Читать книгу The Gathering Storm - Geirr Haarr - Страница 13

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Baltic Eagles

At 04:45 Next Morning

ON 13 MARCH 1938, German troops crossed the border to Austria, bringing 6 million German-speaking people into the Reich. The Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia was next and, in spite of the agreement in Munich, Hitler let his soldiers continue into Prague on 15 March 1939. Two weeks later, as a direct result of the German violation of the Munich Agreement, Britain and France guaranteed the independence of Poland, Greece, Belgium, Romania and Turkey. The policy of appeasement had failed.

In the late hours of 23 August 1939, a Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and his German counterpart, von Ribbentrop.¹ The news of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was met with stunned disbelief by politicians and people worldwide, but in Berlin an assertive Hitler gave orders for the long-planned attack on Poland to commence in the morning of the 26th. He was certain that Britain and France, facing the German pact with Russia, would not honour their promises to Poland other than verbally. Days of hectic diplomatic activity ensued. When Mussolini revealed that Italy ‘was not ready for war’, Hitler lost his nerve. On 26 August, he ordered the attack on Poland, which he had already set in motion a few hours earlier, to be postponed.² Two days later, although tense and visibly tired, Hitler had regained his confidence and decided the attack on Poland should start in the early morning of Friday 1 September. Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War, issued in eight copies, stated that it was:

important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. [. . .] The German land frontier in the west is not to be crossed at any point without my express orders. The same applies to warlike actions at sea – or any which may be so interpreted. (Pencil note in SKL copy: According to this, Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for the time being.) If England or France open hostilities against Germany [. . .] damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. [. . .] In its warfare on merchant shipping, the navy is to concentrate on England.³

In the evening of 31 August, Hitler confirmed that the invasion of Poland should commence at 04:45 next morning.⁴

‘. . . Am Under Fire’

After WWI, the Prussian city of Danzig was made a semi-autonomous, demilitarised city-state under the protection of the League of Nations, with international representatives taking on the role of high commissioner. Although it was officially independent from both Germany and Poland, German influence remained strong and, with an overwhelmingly German population, Danzig was to become the catalyst for releasing Nazi aggression on Poland.⁵

The Military Transit Depot (Wojskowy Skład Transportowy or WST) on the Westerplatte Peninsula outside Danzig had been established during the Russian attack on eastern Poland in 1919–20. The Polish-held part of the sandy headland, separated from the Neufahrwasser suburb of Danzig by the Harbour Channel, a widened tributary of the Vistula River, was closed behind a high brick wall. There were no real fortifications, just a number of concrete blockhouses and some large barracks, supported by a network of trenches and barricades. To the east, the headland was connected to the mainland via a narrow neck, over which a railway line connected it to the rest of Poland. In September 1939, the depot was held by some 220 men. Besides handguns, they were armed with one 75-mm field gun, two 37-mm Bofors antitank guns, four mortars and a number of medium machine guns. The commanding officer of the garrison, Major Henryk Sucharski, knew it was expected of him to withstand a German attack for up to twelve hours. By then they would all, according to plan, either be evacuated, relieved or dead.⁶

On 24 August 1939, the German pre-Dreadnought Schleswig-Holstein secured in the Harbour Channel, off Neufahrwasser. She was one of the original battleships retained by the Reichsmarine in 1918, now used for gunnery training, and her arrival in Danzig was officially to commemorate the twenty-five-year anniversary of the victory at Tannenberg and the sinking of the cruiser Magdeburg in August 1914.⁷ During the 25th, dignitaries from Danzig were received by Kapitän zur See Gustav Kleikamp as part of the protocol for visiting warships.⁸ Unknown to all of them, Oberleutnant Wilhelm Henningsen and 225 men of 3rd Marine-Stoßtrupp-Kompanie, a naval assault company, were kept out of sight below decks.

Kapitän zur See Gustav Kleikamp (left) taking Gauleiter Albert Forster, the Nazi leader in Danzig, on a tour of inspection around Schleswig-Holstein in the last days of August 1939. (Author’s collection)

After the guests had left, the ship was darkened and made ready for battle. At 21:00, however, a brief signal arrived, cancelling the attack without further explanation. Days of tension and confusion followed until, on the 30th, new orders arrived and Schleswig-Holstein was made ready for battle once again.

