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ОглавлениеIs Terrorist Financing a Predicate Offense of Money Laundering?
Following the adoption of the Terrorist Financing Convention, the FATF now emphasizes the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offense; but referring to “the close connection between international terrorism and, inter alia, money laundering,”1 it additionally pushes countries to criminalize terrorist financing as a predicate crime to money laundering.2 Examination of this recommendation provides a convenient way to analyze some of the assumptions built into terrorist financing, and how certain ideas appear to have been borrowed from the theory of anti-money laundering.
The recommendation suggests (although it is difficult to prove) that the underlying approach of the FATF’s policy makers may have been to resolve the problem of terrorist financing by analogy with their existing solutions to money laundering. Whether or not this is the case, there are, nonetheless, some uncertainties about the scope of this FATF’s recommendation. Practically, it is not clear what the reference to the link between terrorism and money laundering implies. Does it mean that terrorism is a crime which generates proceeds which need to be laundered? There is no doubt that some terrorist acts such as hijacking or hostage taking, criminalized by UN conventions annexed to the Terrorist Financing Convention, may generate money which needs to be laundered. But terrorism in its generic sense refers to the use of violence against civilians which results in bodily injuries for the purpose of intimidating or coercing.3
Does the recommendation imply that financing of terrorism is another form of money laundering, which can be included by the anti-money laundering regime? It is the submission of this chapter, that terrorist financing logically does not fit into the money laundering scheme. This chapter will examine whether it is reasonable to legislate to criminalize terrorist financing on the basis of analogies with money laundering. It is argued that while terrorist funds can be processed by the same tools used by launderers, none of those elements involved in money laundering by organized crime are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. Even if terrorist financing is involved in money laundering, labeling them as terrorist financing without linking it to terrorism or terrorist activities is problematic.
The Role of Money Laundering in Terrorist Financing
Money laundering is internationally defined as the process of conversion or transfer, concealment or disguise, and possession or use of any income or property derived from illegal activities (hereinafter “predicate crimes”).4 The origin of the term money laundering arose in the United States in the 1920s when mafia groups owned and used launderettes to gain a legitimate appearance for “proceeds” generated from their criminal activities.5 Later, with the explosion of drug trafficking in the 1980s, money laundering became an important part of any serious criminal enterprise, especially “organized crime” activities, from which huge profits are generated.6 The main purpose of money laundering operations is twofold: to hide the predicate (often organized) crimes from which the proceeds are obtained, and to guarantee that criminals can enjoy their proceeds by using or investing in the legal economy.7
To fulfill these goals, launderers use various and complex techniques to launder their proceeds. These techniques very briefly may include using financial institutions as deposit-taking institutions, “nonbank financial institutions,” nonfinancial institutions, or other informal methods such as the purchase of art treasures and jewelry, techniques of illegal money importation, techniques of smurfing or nominal partnerships, gambling, techniques of overpayment on tax accounts, techniques related to real estate, the buying of gift vouchers, assuring real estate credit, establishing fictitious business organizations, fictitious transactions, creating a cover company, techniques of over- or under-charging, methods of acquisition and selling of companies, acquisition of sports clubs, gold purchase, barter trade systems, and so on.8
The involvement of these techniques in laundering is too complex to explain in detail here. However, it has become common to illustrate the process of laundering, especially those involved with drug money, by utilizing a three-stage framework:9
1. Placement stage: proceeds at the first step need to either enter a financial system or be used to buy an asset.10
2. In the “layering stage,” a launderer, through some financial transactions, tries to conceal and disguise the source of the money. This step can be done by breaking down the money to small amounts and transferring it to different financial institutions.
3. In the final stage, “integration,” the money is assimilated along with all other assets in the system in order to make the money appear as if it were obtained legally.
Regarding the nature of the crime, money laundering can be described as a “legitimization-oriented concept”11 which contains the following features:
• The money involved in the process of money laundering is, in all cases, derived from illegal activities.
• Money laundering is a derivative crime or an output of predicate crimes.
• The main purpose in money laundering is to disguise the origin of proceeds in order for criminals to enjoy their ill-gotten gains.12
• Money laundering takes place when principal crimes (predicate crimes) have already been committed. The necessity of laundering makes detecting criminals by chasing the proceeds of their illegal activities more possible.
