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97 Categor. p. 7, a. 5. ἐνίοτε δὲ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη.

98 Categor. p. 7, a. 31. ἔτι δ ἐὰν μέν τι οἰκείως ἀποδιδόμενον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστί, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τούτου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν πρὸς δεσπότην λέγηται, περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται.

This is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of predication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In general, it would be said that man and biped belonged to the Essence (οὐσία); and the being a master to the Accidents or Accompaniments (συμβεβηκότα). Here the case is reversed; man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the Essence. What is connoted by the term master is here the essential idea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by servant; while the connotation of man or biped sinks into the character of an accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a man, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the Corinthian Aphrodité, had each many slaves belonging to them. Moreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by man are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by the term master. Compare Metaphysica, Δ. p. 1025, a. 32; Topica, i. p. 102, a. 18.

99 That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of precision and appropriateness in designating the Correlatum belonging to each Relatum, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning in the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133–134, where δεσπότης and δοῦλος are also the illustrative examples employed.

100 Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.

101 See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίνˇ τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρουςˇ ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποῦς οὐδὲ χεὶρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνηνˇ διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη. πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὤστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτα εἶναι ἀλλ ὁμώνυμα; also p. 1254, a. 9: τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου.

Compare De Animâ, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a. 12.

The doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in the Aristotelian philosophy.

Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion of the Categories, but faintly and partially.

In the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation of Ad Aliquid different from, and superior to, that which we read in the Categorić; treating it, not as one among many distinct Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a different character according as it is blended with one or the other Essentia, Quantum, Quale, Actio, Passio, &c.102 He there, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of Relata, what seems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct denotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety, Relata Numero, and, as another, Relata secundum actionem et passionem (τὸ θερμαντικὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμαντόν, &c.), he proceeds to a third variety, such as the mensurabile with reference to mensura, the scibile with reference to scientia, the cogitabile with reference to cogitatio; and in regard to this third variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that mensura and cogitatio are Ad Aliquid, not because they are themselves related to mensurabile and cogitabile, but because mensurabile and cogitabile are related to them.103 You cannot say (he thinks) that mensura is referable to the mensurabile, or cogitatio to the cogitabile, because that would be repeating the same word twice over mensura est illius cujus est mensura cogitatio est illius cujus est cogitatio. So that he regards mensura and cogitatio as Correlata, rather than as Relata; while mensurabile and cogitabile are the Relata to them. But in point of fact, the distinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one which is more properly called the Correlatum; yet both are alike relative.

102 Metaphys. Δ. p. 1020, b. 27–32. At the same time we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates τὸ ὑπέρεχον and τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον under Πρός τι, he had just before (a. 25) ranked τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον, under the general head Ποσόν as ποσοῦ πάθη καθ αὑτά.

103 Metaphys. Δ. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p. 1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction here drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it is not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words in the Categorić; viz., that to be simul naturâ is not true of all Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that τὸ αἰσθητὸν is πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, and τὸ ἐπιστητὸν πρότερον τῆς ἐπιστήμης (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8, a. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the Scholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been careful here to observe his own precept of selecting οἰκείως the correlative term. He ought to have stated the potential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the actual. If he had done this, the συνύπαρξις τῶν πρός τι would have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a similar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of πτέρον and πτερωτόν (Schol. 63, a. 43). See Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, vol. ii. p. 330, note ^x.

I transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same question: On réplique maintenant, que la vérité du mouvement est indépendante de lobservation: et quun vaisseau peut avancer, sans que celui qui est dedans sen aperçoive. Je réponds, que le mouvement est indépendant de lobservation: mais quil nest point indépendant de lobservabilité. Il ny a point de mouvement, quand il ny a point de changement observable. Et męme quand il ny a point de changement observable, il ny a point de changement du tout. Le contraire est fondé sur la supposition dun Espace réel absolu, que jai réfuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin dune Raison suffisante des choses. (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770. Erdmanns edition.)

If we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites and applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us, but also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same predicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head in another: what is here spoken of as belonging to Actio or Passio, will be treated in another place as an instance of Quale or Ad Aliquid; even the derivative noun ἕξις (habitus) does not belong to the Category ἔχειν (Habere), but sometimes to Quale, sometimes to Ad Aliquid.104 This is inevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really several different aspects, and may be classified in one way or another, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover, this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would still be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of Ten, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal Categories Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction which has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by acute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept clearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must at the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates which declare Relation must also imply the fundamentum either of Quantity or of Quality.105

104 Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.

