Читать книгу A Companion to Greek Warfare - Группа авторов - Страница 51

Melanie Jonasch

The historiography of Sicily between the eighth and third centuries recounts numerous violent conflicts over territorial control, political power, and social hierarchy. The expansion of Greek settlements on an inhabited island naturally led to war, just as city-state formation and consolidation led to competitive struggles and civil unrest. Because of the favorable position of Sicily and its natural resources, Sicilian Greeks confronted Mediterranean rivals, including Carthage and Athens, and later Rome.

During the initial stages of colonization, the struggle for land and resources took the form of widespread raids. Women and other non-combatants were affected only when seized as booty by the winners. At the end of the sixth century, when rival ambitions for political domination arose, battles came to involve larger numbers, specialized forces, elaborate equipment, and greater devastation and casualties. Such conflicts could be calamitous for the populace, who might be killed or sold into slavery after their cities were besieged and devastated. Often, however, conquered cities were disenfranchised and made tributary, and the civilian population did not materially suffer under the change of authority. By the fifth century, warfare in Sicily depended mainly on mercenaries and allies from non-Greek Sicilian settlements, mainland Greece, and Italy. Although mercenaries featured in Classical and Hellenistic warfare throughout the Mediterranean, Sicilian cities in particular relied on them. This policy guaranteed troop allegiance and prevented military coups by citizen armies. Yet reliance on mercenaries had far-reaching consequences when they attempted to integrate themselves locally after their military service.

Indeed, the average Greek Sicilian was likely affected less by combat than by preventive and preparatory military measures and by the social unrest caused by foreign troops. Warfare was costly, especially when mercenaries were involved. Even in times of peace, leaders resettled entire city populations to meet land or manpower requirements, and new settlers were imported to reinforce populations. Numerous domestic conflicts over political hegemony, property, and constitutional forms resulted from this social instability. While town defenses displayed the strength of the polis to outsiders and protected the citizenry, they also reflected social organization and stratification. Out of town, strategic requirements shaped the landscape through the construction of new towns, military outposts, and border sanctuaries in key positions.

Warfare changed significantly between the eighth and third centuries. From at least the fifth century, cavalry, archers, and slingers commonly fought alongside hoplites. Because Sicily is an island with many harbors, naval warfare played as important a role as ground combat. Siege equipment such as ramps, towers, and artillery were used by the Carthaginians and Greeks by the late fifth century, and complex siege walls were built, as at Syracuse during the Athenian Expedition in 413. Dionysius the Elder later initiated a series of improvements such as increasing the size and power of warships. The late fifth and fourth centuries also witnessed a major evolution in fortification, of which Hermocrates’ fortress at Selinus and the Euryalus fortress of Syracuse are prime examples. When the Romans besieged Syracuse in 214, they faced not only formidable fortifications but also the military inventions of the Syracusan engineer Archimedes.

The following account of violent conflicts in Sicily focuses on various Greek parties and their inter- and intracultural conflicts on the island, but includes the previously mentioned regional powers (Carthage, Athens, and Rome). The concluding section deals with social unrest and domestic conflicts. This artificial arrangement should not obscure the fact that several kinds of parties might participate in a given struggle. For example, Selinus and Carthage allied with one another against Syracuse and Acragas in 480 (Diod. Sic. 13.55.1), and in the mid-fifth century Hybla considered and then rejected an alliance with Sicels led by Ducetius (Diod. Sic. 11.88.6). Appeals to origin and ethnicity could justify military action or the creation of alliances and military support.

The main sources for this reconstruction are Thucydides, Herodotus, Diodorus, Polyaenus, Polybius, Plutarch’s Lives, and various fragments of the Greek historians. Archaeological evidence is considered whenever possible.¹