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22 Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: Ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἕνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναιˇ ἡ γάρ τις γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. Aristotle here recognizes an attribute as individual and as numerically one; and various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say, that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically, and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is Unum Numero? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of different objects; and can we count it as One, in the same sense in which we count each of these objects as One? I doubt whether Unum Numero be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the δευτέρα οὐσία is not Unum Numero like the πρώτη οὐσία οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he ought to declare that the attribute is not Unum Numero; for though it is not (in his language) predicable of many Subjects, yet it is in many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called Unum Numero, according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; Δ. p. 1016, b. 32: ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία, &c.

Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the commencement of this treatise on the Categories between predicates which are affirmed of a Subject, and predicates which are in a Subject23 we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be predicated of Sokrates, but are not in Sokrates; while knowledge is in Sokrates, but cannot be predicated of Sokrates; and may be predicated of grammar, but is not in grammar. But if we look at this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal, rational).24 If, in place of these three last words, we substitute the abstract words corresponding to them humanity, animality, rationality we shall have to say that these are in Sokrates, though they cannot (in their abstract form) be predicated of Sokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise, we can no longer say that this is in Sokrates, and that it may be predicated of grammar. Abstract alone can be predicated of abstract; concrete alone can be predicated of concrete; if we describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The Abstract is in the Concrete the Concrete contains or embodies the Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different Category.25 The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the philosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the Categorić, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be in the Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be co-efficients of its essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other works. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categorić on one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the Categorić he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical structure of a proposition.26

23 The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51, b. 46) as follows: αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι ὑποκεῦνται πᾶσιν, ἀλλ οὐχ ὁμοίωςˇ τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, τούτεστι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς κατηγορίαν, τούτεστι ταῖς καθόλου οὐσίαις.

24 Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this. System der Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.

25 The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of describing the Differentia whether by the concrete word πεζὸν, or by the abstract πεζότης gives occasion to an objection against Aristotles view, and to a reply from Dexippus not very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).

26 Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a. 14–30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase ἕν τινι. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categorić, pp. 44, 45, 53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br., we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his fluctuation. The doctrine of the Categorić was found especially difficult in its application to the Differentia.

In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν σημαίνει, δεῖ κατά τινος ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι, which is at variance with the language of the Categorić, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be said about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; Δ. p. 1017, b. 13. See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.

See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a. 31: οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίανˇ πάντα γὰρ καθ ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται, where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).

Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting those predicates which he describes as (not in a Subject but) affirmed or denied of a Subject i.e. the essential predicates. In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the Subject.27 This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.

27 Categor. p. 1, b. 10–15.

After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds28 to give the enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of entering into a proposition, must belong: 1. Essence or Substance; such as, man, horse. 2. How much or Quantity; such as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. What manner of or Quality; such as, white, erudite. 4. Ad aliquid To something or Relation; such as, double, half, greater. 5. Where; such as, in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. When; such as, yesterday, last year. 7. In what posture; such as, he stands up, he is sitting down. 8. To have; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. Activity; such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. Passivity; such as, he is being cut, he is being burned.

28 Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.

Ens in its complete state concrete, individual, determinate includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First Ens being the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in the answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will comprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten is a Generalissimum; having more or fewer species contained under it, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (Ens not being a genus). So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or describe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing two or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even of wider extent than Summa Genera; thus, Quality cannot be considered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases falling under it. It is a Summum Analogon, reaching beyond the comprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.29 And again the same particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under Relation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.30 Moreover, Good, like Ens or Unum, is common to all the Categories, but is differently represented in each.31

29 Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων, &c.

See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true explanation of this phrase, τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων (p. 69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies here a συνώνομον.

30 Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of Dexippus, p. 48, a. 28–37.

31 Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.

Aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the ten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4. Relation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon some, nothing at all.

His decuple partition of Entia or Enunciata is founded entirely upon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a proposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of scientific research, but from common speech; and from the dialectic, frequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and talk, about received and current opinions.32 We may presume him to have studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to discover what were the different relations in which Subjects and Predicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various questions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the answers suitable to be returned.33

32 Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: Id Categoriis non de ipsâ rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut in Categoriis alia sit πρώτη οὐσία et in prima philosophia: illa enim partes habet, hćc vero non componitor ex partibus.

Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the ἀπορία in Z. p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.

The different meaning of πρώτη οὐσία in the Categorić and in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche Dialektik, p. 141, seq.

33 Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer given, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει, &c.; also ibid. p. 2, b. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.

Aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental Category Substance or Essence Οὐσία; the abstract substantive word corresponding to Τὸ ὄν; which last is the vast aggregate, not generically One but only analogically One, destined to be distributed among the ten Categories as Summa Genera. The First Ens or First Essence that which is Ens in the fullest sense is the individual concrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates, Bukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This First Ens is indispensable as Subject or Substratum for all the other Categories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only; it never appears as a predicate of anything else. As Hic Aliquis or Hoc Aliquid, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of all the work of predication. It is Ens or Essence most of all, par excellence; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all First Entia were supposed to be removed, neither Second Entia nor any of the other Categories could exist.34

34 Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. Οὐσία ἡ κυριώτατα καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

The Species is recognized by Aristotle as a Second Ens or Essence, in which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely the character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as Predicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,35 in which both the First and the Second Essence are included; it is farther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has therefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as predicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the First Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more than the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this respect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse, that tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.36 The First Essence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or degrees of more or less.

