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ОглавлениеBefore examining the legal tools adopted to counter terrorist financing, it is essential to understand, from a factual perspective, the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing as a transnational phenomenon. First, the process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and terrorist groups, the sources of funds, and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move, and store their funds. The last part will address terrorism typologies on the basis of the strategies that terrorists apply to finance their activities. This chapter will not discuss the legal definition of terrorist financing, terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist groups.
The discussions provided in this chapter will help to examine, in the following chapters, the credibility and reliability of the idea that underpins the approach and legal measures taken to address terrorist financing—the approach which does not require a link to the preparation or commission of specific acts of terrorism. As will be pointed out in chapter 2, a distinctive effort has been made by the international community to push this idea, although it is the submission of the book that it is fundamentally flawed partly because of ignorance of basic facts about the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing.1
The Financial Needs of Terrorists and Terrorist Groups
The first step in identifying the flow of funds to what is regarded as terrorists is to understand the funding requirements of terrorists.2 Terrorists’ requirements can be explained with regard to their activities or the nature of their needs.
In terms of terrorist activities, terrorists’ financial needs can be divided into two categories. Terrorists need “operational resources” associated with conducting specific terrorist attacks; these include the costs of attacks, the salaries of individual operatives, communications, training, travel, and logistics. Terrorists, in the case of a large group, also require resources for their “broad organizational requirements” to create, maintain, and develop a terrorism infrastructure.3 Evidence shows that while the current operational costs of terrorist attacks are often very low relative to the damage they cause,4 organizational costs are significantly higher.
Regarding the nature of funding requirements, terrorists’ resources are classified into three categories: money and financial instruments, tangible and intangible resources.5 “Money” and other negotiable and financial instruments are the most important resources required by terrorists.6 Terrorists need money “to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular base and otherwise fill a myriad of purposes.”7 It is also a convenient means of storing wealth.
Tangible resources are also needed by terrorists. At the very least, terrorists need four types of tangible goods to carry out their operations.8 “Life’s necessities” including food, accommodation, clothing, travel cost, and so on are the basic needs of members of terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups also need human resources: members and “personnel” to carry out their activities. In addition, terrorists need to have an effective communication system such as access to media, internet, cell phones, and so on to communicate with each other, disseminate their information, justify and advertise their ideology, and send their messages to their victims.9 Tangible goods also include “operational resources,” which are required to commit violence.10 They range from simple knives to very high-tech weapons, depending on the complexity of the terrorist operations and groups.
Terrorists also require “intangible instruments.”11 “Operational space” or sanctuary is the time and space needed to plan, train for, and execute terrorist attacks.12 A sanctuary can be a small house at the center of a big city or a big camp or farm far from any prying eyes. “Operational security” resources are also needed to enable terrorists to keep security forces from discovering their location, plans, and the people involved in terrorist activities.13 Furthermore, terrorists need “intelligence” to plan how, where, and when they execute their terrorist activities. How much information is needed depends on the scope and complexity of operations.14 Terrorist groups also need “publicity” to promote their ideology, to justify their violent actions, and to encourage people to join them.15 Without effective “leadership,” all of the resources might be useless; so, “command and control” mechanisms are needed to help terrorists to plan, coordinate, and execute their attacks.16 In essence then, it is obvious that terrorists do require different forms of support to carry out terrorist acts.
The Sources of Terrorist Financing
Terrorists meet their funding needs in different ways, depending on the type and purposes of groups, the inherent capabilities of groups, the “opportunities at hand,” and the types of resources needed.17 Also, terrorists can be self-financing or sponsored by states or private actors, individuals, companies, and organizations. In either situation, funds can be derived from legal or illegal sources, or both.
