Читать книгу The Handbook of Solitude - Группа авторов - Страница 64

Another view on the solitary self in infancy is provided by the work of Daniel Stern (1985/2000, 1994, 1995), who, although inspired by psychoanalytic thinking, was one of the main proponents of intersubjectivity – a theory highly relevant to the study of solitude. He introduced a layered model of development that was later revised (Stern, 1985/2000) to include three preverbal senses of self – emergent, core, and subjective (or intersubjective) – all emerging together and in interaction with each other (rather than occurring successively). Under the influence of infant research (e.g., Beebe & Stern, 1977; Trevarthen, 1979), Stern supports the view of the initial dualism, which means that intersubjectivity is present from the beginning of life or that the self is with a differentiated other from the start and gradually develops new forms of relatedness.

Of relevance to beneficial solitude is the self‐in‐the‐presence‐of‐the‐other (Stern, 1985/2000), which reminds us of Winnicott’s notion of the capacity to be alone in the presence of the mother (discussed in the following section). It is a variation of the self‐being‐with‐a‐self‐regulating‐other and refers to the infant’s experience of being alone, with his/her perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and actions, in the physical proximity of the caregiver. Even more relevant to the study of solitude is the schema‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self. This concept is inspired by Winnicott’s (1965) notion of going‐on‐being (see previous section) and Tustin’s (1990) work with high‐functioning autistic children. It represents the way of being with one’s own, without other people around, “a state of mentally floating, alone” (Stern, 1995, p. 108), during which mental activities take place, but the individual does not pay attention to them. Stern (1995) wrote of a friend of his who had such an experience and who seemed to enjoy the beneficial aftereffect of solitary moments: “Such moments are experienced as free mental ambling, quite pleasurable, refreshing, and often productive, because when she breaks the moment and ‘returns’, she often does so with solutions to problems and questions that were pressing just before” (p. 108).

Stern (1995) further argued that when we are alone, “something is always happening” (p. 109), such as intentionally prolonging a peaceful moment in order to keep a state of equilibrium. This is a feeling shape. This moment of lived experience is “a‐way‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self” or, better, “a‐way‐of‐one‐part‐of‐the‐self’s‐being‐with‐another‐part‐of‐the‐self.” It is as if the individual observes his/her complex mental operations from a distance, without interfering, without the need to complete a task and offer a product. The moment is interpersonal in two ways: (i) it is “a‐negative‐way‐of‐being‐with‐someone,” because it reduces consciousness and intrusions and (ii) it is a way for a part of the self to be with another part of the self.

The schema‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self has the same structure as the schema‐of‐being‐with‐an‐other (Stern, 1995). Both schemas use the same kinds of constants, are built around feeling shapes, acquire a narrative form, and are characterized by interpersonal motives and functions. “These experiences structure subjective time, much as music can. Such structuring not only organizes but heightens the sense of existing” (Stern, 1995, p. 108).

Stern’s (1985/2000) conception of intersubjectivity includes the acceptance (influenced by Winnicott) that some experiences are non‐shareable, perhaps because they are never attuned with by the mother. Total psychic transparency leads to psychopathology, as much as the inability to share experiences leads to alienation and loneliness. From infancy, we live in between these two poles. Being‐with‐a‐self‐regulating‐other means co‐discovering a balance between self‐disclosure and privacy. In ill health, the lack of attunement by the mother creates in the infant a feeling of uncanny aloneness. In Stern’s view, loneliness is felt only if sharing has taken place and then has been lost. Finally, with the emergence of language during the end of the first year of life (sense of a verbal self and other), the infant is more likely than before to experience the inability to share some experiences not only with others but also with the self. Paradoxically, language creates a split between the lived and the represented experience, thus contributing to estrangement, while simultaneously enabling the infant to share his/her state of “‘being‐with’ others in intimacy, isolation, loneliness, fear, awe, and love” (Stern, 1985, p. 182). With the advent of symbolic function, the domain of the private is established between the false self and the true self; it contains all experiences that are not shared, but are not disavowed, which means that they are accessible by language and changeable through experience.

In conclusion, it is remarkable that, although Stern formulated a theory for the interpersonal world of the infant and was a proponent of intersubjectivity, he also acknowledged the infant’s need for aloneness and linked it with adult experiences of beneficial aloneness. Schema‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self – a notion combining cognitive and psychoanalytic traditions – implies that from early on the individual is capable of a rather stable representation of a non‐shareable self, complemented by the representation of a self‐in‐a‐relationship. Of major importance for the understanding of the creative use of aloneness is Stern’s view about the paradox of language. The emergence of language, early in life, marks the end of the possibility for a complete understanding, through all senses, of oneself by a significant other, because of the chasm it produces between the real and the symbolized experience. However, only with language can the individual fill and enjoy this empty space as well as share, as far as this is possible, his/her aloneness experiences with the other.