105 See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq.

The remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i. ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr. Mill says: It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of these common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads. (Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol. p. 48, b. 10 Br.: ἀθετοῦντες τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς πολλὰ παριεῖσαν καὶ μὴ περιλαμβάνουσαν, ἢ καὶ πάλιν πλεονάζουσαν. And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be ranked often under more than one head.) That could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi (or position in space); while the distinction between the latter and Situs (Κεῖσθαι) is merely verbal. The incongruity of erecting into a summum genus the tenth Category is manifest. On the other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among substances or among attributes.

Among the many deficiencies of the Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more glaring than the imperfect conception of Πρός τι (the Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category Κεῖσθαι (badly translated by commentators Situs, from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: τὸ δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mills remark, that it is only verbally distinguished from Ποῦ, Ubi. Κεῖσθαι is intended to mean posture, attitude, &c. It is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer. He is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, πὺξ προτείνων, &c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In the market-place, in the palćstra, &c. Κεῖσθαι (as Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily distinguished from Πρός τι: for the abstract and general word θέσις (position) is reckoned by Aristotle under Πρός τι, though the paronyma ἀνακεῖσθαι, ἑστάναι, καθῆσθαι are affirmed not to be θέσεις, but to come under the separate Category Κεῖσθαι. But Κεῖσθαι is clearly distinguishable from Ποῦ Ubi.

Again, to Mr. Mills question, In what Category are we to place sensations or other states of mind hope, fear, sound, smell, pain, pleasure, thought, judgment, &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I apprehend) that they come under the Category either of Quale or of Pati Ποιότητες or Πάθη. They are attributes or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a πάθος, and we speak of Kallias as πάσχων τι; if it be a durable disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations, it is ποιότης, and we describe Kallias as ποιός τις (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental and bodily conditions (ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. p. 9, b. 33). The line is dubious and difficult between πάθος and ποιότης, but one or other of the two will comprehend all the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have admitted that feelings are to be counted among realities, except as they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some other Hic Aliquis one or many. He would consider feelings as attributes belonging to these Πρῶται Οὐσίαι; and so in fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mills classification of Nameable Things is much better and more complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He takes account of himself only as an object as one among the πρῶται οὐσίαι, or individuals, along with Sokrates and Kallias.

The most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the Categories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is sometimes announced as having a standing per se; as not only logically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine, if we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,106 or from the other three, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real separation cannot be maintained. The Prima Essentia (we are told) is indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while all the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and therefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a Relation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what the First Essence is, together with some predicabilia as correlates, though it is not yet specified what the predicabilia are. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between First and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of separation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade down into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in Substance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating that the Species is more Substance or Essence, and that Genus less so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from attributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists without the mind (excluding within the mind or relation to the mind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without the mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be without; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of within and without understood, there is then room for graduation, according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less prominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the mental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When he speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all that he can say about it positively is to call it Unum numero and indivisible:107 even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity, measure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of Quantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance remains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it by the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes certain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence of the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would be considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the specific name.108 When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we find ourselves not merely in the Category of Substantia (Secunda), but also in that of Qualitas. The boundary between Substantia and Qualitas disappears; the latter being partially contained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes attributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here and elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at all, but Quality,109 though when considered as being in implication with the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes substantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both to Substance and to Quality (quale quid), making up as complement that which is designated by the specific name.110

106 Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as χωριστόν, the other Categories being not χωριστά (Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to distinguish whether he means by the term χωριστὰ sejuncta re, or sejuncta notione solâ. See Bonitz ad Metaphysic. (Δ. p. 1017), p. 244.

107 Categor. p. 3, b. 12: ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087, b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.

108 Hobbes says: Now that accident (i.e. attribute) for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing, and extension the essence of a body (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii. s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mills System of Logic, Book I. ch. vi. ss. 2–3; ch. vii. s. 5.

109 Categor. p. 3, b. 13: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει (b. 20).

Metaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐθὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. Compare Metaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a. 9.

