost 40 knots, and with good sea-keeping qualities they soon became popular with their crews. War conditions quickly showed the vulnerability of their complicated engines, though, and an inadequate practical operational radius limited their deployment. Tactical and technical improvements were made, not least by the crews themselves, and the S-boats would become one of the most potent weapons of the Kriegsmarine in coastal waters.²⁷

There were extensive minefields in the North Sea and the Baltic after WWI, and thirty-eight minesweepers were retained by the Reichsmarine to take care of them. The black-painted, coal-fired sweepers worked doggedly throughout the 1920s and became a familiar sight in the ports of northern Germany. As the minefields were gradually removed, the sweepers were used for training and for testing new equipment, keeping the navy alive. Most of them had been built before or during the war, and in the early 1930s new minesweepers were needed. Orders for the first Minensuchboote were placed in November 1935. To be exempt from treaty limitations, the Type 35 minesweepers were nominally less than 600 tons. In reality, they were well over 800 tons fully loaded. In spite of some stability problems, the M-bocks were one of the most successful designs of the Kriegsmarine. Well armed, manoeuvrable and seaworthy, they were to become dreaded adversaries in the Baltic and the Channel in the first part of the war. They were expensive and complicated to build, though, and the engines in particular needed tools and skilled personnel, which were not readily available in front-line situations.

Torpedo boat S16. At the outbreak of the war the Kriegsmarine had seventeen S-boats in commission and a further ten were under construction. S16 was assigned to 2nd S-boot Flotilla based at Heligoland. (Author’s collection)

M1 was commissioned in August 1938, and by April 1940 twenty Type 35 minesweepers were in commission. Two 10.5-cm guns made up the main armament, supplemented by one 37-mm cannon, two 20-mm cannons and ample depth-charges. In addition, they could carry about thirty mines each to lay minefields as well if necessary. Tactically, the M-bocks were intended to operate in flotillas, and most of them had additional special equipment on board, depending on their intended position or task during the sweeping operations. Cruising speed was around 18 knots. M1 and M2 had Voith-Schneider propulsion instead of regular rudders and propellers.²⁸

In parallel, the smaller, more cost-efficient R-boats or Räumboote were also developed for work in shallow, coastal waters such as harbours and estuaries. These were 60–120 tons multi-purpose motorboats used for convoy escort, mine-laying, air-sea rescue and mine-sweeping. About one-quarter of the more than 400 R-boats built had Voith-Schneider propulsion, making them highly manoeuvrable. Armament was light, usually one or two 20- or 37-mm cannons. A far less successful type of ship was the so-called Flottenbegleiter or fleet escort vessels, of which few of the ten built (F1–F10) saw any amount of active service.²⁹

Orders for two heavy cruisers, Admiral Hipper and Blücher, were placed in secrecy by the Kriegsmarine in October 1934. A third ship, Prinz Eugen, was ordered a year later.³⁰ Following the design specifications, Admiral Hipper achieved a displacement of 14,247 tons standard and 18,208 fully loaded, Blücher a couple of hundred tons more. In addition to the four twin 20.3-cm turrets, 10.5-cm multi-purpose guns in six stabilised twin mountings were carried. These had a sophisticated fire-control system and were efficient against aircraft as well as sea targets. The A/A armament with twelve twin-mounted 37-mm and eight single 20-mm guns were heavier than in most other contemporary ships, but the 37-mm guns were only semi-automatic. Twelve torpedo tubes, with ten reloads (twelve in Prinz Eugen) completed the offensive armament. Three Arado Ar196 floatplanes were to be carried for the catapult.

Admiral Hipper was launched by Raeder’s wife Ilse on 6 February 1937 and commissioned in April 1939. As was the case for most large Kriegsmarine ships, the forecastle was found to be very wet, even in moderate seas. During a refit in late 1939, a raked ‘Atlantic’ clipper bow was fitted, the bridge improved and a funnel cap added to prevent smoke invading the tower platforms. This made her a very handsome, efficient-looking ship – and very difficult to distinguish from the battleships at a distance: a problem the Royal Navy and Coastal Command would face several times.

Blücher was launched on 8 June 1937. She was extensively modified, though, based on the experiences from Hipper, and it would be mid-November 1939 before trials and working-up could commence. Hipper and Blücher were formidable ships on paper. In reality, the use of a high-pressure steam system resulted in frail and uneconomic machinery that would trouble them throughout their careers. Prinz Eugen would be better, but she would not be operational until August 1940. Arguably, the need for this type of ship in the Kriegsmarine was limited and thus a waste of resources. Merchant war in the Atlantic required larger units, capable of sustained individual operations, and the German strategy at the time did not include bases in France or Norway from where such cruisers might have operated efficiently in fast battle groups.