35 Aristotle here, in the Categorić, ranks Genus and Species as being, both of them, δεύτεραι οὐσίαι. Yet since he admits Genus to be farther removed from πρώτη οὐσία than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a Third Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or ordination of οὐσία into First, Second, and Third, founded upon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the Categorić ranks as πρώτη οὐσία, ranks as τρίτη οὐσία in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys. Η. p. 1043, a. 18–28.

36 Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.

Nothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences, or said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare what the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates, What he is? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus to which he belongs that he is a man or an animal your answer will be appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood if you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you answer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz., that he is white, that he is running), your answer will be inappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declare what Sokrates is.37 Accordingly, none of these other Categories can be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First and of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of First Essences.38

37 Ibid. p. 2, b. 29–37. εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονταιˇ μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει, καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούςˇ τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅ, τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκόν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς. Ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσίαι λέγονται.

38 Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.

Essence or Substance is not in a Subject; neither First nor Second Essence. The First Essence is neither in a Subject nor predicated of a Subject; the Second Essences are not in the First, but are predicated of the First. Both the Second Essence, and the definition of the word describing it, may be predicated of the First; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas, of that which is in a Subject, the name may often be predicated, but never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second Essence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is not in a Subject, but that it may be predicated univocally of a Subject not only its name, but also the definition of its name.39

39 Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦτο οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταὶς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι.

All Essence or Substance seems to signify Hoc Aliquid Unum Numero. The First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does not really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is enunciated by a substantive name, like the First.40 It signifies really Tale Aliquid, answering to the enquiry Quale Quid? for it is said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each numerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The Second Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signify Tale Aliquid simply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It signifies Talem Aliquam Essentiam; it declares what the Essence is, or marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences, each Unum Numero. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than the Species.41

40 Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10–16: Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνειˇ ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστινˇ ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει.

41 Ibid. p. 3, b. 18–24.

Again, Essences have no contraries.42 But this is not peculiar to Essences, for Quanta also have no contraries; there is nothing contrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one of the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other variety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse, neither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was at another time; though he may become more or less white, more or less handsome.43

42 Ibid. b. 24–30.

43 Ibid. b. 34, seq.

But that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remaining Unum et Idem Numero, it is capable by change in itself of receiving alternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category. For example, this particular colour, being one and the same in number, will never be now black, and then white; this particular action, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time virtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all the other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white, hot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An objector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also of Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remains Unum Numero, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes; for the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting, may now be true and may presently become false. But this case is different, because there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the person or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the same man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick; now hot, then cold.44

44 Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.

Here Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament Essence or Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranks Quantity first among them.45 Quantum is either Continual or Discrete; it consists either of parts having position in reference to each other, or of parts not having position in reference to each other. Discrete Quanta are Number and Speech; Continual Quanta are Line, Surface, Body, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no position in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface, Body, have position in reference to each other. These are called Quanta, primarily; other things are called Quanta in a secondary way, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.46 Thus we say much white, when the surface of white is large; we say, the action is long, because much time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked, how long the action is? we must answer by specifying its length in time a year or a month.

45 Ibid. b. 21, seq.

46 Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.

To Quantum (as to Essence or Substance) there exists no contrary.47 There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits or an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more properly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to another Category. Nor is Quantum ever more or less Quantum; it does not admit of degree. The Quantum a yard is neither more nor less Quantum than that called a foot. That which is peculiar to Quanta is to be equal or unequal:48 the relations of equality and inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of Quanta.

47 Ibid. b. 11, seq.

48 Ibid. p. 6, a. 26–35.

From the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that of Relation;49 which he discusses in immediate sequence after Quantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his exposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how closely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it was that the distinction between the two should be made clear.

49 Ibid. a. 36, seq.

Relata (τὰ πρός τι ad Aliquid) are things such, that what they are, they are said to be of other things, or are said to in some other manner towards something else (ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωστοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greater than another; that which is called double is called also double of another. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c., are all Relata. Habit, is habit of something; perception and cognition, are always of something; position, is position of something. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some cases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or the more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each other.50 All Relata are so designated in virtue of their relation to other Correlata; the master is master of a servant the servant is servant of a master. Sometimes the Correlatum is mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus cognition is cognition of the cognitum, but cognitum is cognitum by cognition; perception is perception of the perceptum, but the perceptum is perceptum by perception.51 The correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the Correlate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be declared to be wing of a bird, there is no apparent correlation; we ought to say, the wing is wing of the winged, and the winged is winged through or by the wing; for the wing belongs to the bird, not quâ bird, but quâ winged,52 since there are many things winged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term appropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of coining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict accuracy, ἡ κεφαλή, τοῦ κεφαλωτοῦ κεφαλή not ἡ κεφαλή, τοῦ ζῷου κεφαλή; τὸ πηδάλιον, τοῦ πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, not τὸ πηδάλιον, πλοίου πηδάλιον.53

50 Aristot. Categ. p. 6, b. 20.

51 Ibid. b. 28–37.

52 Ibid. b. 36; p. 7, a. 5. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ, ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦˇ οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθοςˇ οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερὸν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἀλλ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιˇ πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν, ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες.