Читать книгу Western Philosophy - Группа авторов - Страница 129

The whole enterprise of metaphysics came under heavy attack in the 1920s and 1930s from a group of philosophers (originally based in Vienna) who came to be known as ‘logical positivists’. Prominent among these was Rudolph Carnap, who taught at Vienna and Prague, and later (after emigrating to the United States in 1936) at Chicago and Los Angeles. One of the slogans of the positivists (to be found in the extract that follows) was ‘the meaning of a statement lies in the method of its verification’. David Hume, as we have seen (extract 7, above), insisted that all our knowledge concerning matters of fact must be based on experience; Immanuel Kant (extract 8) had denied the viability of metaphysics that attempted to free itself from all reference to sensory experience. Carnap’s position is that the traditional claims of metaphysicians are, in the strict sense, meaningless: they are ‘pseudo-statements’ that fail to assert anything at all.

Carnap argues first, that many of the individual words used by metaphysicians are no more than ‘empty shells’, since those who use them do not provide any empirical criterion for their use. In order to be meaningful a given word ‘F’ must be supported by rules which enable us to verify, in a concrete case, whether something is F or not. For a word (such as ‘arthropod’) to mean something, it must be possible to specify the truth-conditions for the basic sentences in which that word occurs (these basic sentences are ones whose content can be fixed through some kind of observation or sensory experience). So for Carnap the only meaningful sentences are either those which (like those of logic and mathematics) are true simply in virtue of their form, or those which ‘fall within the domain of empirical science’. ‘Any statement one desires to construct which does not fall within these categories is automatically meaningless.’

Using this framework, Carnap argues that it is overgenerous to dismiss traditional metaphysics as merely a collection of ‘speculations’ or ‘fairy tales’. For assertions in these latter categories, though we may dismiss them, are at least capable of being true or false; metaphysical claims, by contrast, fail to make any intelligible assertions whatever. At best they can be thought of as expressions of some kind of ‘attitude towards life’ – something that could better be done in poetry or music.

Despite the vigorous and in some ways salutary challenge it offered, the programme of the positivists for the ‘elimination of metaphysics’ had ground to a halt by the 1960s. There turned out to be serious problems in formulating the verification principle in a way which was stringent enough to exclude traditional metaphysics, yet liberal enough to accommodate the complex theoretical statements of natural science.

There have been many opponents of metaphysics from the Greek sceptics to the empiricists of the nineteenth century. Criticisms of very diverse kinds have been set forth. Many have declared that the doctrine of metaphysics is false, since it contradicts our empirical knowledge. Others have believed it to be uncertain, on the ground that its problems transcend the limits of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysicians have declared that occupation with metaphysical questions is sterile. Whether or not these questions can be answered, it is at any rate unnecessary to worry about them; let us devote ourselves entirely to the practical tasks which confront active men every day of their lives!

The development of modern logic has made it possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of metaphysics. The researches of applied logic or the theory of knowledge, which aim at clarifying the cognitive content of scientific statements and thereby the meanings of the terms that occur in the statements, by means of logical analysis, lead to a positive and to a negative result. The positive result is worked out in the domain of empirical science; the various concepts of the various branches of science are clarified; their formal, logical and epistemological connections are made explicit. In the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier anti-metaphysical standpoints …

In saying that the so-called statements of metaphysics are meaningless, we intend this word in its strictest sense. In a loose sense of the word a statement or a question is at times called meaningless if it is entirely sterile to assert or ask it. We might say this for instance about the question ‘what is the average weight of those inhabitants of Vienna whose telephone number ends with “3”?’ or about a statement which is quite obviously false like ‘in 1910 Vienna had 6 inhabitants’ or about a statement which is not just empirically, but logically false, a contradictory statement such as ‘persons A and B are each a year older than the other’. Such sentences are really meaningful, though they are pointless or false; for it is only meaningful sentences that are even divisible into (theoretically) fruitful and sterile, true and false. In the strict sense, however, a sequence of words is meaningless if it does not, within a specified language, constitute a statement. It may happen that such a sequence of words looks like a statement at first glance; in that case we call it a pseudo-statement. Our thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-statements…

