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¹ Chappell (1990) shows that both approval ratings and voting depend on growth and inflation in the US.

² Åslund (2013) discuss the transition process in Russia and other post-communist countries at more length.

³ The notion of Russia being a “normal” country was introduced by Shleifer and Treisman (2005) and then used by the authors to look at a wider set of countries in Shleifer and Treisman (2014).

⁴ The benefits of investments in other sectors than the extractive industries are rather obvious. However, decisions to shift government policies away from extractive industries to the benefit of other sectors would be subject to a political process with strong opposing forces as discussed in Fortescue (2018).

⁵ In a recent study, Berezinskaya (2017) notes that there has been no growth in investment measured in constant ruble terms in recent years and this is the first prolonged stagnation of investments since Putin became president.

⁶ Both Bevan et al. (2004) and Frenkel et al. (2004) find significant negative Russian dummies in cross-country regressions of FDI determinants.

⁷ Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2000) discuss the links between institutional quality and the level and composition of capital flows and note that better institutions increase overall flows but that the share of FDI in total flows is negatively correlated with institutional quality.

⁸ Calvo (1998) provides a more in-depth analysis of “sudden stops”, which apparently come from a banker that said that “it is not the speed that kills, it is the sudden stop”.

⁹ Capital flows in the balance of payments statistics are divided into foreign direct investments, portfolio flows and “other” flows that include bank loans between domestic and foreign entities. There are also unaccounted flows that fall under the heading “errors and omissions”, which capture both statistical errors and unregistered flows that would include capital flight that do not go through the banking system or other official channels. As a country’s economic and financial system matures and the statistical agency develops, this component tends to shrink. The balance of payments statistics also makes a distinction between flows in the private sector versus government institutions. This may sound as a relatively straightforward split, but in a country like Russia where many of the large companies have a significant share of government ownership, the distinction is not as clear as it may appear. The share of government ownership in the Russian economy varies over time and across studies, but estimates suggest that the government could account for up to 70% of the economy overall and own 30–50% of asset (see Abramov et al., 2017) and that the share of the government in the economy has increased during Putin’s days in office (Djankov, 2015).

¹⁰ Nivorozhkin and Castagneto-Gissey (2016) focus on how relationships between the Russian stock market and international markets have changed significantly after the Ukrainian crisis. This is consistent with the finding here that there are more excessive volatility and negative return days in 2014/2015 than in earlier periods.

¹¹ Peresetsky (2011) instead uses the Japanese Nikkei index since this is closer in terms of time, but since the S&P is closer to a global stock market index and this analysis is not about market efficiency, the fact that we have to use a lag of S&P to get a good specification is not an issue.

¹² See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995) and Knack (1996) for property rights institutions, Mauro (1995) for corruption and growth and Acemoglu et al. (2014) for the importance of democratic institutions for growth.