By the end of 1935, the German shipyards were working at maximum capacity. Lack of qualified personnel and tools, complicated procedures and the poor quality of some part-deliveries delayed the start-up of new projects. It also meant that frequent compromises were made and that in many cases unsuccessful combinations of old and new technologies were applied. The new ships needed crews, and a large-scale recruitment campaign was initiated. In particular, there was a severe need for experienced officers and a large number of warrant officers were given rank and commission. Good for them, but awkward for the Kriegsmarine, which not only lost the backbone of its organisation, but also had to train new non-commissioned officers (NCOs) amidst an increased competition from the other services for the best candidates. As a consequence, the general standard of the Kriegsmarine fell, in spite of the best intentions. When the war broke out and a large number of auxiliaries and support ships were requisitioned, the lack of qualified and experienced officers became almost desperate.³¹

The U-boat Weapon ³²

In June 1935 the cruiser Emden returned to Wilhelmshaven after an extensive cruise around Africa and the Indian Ocean. With her was Karlsruhe, which she had met off Spain, returning from a similar cruise to the Americas. Admiral Raeder was in Wilhelmshaven to welcome the ships and after inspecting them and addressing the men, he invited Kapitän zur See Günther Lütjens of Karlsruhe to join him in a meeting with Fregattenkapitän Karl Dönitz onboard Emden. In the latter’s cabin, he told the two surprised captains that they were to leave their ships immediately and move to key administrative positions contributing to the rebuilding of the German Navy.

Lütjens would, after a brief spell at the North Sea Naval Station in Wilhelmshaven, head the Officer Personnel Branch of the Navy HQ, shaping the cadre of new officers that would lead the ships and man the staffs of the Kriegsmarine. Dönitz would be tasked with reviving the still officially non-existent U-boat arm, the Unterseebootwaffe or U-bootwaffe.

Eight years earlier, in 1927, the first training courses for the new generation of U-boat men had started. Selected ensigns at the Torpedo and Radio School in Flensburg-Mürwik had been given theoretical lectures in U-boat operations, and in June 1933 the Anti-Submarine Warfare School (Unterseebootabwehrschule – UAW) in Kiel had been opened. In spite of its name, this was in reality a training unit for officers, NCOs and sailors to serve on board U-boats. In parallel, the training of engineering and technical personnel had also commenced. The forty-four-year-old Dönitz was now promoted to Kapitän zur See and challenged to shape these men into an efficient naval force.³³

The first six 250-ton Type II boats, U1 to U6, were commissioned in September 1935 and assigned to the U-boat school flotilla in Kiel.³⁴ The next batch of the improved Type IIB, U7 to U12, each with a handpicked lieutenant as captain, were during the autumn of 1935 assembled in the Weddigen Flotilla under Dönitz’s command and based at Wik, north of Kiel.³⁵ The flotilla, named after one of the first successful U-boat commanders of WWI, became the test-bed for Dönitz’s tactical ideas, including the development of the Wolfrudel – wolfpack – concept: tactical groups of submarines attacking convoys or formations of warships in a coordinated manner. During early 1937, twelve further boats were added to the Weddigen Flotilla, half of them as spare boats so that the flotilla had a good number of boats operational in spite of repairs or maintenance. The new depot ship Saar was assigned to the group, as were four old torpedo boats to act as targets and to retrieve practice torpedoes.³⁶

Overall command of submarine policy, development, construction and training rested firmly with Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM) in Berlin, where Konteradmiral Leopold Siemens was in charge of the U-boat division, while Dönitz focused on operations and tactics. Under his supervision the captains and crews of the Weddigen Flotilla went through an intensive period of drill and operational training under warlike conditions, practising emergency dives, underwater navigation and torpedo attacks – submerged in daylight and at the surface at night. Professional skill alone was not sufficient for a submarine captain to succeed, in Dönitz’s opinion. Each boat as well as the entire arm needed to possess an exceptional pride in the job and a confidence that they were better equipped and better trained than their adversaries. ‘I wanted to imbue my crews with enthusiasm and a complete faith in their arm and to instil in them a spirit of selfless readiness to serve in it,’ Dönitz wrote, adding, ‘I had to rid my crews of the ever recurring complex that the U-boat, thanks to recent developments in British anti-submarine defences, was a weapon that had been mastered.’ The British anti-submarine device Asdic was not proven technology, he held, and should be disregarded. Moving as close as possible to the target would reduce errors and prevent evasive action. In Dönitz’s view, 500–600 metres (550–650 yards) was a suitable distance, contrary to the 3,000 metres (3,300 yards) taught at the Submarine School.³⁷

