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ONE

The Challenge of Public Sector Reform in MENA

ROBERT P. BESCHEL JR.

TARIK M. YOUSEF

IN ALL COUNTRIES, GOVERNANCE and public sector reforms are driven by a complex set of interacting and occasionally conflicting dynamics. There are political pressures to respond decisively to exogenous shocks, ranging from wars and financial crises to natural disasters and pandemics. There are ongoing pressures to deliver high-quality services quickly, equitably, and responsively to the citizenry. There are pressures to ensure transparency and predictability in regulatory policy to attract domestic and foreign investment. There are fiscal pressures to restrain expenditures and to achieve efficient and effective spending outcomes, as well as contradictory impulses to both expand revenue and to avoid the political stigma associated with higher taxes and user fees. There are informal pressures to maintain networks of patronage and power, as well as to assuage important constituencies, such as staff, unions, suppliers, corporations, and civil society organizations.

Throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the challenges are even more complex. During the Arab Spring, the political landscape and governance reform agenda became topics of intense hope, concern, and uncertainty. Subsequent conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as the rise of Islamic extremism, have heightened geopolitical volatility and placed a premium on political stability. High levels of unemployment and population growth create ongoing challenges for job creation, which have historically been met through public employment—resulting in lax productivity, weak accountability, uneven service delivery, and some of the largest public sectors in the developing world. At the same time, the sharp drop in hydrocarbon prices since 2014 and their further fall in 2020 has placed serious financial pressure on many countries, as even non-oil producers are affected by the decline in remittances and transfer payments.

Expectations of greater political participation, transparency, and social accountability in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have now largely given way to the resurgence of what some scholars have dubbed the “new authoritarianism” and what others have characterized as a full-scale “counter-revolution.”1 Yet beneath this broader headline, the picture is often more complex and nuanced. Even in authoritarian states, there is often a strong reformist impulse, especially in response to crises or in pursuit of popular legitimacy. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for example, envisions a host of far-reaching changes under the rubric of effective governance, including delivering “the highest standards” of transparency and accountability; managing finances efficiently and effectively; creating agile public organizations; and implementing effective performance tracking.2

While this authoritarian resurgence must be seen as a setback for the aspirations of 2011, new protests in 2019 have again raised the prospect of an “Arab Spring 2.0,” as a few observers have framed it.3 Unlike the initial Arab Spring protests, which focused on ousting longtime autocratic leaders, the most recent round were heavily focused on the “good governance” agenda, including combating corruption, eliminating vested interests, opening up the political and economic space, and improving the quality of service delivery.4 Protesters view the lack of economic opportunity and poor government services as stemming directly from corrupt governance arrangements, whether driven by military domination in Sudan and Egypt or by sectarian political bargains in Lebanon and Iraq.

Cycles of Stability and Upheaval

An honest reckoning would note that the governance reform agenda in the MENA region has waxed and waned for much of the last century in tandem with the cycles of economic boom and bust. World Wars I and II were periods of fervent nationalist activity, as Arab publics looked to throw off external rule and move to self-rule. However, expectations were thwarted first by the assertion of European colonial rule and subsequently by the ascension of a series of native autocrats and dynasties.

More recently, these cycles appear to have shortened and intensified. The period from 2002 on was initially a heady time for proponents of good governance, catalyzed by the reverberations of the September 11 attacks and the emergence of transnational terrorism as a global concern. External forces were pushing for governance reform, most notably the United States through the “Freedom Agenda,” which sought to promote democracy around the world. So were internal voices, captured in the analyses of the Human Development Reports from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and a variety of declarations, from Alexandria to Doha, which all underscored the imperative of democratic political reform.5

Just prior to the Arab Spring, this agenda appeared to have lost momentum. Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution became mired in a perpetual constitutional crisis rooted in the contradictions of its confessional politics. Palestine’s 2006 elections, widely regarded as fair and free, had unleashed a stream of events that left the Palestinian state divided and deadlocked. After nearly descending into civil war in 2006 and 2007, Iraq had emerged as a more hopeful but still fragile polity, only to shortly thereafter be confronted by the rise of the Islamic State group (IS). Elsewhere in the region, the ruling elite appeared to be every bit as well-entrenched as they had been before, if not more so. The stability and longevity of the region’s authoritarian governments was once again widely assumed, accepted, and perhaps even favored by the international community.