At 04:47 on 1 September, Kapitän Kleikamp gave the orders to open fire in earnest, releasing the carnage that was to become WWII.⁹ In the next six minutes, fifty-nine regular and eight armour-piercing 28-cm shells slammed into Westerplatte from the battleship’s forward turret. Some of the 15-cm guns joined in, quickly silencing the Polish 75-mm gun which tried to respond. At point-blank range the trajectories of the German shells were almost flat and it appears that few actually exploded. Still, most of the wooden buildings collapsed and large holes were made in the brick wall protecting the perimeter. Meanwhile, Henningsen and his men landed on the headland and, as soon as the fire from Schleswig-Holstein lifted, they advanced, expecting an easy victory. Major Sucharski radioed ‘. . . am under fire’ to his superiors and ordered the men into the trenches.

Schleswig-Holstein opening fire on Westerplatte at point-blank range in the morning of 1 September 1939. Note the horizontal guns. (Author’s collection)

Men of Oberleutnant Wilhelm Henningsen’s 3. Marine-Stoßtrupp-Kompanie (naval assault company) advancing on Westerplatte. (Author’s collection)

Inside the brick wall, Henningsen and his men were met by intense small arms and machine-gun fire and had to take cover. Several assaults followed after a renewed barrage from Schleswig-Holstein, but when Oberleutnant Henningsen was mortally wounded around midday, the attack faltered, in spite of being reinforced by local militia. Amazed by the resistance, Kleikamp moved Schleswig-Holstein away from the immediate vicinity of the depot and asked for assistance.

The next day, Ju87 Stukas of StG 2 commenced bombing Westerplatte while Schleswig-Holstein continued the bombardment from a distance, supplemented by T196, the depot ship Von der Groeben and land-based artillery. In spite of the massive onslaught, it was a week before Major Sucharski, in the morning of 7 September, gave the order to surrender. By then, his men were almost out of ammunition, and a growing number of wounded were in dire need of medical attention.¹⁰

Sailing for Britain

The primary task of the Polish Navy (Polska Marynarkna Wojenna – PMW) was to create a credible deterrence against Soviet and German aggression. Hence, it was decided to build the navy around a number of fast submarines with mine-laying capacity. French capital loans for naval development came with conditions for use in specific French yards, however, and Polish plans for nine submarines were changed to three plus two destroyers, which had initially not been wanted. The submarines Wilk, Ryś and Żbik and destroyers Wicher and Burza were poorly designed and plagued by operational problems from the start. In the mid-1930s, the large minelayer Gryf was also built in France, while a further two destroyers, Grom and Błyskawica, were purchased from Britain. Trying to restore the original plans for mine-laying submarines, orders for two large sophisticated vessels were eventually placed in Dutch yards. Orzeł and Sęp, both commissioned in the spring of 1939, were indeed fine boats, well armed and capable of 20 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged. At 1,110 tons, though, they were quite large for the shallow waters of the Baltic, and smaller, coastal boats would arguably have been more suitable.¹¹

Major Henryk Sucharski (right) surrendering to Generalleutnant Friedrich-Georg Eberhardt. (Author’s collection)

Crater from a 250-kg Stuka bomb inside Westerplatte. (Author’s collection)

Destroyer Blyskawica, October 1937. (R Perkins)

The small PMW would be at a significant disadvantage versus the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, should a confrontation occur. Hence, the head of the British military mission in Poland, Lieutenant General Adrian Carton de Wiart, advised that the most modern elements of its fleet should evacuate the Baltic in case of a crisis and be prepared to fight the war from British ports. At first, the C-in-C of the Polish armed forces, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, resisted the idea, but eventually he decided discretion was the better part of valour. In August 1939, he ordered that plans should be developed for a departure, should the situation become desperate. Hence the Peking Plan was formed, through which the destroyers of the PMW prepared to leave the Baltic, passing through the Belts before the Germans had time to block them.¹² Part of Śmigły-Rydz’s reason for accepting the plan was apparently that he believed that Allied troops, munitions and arms could be escorted by Polish ships to Romanian ports, where they would be out of reach of German aircraft, but connected to Poland by railways.

