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Foch, then, was unwilling to withdraw troops from Flanders, where he expected the German attack. It took place on the Aisne, but that did not deter the Commander-in-Chief from keeping his reserves in the north and on the Somme, as in his opinion the Germans could get no results from the attack on the Aisne. Three rivers crossed within five days nevertheless brought the German artillery to Château-Thierry—that is to say, within eighty kilometres of Paris. Will anyone maintain that that is not an important result? Anybody can make a mistake, but there is no real reason for clinging to an opinion in the teeth of the evidence. The man who knows he can go wrong himself might very well grow lenient. When the Marshal lectured his comrades because they had not won the War in 1917, they might have hit back with the failure of the Somme offensive in 1916 and the Chemin des Dames collapse in 1918. We might just as well say that if Marshal Joffre had won the battle of Charleroi the War might have stopped at that.

To avoid all contradiction, the Chemin des Dames affair has been dealt with in the Mémorial by way of judicious selection. It would really be too plain sailing if it was possible to avoid discussion by this simple device.

The Commander-in-Chief may have made a mistake, a mistake of the worst kind, with regard to the point of the enemy’s attack, but his first duty was to guard himself to the best of his power, and the Chemin des Dames, our most important field fortification, was badly—indeed, very badly—guarded. The event proved this only too well.

In reply to my first inquiries I was briefly told that such things are inevitable in war, that anyone, soldier and civilian alike, may be found at fault, and that it was no good dwelling upon the fact. After this opening Foch changed the conversation. When he saw me insisting with my questions he wanted to know if I intended to court-martial him, to which I replied that there could be no question of that.

However, personal responsibilities were involved, and we had first of all to find some temporary settlement of the case, at the same time taking every care not to shake what confidence remained in the minds of the public. To-day this all seems elementary, but in such an emergency, when the very life of the country was at stake, a head of the Government had to have the power of making up his mind promptly and of finding the happy medium between severity and moderation.

As was natural, Parliament, spurred on by public opinion, was greatly excited and did not spare the military leaders, but this did not alter the fact that I should have aggravated the situation considerably, had I begun, in the midst of this grievous confusion, replacing them by others who, after all, were perhaps less prepared. Above all, it was necessary to hold one’s own against the currents of public opinion clamouring for penalties without knowing on whom they were to fall.

I was thoroughly resolved not to stake the final success on a random chance. I complied unhesitatingly with all the demands for information that came from Parliament. I appeared before the commissions, where I met with the keenest hostility. But there was a speedy return of confidence when it became clear that I meant to hide nothing. Meanwhile I was continually up and down the country to see the leaders at their fighting-posts, to comfort and encourage them if necessary, and to maintain confidence, as much as lay in my power. In such emergencies a chief, with uniform or without, who keeps the stubborn will to win has plenty to do.

Below I quote as far as I can from the notebook of General Mordacq, whose tireless devotion never flagged for as much as a single hour.

On May 27, 1918, the Chemin des Dames, which was supposed to be an impregnable fortress, falls at the first onslaught of the German attack without offering any resistance. The bridges of the Aisne are carried, and to this day nobody has attempted to tell us how. The enemy crosses three rivers in succession without any trouble. He reaches Château-Thierry, where he blows up the bridge.

The next day, May 28, a journey to Sarcus, General Foch’s H.Q. He does not believe in an attack on a large scale, as it is quite certain that it could not have important strategical results for the Germans. So he does not think he ought to move his strategical reserves, which at the moment are in Flanders and in the Amiens district.^[1]

May 26, 1918. The French tactical situation on May 26, on the Aisne front (Chemin des Dames):

This front, which stretched over a length of ninety kilometres, was very weakly held: three army corps (eleven divisions) with a thousand guns....

The German tactical situation on the same front (between Noyon and Rheims):

Nine divisions between Noyon and Juvincourt.

Three divisions between Juvincourt and Courcy.

For the attack on May 27 the Germans increased these forces, first of all to thirty divisions, and then, between May 27 and May 30, to forty-two divisions, supported by four thousand guns.

Thus the Germans were going to attack with four times the strength of the Allies in both men and artillery.

The German Plan. The attack in Flanders having failed to obtain the results hoped for (namely, to separate the Belgian and English Armies, to use up the English reserves, and to reach the coast), Ludendorff decides to attack the Allies on the Aisne, a sector that he knows is weakly defended and without strategical reserves. His intention is to draw the Allies’ reserves to that region, and then to reopen the main attack in Flanders and make an end of the British Army.^[2] ...

The Attack, May 27. The infantry attack is launched at 4 A.M. after an artillery preparation lasting four hours....

The Germans, thanks to their numerical superiority, advance rapidly. At 8 A.M. they cross the Chemin des Dames.^[3] At twelve they are over the Aisne and reach the Vesle in the evening....