Yet beneath the apparent calm, it was clear that underlying political, economic, and social dynamics were at work that would make the existing political and economic arrangements in many countries untenable. Summarizing the state of play regarding the region’s governance agenda during the summer of 2009, we argued:

The status quo is unlikely to continue for much longer. A variety of factors are putting pressure upon these regimes to change. MENA is on the cusp of a generational transition, and many leaders currently in their 70s and 80s will be forced by reason of death or ill-health to give way to a younger generation of rulers. Many large public sectors are at their breaking point, and the traditional strategy of using public sector employment for patronage and to soak up excess unemployment is no longer viable. New technologies and media will erode traditional monopolies on information. The growth of an educated middle class will create additional pressures for an expanded political voice commensurate with its growing economic clout.6

Just over ten years later, the octogenarians are gone, yet much of the analysis remains relevant. While it was certain that change would come, everyone failed to anticipate the strength of the backlash and the tenacity of entrenched interests. The forces that oppose comprehensive governance reforms have proven to be powerful and resistant to any adjustments to the status quo. The pace and speed in which political reform would arrive, as well as its nature and content, also remained very much open-ended questions. In the end, those were the elements that really mattered. Few would have predicted that the unrest would have started in Tunisia, whose national security apparatus had long been one of the most ruthless and effective in the region, or that the sparks would begin with an act of extraordinary desperation by a street vendor, whose sacrifice reflected the marginalized voices of a generation of youth across the Arab world.7

The revolutions of 2011 and the subsequent protests of 2019 shared a common assessment of the region’s governance failings. Political and economic power is overly concentrated in the hands of a narrow ruling elite; the rule of law is not adequately respected; and corruption is a serious problem.8 With the possible exception of e-governance metrics and reforms to encourage private sector growth and investment in a limited number of countries, most global indicators of governance have not significantly improved over the past decade.9 Parliaments and judiciaries remain relatively impotent and ineffective in challenging executive power. Access to information is limited. In many countries, governments have repressed independent media and civil society. In states rife with conflict, institutional degradation and loss of human capital is rampant.10

Budgets, Technology, and Protests

While the dynamics underlying the status quo are powerful, strong countervailing factors continue to press for change. Chief among these are growing financial constraints, technological expansion, and citizen mobilization. The recent COVID-19 pandemic will also exert a powerful influence that will create both threats and opportunities for the broader MENA governance and public sector reform agenda. Figure 1-1 provides a breakdown of Brent Crude Oil prices—a standard international benchmark—from 2010 to 2020. It captures the collapse in oil prices from 2014 through 2015, followed by a limited recovery that preceded the most recent collapse of prices in 2020. While prices have enjoyed a modest rebound since their nadir in April 2020, the long-term future of fossil fuel is uncertain. In the near term, the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to suppress the demand for automobile and aviation fuel, while the medium to longer term is clouded by concerns about capping carbon emissions and the growing cost-effectiveness of green energy alternatives.

FIGURE 1-1. Brent Crude Oil Prices, 2010–2020

Source: Macrotrends, “Brent Crude Oil Prices—10-Year Daily Chart,” 2020, www.macrotrends.net/2480/brent-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart.

The volatility of oil prices and the uncertain future of fossil fuels has pushed governments to focus their energies on reform. The impact of the oil price collapse after 2014 was felt throughout the MENA region with the emergence of double-digit fiscal deficits in oil-exporting countries and spillover effects to neighboring economies, leading to a growth slowdown, heightened financial vulnerabilities, and uncertain economic outlooks. As a result, IMF-supported stabilization efforts have been reintroduced to shore up government finances and to incentivize reforms. But with the recent oil price collapse and the COVID-19 shutdowns, the region is projected in 2020 to face the biggest economic contraction in decades. This will place severe limits on available fiscal resources to cushion the socioeconomic impact and support a recovery. As of July 2020, the weighted average price for a barrel of Brent crude oil was around US$44—a marker that would allow only Qatar to cover its current government expenditure.11 Most countries are now cautiously looking at ways to enhance domestic revenue mobilization, with the understanding that efforts to introduce taxes may provoke citizen demands for a greater say over how these resources are allocated.