Hitler visiting the U-boatwaffe in Kiel August 1935. It looks as if he has been down below inspecting U7, which had been commissioned just two months earlier by Oberleutnant zur See Kurt Freiwald. He must have been pleased, as Freiwald was promoted to Kapitänleutnant shortly afterwards. (Author’s collection, original photo taken by Heinrich Hoffmann)

Results improved steadily and morale in the flotilla soared while Dönitz built a reputation as a forceful but fair master who knew his trade and cared for his boats and his men. He encouraged comradeship between officers and men and made an effort to go to sea with his boats as often as he could, or followed them closely from on board the Saar. In 1936, command of the Weddigen Flotilla was transferred to Kapitän Otto Loycke while Dönitz was appointed Führer der Unterseeboote (FdU) – Officer Commanding Submarines.³⁸

To attack the British supply lines effectively, Dönitz argued, he needed 300 U-boats. One-third would always be at base for repair with crews resting, one-third would be in transit to or from the theatre of operations and one-third would be in action – one hundred U-boats being the minimum needed to have any chance of severing the British lines in the Atlantic. Raeder accepted this, but pending an acceptable conclusion to the discussions of what kind of boats to build, followed by a solid strategic analysis of how they should be used; he was not willing to exceed tonnage permitted under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Instead, he focused the resources allocated to the navy on surface ships, where there was a long way to go before the limitations were reached. By the end of 1936, a total of thirty-five U-boats were in commission. When the war broke out in September of 1939, the Kriegsmarine was still a long way from Dönitz’s goal of 300 submarines.³⁹

The Type I boat was one of the least successful of the German submarine constructions, and only two were built: U25 and U26. Both were difficult, almost dangerous to handle, and further construction was stopped.

The Type II boats, Einbäume or ‘dugout canoes’ as they were nicknamed, were small, 250-ton coastal boats; robust, cheap and fast to build. They were uncomplicated, easy to handle and generally well liked by their crews but had a limited range and only three torpedo tubes in the bow, making them unsuitable for operations in the Atlantic.⁴⁰ As the number of larger boats slowly grew, the Einbäume were largely deployed with the training units. Due to the shortage of boats in September 1939, most Type IIs had one or more active patrols during the first months of the war. By mid-1940, most of them were back at the training flotillas, though, except a few of the modified Type IIDs, which were retained in operational service.

U-boats U4, U2, U1, U8 and U9. The former three are Type IIA and slightly smaller than U8 and U9, which are Type IIBs. (Author’s collection)

Submarine tender Saar with the Salzwedel Flotilla in Bremerhaven 1937. The innermost boat, U25, is Type IA, the others are all Type VIIA. Note that U33 to the right is painted in a camouflage pattern, which was tested in Spain but found to be ineffective. (Author’s collection)

Despite their moderate size and relatively simple construction, the 500-ton Type VIIA boats, designed in 1933–34, proved to be a robust design, capable of operations in the Atlantic – just.⁴¹ Fast on the surface and with a potent striking power, they were well-liked by their crews in spite of the cramped interior. In particular, their ability to dive fast and go deep was cherished. There were five torpedo tubes, four in the bow and one aft. The VIIAs could carry eleven torpedoes or twenty to thirty mines at the cost of four to six torpedoes. On deck, there was a fast-firing 88-mm gun with some 200 rounds of ammunition.⁴²

The modified Type VIIB, first launched in June 1936, had a substantially increased range through an additional 33 tons of fuel in external saddle tanks. Capable of some 8,700 miles at 10 knots, this was as near an ideal Atlantic submarine as practicably possible at the time. The VIIBs were slightly faster than the As, and with twin rudders had improved agility as well. Additional torpedo capacity gave a total of fourteen.⁴³ Many of the most famous U-boats of WWII were Type VIIB, including U47, U48 and U99. The further improved Type VIIC would become the mainstay of the U-boat force from 1941 onwards.

