Читать книгу Shaping Future 6G Networks - Группа авторов - Страница 49

The issue of dependence on high‐risk vendors has been thrown to the fore under the Trump presidency. Other countries are also beginning programs to de‐risk their networks and limit the involvement of specific vendors.

Broadly speaking, the 3G world could be defined in two camps: US‐led initiatives contributed to the evolution of CDMA2000, while 3GPP‐led initiatives saw UMTS brought to market. Since then, the evolution of mobile standards based on successive IMTs has been dominated by 3GPP, with 3GPP2 entering into hibernation. For 5G, 3GPP has been the sole standards body responsible for converting the target IMT performance goals into practical standards that can be implemented by stakeholders.

However, there has been significant, sustained debate on the current situation, mostly driven by the post‐2016 White House [12]. Former President Trump had called for US leadership in the mobile industry to be reestablished while also demanding progress toward 6G [13]. Partly this has served to highlight US successes in 5G deployments, but it has also been part of a long‐lasting series of attacks against what the administration sees as the commercial and political rivals of the United States, most notably China [14].

As a result, unprecedented tensions have emerged that have begun to have an impact on market players, with other governments echoing some of the former president’s remarks [15]. In the United Kingdom, this has led to the identification of what has been defined as “high‐risk vendors” (HRVs) and a clear policy to ensure that operators choose alternatives to such actors [16].

The advice goes so far as to define functional elements that are deemed to be “high‐risk,” thereby providing a template for operators to follow. Specifically, the advice notes that “the cyber security risk of using HRVs in the network functions set out below cannot be managed…if effective risk management of HRVs is to be undertaken, their products and services should not be used in the following network functions” [16].

A detailed list of such elements is provided. For 5G networks, this includes – but is not limited to – “5G core database functions, 5G core‐related services,” such as “Authentication Server Function” and “Network Slice Function,” to name but two in a lengthy, comprehensive, and diverse set of instructions [16]. In other words, operators in the United Kingdom are now obliged to diversify their supply chains, an issue to which we shall return.

Similarly, the European Union has also started to move in a similar direction, with the European Commission reported as expressing the view that “progress is urgently needed to mitigate the risk of dependency on high risk suppliers” [17]. While this climate could settle through the creation of new trade agreements or political changes, it has also created considerable uncertainty, not to say unease, in the market and what seemed firm, long‐standing global commercial relationships have been severely disrupted. These shifting sands will likely have an impact on the future standardization of 6G.

3GPP has become a global success story, drawing contributions from stakeholders from around the world. Chinese vendors, in particular, have made important and valuable contributions, alongside counterparts from elsewhere. While this has undoubtedly boosted the industry and accelerated 5G realization, it did not please the then current US leadership – so much so, that attention has now turned to the international standards that support the development of the mobile industry. According to The Economist, companies with manufacturing operations in America have “been frozen out of some standard‐setting as an accidental consequence of the American government’s attack” [18]. This report adds:

The effect has been particularly acute at standards bodies that convene outside America, where the organisers are less inclined to make arrangements to accommodate firms that are subject to export‐control rules. At those meetings, in some instances, Huawei and other Chinese companies have had a voice where American companies have not. Some, such as 3GPP, a body that deals with 5G, and IEEE, an engineering body, have declared themselves to be “open” meetings, in an attempt to remove liability from firms with American operations. But uncertainty persists [18].

Moreover, this “uncertainty” has led to “talk of competing bodies being set up outside America, to make truly global discussion possible” [18]. Whatever the outcomes of the political noise – bluster, negotiation, a return to the status quo – the ground is already set for a possible return to the situation pre‐2013, in which 3GPP2 acted as a counterpart to 3GPP.

Plus, the very ITU operational model of setting requirements, not standards, for mobile communications, and which allocates spectrum, but which does not license it, could easily enable multiple bodies to set independent standards paths to realize the same goals.

ITU recommendations explicitly allow for this possibility, which is not without precedent, as we have seen. They may be said to encourage diversity. Indeed, it has been argued in this chapter that recent harmonization of global standardization activities for mobile broadband are a deviation from the past – and cannot be said to represent an enduring norm.

Allowing for such uncertainty from political and governmental stakeholders is one thing, but disruptive factors from within the industry, both in commercial approaches and as a consequence of the current standards, are quite another. There are disruptive influences that must be considered as we look toward 6G standardization. To put these in context, however, we must first look at the benefits of standardization towards a single template.