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In our current work, we are considering a fourth justification for CAE, which is distinct from but also overlaps with the other three. Cousins and Chouinard (2018, forthcoming) are now seriously exploring an ethical or moral-political justification for CAE, which is rooted in considerations of responsibility, recognizing difference, representation, and rights. In this work, which at least partially arises from prior conversations with our colleague Miri Levin-Rozalis (2016, personal communication), we have come to understand a moral-political justification for CAE to be distinct from and yet overlapping with the other categories in obvious ways. For example, while representation is understood to be obligatory in a democratic sense, it may also be thought of in political terms even though it is not ideological per se (e.g., representative governance). Long ago, Mark and Shotland (1985) made the case for representation as a reason for engaging stakeholders in evaluation. In a different example, we might consider ethical justifications for involving indigenous peoples in evaluations of their own programs from a responsibility and recognition-of-differences perspective. Such considerations are part and parcel of post-colonial discourse in economics and philosophy. But such ethical justification could also overlap with epistemological considerations; for example, CAE could provide a bridge between indigenous and western ways of knowing in the joint production of evaluative knowledge (Chouinard & Cousins, 2007). Justification along these lines would draw from the philosophical category.