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“Free,” of course, is a slight exaggeration. Deploying solar geoengineering does come with costs. There are potentially large risks, unknowns, and unknowables.⁸

There are also costs for monitoring and guiding any deliberate, largescale solar geoengineering deployment program. The cost in both money and time is potentially large. That, too, is important – and ought to be a crucial part of any sensible solar geoengineering deployment scenario. Chapter 4 will attempt to paint such a scenario.

Here, I’m simply referring to raw deployment costs – the narrow engineering costs of actually doing the solar geoengineering. Those costs are what the free-driver effect captures, and they are indeed cheap – too cheap. But solar geoengineering is not free.

In fact, some of the best estimates put the costs of stratospheric aerosols in the single-digit billions of dollars per year during the early stages of deployment. That’s not nothing. It isn’t tens, or hundreds, of billions of dollars per year either. In short, done “efficiently,” deploying solar geoengineering at scale is within the purview of dozens of countries. The military budgets alone of around 35 countries are at least $5 billion, and 24 have budgets greater than $10 billion.⁹ Those estimates entail designing an entirely new plane capable of flying missions – sorties, in aerospace speak – to at least around 20 kilometers up and somewhere within plus or minus 30° latitude around the equator. The origin behind this number is instructive by itself.

Common lore has always been that stratospheric aerosols would be cheap, and that deploying them could be done easily. In fact, word in the (small) solar geoengineering research community was that it could be as simple as modifying a dozen or so existing jets. High-flying business jets could do the trick, invoking images of the crazed billionaire business owner taking the seats out of his Gulfstream – and voila.

The origin of this belief is a bit murky, but among the first to explore the topic in earnest was a study conducted by Aurora Flight Sciences, funded by David Keith with money from the Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research (FICER), which, in turn, had been provided by Bill Gates. (More on all this later, in Chapter 3.) The resulting report presented calculations for a New High Altitude Aircraft and also concluded that it might be as easy as modifying existing aircraft.¹⁰

Cue a couple of emails from one Wake Smith, sent out of the blue to David Keith and me around 2016, when we were in the early stages of developing what would turn into Harvard’s Solar Geoengineering Research Program. (More on that later, too, primarily in Chapter 3.) Wake introduced himself as having held, among many other accomplishments, the position of former President and Chairman of Pemco World Air Services, a leading airplane modification company. He clearly had a lot of expertise on the subject, he cared about climate change, and he wanted to try to be helpful. We met.

I began our first meeting in the way I tended to whenever I spoke to anyone with any kind of business or finance background: Ours was a research effort; commercial interest would be dangerous. And in any case, there was no commercial case here: “Have you heard of the free-driver effect?” Wake assured me he had no financial interest, but that he was, in fact, curious about the free-driver effect. He had read David Keith’s book and about how modified business jets could work. From David, verbatim:

Injection of sulfates might be accomplished using Gulfstream business jets retrofitted with off-the-shelf low-bypass jet engines to allow them to fly at altitudes over sixty thousand feet along with the hardware required to generate and disperse the sulfuric acid.¹¹

Wake was skeptical. He didn’t want to say so directly, at our first meeting, but he clearly thought such a retrofit wouldn’t work. Or rather, that a more powerful engine implied a new plane, a new certification process, the works. For someone who used to run a company modifying planes, this seemed like a different exercise altogether: designing a new plane.

Wake set out to demonstrate that his initial reaction was correct. He spoke to engineers at Airbus, Atlas Air, Boeing, Bombardier, GE Engines, Gulfstream, Lockheed Martin, NASA, Near Space Corporation, Northrop Grumman, Rolls Royce Engines, Scaled Composites, The Spaceship Company, and Virgin Orbit.¹² He did what someone with a deep business background would do: he created a development plan for how one might approach a venture that could design such a plane, finance the development, and see things through from conceptualization to deployment.

We ended up co-authoring a paper describing the process, laying out “Stratospheric aerosol injection tactics and costs in the first 15 years of deployment.”¹³ The gist was: Existing planes are inadequate. It would take a newly designed plane with a large fuselage and sizable wingspan to transport the material and fly into the lower stratosphere. Moving such a plane from concept to deployment would take the better part of a decade.

None of that is free. It would cost billions. But nobody we spoke to had any doubts that it would be possible to do. And the cost figures confirmed the broader sentiment: single-digit billions of dollars per year are, in fact, cheap. Very cheap.

The direct comparison with cutting CO₂ emissions is a problem for many reasons. Timescales is one. While solar geoengineering could lower global average temperatures within months, addressing the root cause by cutting CO₂ emissions and pollution would show effects only over decades and centuries. But it is clear that, while far from free, solar geoengineering is indeed very cheap by comparison. The absolute lowest estimates of decarbonizing the world economy come in at around $50–100 trillion.¹⁴ That’s the total estimate, not the annual cost, but it is still at least 100 to 1,000 times more expensive than the cost estimates for solar geoengineering. If anything then, solar geoengineering is too cheap.

In a rational world, there would be no such thing as too cheap. Even if something were indeed free, we would not have to do it if we did not want to. Of course, we don’t live in a rational world. To begin with, it’s highly unclear who the “we” here is. Who makes the decision? Who might be motivated to pay for such a venture? Equally important: If solar geoengineering is so cheap, and the free driver is so dominant, why isn’t it happening already?