May 28. Their progress continues. By 11 A.M. Fismes has fallen, and at close of day they are outside Soissons, having taken a considerable number of prisoners....

Paris is in a high state of excitement. The French G.H.Q. has to-day ordered nine divisions to the Soissons district, but without paying sufficient attention to the organization of the command.

May 29 and 30. The Germans continue their victorious march: they capture Soissons, cross the Arlette on the 30th, and this same day reach the Marne at Jaulgonne.

The French reserves continue to arrive.^[4] The Tenth Army is recalled from the Doullens district.

May 31 and June 1. The Germans lie along the banks of the Marne between Dormans and Château-Thierry. Everywhere else they can only advance with the greatest difficulty, continually coming up against the French reinforcements, which are arriving in ever-increasing numbers. They try, in vain, to get round the thickly wooded massif of Villers-Cotterets; they cannot penetrate into the forest itself, which is strongly held by our troops....

June 2. It may be said that by the 2nd of June the German attack is definitely stopped. The Germans now have thirty-seven divisions facing them, divided into three armies (Maistre, Duchesne, and Michelet), while another fifteen divisions are on their way to reinforce these. So the enemy’s onrush will not be able to make much further headway.

June 2 to June 8. And, in fact, from the 2nd to the 8th of June all the German efforts are broken against the organized resistance of the Allies.

In this battle of the Chemin des Dames the Allies lost more than sixty thousand prisoners, seven hundred guns, two thousand machine-guns, a considerable amount of flying and artillery material, large depots of munitions, provisions, and stores of all kinds, important medical organizations, etc....

The Paris-Châlons railway, so necessary for bringing up supplies, was no longer usable.

Thus it was a real disaster.^[5]

This attack was quickly followed by that of Compiègne (June 9 to June 12).

May 28. Go to Belleu, H.Q. of General Duchesne, in command of the Sixth Army; he has fallen back to Oulchy-le-Château. We go there. He explains the situation to us, which is by no means bright; the German advance continues, and we have nothing but ‘sweepings’ to pit against them. He complains that since the attack began he has not seen a single chief belonging to the High Command.

We spend the night at Provins, General Pétain’s H.Q. He complains of Foch’s sending the reserves up north and to the Somme. He had opposed it. Sends troops to stop the gap, but they are not used to advantage. There is a shortage of artillery.

May 29. The next day, May 29, we go to Fère-en-Tardenois, which we reach just as the Germans arrive. We escape. Thence to Fresnes, General Degoutte’s fighting-post. His part in the fight: he tells us of divisions being flung into the battle one after another, without artillery. A tragic sight to see the General silently weeping over a tattered remnant of a map, and all the while a continuous stream of motor-cyclists arriving with reports of the enemy’s approach. I left him with no hope of ever seeing him again. For me this is one of the most poignant memories of the War.

Lunch at Oulchy-le-Château with General Duchesne, to cheer him up, and try to get precise information about the battle.

Visit General Maud’huy at Longpont. His impressions—his anger against Duchesne. Then to Ambreny, General Chrétien’s H.Q.

We return to Paris. State of confusion.

Panic in the Chamber.

May 30. Go to Trilport (General Duchesne’s fighting-post), to Coupru (General Degoutte’s fighting-post), to Longpont (General de Maud’huy).

The hole is stopped up, but there is a great lack of artillery.

Popular agitations at Paris demanding the heads of Duchesne, Franchet d’Esperey, Pétain, and Foch.

Interview at Trilport. Discussion on the journey. Foch, Pétain, and Duchesne severely criticized. Weakness of the subordinate command. Necessity of cutting out the dead wood.

Paris very nervous, especially over the abandoning of the bridges on the Aisne.

In spite of the animosity of the Allies against Foch, M. Clemenceau has these words inserted in a telegram to the Allied Governments: “We consider that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate skill, and whose military judgment inspires us with the utmost confidence, does not exaggerate the necessities of the moment.^[6] ...”

June 3, evening. Sitting of the Commission de l’Armée. M. Clemenceau says, “We must have confidence in Foch and Pétain, those two great chiefs who are so happily complementary of each other....”

June 4. My interview with Foch at Mouchy-le-Châtel. The necessity of removing the incompetent Divisional Commanders. Foch must speak about this to Pétain.

Better news from the Front.

I had to make things right with Parliament. I am always and unvaryingly a staunch Parliamentarian. I must admit that the Parliamentary system as we know it is not always a school for stout-heartedness. All the conversations before that formidable meeting were full to bursting with evil auguries for the High Command. I never wavered. I took everybody under my shield, to the great astonishment of those who had told me that by throwing all the responsibility on the Commander-in-Chief I should regain the authority belonging to my position.