A second dynamic transforming the broader governance landscape within MENA is the rapid growth in information and mobile technologies. Many countries, particularly those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have effectively utilized these technologies to improve governance, especially the provision of public services.12 By the end of 2018, nearly half of MENA countries had mobile phone subscriber penetration rates of 70 percent or more, as compared to a global average of 66 percent. United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar now have the highest global penetration rates of social media, which has become the primary source of news and interaction for growing shares of the MENA publics.13 The region continues, however, to lag behind international trends in legislating free access to information and ensuring transparency. Worse still, a variety of legal instruments, including national security provisions and criminal defamation laws, have been used to dampen free digital expression.

Not surprisingly, these developments are now influencing traditional governance arrangements in new and dynamic ways. Mass protests have made a comeback in recent years against economic austerity measures, deteriorating public services, and perceived government corruption in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. These demonstrations coincided with these populations self-reporting some of the lowest levels of life satisfaction and optimism of any region in the world.14 Drawing upon mobile technologies, these protest movements are amorphous and leaderless, which offers both advantages and disadvantages. In 2019, protesters in Algeria and Sudan adopted slogans from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, demanded systemic governance reforms, and toppled incumbent leaders. This led to tightly managed, but uncertain political transitions.

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to impact the region and its governance agenda in complex ways.15 As of mid-2020, the region has yet to experience the high number of fatalities per capita that have plagued other regions, such as Europe and North America and South America. Yet few would argue that the threat has peaked, and the danger of mass fatalities remains very real should the virus break containment and ravage through underserved communities and refugee camps. Early assessments of the socioeconomic fallout suggest a significant impact on livelihoods due to increased unemployment and poverty.16 The dislocation could also severely disrupt the flow of remittances that account for between 8 percent and 14 percent of GDP in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. Together with heightened uncertainty about the timing and speed of recovery, these conditions could fuel the spread of social unrest and undermine stability. On the other hand, the fiscal pressures generated by the pandemic could accelerate ongoing reform plans to diversify economies, strengthen social protection systems, and enhance the performance of the public sector, as seen recently in the improved quality of intergovernmental coordination.

MENA’s Development and Governance Agenda

Through the haze of these dynamics, three points are clear. The first is that MENA is currently facing daunting economic, social, and developmental challenges. Demographically, the population of the Arab world is expected to grow by 40 percent over the next two decades, adding a figure equal to the current population of Egypt, Iraq, and Morocco combined. These young and increasingly educated cohorts will require jobs, yet the region has maintained one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world for decades.17 Furthermore, the region has historically been far less adept than East and South Asia in attracting private investment to spur growth and generate employment. Demographic pressures will, in turn, create major challenges to provide adequate housing, infrastructure, education, health care, and water—services that Arab public sectors will be called upon to deliver in whole or in part.18

The return of large-scale protests has underscored the emergence of a new and more complex set of socioeconomic problems in MENA. There is growing evidence, for example, suggesting that the size of vulnerable populations in non-oil exporting countries has risen significantly in the past decade. Conditions of heightened economic vulnerability facing the lower middle class, due to failing social protection systems and emphasis on selective and targeted subsidies together with rising income inequality and limited intergenerational mobility, are contributing to the spread of political discontent.19 These challenges require addressing long-standing questions about the very social contract underpinning state-society relations to mitigate growing social tensions while expanding the benefits afforded by markets and technological change.

Second, issues of governance and public management will form an essential part of any solution to these problems. Governments in the region provide critical services, such as public health and education. They intervene and redistribute on a scale unrivaled elsewhere in the world. They regulate—indeed, in many countries over-regulate—the private sector. They make the bulk of investment decisions and provide basic infrastructure. Governments are often the largest employer and exert a disproportionate influence over the broader labor market. They control the instruments of state coercion and closely manage the available space for public information and consultation. With limited exceptions, MENA governments wield an extraordinary influence over the lives of their citizens and the development trajectory of their economies.

Any major effort to reorient the region’s economies toward private sector-led growth, to pursue more inclusive development strategies, or to improve the quality of service delivery, will, almost by definition, be an effort to translate developmental aspirations into concrete plans for public sector restructuring.20 Ultimately, these transitions will need to be broken down into the nuts and bolts of legal, institutional, and regulatory reforms to gain traction. Otherwise, they will remain forever at the level of slogans and aspirations. Once they enter the realm of public management, they become subject to a myriad of bureaucratic constraints, tradeoffs, frictions, and inertia that are common to all countries.21 The ability of future reformers to navigate these challenges will play an important role in their ultimate success or failure.