Kontradmiral Jozef Unrug, Fleet Commander of the PMW, issued the instructions for the Peking Plan on 26 August 1939, the day after the signing of the Polish–British Defence Pact. Sealed envelopes were distributed to the ships in question, with instructions to keep them under lock and key, pending further orders. At 12:55 on the 29th, the order ‘Execute Peking’ arrived, and the captains could open the mysterious envelopes. The instructions were short and unambiguous: ‘. . . Błyskawica, Grom and Burza to sail for Britain, reaching position off Bornholm by sunset, passing Malmø at midnight. Departure immediate . . .’ An hour later, the three destroyers cast off. For a while they were stalked by the German destroyers Steinbrinck, Ihn, Eckholdt and Heinemann, but encountered no problems and passed through the Öresund during the night. Next day in the Skagerrak, they were followed by German reconnaissance aircraft, but a change of course towards the Norwegian coast during the ensuing night shook them off. At 09:25 on 1 September, in the North Sea, information of the German invasion of Poland arrived. At 17:37 on the first day of the war, the Polish destroyers docked in Leith.¹³

The remaining Polish naval surface ships, destroyer Wicher, minelayer Gryf, mine-vessels Jaskółka, Czapla, Żuraw, Czajka, Rybitwa and Mewa, gunboats Komendant Piłsudski and Generał Haller, and some smaller vessels, received orders during 1 September to relocate from Oksywie to the naval base on the Hela Peninsula.¹⁴ From there they were to commence Operation Rurka, laying minefields at the entrance to Danzig Bay to disrupt German traffic. Meanwhile, the submarines were deployed in predetermined operational zones in Danzig Bay and the southern Baltic for Operation Worek – sinking as many German ships as possible. A minefield should have been laid outside Gdynia harbour on the 29th, but a neutral Greek ship, hesitating to depart, prevented this.¹⁵ At Hela, some 15 miles north of Danzig across Puck Bay, around three thousand soldiers were manning a set of strong defensive lines and formidable amounts of A/A guns, searchlights and coastal batteries with in all four 15.2-cm guns, four 10.5-cm guns and some twenty-five smaller guns.¹⁶

Polish 15.2-cm guns at Hela. (Author’s collection)

In the afternoon of 1 September, Gryf and the other mine-vessels cast off from Gdynia for Operation Rurka. Wicher, Piłsudski and Haller joined as cover. En route, they were attacked by Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers of 4.(St)/TrGr 186. There were no direct hits, but a bomb exploded in the water close to Mewa. All twenty-two men on board were either killed or wounded and she had to be taken in tow by Rybitwa. Gryf was also damaged by splinters and strafing. Among the casualties was her captain, and first officer Lieutenant Commander Wiktor Łomidze took command. He decided the 300 mines on board were a liability and, having their triggers removed, he ordered them thrown overboard. Operation Rurka was no longer possible, and the ships headed for Hela under continued air attacks. Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden of Wicher did not receive the information that the operation had been called off and continued to the rendezvous area to cover the mine-laying. While he was waiting through the night, German destroyers were sighted on two occasions, but de Walden did not attack, as he feared he might compromise the operation he still believed he was covering. Realising in the morning of the 2nd that something was wrong, de Walden took Wicher to Hela.¹⁷

The Kriegsmarine saw the primary threat from the PMW to be against the troop and supply convoys between Germany and East Prussia. Extensive minefields were expected and the coastal batteries on the southern tip of the Hela Peninsula, which covered a large part of western Danzig Bay, would have to be avoided. A large number of destroyers, minesweepers, escort vessels and cruisers were allocated to support the operations. Minesweepers would be sent in to clear the anticipated minefields as fast as possible, prioritising Danzig Bay. Destroyers would stand by, outside the range of the Polish coastal artillery, waiting for the bay to be declared mine-free. Beyond these, a number of U-boats (Type II and Type VII) would make a defensive barrier, while Vizeadmiral Hermann Densch with Köln, Leipzig and Nürnberg would be patrolling further out in the Baltic as back-up, should anything unforeseen develop. The Flottenchef, Admiral Boehm, found this somewhat excessive and sent a letter to Raeder on 21 August, arguing that in the event that Britain and France honoured their obligation towards Poland, a larger part of the Kriegsmarine would be needed in the west. Raeder did not agree, and Generaladmiral Albrecht, in overall charge of the naval operations against Poland, was allowed to continue the preparations for Fall Weiss.¹⁸

In the early hours of 1 September, the German naval ships moved into position off the Polish coast. The sea was calm, with patches of fog in some places. As the attack progressed on land, the Polish Navy declared Danzig Bay to be mined, but several merchant ships moved unharmed through the area and no mines were encountered by the sweepers. When on the 2nd all Polish territorial waters were declared dangerous, this hardly raised a German eyebrow. By now, the Polish surface fleet was accounted for, either on its way to Britain or at Hela under air attack, leaving only the submarines for the Germans to worry about. All U-boats were pulled out of the area from Swinemünde to Memel and the German A/S forces were given ‘free hunt’. In the afternoon of the same day, Densch was ordered back to the North Sea with his cruisers. There was no further use for them in the Baltic.