A word which (within a definite language) has a meaning, is usually also said to designate a concept; if it only seems to have a meaning while it really does not, we speak of a ‘pseudo-concept’. How is the origin of a pseudo-concept to be explained? Has not every word been introduced into the language for no other purpose than to express something or other, so that it had a definite meaning from the very beginning of its use? How, then, can a traditional language contain meaningless words? To be sure, originally every word (excepting rare cases which we shall illustrate later) had a meaning. In the course of historical development a word frequently changes its meaning. And it also happens at times that a word loses its old sense without acquiring a new one. It is thus that a pseudo-concept arises.

What, now, is the meaning of a word? What stipulations concerning a word must be made in order for it to be significant? (It does not matter for our investigation whether these stipulations are explicitly laid down, as in the case of some words and symbols of modern science, or whether they have been tacitly agreed upon, as is the case for most words of traditional language.) First, the syntax of the word must be fixed, i.e. the mode of its occurrence in the simplest sentence form in which it is capable of occurring; we call this sentence form its elementary sentence. The elementary sentence form for the word ‘stone’ e.g. is ‘x is a stone’; in sentences of this form some designation from the category of things occupies the place of ‘x’, e.g. ‘this diamond’, ‘this apple’. Secondly, for an elementary sentence S containing the word, an answer must be given to the following question, which can be formulated in various ways:

(1) What sentences is S deducible from, and what sentences are deducible from S?

(2) Under what conditions is S supposed to be true, and under what conditions false?

(3) How is S to be verified?

(4) What is the meaning of S?

… In the case of many words, specifically in the case of the overwhelming majority of scientific words, it is possible to specify their meaning by reduction to other words … e.g. “‘arthropods” are animals with segmented bodies and jointed legs’. Thereby the above-mentioned question for the elementary sentence form of the word “arthropod”, that is for the sentence form “the thing x is an arthropod”, is answered: it has been stipulated that a sentence of this form is deducible from premises of the form “x is an animal”, “x has a segmented body”, “x has jointed legs”, and that conversely each of these sentences is deducible from the former sentence. By means of these stipulations about deducibility (in other words: about the truth-condition, about the method of verification, about the meaning) of the elementary sentence about “arthropod”, the meaning of the word “arthropod” is fixed. In this way every word of the language is reduced to other words and finally to the words which occur in the so-called “observation sentences” or “protocol sentences”. It is through this reduction that the word acquires its meaning.

For our purposes we may ignore entirely the question concerning the content and form of the primary sentences (protocol sentences) which has not yet been definitely settled. In the theory of knowledge it is customary to say that the primary sentences refer to ‘the given’; but there is no unanimity on the question what it is that is given. At times the position is taken that sentences about the given speak of the simplest qualities of sense and feeling (e.g. ‘warm’, ‘blue’, ‘joy’ and so forth); others incline to the view that basic sentences refer to total experiences and similarities between them; a still different view has it that even the basic sentences speak of things. Regardless of this diversity of opinion it is certain that a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences are fixed, whatever the characteristics of the protocol sentences may be; and similarly, that a word is significant only if the sentences in which it may occur are reducible to protocol sentences.

Since the meaning of a word is determined by its criterion of application (in other words by the relations of deducibility entered into by its elementary sentence-form, by its truth-conditions, by the method of its verification), the stipulation of the criterion takes away one’s freedom to decide what one wishes to ‘mean’ by the word. If the word is to receive an exact meaning, nothing less than the criterion of application must be given; but one cannot, on the other hand, give more than the criterion of application, for the latter is a sufficient determination of meaning. The meaning is implicitly contained in the criterion; all that remains to be done is to make the meaning explicit.

Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that someone invented the new word ‘teavy’ and maintained that there are things which are teavy and things which are not teavy. In order to learn the meaning of this word, we ask him about its criterion of application: how is one to ascertain in a concrete case whether a given thing is teavy or not? Let us suppose to begin with that we get no answer from him: there are no empirical signs of teavyness, he says. In that case we would deny the legitimacy of using this word. If the person who uses the word says that all the same there are things which are teavy and there are things which are not teavy, only it remains for the weak, finite intellect of man an eternal secret which things are teavy and which are not, we shall regard this as empty verbiage. But perhaps he will assure us that he means, after all, something by the word ‘teavy’. But from this we only learn the psychological fact that he associates some kind of images and feelings with the word. The word does not acquire a meaning through such associations. If no criterion of application for the word is stipulated, then nothing is asserted by the sentences in which it occurs; they are but pseudo-statements.

Secondly, take the case when we are given a criterion of application for a new word, say ‘toovy’; in particular, let the sentence ‘this thing is toovy’ be true if and only if the thing is quadrangular. (It is irrelevant in this context whether the criterion is explicitly stated or whether we derive it by observing the affirmative and the negative uses of the word.) Then we will say: the word ‘toovy’ is synonymous with the word ‘quadrangular’. And we will not allow its users to tell us that nevertheless they ‘intended’ something else by it than ‘quadrangular’; that though every quadrangular thing is also toovy and conversely, this is only because quadrangularity is the visible manifestation of toovyness, but that the latter itself is a hidden, not itself observable property. We would reply that after the criterion of application has been fixed, the synonymy of ‘toovy’ and ‘quadrangular’ is likewise fixed, and that we are no further at liberty to ‘intend’ this or that by the word.

Let us briefly summarize the result of our analysis. Let ‘a’ be any word and ‘S(a)’ the elementary sentence in which it occurs. Then the sufficient and necessary condition for ‘a’ being meaningful may be given by each of the following formulations, which ultimately say the same thing:

1 The empirical criteria for ‘a’ are known.

2 It has been stipulated from what protocol sentences ‘S(a)’ is deducible.

3 The truth-conditions for ‘S(a)’ are fixed.

4 The method of verification of ‘S(a)’ is known.

Many words of metaphysics, now, can be shown not to fulfil the above requirement, and therefore to be devoid of meaning … [An] example is the word ‘God’. Here we must, apart from the variations of its usage within each domain, distinguish the linguistic usage in three different contexts or historical epochs, which, however, overlap temporally. In its mythological use the word has a clear meaning. It, or parallel words in other languages, is sometimes used to denote physical beings which are enthroned on Mount Olympus, in Heaven or in Hades, and which are endowed with power, wisdom, goodness and happiness to a greater or lesser extent. Sometimes the word also refers to spiritual beings which, indeed, do not have manlike bodies, yet manifest themselves nevertheless somehow in the things or processes of the visible world and are therefore empirically verifiable. In its metaphysical use on the other hand, the word ‘God’ refers to something beyond experience. The word is deliberately divested of its reference to a physical being or to a spiritual being that is immanent in the physical. And as it is not given a new meaning, it becomes meaningless. To be sure, it often looks as though the word ‘God’ had a meaning even in metaphysics. But the definitions which are set up prove on closer inspection to be pseudo-definitions. They lead either to logically illegitimate combinations of words, or to other metaphysical words (e.g. ‘primordial basis’, ‘the absolute’, ‘the unconditioned’, ‘the autonomous’, ‘the self-dependent’ and so forth), but in no case to the truth conditions of its elementary sentences …

