Читать книгу A Companion to Greek Warfare - Группа авторов - Страница 48

While Philip’s and Alexander’s innovations changed the nature of warfare by introducing new weapons, new formations, and a greater use of combined arms, these were all, as one might say, variations on established themes. What was truly new to Hellenic warfare was the introduction of the elephant.²¹ Sometimes mistakenly compared to the tanks of modern warfare these impressively sized animals, however, seldom seriously affected the outcome of battle, and in some of those cases where they did, it was often to the detriment of their own army. Slingers, archers, javelin men, and caltrops were all effective against these animals, the last used effectively by Ptolemy in the Battle of Gaza in 312 (Diod. Sic. 19.84.4). Alexander the Great in his Battle on the Hydaspes River used his light infantry to kill the animals’ drivers and to surround the elephants, which were now injured by the javelins (Arr. Anab. 5.17.3). In 316, Antigonus Monophthalmus’ cavalry archers in the Battle of Paraetacene rode out of range and inflicted severe injuries on Eumenes of Cardia’s elephants (Diod. Sic. 19.30.2). Also, by maneuvering formations to let them pass harmlessly between the ranks and then attacking their legs and sides with javelins and swords experienced infantry would effectively negate them. Wounded or frightened elephants, unlike mechanized vehicles, had minds of their own and would often turn and injure their own forces. This was especially the case if their driver or the lead elephant was killed. Alexander faced elephants at least twice, at Gaugamela and on the Hydaspes. At Gaugamela, 15 were stationed in front of the Persian infantry (Arr. Anab. 3.11.6), but it has been argued that this is in error since they are only mentioned by Arrian and are never listed as engaging in the battle.²² They were, however, fully engaged on the Hydaspes. In 190, in the Battle of Magnesia, the Seleucid King Antiochus’ phalanx under attack on its flanks and rear formed a square with elephants in its center. The Roman ally, the Pergamene King Eumenes had his archers and slingers concentrated their fire on the elephants, causing them to panic and run through the Seleucid infantry destroying the cohesion of the square (App. Syr. 6.35).

Those actions where elephants proved effective were most often against forces unfamiliar with them. This was especially the case with horses who were commonly terrified of these animals unless they had previously been acclimated to them.²³ In 275, in a battle between an invading force of Gauls and an army hastily assembled by Antiochus I, the Seleucid king, the elephants proved to be the source of the Seleucid victory. Antiochus was caught by surprise by the Gallic invasion. The Gauls had a sizable force of heavy infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 240 war chariots. Against this formidable force the Seleucid king could muster only a small force mostly of skirmishers and light-armed troops, but also 16 elephants. The latter were arranged on the flanks and in the center to meet the chariots. Apparently the Gauls had never before encountered elephants. Even before they were within arrow range, they turned and fled the field (Lucian, Zeuxis 8–11). These battles where elephants proved effective would also include Pyrrhus’ first victory over the Romans at the Battle of Heraclea in 280. Here, as the battle reached a stalemate, Pyrrhus brought forth his elephants, which to this point had been held in reserve. The Roman cavalry had no experience with these creatures and fled before them, resulting in the rout of the Roman forces (Plut. Pyrrh. 17.3). Subsequently, the Romans in their contests against Pyrrhus negated their effectiveness through the methods already described.

There are few cases where elephants were used effectively against forces familiar with their presence. The most notable of these is the Battle at Ipsos in 301 where they were partially responsible for the victory of Lysimachus and Seleucus over their rival Antigonus Monophthalmus. The elephants blocked the return of Antigonus’ cavalry, which, while victorious over that of the opposition, had over-pursued the fleeing enemy, leaving one flank of the phalanx unprotected. The result was the defeat and death of Antigonus (Plut. Demetr. 28–30). Elephants were also one key in the Roman victory over the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna, where they faced forces familiar with them, but despite the usual counter measures, nonetheless proved effective (see the section on Later Battles: Raphia, Magnesia, and Pydna).