Illegal Sources
It is believed that because of the dramatic decrease of state-sponsored terrorism, terrorists have turned to alternative sources of funding, including criminal activities such as arms trafficking, extortion, credit card fraud, smuggling, robbery, cheque fraud, racketeering, kidnap-for-ransom, and most importantly, drug trafficking or the sale of oil and gas.18
Drug trafficking is the most important and attractive source of funds for large terrorist groups.19 This phenomenon, called “narcoterrorism,” involves terrorist groups cultivating, refining, and distributing narcotics across the world.20 This trend has been apparent since the 1990s. It usually takes place in countries where such groups control territories.21 Evidence shows that, for example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Peruvian Shining Path, Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan all used drug trafficking as an important source of terrorist funding.22 The United Nations Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team’s assessments reported that, out of the total 2011–2012 budget of the Taliban of US$400 million, “one third was raised from the poppy trade.”23 Also, a 2007 United Nations report declared that the total value of the export of drugs from Afghanistan stood at around US$4 billion divided up among insurgents, warlords, and drug traffickers.24 Opium production in Afghanistan has been rising in the last few years.25 It is not clear how much these groups, such as Taliban—a designated terrorist group, “profit from the drug trade, but whether they do isn’t up for serious debate.”26
Legal Sources
Terrorism may be financed with considerable support and funding from and through legal sources, including donations and investment in legitimate businesses.
Donations and the Role of Nonprofit Organizations
Donations, which may come from individual donors or from charitable organizations, are a common means of terrorist funding.27 An individual donor can be a wealthy person who directly donates huge sums of money to a terrorist group. A very famous example of a wealthy donor is Osama Bin Laden who spent his estimated US$20 to 30 million inheritance on funding Al-Qaeda. Also, it is claimed that Shad Sunders, a rich Tamil living in California, donated US$4 million to the Tamil Tigers.28
Donations can be also solicited from those who donate as part of their religious obligations such as Islamic “Zakat.” Zakat is 2.5 percent of one’s accumulated wealth, which is an example of donation. It might be collected by some Islamic charity organizations that are in contact with terrorism.29 Donations may be raised by diasporas who seek self-determination. Tamil diaspora was a noteworthy example of a diaspora “as a people with common national origins who lives outside a clamed or an independent country.”30 Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas across the world provide and transfer considerable amount of money and materials to the Tamils people in Sri Lanka. It was high likely that while it existed, some part of the funds provided went to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam group; the group is designated by some states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and EU as a terrorist group, which fought for Tamil self-determination against the Sri Lankan Government.
Donations are usually collected through nonprofit organizations such as charities. Enjoying public trust, having a global presence that provides a framework to operate internationally and being subject to lighter regulatory requirements than other financial institution are characteristics of these organizations which make them attractive to terrorists.31
Charities can be abused in different ways. Terrorists may take over an entire charity and use it as a front organization. In such a case, called a “sham charity,” terrorists use the charity as a vehicle to perpetrate fraud against donors in order to raise and disguise funds for terrorism.32 Terrorists may also infiltrate an established charity by taking over some branches of a large charity and diverting some portion of the donations collected for humanitarian purposes to terrorists. For instance, in 2003, the chief executive officer of the Benevolence International Foundation, an Illinois-based charity in the United States, was convicted of diverting of US$315,000 of charitable donations to terrorist groups.33
Nongovernmental organizations can also provide facilities for terrorists, such as a “shipping address[es], housing, employment, identity cards, [or] a recognized reason to be at a particular location.”34 For example, Al-Qaeda members confessed that they received identification cards from the Kenya-based Mercy International Relief Organization as they plotted the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi.35