The majority of the German aerial attacks on the Polish harbour installations, warships and coastal batteries in the first days of the war came from the reinforced 1st Fliegerdivision of Generalleutnant Ulrich Grauert. In addition to the regular fighter and bomber units of the group, four Ju87 Stuka dive-bomber units had been added for the occasion: II/StG 2, III/StG 2, IV/LG 1 and the naval Stuka squadron 4.(St)/TrGr 186 – the latter assigned to attack the naval bases along Danzig Bay.¹⁹ Dense fog in the morning of 1 September prevented air attacks in many places inland. Along the coast, the fog was patchy, lifting early, and there were few restrictions. Around midday, 4.(St)/TrGr 186 attacked Hela for the first time, losing two of its aircraft to A/A fire.

Adapted from many sources. Insert map modified from Smedberg and Zetterling, Utbruddet av andre verdenskrig.

On the 3rd, FdT Konteradmiral Lütjens took the destroyers Leberecht Maass and Wolfgang Zenker towards Hela to test the coastal defences. Gryf and Wicher were both moored in the harbour and opened fire, as did the 15-cm shore batteries. At least one shell, presumably from Wicher or Gryf, hit Maass in the B-gun turret. Four sailors were killed and another four wounded. Outgunned by a fair margin, Lütjens pulled back behind a smokescreen, but not before Gryf had been hit and lightly damaged. As the Zerstörer left, Jaskolka and Rybitwa headed towards Gdynia to pick up reinforcements.

Later in the day, the Stukas of 4.(St)/TrGr 186 arrived again. Gryf was hit by at least one bomb and partially sunk, with fires raging through the portions above water. When the fires were finally extinguished after two days, the minelayer was a sorry sight. The two stern 12-cm gun mountings, one twin, one single, were dismounted and taken ashore before the wreck was abandoned. Mounting the guns on land was time consuming, though, and they were not operational until 30 September, just before the base surrendered. Wicher also received the attention of the TrGr 186 Stukas. Two attacks were repulsed, but at around 15:00, three bombs hit the destroyer in short succession, two amidships and one in the bow. A fourth bomb exploded in the water close to the starboard side, fracturing the hull in several places. One man was killed, twenty-two were wounded. Wicher capsized and the PMW’s surface fleet was, for all practical purposes, no more. In the afternoon of 4 September, Lütjens was ordered back to the North Sea with the destroyers and S-boats, leaving the Polish submarines for the minesweepers and R-boats to deal with.²⁰

In the afternoon of 9 September, Admiral Raeder arrived in Danzig. After an inspection of the ruins of Westerplatte, he went on board Schleswig-Holstein, where he addressed the men and officers, handed out medals and sat down with FdM Kapitän Friedrich Ruge to discuss the continued naval operations, including harbour defence and convoy protection.

Meanwhile, German forces occupied Gdynia on 14 September, leaving Hela as one of the few remaining pockets of Polish resistance.²¹ The Hela Peninsula had been the subject of air attacks from the first day of the campaign, but German land forces did not arrive at the headland until 9 September. Resistance was fierce and the advance was slow down the 20-mile-long peninsula towards Hela proper, to where Admiral Unrug had moved his HQ from Gdynia. At 10:00 on the 14th the Stukas arrived over Jastarnia harbour. When they left, the mine-vessel Jaskolka was a burning wreck, while Czapla and Rybitwa were both severely damaged. The former was beyond repair and abandoned; Rybitwa limped south to Hela harbour with Czajka and Zuraw, which had sustained only light damage, to be used as floating batteries.