Just like … ‘God’, most of the other specifically metaphysical terms are devoid of meaning, e.g. ‘the Idea’, ‘the Absolute’, ‘the Unconditioned’, ‘the Infinite’, ‘the being of being’, ‘non-being’, ‘thing in itself’, ‘absolute spirit’, ‘objective spirit’, ‘essence’, ‘being in itself ’, ‘being-for-itself’, ‘emanation’, ‘manifestation’… etc. These expressions are in the same boat as our previously fabricated example ‘teavy’. The metaphysician tells us that empirical truth-conditions cannot be specified; if he asserts that nevertheless he ‘means’ something, we show that this is merely an allusion to associated images and feelings which, however, do not bestow a meaning on the word. The alleged statements of metaphysics which contain such words have no sense, assert nothing, are mere pseudo-statements …

Having found that many metaphysical statements are meaningless, we confront the question whether there is not perhaps a core of meaningful statements in metaphysics which would remain after elimination of all the meaningless ones.

Indeed, the results we have obtained so far might give rise to the view that there are many dangers of falling into nonsense in metaphysics, and that one must accordingly endeavour to avoid these traps with great care if one wants to do metaphysics. But actually the situation is that meaningful metaphysical statements are impossible. This follows from the task which metaphysics sets itself: to discover and formulate a kind of knowledge which is not accessible to empirical science.

We have seen earlier that the meaning of a statement lies in the method of its verification. A statement asserts only so much as is verifiable with respect to it. Therefore a sentence can be used only to assert an empirical proposition, if indeed it is used to assert anything at all. If something were to lie, in principle, beyond possible experience, it could be neither said nor thought nor asked.

(Meaningful) statements are divided into the following kinds. First there are statements which are true solely by virtue of their form (‘tautologies’ according to Wittgenstein; they correspond approximately to Kant’s ‘analytic judgements’). They say nothing about reality. The formulae of logic and mathematics are of this kind. They are not themselves factual statements, but serve for the transformation of such statements. Secondly there are the negations of such statements (‘contradictions’). They are self-contradictory, hence false by virtue of their form. With respect to all other statements the decision about truth or falsehood lies in the protocol sentences. They are therefore (true or false) empirical statements and belong to the domain of empirical science. Any statement one desires to construct which does not fall within these categories becomes automatically meaningless. Since metaphysics does not want to assert analytic propositions, nor to fall within the domain of empirical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified and which are therefore devoid of sense, or else to combine meaningful words in such a way that neither an analytic (or contradictory) statement nor an empirical statement is produced. In either case pseudostatements are the inevitable product …

Our claim that the statements of metaphysics are entirely meaningless, that they do not assert anything, will leave even those who agree intellectually with our results with a painful feeling of strangeness: how could it be explained that so many men in all ages and nations, among them eminent minds, spent so much energy, nay veritable fervour, on metaphysics if the latter consisted of nothing but mere words, nonsensically juxtaposed? And how could one account for the fact that metaphysical books have exerted such a strong influence on readers up to the present day, if they contained not even errors, but nothing at all? These doubts are justified since metaphysics does indeed have a content; only it is not theoretical content. The (pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs, neither existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) nor non-existing ones (in that case they would be at least false statements). They serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life.

… The metaphysician believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at stake. In reality, however, he has not asserted anything, but only expressed something, like an artist. That the metaphysician is thus deluding himself cannot be inferred from the fact that he selects language as the medium of expression and declarative sentences as the form of expression; for lyrical poets do the same without succumbing to self-delusion. But the metaphysician supports his statements by arguments, he claims assent to their content, he polemicizes against metaphysicians of divergent persuasion by attempting to refute their assertions in his treatise. Lyrical poets, on the other hand, do not try to refute in their poem the statements in a poem by some other lyrical poet; for they know they are in the domain of art and not in the domain of theory.

Perhaps music is the purest means of expression of the basic attitude because it is entirely free from any reference to objects. The harmonious feeling or attitude, which the metaphysician tries to express in a moralistic system, is more clearly expressed in the music of Mozart. And when a metaphysician gives verbal expression to his dualistic-heroic attitude towards life in a dualistic system, is it not perhaps because he lacks the ability of a Beethoven to express this attitude in an adequate medium? Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude.