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London

The battle in progress in France since the 21st of last March at its opening found the British armies fifty-seven divisions strong (lately reduced to nine battalions to the division^[2]), to which there were subsequently added two divisions brought back from Italy and two from Palestine (one of which is still in process of disembarkation).

The British Army in France ought therefore to comprise sixty-one divisions at the present moment.

Now, in consequence of the losses sustained since the opening of the attack, and in consequence of the insufficient numbers of reinforcements sent from the United Kingdom to replace those losses, it has been judged by the English High Command impossible to maintain the British divisions in France at the number cited above. That number, as you are aware, has been diminished by nine, and consequently to-day it stands at fifty-two.

To maintain the English divisions in France at this number, and, a fortiori, to diminish it, would throw almost the whole weight of the future battle, which, according to every probability, will still be long and severe, upon the French divisions alone, and under these conditions we should very quickly be forced, by losses on a scale surpassing all our most ample forecasts, to reduce the number of our divisions.

The gravity of the circumstances cannot but be obvious to you, and it must consequently seem to you, as to ourselves, that the only way to deal with them is to maintain by every means in your power the number of English divisions at what it was before the suppressions—that is to say, at sixty-one.

To ensure this result, which is, I repeat, indispensable for bringing this battle to a victorious conclusion, it is absolutely essential that the British Commander-in-Chief on the French front should receive all the necessary reinforcements.

Now the plans for the dispatch of reinforcements drawn up by the British Staff for the months of May, June, and July lay down that an average of 34,000 men shall be sent into France each month.

You will feel, as I do, that this number is totally insufficient, alike to maintain the still existing divisions or to revive the nine divisions that have been done away with.

It is, however, vitally necessary, as I have set forth above, that this twofold result should be attained as quickly as possible.

Now it appears to us that it can be attained if a resolute call is made in the fullest measure upon the already mobilized resources in the United Kingdom.

It is actually shown from the latest survey of the position by the War Office, dated April 22, that the total number of mobilized men in the United Kingdom is 1,284,819.^[3]

If, as we quite recognize, a great part of these men are not fit for service abroad it nevertheless remains that at the date shown above

(1)	The establishments of home-defence troops were	171,565	men
(2)	The troops in the depots were	389,016	men„
(3)	Workers in uniform on various work	258,291	men„
		________
	Making a total of	818,872	men„

To which must be added the men in hospitals from whom drafts can be made as they are passed fit for service, and who at the same date numbered 317,582.

The sole obstacle to the sending into France of the greater part of the men in the first three categories above is the fact that they belong for the most part to other classes than A.^[4]

Now it will undoubtedly appear to you that all the men of Class B, men classed as fit for the defence of the United Kingdom in case of invasion, could very well, in view of the gravity of the present crisis, be sent without exception to fight on the French front.

This measure would in any case merely correspond to that adopted in France, which has sent to the Front our men in the auxiliary services.^[5]

Its immediate, strict, and full application in the United Kingdom would, I am persuaded, enable you to find the necessary resources for dealing with the grave crisis through which we are now passing.

It seems to us, in any case, to be the only one that in the present circumstances can allow us to emerge victorious from the most formidable and, no doubt, decisive trial we have faced since the beginning of the War.

[Signed] G. Clemenceau

This letter, followed by incessant and unremitting pressure, produced the desired effect. The English, after a great deal of backing and filling, promised to re-establish the nine suppressed divisions, and they did re-establish them effectively and progressively from May to September, sending to France not merely Class A men, but also those in Class B.

The truth is that there was nothing in the character of the war on the Continent to justify any distinction between the two classes. It was a mere sailor’s notion.

From this narrative, corroborated by an official document, it may be seen that if I did not succeed in making good our effectives by the help of the American soldiers (whom their own chiefs at the time blankly refused to move without Foch making up his mind to command), I was more fortunate with the English, who, having suppressed nine divisions after Gough’s misfortune, still had at their disposal reserves more than sufficient, but badly arranged in groups with misleading labels.

The document I have quoted above shows that I was not incapable of arguing with Mr Lloyd George, since a closely reasoned and moderate letter succeeded in getting the English General Staff, while there was yet time, to revive the nine suppressed divisions. The name of Foch did not even occur in this letter, which by rights ought to have been signed by him. As for me, I was only too happy to help him, even without his knowledge, at the moment when he was boasting of taking no notice of urgent instances to which Mr Lloyd George showed himself accessible.

[1] March 1918.

[2] This reduction took place in February 1918, or about a month before the attack of March 21.

[3] With this formidable number of reserves the British Staff could without trouble have re-established the nine divisions that had been suppressed, as, indeed, it did later easily enough.

[4] The English private soldiers were divided into four classes distinguished as A, B, D, E. Class A was made up of men fit for active service outside the United Kingdom; Class B, men fit for service within the United Kingdom; Class D, men temporarily unfit for a period not exceeding six months; Class E, men unfit for a period exceeding six months.

[5] At that moment, in France, we had in the first-line units, 160,000 men over forty-two years old, 110,000 men of the auxiliary services.