The role of nonprofit organizations, companies, and “sympathetic financial institutions” in transferring funds or logistical resources to terrorists is also considered important. For example, those entities can use their bank accounts to collect funds or to transfer those funds to any destination required.36
Investment in Legitimate Business
Legitimate businesses are a complex and “versatile tool” for the financing of terrorism.37 In its simplest form, terrorists can establish a local business and use its income for their purposes. They can also invest in stocks, bonds, real estate, construction companies, honey shops, tanneries, banks, agricultural commodity growers and brokers, trade businesses, bakeries, restaurants, and bookstores and in any business, local or international, open to such investment. Evidence shows that large terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have invested in the past in various businesses such as wood and paper industries in Norway, hospital equipment in Sweden, real estate in London, and newspaper ink and honey in Middle East.38
Like nonprofit organizations, such businesses and front companies can provide other facilities such as access to bank accounts and postal addresses. Furthermore, the right sort of business can provide cover for the purchase and acquisition of explosives and chemicals needed for terrorist attacks.39
Terrorism, in some cases, can also be financed by small amounts of funds, involving family or other noncriminal sources.40 The amount of money to launch small attacks can be acquired by individual terrorists or their supporters “using savings, access to credit or the proceeds of businesses under their control.”41 An example of such financing is the July 7, 2005 attacks on the London transport system. The official report in this regard stated that “there is no evidence of external sources of income. Our best estimates are that the overall cost is less than GBP 8000. The bombs were homemade, that the ingredients used were all readily commercially available and not particularly expensive.”42
To sum up, it should be noted that there is no accurate data or evidence as to whether terrorists rely more on one of these sources than another.43 Resort to any of these sources depends on the type, size, and purposes of groups; the opportunities at hand; and the types of resources needed. For example, Al-Qaeda has at least five financial resources: investments and inheritances of Osama Bin Laden, funding from wealthy Arab supporters, contribution through charities, and income from investments in legal businesses and criminal activities.44
Methods and Means of Moving and Storing Terrorist Funds
The literature on terrorist financing highlights the great “adaptability and opportunism” that terrorists or their supporters exploit to move and store their funds.45 In general, there are three main known methods by which terrorist funds are moved: formal and informal financial systems, physical movement of funds and value, and the international trade system.46
Financial System
The formal financial system is an attractive channel for the financing of terrorism because of the provision of services and products by which terrorists can move their funds, and the “speed and ease” with which funds can be transferred “efficiently and effectively between and within jurisdictions.”47 Money and value operations through formal financial systems enable terrorist financers or terrorists to make an amount of money available to terrorists at another financial institution. The 9/11 Commission Report made clear that “wire or bank to bank transfers” were one of the main tools that Al-Qaeda used to fund the hijackers in the United States.48
Formal financial institutions can also provide cover for terrorists to conduct transactions or conceal the origin of their funds. In the case of Al-Qaeda, it was discovered that Osama Bin Laden, while he lived in Sudan, opened different accounts under fake names in different countries, which guaranteed his privacy.49
In addition to formal financial systems, informal value transfer systems (IVTS) are deployed for financing terrorism. An informal method of money and value transfers refers to a trust-based mechanism through which money is ensured to be transferred to another geographic location by “using a series of informal, and often unlicensed, money exchanges.”50 In this mechanism, there may be no actual movement of cash; instead, value is transferred between two locations. Such financial arrangements, which are very well known in South Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, are known by different names: for example hundi in India, fei chi’ien in China, phoe kuah in Thailand, and hawala in Muslim countries.51 Hawala, for example, operates as follows:
1. [The] Originator gives currency to the Hawaladar [the agent] in Country A.
2. The Hawaladar in Country A provides the Originator with a payment code.
3. The Hawaladar in Country A notifies his counterpart in Country B by phone, fax, or email of the transaction amount to pay the beneficiary, as well as the payment code.