Third, as noted, the impetus to reform is not new. Governments have been struggling to implement improvements in how they organize themselves; make critical policies and decisions; allocate human and financial resources; collect revenue; improve the quality of their services; and spur private sector growth and development. They have adopted reforms most eagerly in response to severe economic downturns and political crises. Most of these reforms have been technocratic in nature, although a few have supported greater transparency and social accountability. Some of these reforms have been quite successful; others were dismal failures; and many ended up somewhere in the muddled middle.

Filling the Gap in MENA Cases

For the past two decades, governments in MENA have grappled with how to structure, manage, and deliver public services. Through the prism of eleven case studies, this book addresses the general dearth of knowledge about public sector reform and aims to make a significant contribution to our broader understanding of the challenges to pursuing it in this region. We have sought to understand not only the types of reforms that were undertaken but the underlying decision processes that shaped the reform agenda; how they were structured and implemented; who supported them and who resisted them; how the reforms were managed and how resistance was overcome; as well as where things went well and where they did not.

In the study of public administration, the case study method has become a widely accepted approach for evidence-based analysis, capturing noteworthy examples in a focused and structured manner and drawing lessons for policymaking.22 Hundreds of cases have been drafted on a wide variety of experiences within national, state, and local governments. Most of this experience is America-centric, reflecting the more pragmatic and managerial orientation of Anglo American administration. (Continental administrative traditions have historically placed a higher premium on law and legal training.) Fortunately, over the past few years, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government—perhaps the leading exemplar of the case study approach—has made a conscious effort to diversify its library and expand the number of cases from overseas.

However, very few have been developed for the MENA region. Of the roughly 2,000 cases in the Kennedy School’s database, fewer than five directly address managerial and administrative challenges in Arab countries.23 In 2010, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a series of cases that focused on policy reforms. While the study highlighted the initiatives that MENA governments were pursuing at that time, it paid less attention to examining the implementation and results of these reforms.24 Princeton’s Innovations for Successful Societies program has probably come the furthest in filling this lacuna, and over the past decade it has produced several case studies on reforms in MENA. Yet few scholars, practitioners, and analysts would dispute that much more needs to be done.

The Cases Selected for This Study

The cases in this study cover a range of countries, issues, and reform strategies. Five look at reforms in core systems and procedures within government, including cabinet reforms in Jordan; public financial management reforms in Palestine; efforts to reduce the cost of the wage bill through a voluntary retirement program (VRP) in Morocco; reforms to strengthen meritocracy in human resource management in Lebanon; and e-governance reforms in Dubai. Taken together, they address many of the key cross-cutting functions any government must perform, including coordinating policy; allocating financial and human resources and managing them effectively; and utilizing technology to deliver products and services.

The sixth cross-cutting case, Tunisia’s right to information (RTI) reforms, is different in that it sought to improve transparency in the wake of the Arab Spring. Many have argued that transparency plays an essential role in both combatting corruption and advancing social accountability. Yet the MENA region remains among the least transparent when measured by metrics such as RTI legislation.

The remaining set of five reforms looks at various efforts to improve the performance of line departments. One case examines Egypt’s reforms to improve its business climate and attract foreign investment by streamlining procedures for opening a business—a critical priority for many countries in the region. Another looks at Egypt’s efforts to enhance revenue collection and improve the business environment by reforming its tax policy and administration. A third case reviews Saudi Arabia’s initiative to improve service delivery and bill collection by setting up an automated payments system. A final set of cases looks at two highly effective efforts to improve document processing within Jordan.

Not all of these cases were successful. Jordan’s efforts to reform its cabinet structures made some modest improvements but fell well short of expectations. Lebanon’s efforts to restructure its human resource management practices were a clear failure, although an instructive one; the aspiration still survives in some quarters and may be revisited at some point in the future. At the other end of the spectrum, by any measure, Jordan’s largely home-grown efforts to restructure its document processing were a striking success and resulted in far more fair, efficient, transparent, and customer friendly service.