That which is called πρώτη οὐσία in the Categorić is called τρίτη οὐσία in Metaphys. Η. p. 1043, a. 18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the generalissima are called πρῶτα, and particulars are called ἔσχατα. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), τὰ ἔσχατα sunt res singulć, quć et ipsć sunt extremć, ratione mentis nostrć, ab universis ad singula delabentis. Patricius remarks upon the different sense of the terms Πρώτη Οὐσία in the Categorić and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p. 21).

110 Metaphysic. Δ. p. 1020, b. 13: σχεδὸν δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους λέγοιτ ἂν τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τούτων ἕνα τὸν κυριώτατονˇ πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ποιοτὴς ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά. Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.

The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp. 52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be Neither and Both οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα (Plato, Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something intermediate between οὐσία and ποιότης, or between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός.

We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of Substantia given by Spinoza quod in se est et per se concipitur. It can no more be conceived or described without some of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the Subject of all Predicates: it is Unum numero and indivisible.111 Not one of these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is, relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic notion of Predicate.112 All three lie together at the bottom of the analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.

111 Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.

112 Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by καθ αὑτό καθ αὑτά, in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary to include in τὸ καθ αὑτὸ of the Category Οὐσία, all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation of that Category understood.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the Categories generally, and especially of πρώτη οὐσία, as simply naming (i.e. giving a proper name), and doing nothing more. I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms anterior and posterior can mean nothing more than logical anteriority and posteriority.

Mais comment classer les mots? Cest ŕ la réalité seule quil faut le demander; ŕ la réalité dont le langage nest que le réflet, dont les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-męmes, et se groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des espčces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant lindividu, lętre individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce quil est possible den dire en tant quętre, on aura les classes les plus générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme français, les attributions, quil est possible de lui appliquer. Voilŕ tout le fondement des Catégories. Ce nest pas du reste, une classification des choses ŕ la maničre de celles de lhistoire naturelle, quil sagit de faire en logique: cest une simple énumération de tous les points de vue, doů lesprit peut considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport ŕ lesprit lui-męme, mais par rapport ŕ leur réalité et ŕ leurs appellations. Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix significations principales des mots. La Catégorie de la Substance est ŕ la tęte de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la premičre, la plus essentielle, marque dun ętre, cest dętre. Cela revient ŕ dire quavant tout, lętre est, lętre existe. Par suite les mots qui expriment la substance sont antérieurs ŕ tous les autres et sont les plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots lŕ participeront en quelque sorte ŕ cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la nature. Mais de męme que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant par eux seuls forment des espčces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de męme en substance premičre et substance seconde. Les espčces et les genres, sils expriment la substance, ne lexpriment pas dans toute sa pureté; cest déjŕ de la substance qualifié, comme le dit Aristote. Il ny a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des espčces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi nexistent pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi, tout comme ils expriment lexistence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes de mots formeront les autres Catégories. Ces modifications, ces accidents, de lindividu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote nen reconnaît pas davantage. Voilŕ donc les dix Catégories: les dix seules attributions possibles. Par la premičre, on nomme les individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les qualifie. On dit dabord ce quest lindividu, et ensuite quel il est. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique dAristote, Preface, pp. lxxii.-lxxvii.

Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the conception, raised by the substantive named alone (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to come; a mere point of commencement or departure,113 known only by the various lines which may be drawn from it; a substratum for various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known only as a substratum, is known only relatively to a superstructure to come; the one is Relatum, the other Correlatum, and the mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience, belonging to the substratum, because it remains numerically one and the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is simultaneity by nature (according to Aristotles own definition of the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is the cause of the others.114

113 Plato would not admit the point as as anything more than ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a. 21).

114 Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεοςˇ &c.

When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must understand what he means by the term first. That term bears, in this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence, in the Categories, is a Hoc Aliquid (τόδε τι), illustrated by the examples hic homo, hic equus. Now, as thus explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as a mere substratum without Second Substance and without any Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are. Being an individual (Unum numero), it unites in itself both the essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes peculiar to itself.115 It is already understood as including attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare (δηλοῦν ἀποδιδόναι116) what these attributes are. The First or Complete Ens embodies in itself all the Predicaments, though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away either one of the three, and the First Ens disappears. But in regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority, founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The Hoc Aliquid or Unum Numero, which intimates in general outline a certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not yet know what they are being as it were a skeleton comes naturally as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a specific name connoting other attributes.117 The essential characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are domiciliated foreigners.118