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—After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 by the French an organization of French scientists made a careful study of the various routes across the Isthmus and decided the one at Panama to be the most feasible. As a result, in 1875, De Lesseps, the engineer of the Suez Canal, began a careful survey of that route and in 1878, Lucien Bonaparte Wyse, of the French Navy, secured from the United States of Colombia (which had succeeded New Granada) a concession giving a company to be organized by him exclusive right to construct a canal and railroad across the Isthmus of Panama. Neutrality was to be maintained and troops transported only by permission of Colombia. In return for this privilege and certain grants of land Colombia was to receive 5 per cent of the gross tolls collected. The concession was for ninety-nine years and the canal was to be opened within eighteen years. While it was claimed this concession did not conflict with the treaty of 1846 between New Granada and the United States, nevertheless it provided that the latter might share in its advantages. The concession was transferred to De Lesseps, who arranged for an International Congress of Geographical Sciences, which assembled in Paris, May 15, 1879. The United States was one of the twenty-five nations there represented. Fourteen projects involving seven different routes were discussed and included all that were considered feasible.

Without going into detailed description some of these routes may be mentioned. The Tehauntepec route was 148 miles long and required 120 locks, would take about twelve days to pass a vessel through, and was in the region of earthquakes. The Nicaraguan Route was favored by many—it was 180 miles long, needed 17 locks, but it required an actual construction of only 60 miles as existing rivers and lakes could be utilized. A route from the Chiriqui Gulf to the Gulf Dulce, another from the Gulf of Darien by way of the Atrato and Napipi Rivers, and another into the San Miguel Bay, were discarded for various reasons. The choice centered upon the route from Colon to Panama by way of the Culebra pass and the Chagres River. This route, the shortest of all, was only 45 miles in length, but there were several disadvantages. The Chagres River must be diverted by a large dam or carried for miles in an aqueduct.

A company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique) was organized and popular subscriptions invited. It was claimed that further than granting the charter the French Government had nothing to do with the canal. Stock could be owned by people of all nations, but the United States did not take kindly to the measure, although no formal action to prevent the construction of the canal was taken. Several promotion schemes were advanced by private individuals to head off the French and Congress was petitioned for aid. Captain Eads, who by jetties had deepened the mouth of the Mississippi River, and an engineer of note, suggested a ship railway across the isthmus of Tehauntepec. A “Marine Canal Company of Nicaragua” wanted Congress to guarantee its capital stock; another Nicaraguan company had Ex-President Grant as a sponsor.[57] The surveys made by the United States of the Panama and of the Atrato-Napipi routes in 1875, were printed by order of Congress. In 1880 the House asked the president for the report of surveys made in 1872 and submitted in 1875 which had not yet become public; this report recommended the Nicaraguan route.

From time to time indignation was manifested in the United States against allowing a foreign country to gain a foothold even though by a neutral company on the American continent. The Monroe Doctrine was brought out; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was presented; the reports of Congressional Commissions were referred to as arguments against the De Lesseps Canal. Various other complications entered, one of which was a possible conflict of authority if in case of a revolution on the Isthmus it were necessary to send troops by the United States to maintain the neutrality of the railroad and by France troops to maintain the neutrality of the canal.

Sweeping aside these questions De Lesseps made preparation to construct the canal, and landed a force of seventy engineers, superintendents and workmen on the Isthmus of Panama in 1881. De Lesseps planned a tide-water canal which would require a cut of 285 feet in the Culebra pass. Difficulties encountered from slides in this cut and other reasons made it advisable afterwards to change the plans. De Lesseps purchased much machinery in Europe and America at large expense; bought the Panama railroad for $17,000,000, because the line of the Canal crossed it frequently and it could be utilized for transporting materials, and began the operation of opening up the cut at various points along its course. The engineers estimated the cost at 843,000,000 francs; this, De Lesseps cut to 600,000,000 francs, and set the opening ceremonies for 1888.

During the Garfield administration Secretary of State Blaine held out for a strong American policy and informed Colombia, which was charged with making arrangements whereby certain European powers might assume joint guarantee over the canal, that “any movement in the sense of supplementing the guarantee contained (in the treaty of 1846) would necessarily be regarded by this government as an uncalled for intrusion into a field where the local and general interest of the United States of America should be considered before those of any other power save those of Colombia alone.”[58] England claimed to be a new world power equally interested with the United States in maintaining the neutrality of the canal. Blaine proposed amending the Clayton-Bulwer treaty so that the United States could fortify the canal, also to annul that part extending it to any other practical routes so that the United States might be free to build a canal at Panama or elsewhere as it chose. Garfield’s death and Blaine’s retirement from the cabinet ended for the time being policies regarding South and Central Americas that would either have brought the United States in trouble with England or secured to her complete control of the canal and also, perhaps, much of South American trade. A treaty with Nicaragua allowing the construction of a canal wholly under American control, the United States guaranteeing the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua, which was undoubtedly a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and prepared by Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under Arthur, for the purpose of testing that treaty, was withdrawn by President Cleveland who was inaugurated before its confirmation.

There was a growing feeling that the De Lesseps company would never finish the canal. The company had spent $10,000,000 more than the estimate of 600,000,000 francs ($120,000,000), and had not paid the $17,000,000 promised for the Panama railway. In fact it was bankrupt. While a large amount of excavation had been done, it was small compared with what was necessary. A magnificent plant with much costly machinery was going to decay.

The Spanish-American war brought forcibly to the attention of the public the need of an interoceanic canal.

In 1900 a treaty negotiated by John Hay and Sir Julian Pauncefote embodying some modifications of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had been so amended in the Senate that Great Britain would not accept it. A new treaty made in view of the Senate amendments and the British objections was submitted a few months after Roosevelt became President. It abrogated parts of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and gave to the United States full ownership and control of the proposed canal. Colonel Roosevelt had strongly advocated this while governor of New York before his accession to the presidency.[59]

Two commissions in the past had reported favorably on the Nicaraguan route. A third commission with Admiral John G. Walker as chairman was appointed and authorized in 1899 to expend a million dollars, if necessary, to make a thorough investigation of the several routes. In 1901 the committee reported that the “Commission is of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian Canal, to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States is that known as the Nicaraguan route.”[60] The Commission placed the estimated cost of the Nicaraguan Canal at $189,864,062; of completing the Panama Canal at $144,233,358; and that to this latter sum should be added the cost of acquiring the rights of the French company. The company asked $109,141,500, but the Commission estimated its worth at $40,000,000. The company considered this unfair but finally offered to negotiate with the United States and sell on the best terms possible. The Commission made a supplementary report recommending the Panama route and purchase of the French company’s work and rights at $40,000,000. An act was signed by the president, June 28, 1902, which had passed Congress, not without opposition, authorizing the president to acquire control of the rights and property of the Panama Canal Company, to acquire perpetual control of a strip of land not less than 6 miles in width, across the Isthmus, to proceed as soon as these rights were acquired to construct a canal through “The Isthmian Canal Commission” created by the act; but should he be unable to get satisfactory title to the property of the French company and the control of territory from Colombia, then the president was authorized to negotiate with Nicaragua and build a canal along the Nicaraguan route.

Attorney General Knox reported that the French company could give a clear title; a convention was entered into by which the United States upon the payment of $10,000,000 in cash and an annual rental of $250,000 per year was to receive the necessary control and strip of land. The Senate ratified this March 17, 1903. When it went to the Colombian congress, however, it was rejected by unanimous vote. President Roosevelt declared Colombia wanted to wait until they could forfeit the title of the French company then sell to the United States for $40,000,000.[61] This view may and possibly was erroneous. There was again a demand that the Nicaraguan route be chosen. But on November 3, 1903, the Panamanians, instigated by the French company, whose entire concession and undertaking would revert to Colombia in less than a year,[62] seeing their interests being sacrificed by the cupidity of Colombia, consummated a revolution. Many were of the opinion that the president of the United States was particeps criminis. In a letter to a friend[63] dated October 10, 1903, he says, “I cast aside the proposition at this time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States can not go into the securing, by such underhand means, the cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it.”

Many years later when chaffingly accused of being a wicked conspirator, Mr. Roosevelt is quoted as having said: “What was the use? The other fellows in Paris and New York had taken all the risk and were doing all the work. Instead of trying to run a parallel conspiracy, I had only to sit still and profit by their plot—if it succeeded.”[64]

The revolution was bloodless except for the accidental killing of a Chinaman and a dog. Colombia, however, as soon as possible sent troops to Colon. The following day the U. S. Ship Nashville landed fifty marines. The next day the Colombian troops left, said by some to have been bribed. A Panamanian government was formed; on November 6th, the American consul was ordered from Washington to recognize it; a week later their minister was formally received by President Roosevelt. On January 4, 1904, the president presented for ratification a treaty. The Senate ratified it February 23, 1904. Thus rapidly did things move. By this agreement the United States secured from the Republic of Panama a zone of land 10 miles wide for the canal with full power over it. In return the United States guaranteed the independence of the Panama republic, and agreed to pay $10,000,000 upon exchange of ratifications and the sum, beginning nine years thereafter, of $250,000 per annum.

The Colombians protested and sent their former president General Reyes to Washington to persuade the Government to abrogate its compact with Panama. The counsel for Colombia is quoted as saying that “Reyes was authorized to accept $8,000,000 for all the desired concessions and he would have taken $5,000,000, but Hay and Roosevelt were so foolish they wouldn’t accept.”[65] Be that as it may, the effort was several times made to get for Colombia a gratuity much greater than Reyes would have accepted, and in 1921 Congress appropriated for that purpose $25,000,000, thus, in a way, acknowledging that Colombia was wronged and that the United States had been profited thereby.

A commission was formed to undertake the construction of the canal. This was changed two or three times during the construction. The immensity of the work necessary to make a tidewater canal, and the fact that its completion would be materially delayed, caused the abandonment of that plan. Three sets of locks were provided—at Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores. A great dam was built across the lower end of the Chagres, entirely blocking the flow of that river and creating a large artificial lake 165 square miles in area whose maximum height is 85 feet above sea water. This lake serves for storage water necessary to manipulate the canal and locks; any surplus flows through a spillway into the Pacific Ocean. Great breakwaters were constructed to make smooth harbors at Colon and Panama and prevent silting. The canal is at sea level to Gatun, 8 miles, then three steps lead it to Gatun Lake; it continues on that level for 32 miles; then down one step at Pedro Miguel to Miraflores Lake, 55 feet above sea level; thence through the Miraflores locks to sea level again and then out to deep water in the Pacific, 11 miles. The locks are 1000 feet long and large enough in every way to accommodate the largest ships afloat. These great locks with their mammoth gates, tunnels for filling, and mechanical means of operation are one of the seven wonders of the modern world. The cost was about $400,000,000 to date of opening. Since that time considerable sums have been spent in fortifications, improvements, and maintenance—several large slides having occurred in the Culebra Cut. The “total amount expended or advanced to disbursing officers for purchase, construction, fortification, etc., to June 30, 1919, $452,075,376.”[66] The tolls amount to about $7,000,000 annually.

The principal arguments in favor of the United States building the inter-oceanic canal were its utility as a measure of preparedness for and strategy in case of war. By furnishing quick passage between the east and west coasts the navy necessary for the protection of these coasts could be reduced one half. With the canal entirely in the control of the Government no foreign nation could take advantage of it to our detriment. Notwithstanding the need of the canal for war purposes, the benefits to be derived by the commerce of peace will doubtless be manifold more valuable. It furnishes cheap transportation between the west and east coasts, and shortens materially the distance from the Atlantic seaboard to western South America as well as to the islands of the Pacific Ocean. During the year 1920, “2814 ships representing 11,236,119 tons of cargo, passed through the waterway” being a considerable increase over any preceding year.[67] Of these 45.5 per cent were registered United States vessels, more than any other one nation. Fuel-oil, nitrates, steel and iron hold leading places in the line of commodities carried.