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1 Thanks to Professor Harry Collins for fruitful discussions on interactional and contributory expertise.

2 Despite extensive use of biking as an archetypical example of implicit cognition, it might invoke erroneous beliefs about implicitness and bodily foundations. We are fully aware of instances of knowledge (implicit or explicit) without overt physical elements of action, but for the sake of clarity refrain from addressing the differences in this chapter. Here, the interest is exclusively on the bodily part of biking and not on putative social aspects.

3 In this context, “body” refers to limbs and other body parts sustaining actual biking.

4 Almost the same scenario as the famous “brain in a vat” composition in which evil neuroscientists are thought to transfer brains to a vat and hook it up to computers overnight.

5 The idea is not that farfetched, as shown by the current promotion in the lifestyle industry of electric muscle stimulators (originally for medical purposes) targeted to stimulate motor nerves to cause a muscle contraction.

6 In Collins (2000), a Vietnam veteran has his brain loaded with the knowledge of a champion tennis player but does not have the constitution to act like one and thus lacks what Collins names “embodied knowledge”.

7 Biological traits have not evolved intentionally. They have come about incrementally to ensure reproductive success.

8 An animal order including lemurs, tarsiers, monkeys, apes and human beings.

9 Reproductive fitness.

10 Innate characteristics are species-specific. Biologically speaking, it means that all members of the species are equally equipped and equally responsive.

11 We have to assume that the amount of time spent thinking about the topic while in the lab is not mistaken for the additional effect of bodily engagement.

12 This is not to say that elderly people have lost the ability to think creatively because of age. Creativity originates from other sources, one of which is, in fact, experience and the resulting breadth of view.

13 The question of what interactional knowledge specifically refers to is very interesting. Is it mainly abstract notions without mental images or are most ideas, however vague, connected to former experiences and previous perceptions?

14 One might speculate that visual size transformations could also rely – in part – on motor areas. This would not be unlikely if subjects imagined moving towards or away from an object, rather than the object moving nearer or farther away from them. To our knowledge, this proposition has not been empirically tested.