4. The Originator contacts the beneficiary (in Country B) and provides the payment code to him/her.
5. The beneficiary goes to the Hawaladar in Country B, gives [them] the payment code, and picks up the specified [amount] sent.52
Informal methods are attractive to criminals, including terrorists, for their convenience, level of anonymity and rapidity.53 Also, it is a reliable means to transfer money especially in countries with poor, corrupt, or nonexistent banking systems.54 Furthermore, such systems are subject to generally less strict regulatory control. It is reported that Hamas, the Jemaah Islamiya organization, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, as designated terrorist groups, either received or continue to receive funds through hawala.55
Physical Movement of Funds
Terrorists may also use the traditional money laundering method of smuggling cash. Cash smuggling is attractive because smuggled money is completely fungible, anonymous, and more importantly, easy to convert into any other resources needed. Cases highlight that smuggled money can be transported either to where terrorist operations are to take place or to where the cash can be deposited into financial systems with less risk.56
Due to some of the disadvantages of cash smuggling such as difficulties in concealing large quantities of cash or the danger of being detected or having the cash stolen, terrorists and their supporters may use precious metals and stones such as gold and diamonds, antiques or any other expensive items to move and store terrorist funds. While maintaining their value and liquidity, they are easy to conceal and untraceable.57 These items can be converted into cash whenever needed. Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are believed to have been active in this field.58 Also, it has been reported that donations to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from Saudi wealthy donors were made in gold.59
Trade System
The international trade system provides an opportunity for perpetrators to transfer value and goods through legitimate trade flows. This is the area in which enormous wealth can cross borders without raising suspicion “as the paperwork and shipments may look completely legitimate to outside inspection.”60 Over- and under-invoicing practices61 are commonly used by launderers to transfer value across borders. It is possible, although it has not been confirmed,62 that terrorists or their supporters also use such methods to finance terrorism. For example, by selling and shipping a commodity at a lower rate than the actual value, a seller, as a terrorist financer, can provide funds for the buyer who sells the products at a higher price and keeps the difference for terrorist purposes.63
Financing of Terrorism and Terrorism Typologies
There are many different categories of terrorism. These categories help to differentiate terrorist groups according to specific criteria related to a specific field.64 On the basis of the strategies that terrorists use to finance their activities, terrorism can be divided into seven groups: state-sponsored, state-sponsoring, shell state, franchise, bundled support, transnational corporation, and lone wolf.65
A state-sponsored group receives substantial supports from a state which seeks particular political or ideological objectives. The state may find numerous ways to support terrorists such as supplying them with false documentation and passports, allowing them to travel safely within the nation or to other countries, and providing them with sanctuary and weapons.66 The autonomy of groups in this category depends on how integrated they are into a particular state’s command and control structures.67 Terrorists may usefully receive support from states as long as that aid does not disturb their independence to pursue their own agendas. However, state sponsors may place requirements on groups for receipt of support in order to guide them in a specific direction. In such a case, in what are called “state-directed groups,”68 the groups exist as long as they are worthwhile for the sponsor states.
A state-sponsoring terrorist group is one that is capable of providing facilities for a state sponsor in return for receiving support from that state.69 For example, the government of Sudan let Al-Qaeda have training camps in Sudan in exchange for money and building infrastructure.70 It is believed that terrorist-sponsoring groups have to have achieved a high level of capability to attract state sponsor attention.71
In the case of “shell states,”72 terrorists take control of a geographical area and exploit it for sanctuary and their needs.73 An area can be as small as a few neighborhoods or as large as a huge area in a country. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant were other examples, which met their financial needs largely through “proceeds from occupation of territory, such as bank looting, extortion, control of oil fields and refineries, and robbery of economic assets and illicit taxation of goods and cash that transit” and so on.74
In the franchise category, terrorist groups receive a large percentage of their support from one source, but their resources are diversified enough to remain independent.75 In this case, if sponsors stop supporting them, although terrorist groups may weaken, they do not face extinction. For example, it is claimed that Hamas and Hezbollah are franchisees of Iran, from whom they receive much of their support,76 but they also maintain their own network of charities, front companies, and criminal networks to sustain their activities.77
In the “bundled support” category, terrorists do not rely on one or few sponsors; instead, they receive a number of tangible and intangible resources from numerous non-state contributors.78 The phenomenon of diaspora support, in which terrorists receive support from dispersed donors of the same ethnicity or nationality, is the prominent example of this category. Many small contributions from different contributors give terrorist groups more autonomy than a state-sponsored terrorist group. However, they receive support only so long as their actions satisfy their supporters.79
In the transnational corporation model, extensively used to describe Al-Qaeda, terrorist groups act on a global scale without any specific national identification. These groups, utilizing globalization,80 are highly sophisticated and complex in resourcing, membership, and geographical operations.81 Groups within this model are experts at using formal and informal financial systems, front companies, charities, money laundering, and other criminal activities. They also have a high level of autonomy as they have access to various financial resources.
Lone wolf terrorism is carried out by terrorism groups (or individuals) which are not essentially involved in collective, organized activities.82 Lone wolf terrorist groups are individuals or small groups which are identifiable by a particular ideology or grievance, and which carry out actions in support of their radical beliefs.83 Unlike other types, lone wolf terrorist groups are small in size with few financial requirements and limited capabilities. They are self-contained, free to choose their targets and tactics. Terrorism in this form is very cheap, but the impact can be significant. It is claimed that there is a considerable trend indicating the increasing frequency of lone wolf attacks by individuals with little or no connections to formal organizations.84 Terrorist attacks in Germany in March 2011,85 in France in March 2012 and April 2017,86 in Norway in July 2012,87 and England in May 2017 are recent examples of lone wolf terrorism.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing. Terrorist financing can most narrowly be interpreted to mean financing planned, attempted, or completed terrorist acts. In a broader sense, the terms financing terrorism, or financing terrorists, or terrorist groups can be used to include any activities carried out to finance the activities of these individuals or groups. Action to finance these activities can include raising, moving, and restoring funds allocated to carry out these activities.
Techniques and methods to raise, move, and restore funds are also not necessarily carried out through illegal activities. In other words, terrorists and their activities can be funded by any means, legal or illegal, and by anyone, terrorists or non-perpetrators. Due to these particular nature and characteristics, it seems that the terroristic criminality of these financing activities can be only derived from their connection with terrorism or terrorist acts. Obviously, these features of terrorist financing should be taken into account in the adoption and implementation of any counterterrorist financing measures. In the rest of the book, I seek to examine how the international community has responded to terrorist financing and whether its response is proportionate to the distinctive nature of the terrorist financing phenomenon.
NOTES
1. Earlier versions of some sections of this chapter and chapter 3 were published in the Journal of Money Laundering Control. See Hamed Tofangsaz, “Rethinking Terrorist Financing; Where Does All This Lead?” 2015 18(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 112.
2. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing” (February 29, 2008) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf>, p. 7.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See Jodi Vittori, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011), p. 13.
6. Ibid.
7. Daniel Byman, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001), p. 87.
8. Vittori, above n 5, p. 15.
9. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, New York, 2006).
10. Vittori, above n 5, p. 17.
11. Ibid., p. 18.
12. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (RAND, Santa Monica, 2004), p. 45.
13. Ibid., p. 47.
14. Ibid., p. 50.
15. Vittori, above n 5, pp. 20–21.
16. Cragin and Daly, above n 12, p. 40.
17. Vittori, above n 5, p. 29. Also see Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Dilemmas” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds) Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2007), p. 32.
18. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 15.
19. Ibid.
20. Vittori, above n 5, p. 36.
21. Ilias Bantekas, “International Law of Terrorist Financing” 2003 97(2) American Journal of International Law 315, p. 317.
22. LaVerle Bennette Berry, A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups: A Report (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 2002), p. 52. Also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002), p. 165.
23. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Report: Financial Flows Linked to the Production and Trafficking of Afghan Opiates (Paris, 2014), p. 42.
24. Vittori, above n 5, p. 36.
25. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016; Cultivation and Production (October 2016).
26. Jonathan P. Caulkins, Jonathan D. Kulick, and Mark A. R. Kleiman, “Think Again: The Afghan Drug Trade” 2011 Foreign Policy.
27. Vittori, above n 5, p. 38.
28. Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader (Free Press, New York, 2006), p. 10. Also see Steve Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure (PhD thesis submitted to Pardee Rand Graduate School, Santa Monica, 2005), p. 35.