Raeder visiting on board Schleswig-Holstein, 9 September. Kapitän Kleikamp, behind him, does not look too happy and there are indications that he was deeply disturbed when he realised what he had been part of. (Author’s collection)

The ones that did not get away. Top, the wreck of Gryf. (A Wilmar Collection). Below, Wicher, capsized at Hela. (Author’s collection)

Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien and some smaller ships remaining in the east shelled the Hela Peninsula for several days from 23 September. Smoke and dust from the exploding shells gave the impression of brutal efficiency, but the results were actually rather limited. Quite to the contrary, Schleswig-Holstein was damaged by return fire from the coastal batteries, after which the battleships withdrew, continuing the shelling from some 9 miles distance, reducing the effect further.²² The Stukas of TrGr 186 were sent to finish the job, and the outcome was inevitable. During the night of 1/2 October, the remainder of the garrison at Hela laid down their weapons, ending the Polish campaign. By then the harbour and naval base at Hela was a graveyard of sunk or scuttled ships surrounded by ruins.²³

Schleswig-Holstein firing on Hela from Langführ. Note the elevation of the guns as the target is on the other side of Danzig Bay. (Author’s collection)

Submarine Orzel. (Author’s collection)

Just after the ceasefire had been agreed, the German minesweeper M85 struck one of the very few Polish mines that had not already been swept and sank rapidly around 5 miles north-east of Jastarnia. Twenty-four men perished.²⁴

Predicament

The five Polish submarines, Orzeł, Wilk, Sęp, Żbik and Ryś, were supposed to create a defensive screen in and around the entrance to Danzig Bay, attacking German convoys to East Prussia and naval vessels shelling coastal positions. The plan, collectively known as Operation Worek, called for Wilk to operate inside Danzig Bay, Sęp, Żbik and Ryś outside in the Baltic and Orzeł to stand by as reserve in the Bay of Puck. The captains had strict orders not to lay their mines until specific orders arrived and to conserve their torpedoes for ‘significant military targets’. This disposition was far less aggressive than expected by the Kriegsmarine, which anticipated that the Polish boats would operate against their warships and transports in the entire southern and western Baltic. In the shallow coastal waters, the submarines would be vulnerable to A/S counter-measures and the Worek Plan actually took the submarines away from where the enemy would be. In the event that the Polish naval bases were overrun, the submarines should remain as long as possible in the Baltic, inflicting maximum damage, and then leave for Britain. If this was not possible, refuge should be sought in a neutral port.

In the morning of 1 September, Sęp, Żbik and Ryś were at Hela, while Orzeł and Wilk were at Oksywie. The emergency call from Westerplatte sent all five submarines to sea, but air activity was intense and they had to stay submerged. It would be evening before they were in place as planned.²⁵

When the PWM was mobilised, Lieutenant Commander Boguslaw Krawczyk of the submarine Wilk took onboard ten torpedoes, twenty-two mines and 114 shells for the 10-cm deck-gun before taking to sea. In the morning of the 2nd, the German destroyer Erich Steinbrinck was sighted, bombarding the naval base on the Hela Peninsula. Krawczyk prepared to attack, but while getting into position, Wilk came under attack from a group of A/S vessels, forcing him to dive deep and withdraw. Three days later, preparing to lay mines off Hela, Wilk was again attacked by German A/S vessels. Again she escaped and Krawczyk decided to withdraw north towards the coast of Sweden.

On the way, Wilk was constantly harassed by German A/S vessels and it was obvious that she was leaving a trail of oil from leaking tanks. Krawczyk decided it was better to lose his boat fighting than fleeing and prepared to surface. By the time Wilk broke surface, though, the sea was empty. Undoubtedly relieved, he continued northwards, cleaning the leaking tanks to stop leaving a trail. Two days later, on the 11th, the cruiser Hipper was sighted and Krawczyk prepared for an attack. Before he could get into position, however, the cruiser turned away. Later the same day, orders were received from the Polish Naval Command for all submarines to head for Britain. Krawczyk waited until a convoy appeared on a westerly course near the Swedish coast and, surfacing, positioned his submarine close by. Approaching Öresund at dusk on the 14th, the German destroyer Richard Beitzen and the torpedo boat T107 were sighted, but, as Krawczyk had hoped, they believed Wilk was a Swedish submarine escorting the convoy and did nothing. The same day, Krawczyk took his boat through the Kattegat and, on the 20th, Wilk arrived in Rosyth.²⁶