In the years that followed the great conqueror’s death, cavalry continued to retain their importance, but seldom again became the “Hammer” envisioned by Philip and executed by Alexander. The numbers of heavy cavalry steadily decreased over time. This was not the case, however, during what is called the Second War of the Successors, fought from 320 to late 316.²⁴ In what was probably the best documented battle of the entire Hellenistic era, heavy cavalry proved the salvation of what might have been a devastating loss for one of the parties. In late October or early November of 316, the armies of Eumenes and Antigonus drew up for battle in the Median district of Paraetacene, located somewhere on the fringes of the Dasht-i Kavir, likely southwest of the modern city of Isfahan. Antigonus’ army contained 28,000 heavy infantry, 15,000 light infantry,²⁵ 10,600 cavalry of whom approximately 6,900 were light cavalry, and 65 elephants; while Eumenes’ forces numbered 35,000 infantry,²⁶ of whom 17,000 were heavily armed, approximately 2,000 heavy cavalry, 4,300 light, and 125 elephants. Both armies were of Asian majority. While Antigonus’ phalanx was likely mostly Macedonian, much of the rest of his forces, especially the light-armed infantry and cavalry, were recruited in Asia, and Eumenes’ heavy infantry was largely Greek mercenaries and Asian pikemen.²⁷ Hellenistic armies in Asia came to be overwhelmingly Asian.²⁸

Eumenes arranged his army with his best troops stationed on the right. Here were the Argyraspids, Alexander’s former Hypaspists, who had decorated their shields with silver and hence the new name, and Eumenes’ own personal infantry guards, themselves numbering more than 3000.²⁹ Given the numerical advantage that Antigonus possessed in heavy infantry, especially those equipped with the sarissa, the Argyraspids were on this occasion equipped with pikes,³⁰ and Eumenes’ Hypaspists with hoplite spears. This flank was protected by 2,900 elite heavy cavalrymen, personally selected by Eumenes himself, including his 900 “companions,” his personal cavalry bodyguard, and all under the Cardian’s command. The entire phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops, with the right cavalry wing screened by an additional corps of 40 elephants. On his left, Eumenes stationed 3,400 mostly light cavalry, anchored on the rising foothills, making any flanking maneuver by Antigonus’ forces difficult. In the infantry center, moving from left to right, were stationed 6,000 mercenaries armed as hoplites. Next came 5,000 “men of many races” armed with the sarissa. Following along the line were the Argyraspids, and then Eumenes’ infantry guards (Diod. Sic. 19. 27–29).

Antigonus, in response to Eumenes’ deployment, stationed approximately 7,000 light cavalry on his left flank under the command of Pithon. These included 1,000 mounted lancers and archers from Media and Parthia and 2,200 Tarentines,³¹ drawn up in open order and instructed to avoid any frontal attacks. They were to impede the progress of Eumenes’ best cavalry and elephants. Next to them were 12,000 hoplites, mercenaries, and Asian allies; and to their right, 16,000 sarissa-bearing infantry. The right flank was guarded by a few hundred light cavalry and 3,300 heavy cavalry, which, with the exception of 300 directly associated with Antigonus, were under the command of Antigonus’ 20-year-old son, Demetrius. Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right. After some initial skirmishing, the screening elephants and the light-armed troops on both sides retreated through the ranks of their respective infantries, which then advanced to battle. Only the 40 elephants protecting Eumenes’ right flank apparently saw action and then only against the enemy’s light cavalry.

With their armies thus disposed, both forces advanced in an oblique fashion, with their right wings leading and their left held back, hoping that their respective right wings would crush the enemy’s left before their own left was destroyed. Consequently, Antigonus had told Pithon to attack Eumenes’ opposing cavalry immediately to slow its advance and give Antigonus’ right wing more time to win the battle. While Pithon’s troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes’ right and inhibited this wing’s advance, Eumenes reinforced the harassed units with additional light cavalry from his left, with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills. Elsewhere Eumenes’ phalanx, even though inferior in numbers, proved superior in ability. Antigonus’ infantry was forced back to the hills as well. Antigonus now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat, Antigonus saved himself and his army. As Eumenes’ phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes’ left. Antigonus with his heavy cavalry detachment charged through the break. With his left threatened, Eumenes recalled his victorious right. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up in a line along the foothills. Although it was already growing quite dark, both generals rallied their forces and prepared to renew the struggle. By midnight the two armies, after many attempts to outflank one another, formed into line about 3.5 miles from the site of the previous battle. By now, however, both armies were too exhausted to continue. In the battle Antigonus’ forces suffered the loss of 3,700 infantry and 54 cavalry, with 4,000 wounded. Eumenes’ troops lost 540 infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900. (These may be heavy infantry losses only, Diod. Sic. 19.30–31.) While Antigonus had lost more troops, the battle had ended in a stalemate. Subsequently, in the Battle of Gabene, Antigonus was able to effect the capture of Eumenes and thus end the Second War of the Successors. This victory was the result of a cavalry victory of sorts. During the actual battle part of Antigonus’ light cavalry had captured Eumenes’ camp, putting them in possession of the wives and possessions of the Argyraspids in particular. These troops, even though the result of the battle had been remarkably similar to that at Paraetacene, surrendered themselves and Eumenes to Antigonus (Diod. Sic. 19.43.8–9).