29. See Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and America’s War on Terrorism (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2004), p. 184. Or see Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008), p. 121.
30. See Byman, above n 7, p. 57.
31. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 11.
32. Ibid., p. 12.
33. Ibid.
34. Vittori, above n 5, p. 40.
35. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (Ecco, New York, 2003), p. 273.
36. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 (Paris, February 14, 2003) p. 9. See also Vittori, above n 5, p. 42.
37. Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer, Berlin, 2006), p. 22.
38. Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the bin Laden Brotherhood (Duke University Press, Durham, 2002), p. 128.
39. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1999), p. 178.
40. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 14.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Koh, above n 37, p. 24.
44. Ibid.
45. Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation” 2005 IV(1) Strategic Insights, p. 2.
46. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 21.
47. Martin Runder, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering” 2010 33(8) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 700, p. 706.
48. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, 2004), pp. 245–254.
49. Kiser, above n 28, p. 86.
50. Vittori, above n 5, p. 45. See also Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System (International Monetary Fund, Washington, 2003), p. 6.
51. Kiser, above n 28, p. 90.
52. Dixon Hughes Goodman Risk Advisory, “Understanding Informal Value Transfer System” (June 2015), <https://m.dhgllp.com/Portals/4/ResourceMedia/publications/DHG_Views_RAS_IVTS.pdf>.
53. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 24.
54. Vittori, above n 5, p. 46.
55. Passas, above n 17, p. 29.
56. Kiser, above n 28, p. 91.
57. Koh, above n 37, p. 30.
58. Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (1st ed., Broadway Books, New York, 2004), pp. 23, 47, and 55.
59. Douglas Farah, “The Use of Gold, Diamonds and Other Commodities in Terrorist Finances” (March 18, 2004), <http://www.douglasfarah.com/presentations/use-of-gold.php>.
60. Passas, above n 17, p. 31.
61. Financial Action Task Force, Trade Based Money Laundering (Paris, 2006), p. 4.
62. Passas, above n 17, p. 31.
63. Ibid.
64. Terrorism Research, “Categories of Terrorist Groups,” <http://www.terrorism-research.com/groups/categories.php>.
65. Vittori, above n 5, p. 7.
66. Terrorism Research, “State Sponsored Terrorism,” <http://www.terrorism-research.com/state/>.
67. Vittori, above n 5, p. 7.
68. Robert H. Deatherage, Terrorism Awareness (Turtle Press, Santa Fe, 2008), p. 31.
69. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
70. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 187.
71. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
72. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (Seven Stories Press, New York, 2005), p. 65.
73. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
74. Financial Action Task Force, Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Paris, 2015), p. 12.
75. Vittori, above n 5, p. 10.
76. Some countries such as Iran consider Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement fighting for the liberation of Israeli occupied territories. See Ophir Falk and Henry Morgenstern, Suicide Terror Understanding and Confronting the Threat (Wiley, New York, 2009), p. 233.
77. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds) Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2007), p. 134.
78. Vittori, above n 5, p. 114.
79. Ibid.
80. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism” 2002–2003 27(3) International Security 30, p. 45.
81. Vittori, above n 5, p. 145.
82. R. F. J. Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (Springer, Dordrecht, 2012), p. 15.
83. Vittori, above n 5, p. 115.
84. George Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 2012), p. 1.
85. Fox News and Associated Press, “Terrorism Eyed in Attack at German Airport That Killed 2 U.S. Airmen” (2011), <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/02/shots-fired-bus-carrying-soldiers-germany/>.
86. Kurt Nimmo, “French Terror Attack: All the Hallmarks of an Intelligence Psy-op and False Flag” (March 21, 2012), <http://www.infowars.com/french-terror-attack-all-the-hallmarks-of-an-intelligence-psy-op-and-false-flag/>.
87. Spaaij, above n 82, p. 1.