Obviously, the more Foch’s power had been increased, the greater was his military responsibility. No one knew it better than he did. By nature he was not a great talker. I did not try (for I had not the time) to form a personal opinion as to the military responsibility taken as a whole, and later I was given no opportunity to get to know. So I only exchanged a few vague remarks with the Generalissimo, and went to the Parliamentary battle without telling anyone what I proposed to do. I won a signal victory, and at the same time shielded all my subordinates; but nobody can seriously doubt that, had I faltered for a single moment, the High Command would have been swept away. Foch never said a word to me about this sitting, at which it is no mere boast for me to say that I saved him. You must admit that this silence on Foch’s part might well lend itself to comment. We had not yet come to our great disputes over the American Army and the annexation of the Rhineland. No harsh words had or have ever passed between us. Nothing more, perhaps, than the inevitable clash of military and civil power. But I took great pains never to press the discussion too far, and for my part I never took a very marked stand against him until the day he tried to maintain to me that he was not my subordinate, going on to open insubordination in the matter of the Nudant telegram.

Meeting of the Chamber, June 4, 1918^[7]

The Chemin des Dames Affair. Questions.

M. Aristide Jobert. I wish to ask the Government what steps they intend to take in order to provide our heroic and magnificent French Army with the leaders it deserves, and also what penalties they propose to inflict upon those who are found to be incompetent....

M. Frédéric Brunet.... Mr Prime Minister, it does not appear to us that in the recent fighting sufficient foresight has been shown in taking all the precautionary measures necessary for safeguarding the lives of the men and for employing their heroism to the best advantage. When we saw the first onrush of the Germans on the Somme not a soul faltered in the whole country; we all said with you, “They shall not get through.” But when we have seen this Chemin des Dames, along which so many of our men have fallen in order to keep it in French hands, we could not but feel a momentary pang, and asked ourselves if those in command had really done their whole duty, ... and if the law comes down with crushing force upon the soldier who fails to do his duty it ought to deal still more drastically with the leader who through negligence or lack of foresight may well be the cause of irretrievable defeats.

M. Clemenceau addresses the House:

If, to win the approbation of certain persons who judge in rash haste, I must abandon chiefs who have deserved well of their country, that is a piece of contemptible baseness of which I am incapable, and it must not be expected of me.

If we are to raise doubts in the minds of the troops as to the competence of certain of their leaders, perhaps among the best, that would be a crime for which I should never accept responsibility....

These soldiers, these great soldiers, have leaders, good leaders, great leaders, leaders in every way worthy of them.

... Does that mean that nowhere there have been mistakes? That I cannot maintain; I know the truth full well. It is my place and duty to find out those mistakes and to correct them. That is what I am devoting my energies to. And in that task I have the support of two great soldiers whose names are General Foch and General Pétain.

Our allies have such high confidence in General Foch that yesterday, at the Conference of Versailles, it was their wish that the communiqué given to the Press should contain a reference to that confidence.

(A deputy: It was you that made them.)

These men are at this very moment waging the hardest battle of the War, and they are waging it with a heroism for which I can find no words equal to the task of describing it. And is it for us, because of some mistake that occurred in this place or that, or even never occurred, to ask for, to extort explanations before we know the facts, while the battle is still raging, from a man exhausted with fatigue, whose head droops over his maps, as I have seen with my own eyes in hours of dreadful stress? Is this the man we are going to ask to tell us whether on such and such a day he did thus or thus?

Turn me out of the tribune, if that is what you want, for I will never do it.

... I said that the Army had surpassed all we could have expected of it, and when I say “the Army” I mean the men of all ranks and of all grades under fire. That is one of the factors in our confidence, the chief factor. Faith in a cause is indeed a fine thing, but it does not bring victory; for the victory to be assured men must die for their faith, and our men are dying now.

We have an Army made up of our children, our brothers, of all our own people. What could we have to say against it?

The leaders too have sprung from among ourselves; they too are our kinsmen; they too are good soldiers. They come back to us covered with wounds, or remain for ever on the field of battle. What have you to say against them?

... We have allies who are pledged with us to carry on the War to the end, to the ultimate success that is within our grasp, that we are on the very eve of grasping if only we have enough tenacity. I know full well that the majority of this House will have that tenacity. But I should have rejoiced had it been unanimous.

I maintain—and these must be my closing words—that victory depends on us ... so long as the civil powers are equal to their task, for this exhortation would be superfluous to the soldiers.

Dismiss me if I have been a bad servant, drive me out, condemn me, but at least first take the trouble to put your criticisms into plain words.

For my part I claim that up till now the French people, and every section of it, has done its duty to the full. Those who have fallen have not fallen in vain, for they have found a way to add to the greatness of French history.

It remains for the living to finish the glorious work of the dead.

Foch was saved.