At Oksywie, Orzeł was ordered to slip anchor and head for her pre-ordained sector in the Bay of Puck immediately after the first air raids on 1 September. Over the radio from Hela, Lieutenant Commander Henryk Kloczkowski, received orders to look out for and attack Schleswig-Holstein should she leave Danzig. German aircraft and A/S vessels kept the submarine below most of the time, though, except for a few hours every night. Learning the fate of the surface ships, Kloczkowski decided on the 4th to head for the Baltic.²⁷ On the way, Orzeł was subjected to a particularly violent attack by the minesweepers M4 and M3. One depth-charge exploded just above the boat, sending it crashing into the sea-bed. All lights went out and water started leaking through the diesel exhaust valve. The attack lasted all day, but eventually Orzeł managed to get away under cover of darkness. An oil leak had developed, which could not be repaired at sea, and Kloczkowski decided that the best thing would be to enter Tallinn in neutral Estonia to seek assistance. Anchoring there on the night of the 13th, Kloczkowski – who had been sick for several days – left his boat and was hospitalised.²⁸

At first the Estonians accepted the reference to the Hague Convention, and measures were taken to facilitate repairs. Pressure from Germany was instant and, a few hours later, an armed detachment boarded the boat, informing the crew that they had been interned, confiscating maps and navigation aids. During the night, removal of the ammunition for the deck gun and the torpedoes commenced. By midday on the 14th, all forward torpedoes had been landed, but Kapitan Marynarki Jan Grudzinski, first officer and in command while Kloczkowski was in hospital, managed to sabotage the torpedo hoist and the six torpedoes aft were left on board. Instead, Grudzinski and the new first officer, Lieutenant Andzej Piasecki, worked out a plan to escape. Dismantling work on the engine and radio were delayed under all kinds of pretexts and, a few nights later, the Estonian guards were overpowered, the mooring wires cut, and Orzeł got under way.²⁹

The alarm was immediately raised and some light guns of the harbour defences opened fire. Fortunately for the Poles, the larger guns held back, allegedly from fear of hitting their own ships moored around the port. In reality, most of the Estonian military probably cheered the Poles as they raced for the open sea. Orzeł touched a sandbank near the exit of the harbour, but Grudzinski managed to get her off and the submarine slipped away into the Baltic.

With no charts on board, Grudzinski intended to board the first German merchant vessel he met and take her maps. No German civilians were encountered, though; only warships looking for them. After three weeks of fruitless searching for something on which to use her remaining aft torpedoes, Grudzinski finally decided it was time to leave the Baltic, heading for Britain. The entrances to the Belts were closely guarded by German A/S ships, but Orzeł managed to crawl through during two days of high tension, with the help of a map drawn from memory by the navigating officer, and a list of Swedish lighthouses. On 14 October, some fifty days after she sailed from Oksywie, Orzeł made landfall off the east coast of Scotland. A signal was sent in plain English and a British destroyer came out to escort her into port, much to the surprise of the Admiralty, who had thought her long since sunk. After a refit, Orzeł was assigned to the 2nd Flotilla, deployed in the North Sea and Skagerrak.³⁰

Orzeł’s sister boat Sęp had been rushed home from the Dutch yard a few months earlier and was yet not fully tested by her crew when she took to sea. On 2 September, Sęp fired a single torpedo at the German destroyer Friedrich Ihn. The speed of the destroyer was underestimated, and the torpedo missed, in spite of the submarine being only 400 yards away. Ihn counterattacked with a vengeance and the submarine crawled away with severe oil leakages as well as other damage, water seeping into the boat. On the 3rd, Sęp was at the receiving end of a torpedo from U14, but the torpedo exploded prematurely and she escaped again.³¹ On 13 September, orders were received to sail to Britain if possible or, if not, to a neutral Swedish port for internment. By now conditions on board the boat were severe due to the extensive damage and leaks and, when Hela confirmed it would not be possible to return there, Commander Salamon was in a predicament. Considering all options for another day and finding it would take half an hour to dive safely, he finally decided the best he could do would be to seek refuge inside Swedish territorial waters. On 17 September, Sęp appeared off Stockholm, requesting permission to enter the harbour for repairs, knowing that this would mean internment.

Ryś had also been damaged through repeated attacks from German A/S forces and aircraft and her captain decided to head for Sweden on the 18th. Both submarines were interned for the duration of the war and taken to Vaxholm, north-east of Stockholm. On the 25th, they were joined by Żbik, her captain also having concluded that his boat was not in a condition to break out for Britain.³²

Except for M85, which foundered on a mine laid by Żbik, no German ships were sunk by the Polish submarines during the campaign, nor were any of the submarines sunk.³³