A number of cases fall somewhere in the middle because they represent solid but imperfect efforts to improve public administration. On the one hand, these initiatives enhanced performance, improved transparency, streamlined business processes, reduced opportunities for corruption, and delivered services more efficiently. On the other hand, the results of these programs were mixed. Morocco’s experience with its VRP exemplifies this trend. The program’s financial returns were positive. However, its impact on the broader functioning of the public sector was problematic. The program was unable to avoid the problems of adverse selection typically associated with such exercises, and many of the “best and brightest” ended up leaving the public sector. Tunisia’s experience with RTI legislation is another such case, in that it underscores the complexities of trying to strengthen transparency and social accountability in countries without a strong tradition of civil society engagement.

Taken together, these cases represent many of the most interesting and important sets of public management reforms attempted in MENA during the last two decades. All were serious efforts in which the credibility and prestige of senior officials were directly implicated. Several were among the region’s more impressive and far-reaching success stories. Some have endured the test of time, while others have faded. The final chapter reflects on the experiences gleaned from these cases, as well as their broader implications.

As we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, public sector reforms will be on the agenda of incumbent autocrats and new governments seeking to respond to the growing demands of their citizens.25 As countries slowly emerge from prolonged conflict, they will need to contemplate rebuilding institutions and infrastructure. Public sector reform will be at the heart of this process. For these reasons, we believe the lessons learned from these experiences, both good and bad, will be highly instructive for future reformers in both MENA and beyond.

Notes

1. See Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2017); and Shafeeq Ghabra, “The Arab World at a Crossroads: Rebellion, Collapse and Reform,” Arab Center Washington, DC, 2018, http://arabcenterdc.org/research-paper/the-arab-world-at-a-crossroads-rebellion-collapse-and-reform/.

2. See Vision 2030, “An Ambitious Nation,” 2020, www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/themes/4. Kuwait Vision 2035 was launched in 2017 and Oman Vision 2040 in 2019, both of which target ambitious public sector reforms; Morocco and Jordan also announced reform agendas for 2020.

3. Marwan Muasher, “Is This the Arab Spring 2.0?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/is-this-arab-spring-2.0-pub-80220; Paul R. Pillar, “Will There Be an Arab Spring 2.0?” National Interest, November 21, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/will-there-be-arab-spring-20-98527.

4. Rami G. Khouri, “Comprehensive, Contentious, Convulsive, and Continuing: Some Observations on the 2010–2020 Arab Uprisings,” Journal of Middle East Politics and Policy, 2020, https://jmepp.hkspublications.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2020/03/Khouri.pdf; Arab Barometer, “What Arab Publics Think: Findings from the Fifth Wave of Arab Barometer,” 2020, www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Arab_Barometer_CEPS_Presentation_Public-Opinion_2020.pdf.

5. See, for example, UNDP, “Arab Human Development Report 2002,” 2002, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/rbas_ahdr2002_en.pdf; World Bank, “Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability,” MENA Development Report, 2003, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/558101468776955399/Better-governance-for-development-in-the-Middle-East-and-North-Africa-enhancing-inclusiveness-and-accountability; and Bibliotheca Alexandrina, “The Alexandria Declaration,” 2004, www.bibalex.org/arf/en/Files/Document.pdf.

6. Robert Beschel and Tarik Yousef, “Governance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Survey of Major Issues and Trends,” in Legatum Prosperity Symposium (United Kingdom: Brocket Hall, 2009).

7. See Navtej Dhillon and Tarik M. Yousef, editors, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); For a recent update, see Nader Kabbani, “Youth Employment in the Middle East and North Africa: Revisiting and Reframing the Challenge,” Brookings Doha Center, Policy Briefing, February 2019, www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/.

8. For a detailed empirical assessment of corruption in business-government relations, see Ishac Diwan, Adeel Malik, and Izak Atiyas, Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: Business and Politics from Liberalization to the Arab Spring (Oxford University Press, 2019). Survey results from a post-2011 assessment can be found at European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), and World Bank Group, “What’s Holding Back the Private Sector in MENA? Lessons from the Enterprise Survey,” 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/170531469775655994/pdf/107174-WP-PUBLIC-7-22-2016-MENAESBookWEB.pdf.

9. See, for example, Hana Brixi, Ellen Marie Lust, and Michael Woolcock, “Trust, Voice, and Incentives: Learning from Local Success Stories in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank, 2015, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21607; Program on Governance and Local Development University of Gothenburg, “Governance in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa,” Background Paper for World Development Report, 2017, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/765671485539747061/WDR17-BP-Governance-in-Service-Delivery.pdf.