The largest of the initial German U-boats was Type IX. The large hull made room for six torpedo tubes, four in the bow and two aft, and a total of twenty-two torpedoes were carried, of which ten were external and had to be taken inboard while at sea. Operational diving depth was given as 100 metres (330 feet), but several boats would later go well below 200 metres, and survive.⁴⁴

First Blood

The Spanish Civil War offered an opportunity for the Kriegsmarine to test its new ships and U-boats under proper operational conditions. On 24 July 1936, Deutschland and Admiral Scheer set off for Spanish waters under command of Konteradmiral Rolf Carls to participate in the international operation, bringing expatriates and refugees to safety. Within a few days, the light cruiser Köln followed, accompanied by the torpedo boats Albatros, Leopard and Kondor. For recognition purposes the main turrets of the ships were marked with black, white and red stripes. By October, some 15,300 refugees had been brought to safety, of which 5,539 were German nationals.⁴⁵ Deutschland and Scheer operated individually most of the time, responding to the needs reported from German or international counsellors ashore. The torpedo boats followed whichever ship was considered most in need of escort or if there was likely to be an evacuation requiring smaller ships.

In August, Britain, France, Germany and Italy signed an agreement to establish an international Non-Intervention Committee, preventing personnel, weapons and other contraband materiel reaching the warring parties by a naval force. Germany was given responsibility for the waters off a sector between Almeria and Oropesa in the Mediterranean and, unlike on land – where the Legion Condor openly sided with the rebels – the Kriegsmarine participated in joint naval operations, led by the Royal Navy. In reality, the German warships were also used to ensure the safe arrival of their own merchant ships, delivering supplies to the nationalists.⁴⁶ Deutschland, Scheer and Graf Spee would do several tours in Spanish waters on a rotational basis; each tour usually lasting from two to three months, supported by torpedo boats. Command of the German ships in Spain alternated between Konteradmirals Carls, Boehm and von Fischel. During late 1937 and 1938, Konteradmiral Wilhelm Marschall and Kapitän Otto Ciliax, to be key officers in the Kriegsmarine, were also tested out as commanders of the German naval forces in Spain.⁴⁷

U-boats served in Spanish waters during the civil war, giving their captains and crews invaluable experience, testing equipment as well as tactics, particularly in avoiding detection by surface vessels. At least two U-boats served clandestinely on the Nationalist side. U34 sank the Republican submarine C3 off Malaga in December 1936 – a flagrant breach of German neutrality hushed up to avoid political complications.⁴⁸

In May 1937, Deutschland was at Palma on the island of Mallorca, accompanied by the torpedo boat Albatros and two U-boats. On the 24th, Republican aircraft attacked the town and harbour installations. British and Italian ships opened fire on the aircraft, while Deutschland cast off, heading for the neighbouring island of Ibiza. During further attacks later in the evening, several bombs fell close to Albatros, and Kapitänleutnant Hans Erdmenger decided to take to sea. On 29 May, Deutschland came under attack again, this time while at anchor off Ibiza. There were guests on board and most of the crew had been allowed to relax on deck. In the afternoon, two light cruisers, the Republican Libertad and Mendez-Nunez, were seen approaching, accompanied by eight destroyers. They appeared to be just passing, but Kapitän Paul Fanger asked the guests to go ashore and ordered ten minutes’ notice for engine and anchor-handling crews on duty. No general state of alert was sounded, though, and the A/A guns were not manned. Suddenly, two aircraft appeared, coming out of the evening sun over land.⁴⁹ Within seconds, the Panzerschiff was hit by two 50-kg (110-lb) bombs. The first struck the roof of No. III starboard 15-cm gun, splinters puncturing the fuel tank of the floatplane on the catapult. The leaking aviation spirit caught fire and a serious blaze ensued. The second bomb struck forward of the bridge, penetrating to the mess deck before exploding, also starting a major fire. The forward 15-cm magazine was flooded as a precaution, while the forward main turret was evacuated for over twenty minutes.

Spain, 29 May 1937. The Panzerschiff Deutschland was hit by two 50-kg bombs from Republican Tupolev SB-2 bombers, most likely flown by Soviet crews. The first bomb hit No. III starboard 15-cm gun. The second struck forward of the bridge, exploding on the mess deck and starting the major fire seen here. (Author’s collection)