I quote again from General Mordacq’s notes:

June 5. Parliamentary intrigues proceed. M. Clemenceau is obliged to stay in Paris, and sends me on June 5 to Bombon (Marshal Foch’s H.Q.) and to Provins (General Pétain). We must have done with the incompetent leaders. On the other hand, the need for energetic and competent chiefs is felt more than ever. M. Clemenceau decides to recall Guillaumat from Salonica, and to relieve Franchet d’Esperey of his command and send him to Salonica. Foch and Pétain both agree.

This resolution was taken without consulting Lloyd George, who had declared himself against Foch and Pétain.

June 7. Meeting at the War Ministry: Lord Milner, Haig, Foch, Wilson. Use of English divisions on the French front. Foch’s dilatory answer.

June 8. Visit Third Army, General Humbert (Oise). Warning of impending German attack. Everything prepared to receive it.

June 9. The attack is launched.

Night and day since the vote of confidence had I been going up and down visiting the fighting-posts. Everywhere I was brought back to the everlasting question of the lapses of subordinate commanders. This lamentable rout, upon which some day we shall have to make up our minds to shed the light of day, was no doubt attributable in the first place to the High Command, which was not sufficiently in touch with the actual fighting units. But had the secondary commands been strongly welded together, we should have been able to hold out, in spite of the absence of the reserves whom Foch was keeping up in Flanders doing nothing.

Finally I told the Generalissimo that new duties had been imposed upon us by reason of our victory in Parliament, and I appealed to him on his military conscience as supreme commander to tell me if he had no urgent reforms in the personnel to suggest. Without hesitating he replied that the chief fault was the inadequacy of his Staff,^[8] but that it was very difficult to reorganize, because it meant breaking up General Pétain’s Staff.

I replied that General Pétain was the most disinterested of men, and that it would be sufficient to give him the explanation to which he was entitled. At the same time I drew from my pocket a fairly long list of older generals whom I had decided to replace.

I had defended the High Command in the House, but I knew very well, from having seen it close to on my visits to the Front, that an important group of leaders had grown old and ought to be replaced. Foch certainly knew it as well as I did, perhaps even better, but, as with many chiefs, the phrase ‘old comrade’ was a very potent charm with him.

I must say that the Commander-in-Chief offered no resistance to my determination. Without losing a moment we went to General Pétain, and I laid before him as well as I could the conversation I had just had with his chief. With his customary placidity General Pétain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, heard me through without uttering a word. Then he said:

“Monsieur le Président, I give you my word that if you leave me an army corps to lead I shall deem myself greatly honoured, and that I shall rest content in carrying out my duties properly.”

It was one of those high moments that can never be forgotten.

I then returned to my list of generals to be relieved of their commands, which the Generalissimo did not challenge in one single instance; he knew too well each one’s deficiencies. At certain names I saw him shrug his shoulders with the murmur, “An old friend!” The sacrifice was consummated with but few exceptions. As a matter of fact, Foch asked me to spare those of his “old comrades” who were on parts of the Front where there was no fighting, and promised that if the occasion called for it he would rigorously apply the same standard.

My duty should have been to resist this appeal to normal human weaknesses, for the battle might break out at any moment in those places where it was temporarily dormant. If a disaster occurred the blame would have only too justly been laid at my door. I took that chance to win my way into the good graces of the Generalissimo, who himself only retained his post thanks to my intervention in the Chamber. On what grounds does he accuse me of persecuting him? Where would you be to-day, my dear Marshal, had I not interposed my breast between you and your judges? I have to remind you of this because you never thought of it yourself.

In accordance with my promise, a Parliamentary commission was set up, and had placed before them all the documents, which, owing to other more pressing occupations, I have never seen. When they had declared themselves unable to discover where the various responsibilities lay my only remaining opponent was Marshal Foch, and the reason for the silence in which the Mémorial is entrenched is only too well understood to-day.

[1] I am inclined to think that a great deal might be said on the passages I have italicized.

We must look at our losses in men and artillery, and in ground too, before agreeing with Foch that the Chemin des Dames affair “was not an attack on a large scale.” On what sort of scale is an attack that enables the Germans to get within eighty kilometres of Paris?

The Germans had the advantage in numbers, but that was because they had managed to deceive Foch—which cannot possibly be considered a feather in his cap. They taught me at school that the first thing in the art of war is to meet the enemy in force.

[2] An intention presumed in order to justify giving up the Aisne.

[3] In four hours! What about the defence? Why were not the bridges on the Aisne blown up?

[4] And high time!

[5] If the operation was on such a small scale as Marshal Foch had declared why all that elaborate and formidable organization at this particular place? Even that does not explain why it should be abandoned so rapidly. There are altogether too many whys about this curious business.

[6] As I have related in Chapter II.

[7] From the official report.

[8] In all that I have since learned about what happened at the Chemin des Dames nothing has appeared to confirm this explanation. It is a case to be tried. It will have to be dealt with yet.