10. Shanta Devarajan and Lili Mottaghi, “The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Middle East and North Africa,” The World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Economic Monitor, 2017, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235401491413228678/pdf/114057-REPLACEMENT-PUBLIC-4-17-10-am-Online-MEM-SPRING-2017-FINAL.pdf.

11. According to IMF data, the fiscal break-even point varies by country, ranging from US$39.90 per barrel for Qatar to US$76.10 for Saudi Arabia to US$157.20 for Algeria. See IMF, “Breakeven Oil Prices,” https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60214246.

12. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “2018 UN E-Government Survey,” 2018, www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-un-e-government-survey.html.

13. See GSMA, “The Mobile Economy Middle East and North Africa 2019,” 2019, www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/mena/.

14. See, for example, Sergio Pinto and Carol Graham, “Men Without Work: A Global Well-Being and Ill-Being Comparison,” IZA World of Labor, 2019, p. 464, https://wol.iza.org/articles/men-without-work-a-global-well-being-and-ill-being-comparison/long.

15. See Adel Abdellatif and Ellen Hsu, “Grappling with a crisis like no other: the fragility of Arab countries in the face of COVID-19,” Medium, March 31, 2019, https://medium.com/@UNDPArabic/grappling-with-a-crisis-like-no-other-the-fragility-of-arab-countries-in-the-face-of-covid-19-581c8b017f59.

16. See, for example, the assessment reports on the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on economies and communities that have been completed by the United Nations Development Programme for Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen (www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/covid-19-pandemic-response/socio-economic-impact-of-covid-19.html).

17. For a recent examination of the challenges facing education in the region, including governance issues in the sector, see Safaa El Tayeb El-Kogali and Caroline Krafft, “Expectations and Aspirations: A New Framework for Education in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank, 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30618.

18. There are also significant economic and resource disparities between regions and within cities in most countries that require concerted attention in the future. See “Convergence: Five Critical Steps toward Integrating Lagging and Leading Areas in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank, 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33187.

19. See, for example, Rami G. Khouri, “How Poverty and Inequality are Devastating the Middle East,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2019, www.carnegie.org/topics/topic-articles/arab-region-transitions/why-mass-poverty-so-dangerous-middle-east/; Khalid Abu-Ismail and others, “Multidimensional Poverty Index for Middle Income Countries: Findings from Jordan, Iraq, and Morocco,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Africa (ESCWA), 2015, www.unescwa.org/publications/multidimensional-poverty-index-jordan-iraq-morocco; Facundo Alvaredo, Lydia Assouad, and Thomas Piketty, “Measuring Inequality in the Middle East 1990–2016: The World’s Most Unequal Region?” The Review of Income and Wealth, Volume 65, issue 4, 685–711.

20. How the public sector organizes to respond to increasingly complex policy challenges is a subject of growing debate among academics and practitioners. See Mark Robinson, “From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service: Implications for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries,” UNDP Global Center for Public Sector Excellence, 2015, www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/capacity-development/English/Singapore%20Centre/PS-Reform_Paper.pdf.

21. For an extended exposition of these issues in the context of public sector reform efforts in the advanced economies, see Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State, 3rd edition (Oxford University, 2011).

22. This case method often competes and at times complements experimental and statistical methods. See Sanjeev Khagram and Craig W. Thomas, “Toward a Platinum Standard for Evidence-Based Assessment by 2020,” Public Administration Review 20, issue 1 (December 2010), pp. S100–S106.

23. A number of other cases address MENA topics and themes but typically from the vantage point of addressing a particular issue or challenge in American foreign policy.

24. OECD, “Progress in Public Management in the Middle East and North Africa,” Case Studies on Policy Reform, 2010, www.oecd.org/mena/governance/48634338.pdf.

25. Mehran Kamrava, Inside the Arab State (Oxford University Press, 2018); Joseph Bahout and others, “Arab Horizons: Pitfalls and Pathways to Renewal,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ArabHorizons_report_final.pdf; and The Atlantic Council, “Politics, Governance, and State-Society Relations,” A Working Group Report of the Middle East Strategy Task Force, 2016, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/cmep_201611_mest_paper_final.pdf.