Seeing Deutschland under attack, four of the Republican destroyers turned towards the Panzerschiff, opening fire. Some of the shells landed very close and some panic ensued while ‘Action Stations’ was sounded.⁵⁰ Before the guns were ready, though, the destroyers turned away, checking their fire. Twenty-three sailors were dead on board Deutschland. A further eight died from their wounds within two weeks; 110 were wounded, seventy-four seriously with horrific burns. Kapitän Fanger headed for open sea, and after meeting with Admiral Scheer to take on additional medical personnel, sailed for Gibraltar. There, fifty-four of the most seriously wounded were hospitalised and the dead buried with military honours. Hitler ordered the bodies to be exhumed and brought home for a reburial at Wilhelmshaven under a full German ceremony, which he himself attended. Meanwhile, Admiral Scheer was ordered to bombard the Republican-held port of Almeria in revenge. This she did in the morning of 31 May, flying the old imperial German war flag. Republican shore batteries, naval buildings and ships in the harbour were pounded thoroughly, inflicting severe damage and killing nineteen people.⁵¹

Consolidating

When the missions off Spain ended in late 1938, the ships of the Kriegsmarine spent the remainder of the time before the outbreak of WWII on training cruises, exercises and official visits around the North Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic. The Panzerschiffe, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and U-boats were tested alone and together in various scenarios, attacking ‘convoys’ of auxiliaries in the North Sea, the Baltic and the Bay of Biscay. In a series of large-scale exercises in April and May 1939, Gneisenau and a number of the Zerstörer also participated. Tactics were developed, officers and men trained and at least some of the teething troubles of the new ships were ironed out. For some reason it seems that the Royal Navy paid very little, if any, attention to these activities.

Admiral Scheer off Spain in 1938. (Author’s collection)

Raeder (second left) at his happiest, among his men on board Scharnhorst. (Author’s collection)

During the early period of Nazi rule, Raeder managed to keep the Kriegsmarine isolated from the politicisation that permeated the other services, even if he in public speeches declared his full support for the Nazi regime and its ‘battle against Bolshevism and international Jewishness’. Raeder was not blind to reality, but it seems that he wanted to avoid a war with Britain so much that he readily accepted Hitler’s word that a fleet to fight Britain would not be needed for many years. Nevertheless, in May 1938, during the first Czechoslovak crisis, Raeder was called to the Chancellery and informed by Hitler that from now on Britain would have to be considered as a potential future enemy. The navy would have to accelerate the completion of Bismarck and Tirpitz and develop a plan for increased warship construction to meet the new situation. Reluctantly, Raeder tasked Fregattenkapitän Helmuth Heye of the OKM’s Operational Department to assess the options for a naval war against Britain.

The forty-three-year-old Heye was an intelligent and outspoken officer with unorthodox views on naval warfare. He composed a memorandum that strongly advocated preparing for ‘cruiser’-warfare against British supply lines rather than spending resources building battleships for another Jutland-style encounter.⁵² The admirals of the OKM were horrified. No navy would be complete without battleships! Their alternative was a fleet of fast, powerful battleships capable of taking on the Royal Navy as well as operating against convoys and merchant ships in the Atlantic. Neither of the proposals considered the U-boat as a decisive weapon on its own. Heated discussions followed, but in the end the battleship alternative won and was presented to Raeder on 31 October 1938. Raeder, believing he had at least eight years to build, accepted the concept for the so-called Z Plan and forwarded it to the Führer, recommending a balanced capital fleet, customised for merchant war, with a moderate number of U-boats. Hitler agreed, but the Z Plan would never be more than a dream. Building such a fleet would have been a massive drain on Germany’s military resources, even in peacetime, and Raeder simply did not carry the weight in the German system to divert sufficient amounts of high-quality steel or skilled workers to the shipyards. Guns, tanks and aircraft would have priority.

In November 1938, Raeder ended up in a disagreement with Hitler over the design and fighting capabilities of the Bismarck-class battleships shortly to be launched. Raeder threatened to resign and Hitler backed down, but a critical gap had been opened between the two men. At the launch ceremony of the battleship Tirpitz in Wilhelmshaven on 1 April 1939, Raeder was promoted to Grossadmiral, Grand Admiral, but it still appears that he, and thus the Kriegsmarine, increasingly lost touch with Nazi reality in this period. To Raeder’s bafflement, Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 unilaterally annulled the Anglo-German Naval Treaty without any discussion whatsoever. The Kriegsmarine had been excluded from the inner circles of the Third Reich and Raeder would from then on only be invited to meetings that had naval affairs on the agenda. Critically, he would be without a liaison officer in the Chancellery until Konteradmiral Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer was appointed Adjutant der Kriegsmarine beim Führer und OKW, Naval Liaison Officer, at the outbreak of the war.⁵³

On 27 January 1938, Hitler issued a decree announcing himself Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The authority would be exercised through a new High Command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW, to which the army, navy and air force would be subordinated. Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel was appointed head of the OKW, while Generalmajor Alfred Jodl was given charge of the Operations Staff (Führungsstab). The OKW, reporting directly to Hitler through Keitel and Jodl, was intended to coordinate the activities of the three fighting services, the civil administration and the production authorities, combining strategic, operational and ministerial functions. In effect, though, it became Hitler’s personal staff, manned by advisers picked mainly for their loyalty, with no responsibilities outside the OKW and not representing the services in a normal sense.

