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Initially both optimism and scepticism thrived with respect to political developments in the aftermath of communist rule. In political science there was certainly room for optimism. Following the lead of Rustow (1970), a group of prominent researchers led by Schmitter and O’Donnell published a monumental four-volume study of the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America, emphasising actors and stages in the process (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead (eds.) 1986a; 1986b; 1986c; O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). The core of their argument rests on the intuitive fact that the initiation of democracy is an agreement made among concerned interests (Przeworski 1988; 1991; McFaul 2002) – a matter of ‘craftsmanship’ (di Palma 1990). Structural factors are consequently relegated to a status of being more or less benevolent factors for the survival of democracy rather than root causes for the development of democracy (Przeworski & Limongi 1997). The speed with which the Central and Eastern European countries embraced democratic procedures can be interpreted as the ultimate confirmation of their core argument.

The initial optimism was, however, soon laced with scepticism. The concerns about the viability of democracy were not unfounded. Stepan and Suleiman (1995), for example, warned about political instability in Poland, and the ‘stolen revolution’ in Romania (Tismaneanu 1997) was ample evidence of the difficulties associated with establishing democracy. Populism, not only as a general phenomenon (Carpenter 1997), endangered economic reform (Sachs 1992) and bore with it the seeds of authoritarianism (Eke & Kuzio 2000). Popular mistrust of new institutions and the political elite also became widespread (Misler & Rose 1997; 2001). However, perhaps because of the speed with which the Central and East European countries embraced free elections, the transition to and consolidation of democracy came to be used interchangeably, creating a conceptual fog between the end goal of political development and the process (Kopecky & Mudde 2000). In other words, the focus on getting the institutions right was confounded with internalisation and the acceptance of democratic norms and values.

The theories of transition from authoritarian regimes have focused on the development of democratic political institutions. In line with the scepticism noted above, it would seem odd to speak of a process of democratisation as there are few signs that this is occurring in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Instead a number of scholars have pointed to the rise of authoritarianism (Kubicek 1998; Treacher 1996), if not sultanism (Eke & Kuzio 2000; Blank 2004) or clan politics (Schatz 2004; Collins 2004; Matsuzato 2004). The last few years have seen a growing literature about these ‘halfway houses’ using vocabulary like ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky & Way 2003) and ‘Hybrid Regimes’ (Diamond 2002) in their efforts to classify regimes and to understand the processes in countries that feature some elements of liberal democracy, but also major or minor democratic deficiencies. That is, while much of Eastern Europe is characterised by deficient democracy, democratic quality remains problematic even among more advanced countries (Lewis 2004, 162). So in terms of democratic choices, the outcomes of post-communist transitions range from defective democracies or de facto return to authoritarian regimes further to the East and in the Southern Balkans, to success stories of democratically consolidated systems that are now – or are about to become – members of the European Union. Even though there are undoubtedly some success stories, they are still marred by democratic deficits (Rupnik 2007; Mungio-Pippidi 2007). That is not to say that democracy is considered fragile in the new and coming EU member states. At a macro-level EU membership will safeguard democratic transition (Sadurski 2004). Still, ‘there are democratic deficits, corresponding to the advanced democracies, acting as obstacles to further democratization’ (Ágh 2002). So while the early process of building democratic institutions is finished and primarily interpreted as a top-down elite project, the development of efficient political decision-making systems capable of producing policies that maximise collective benefits to democratic majorities and the creation of state administrations to implement political decisions in transparent ways that include citizens’ interests and concerns are much more difficult and timeconsuming tasks.

In early transition studies much ground was gained with respect to the description and explanation of the sudden breakdown of the communist regimes, the subsequent negotiations (Elster 1993), and the study of the early choices in rebuilding institutions (Geddes 1996; Elster, Offe & Preuss (eds.) 1998; Nørgaard & Johannsen 1999). A large number of case studies discussed the political developments in individual countries in detail, but few scholars attempted comparative studies. Ágh’s (1998) informative study of Central Europe and the Balkans and Geddes’ (1999) seminal article, in which she uses game theory to lay the theoretical foundations for comparing military and party cadre preferences depending on their strength, are notable exceptions. Even though O’Donnell (2002, 7), one of the authors of the four-volume study mentioned earlier that paved the way for transitology, later emphasised that ‘nothing [is] predestined about the transition’, there has been a puzzling silence about the formation of actor preferences. This silence is justified in a rational choice model applying a short-term perspective that distinguishes between hard- and soft-liners (Karl 1986; Elster 1993); but Haggard and Kaufman (1997) have rightly challenged transition theory for using the short-term perspective because it fails to address the historical context and the political economy, without which it is not possible to understand the relative positions of the actors or their values.

The successes, deficiencies or democratic failures of various regimes within the region demonstrate that we will not be able to understand the trajectories or later developments unless the historical context and the values and strengths of the respective actors are factored into the equation. Although we emphasise the importance of the past, we do not necessarily see the past as a deadweight but, referring to Stark and Bruszt (1998), as the social logic that configured strategic choices and shaped future policy outcomes. However, following Kreuzer & Pettai (2004), merely referring to history is not sufficient. Instead, the impact of each historical phenomenon upon the present must be specified and, ideally, a weight must be assigned to the argument. Thus, rejecting the assumption of a tabula rasa situation after the breakdown of the Soviet communist regime, we contend that the political developments that formed the power structures of the elites were shaped by historical constraints as well as opportunities. Moreover, we not only focus on the political and economic transformation as being pertinent to the early transitology studies. Following Bunce as quoted above, our ambition is to analyse the way in which the present power structures and the opportunities and choices afforded to the elites were shaped by the past and intertwined in the four transition areas: political development, economic liberalisation, nation building, and state building. Furthermore, we seek to place the development of domestic power structures within the international context.