In time, cavalry diminished in importance and phalanxes increasingly became almost exclusively sarissa bearers, with pikes reaching as much as 24 feet in length (Polyaen. Strat. 2.29.2). These phalanxes were protected on the flanks by light-armed infantry and/or cavalry, whom they supplanted as the decisive component of the army. The lengthening of the pikes made this unit more invulnerable to a frontal attack, but even less maneuverable. Polybius describes the opposing phalanxes at Sellasia in 222 (2.65.1–7) and again at Mantinea in 207 (11.15.6, 16.1) as primarily armed with pikes. At Sellasia there were 14,000 sarissa carriers of whom 10,000 were Macedonian (Polyb. 2.65).³² In these battles many of the light infantry were armed, however, more heavily than the usual light-armed troops. These carried large oval shields and weaponry that varied from long thrusting spears to javelins. Troops so armed were known as Thureophoroi. If these troops were more heavily armored still, with a breastplate, they were called Thorakitai. While distinguishable from other light-armed soldiers, they were none the less to be included in their number. While Alexander the Great’s Hypaspists often accompanied light-armed troops, they also served regularly in the phalanx. The Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai appear not to be associated with the latter. They seem to have been a lighter version of traditional hoplites. In his description of the army of Antiochus III in 209, Polybius includes both the Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai with the light-armed troops (Polyb. 10.29.4–6). This distinction is also made in a battle near the Arcadian city of Caphyae in 219 at the beginning of the Social War. In this battle these troops were initially stationed on the wings, perhaps serving here as Philip’s and Alexander’s hoplite units did to protect the flanks of the phalanx (Polyb. 4.12.3, 12). However, unlike the Hypaspists, they clearly do not move in any type of formation (Plut. Phil. 9.1–2; Polyb. 4.12.7; Plut. Cras. 25.7).

Nowhere are these changes from the legacy of Philip and Alexander more apparent than in the decline in the quality of cavalry. This change in Hellenistic warfare was due to a combination of factors. One such factor was an effect of Philip’s initial reforms, which changed the dynamic of Macedonian society. His creation of a landed peasant class who peopled his infantry and his centralizing of power in royal authority both diminished the esprit de corps of the aristocratic class, not to mention their role as highly skilled mounted warriors. Alexander’s conquests only accelerated this process. While Alexander crossed to Asia with a ratio of infantry to cavalry of 6:1, the later Hellenistic period seldom saw a ratio of 10:1, and often even higher. In one of the few battles in the third century where cavalry played a significant role, Sellasia, this ratio in the victorious Antigonid army was still 23:1 (Polyb. 2.65.5; Liv. 34.28). Moreover, this was mostly light cavalry. The reduction in the numbers of heavy cavalry was even more dramatic in the Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia and northeast Africa. In Asia there was little tradition of heavy cavalry and in Egypt not much tradition of cavalry at all, apart from chariots. It apparently was not until the campaigns in central Asia of the Seleucid King Antiochus III that the Parthian “cataphracts” were introduced into Hellenistic warfare, but generally only served in the eastern Hellenistic armies. Whereas Philip and Alexander’s heavy cavalry, the Companions, wore armor and carried lances, with cataphracts, horse and rider were virtually encased in armor similar to that of Medieval knights (Liv. 35.48.3).³³ However, even with these troops, cavalry in the Hellenistic era primarily skirmished with other cavalry. They were seldom employed against infantry. As noted, heavy cavalry was critical in Philip’s and Alexander’s battle plans. Cavalry now increasingly took on a secondary role, most units being light in weaponry and armament. After the deaths of Alexander’s immediate Successors, cavalry seldom won battles, which increasingly became confrontations between opposing pike phalanxes.