The headquarters of the OKM and Admiral Raeder, now Oberbefehlshaber der Marine and Chef der Seekriegsleitung, were at Tirpitzufer in Berlin, next to the Landwehr Canal.⁵⁴ The Seekriegsleitung (SKL) or Naval Warfare Command was directly subordinated to the OKM, and the Chief of Staff of the SKL was responsible for naval operations as well as intelligence, administration and construction. Konteradmiral Otto Schniewind, a reserved, analytical and always correct officer, would be the first officer to have this key position; he would become Raeder’s right hand in the first phase of the war. Kapitän zur See (later Konteradmiral) Kurt Fricke, an impulsive extrovert, very different from Schniewind, was given the position of Chief of Naval Operations (Chef der Operations-Abteilung – 1.Abtl.SKL).

Generaladmiral Alfred Saalwächter in charge of Marinegruppenkommando West – Naval Group Command West.

Konteradmiral Otto Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the SKL. (Author’s collection)

The Fleet Headquarters was established at the naval base in Kiel. The C-in-C Fleet (Flottenchef) was originally in charge of capital ships, cruisers and submarines. Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm was appointed Flottenchef in October 1938. A year later, he was replaced by Admiral Wilhelm Marschall when Boehm fell out with Admiral Saalwächter over how to conduct the mine-laying operations on the British east coast.⁵⁵ At the same time, the command of the Flottenchef was limited to the capital ships. Konteradmiral Günther Lütjens, in the position of C-in-C Reconnaissance Forces (Befehlshaber der Aufklärungsstreitkräfte – BdA), controlled all cruisers.⁵⁶ Flag Officer Torpedo Boats and Destroyers (Führer der Torpedoboote – FdT) and Flag Officer Minesweepers (Führer der Minensuchboote – FdM) were at first subordinated to the BdA. Initially, the position of FdT covered both torpedo boats and destroyers, but in November 1939 Kapitän zur See Friedrich Bonte was appointed Flag Officer Destroyers (Führer der Zerstörers – FdZ), subordinated to the Flottenchef, while Kapitän zur See Hans Bütow was appointed FdT, remaining subordinated to BdA.⁵⁷

October 1937: Konteradmiral Lütjens, newly appointed Führer der Torpedoboote coming onboard his lead destroyer Z1 Leberecht Maass. Two years later, in October 1939, Lütjens was appointed Befehlshaber der Aufklärungsstreitkräfte, commanding cruisers and torpedo boats. (Author’s collection)

Naval Group Command West – Marinegruppenkommando West – was in charge of operations in the Heligoland Bight, the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. It was formally established in August 1939 with headquarters in Sengwarden near Wilhelmshaven under the command of Generaladmiral Alfred Saalwächter. Naval Group Command East – Marinegruppenkommando Ost – covering the Baltic from headquarters in Kiel, was led by Generaladmiral Conrad Albrecht until late October 1939, when Admiral Rolf Carls took over as Albrecht retired. The Naval Group Commands were on paper given operational control within their areas of command, but in reality the OKM and SKL would intervene frequently, either through strict operational orders or directly. When at sea beyond the coastal areas, the fleet was, in theory, directly subordinated to the OKM. Where and how this occurred was unclear, though, giving rise to serious disputes between the commanders, Naval Group Command West and the OKM/SKL during long-range operations of the larger ships in 1939 and 1940.

On the eve of WWII, the Kriegsmarine had in commission two battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, two old battleships – Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, three Panzerschiffe – Admiral Graf Spee, Admiral Scheer and Deutschland, one heavy cruiser – Admiral Hipper, six light cruisers – Emden, Leipzig, Nürnberg, Köln, Karlsruhe and Königsberg, thirty-four destroyers and large torpedo boats, fifty-seven U-boats, and some forty other small vessels. Within weeks, virtually all building of large surface ships, except those near completion, was suspended in order to focus on U-boats and smaller vessels. Eventually, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Blücher and Prinz Eugen were the only ships larger than destroyers to be commissioned by the Kriegsmarine after the outbreak of the war.