However, in regard to financing terrorism, there is a different story. Terrorist financing can be divided into “a framework with three levels”: activities done to make and raise funds for terrorist purposes,13 strategies used to move the funds whence they have been collected to where they need to be held, and methods used to move funds to frontline terrorists.14 It seems that terrorist financing is a phenomenon which begins with fund-raising and ends by distributing the funds to terrorist cells.
The emphasis, in such a case, is not on the legitimization and accumulation of funds, but making funds available to terrorist cells; so, terrorist funds do not inevitably need to go through those money laundering stages by which the proceeds of organized crime are processed. However, money laundering can be a part of terrorist financing process in some cases.
Regarding the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing, terrorist funds can be processed under three scenarios:
Scenario one: When the funds have been derived from legal sources, nothing appears illegal except the future use of the money. The funds, in this case, can be transferred by noncriminal individuals or legal entities like charities and front companies, and through the legal financial system.
Scenario two: Terrorists are involved with criminal activities in order to generate funds for their terrorist purposes. So, they may need to launder the proceeds of their crime if they wish to invest proceeds to produce regular revenue. If the funds come under scrutiny at this stage, there may be no connection with terrorist activities. Also, after having been laundered, the disguised origin of money might not be identifiable because the connection between the funds and their illegal source has already been interrupted; as a result, the funds have a legitimate appearance.
Scenario three: The proceeds of crime are directly (without being laundered) used by terrorist cells. In this case, terrorists do not need to launder the money, because the amount of money on the move may be small.
In comparison with money laundering, the main characteristics of the terrorist financing process are:
• Unlike money laundering the subject matter of which is money derived from the commission of crime, in terrorist financing “funds” is defined very broadly. They include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.”15
• Terrorist financing involves preparing funds for the commission of another crime. So, it is an input into terrorism, and preparatory in its nature.
• When terrorist financing occurs the principal crime (terrorism) has not been committed or even attempted yet; so, the relationship between the funds and terrorist activities may or may not be identifiable.
• The purpose in terrorist financing is not accumulation, but distribution. In result, the amount of funds on the move may often be very small.16
• The attempt in terrorist financing is to hide the destination of the funds.
Discussion on the Relationship of Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering
There has been a continuing argument about whether the measures provided to counter money laundering are able to prevent and counteract terrorist financing. Those who support the integration of terrorist financing into anti-money laundering measures base their argument on two inaccurate assumptions: the link and nexus between terrorism and criminal activities,17 and the involvement of terrorist financing in money laundering.18
Terrorists’ Involvement in Criminal (Organized) Activities
The first assumption, which emphasizes and exaggerates the involvement of terrorists in criminal (especially organized) activities as the main source of terrorist financing,19 considers terrorism as a criminal activity potentially resulting in proceeds in regard to which money laundering may occur. From a logical perspective, this approach assumes that terrorism as a criminal activity, which produces proceeds, precedes money laundering.20 The reflection of this argument can be explicitly seen in the Council of the European Communities Directive of June 10, 1991 on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering where it provides that
since money laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related offences but also in relation to the proceeds of other activities (such as organized crime and terrorism), the Member States should, within the meaning of their legislation, extend the effects of the Directive to include the proceeds of such activities, to the extent that they likely to result in laundering operations justifying sanctions on that basis.21
This assumption is to some extent based on reality. Regarding the evidence and studies on terrorist financing typologies mentioned in chapter 1, it has been proved that terrorist groups, in some cases, are involved in criminal activities such as hostage taking for ransom. However, complete reliance on the assumption to justify the inclusion of terrorism into the instruments related to repression of organized crime (and as result, inclusion of terrorist financing into anti-money laundering measures) can be problematic for the following reasons.
First of all, it is a category error to presume that terrorism is a crime for the purpose of making money. Terrorists are generally motivated by ideology greater than personal impulses or material benefits.22 Their engagement in crime to fund their activities needs to be considered as an instrumental purpose.23 This feature distinguishes it from other criminal acts, especially organized crime, which are not afforded any kind of excuse as criminals seek personal or financial gains.24 More importantly, terrorist funds can be acquired from legal sources. This considerably differentiates terrorist financing from organized criminal activities.
In addition to the distinct motivations, terrorists measure their conduct against the standards and “codex” of the ideology that they follow.25 So, even though an act is unlawful according to the law of a state or to international law, it might be legitimate and appropriate from the terrorists’ perspective. Emphasizing the significant consequence of this feature, some argue that “standard criminology” cannot apply to the case of terrorism since “the notion of deterrence is largely irrelevant, with the language of terrorists often entirely divorced from that of the normal criminal offender.”26
Moreover, it is impossible to estimate the extent and spread of terrorists’ involvement in criminal (organized) activities.27 In 2003, in the United States, it was reported that fourteen of the thirty-six groups designated as terrorist organizations on the U.S. Department of State list were engaged in drug trafficking.28 This fact was applied to argue that the war on drugs and the war on terrorism need to continue to be linked. However, this conclusion was correctly criticized as “there are hundreds of terrorist organizations and drug trafficking groups, but it is usually the same dozen or so groups that get identified as being involved in both types of activities.”29
From an international law perspective, the inclusion of the concept of terrorism within the scope of international instruments relating to organized crime is also problematic. The problem lies in the nature and definition of terrorism. While there is not a consensus on a concrete definition of terrorism, and on the designation of groups as terrorist groups, certain characteristics of organized crime have been at least identified over the course of time.30 With regard to this fact, the inclusion of terrorism in instruments related to organized crime has the potential to “divide parties to a treaty and make it unworkable.”31 It might be the reason why the authors of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (also called the Palermo Convention) avoided the inclusion of terrorist acts in the definition of organized crime32 in spite of acknowledging the involvement of terrorists in criminal activities.33
By exemplifying the practices of few terrorist groups, it is also argued that “terrorist groups are now turning gradually into a big business . . . and enjoy the unexpected fruits of their way of life.”34 However, regarding the paucity of available data, it does not make sense to claim that such transformation is a typical or common pattern for all terrorist groups.35 Moreover, from a criminal law perspective, if a terrorist group is transformed into some sort of a criminal organization, it can no longer be considered as a terrorist group.
To end this, it is worthwhile to note the result of the questionnaire administrated by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UN Terrorism Prevention Branch) indicating that36
terrorist groups are frequently involved in other crime, particularly illegal drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, falsification of illicit travel and identity documents, trafficking in firearms and other exploitation of illicit markets. However, the responses did not provide strong evidence of organizational links between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. There was no indication either that criminal groups were becoming more involved in terrorist acts.37
Even if there is a strong link between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups, why are not they prosecuted under ordinary criminal law? Why is it so important to make a doctrinal link between terrorism and in some way amalgamate those activities?
Terrorists’ Involvement in Money Laundering
Unlike the first assumption which emphasizes inaccurately and exaggeratedly the illegal sources of terrorist funds, the second assumption focuses on the tools and methods which terrorists use to conceal the flow of their funds.38 This assumption acknowledges that although terrorist funds can be derived from both legal and illegal sources, terrorists process their funds—“that is, move them from the source to where they will be used”—in the same way that nonterrorist criminals launder funds.39
In other words, terrorists are involved in either money laundering or “reverse money laundering.” If terrorists are involved with criminal activities, they need to use the same methods as criminals to conceal the origin of proceeds. If terrorist funds have a legitimate origin, then terrorists must engage in “reverse money laundering,”40 which is the application of the same methods and tools used by launderers to hide the destination of funds. In this regard, it has been noted that
terrorists use the same professional money network, they use the same convoluted transactions to hide the location of the money or where it’s going. They can use the same clandestine shipment of cash to avoid paper-trails. They can engage in the same international shell games as they move money from this account to that, disguised as legitimate funds for some lawful purpose when it really is to finance new crime and new criminal enterprises. . . . The source of the money doesn’t matter, it is the deadly purpose the money was intended to fund.41
As a result of this analogy, it is concluded that there is significant room for anti-money laundering measures to deal with the phenomenon of terrorist financing. Therefore, terrorist financing is considered as a subcategory of money laundering, or a predicate crime to money laundering which potentially can be detected, investigated, and prevented by the already existing measures.42
The logic of this assumption is not compelling for the following reasons. Most of all, it is questioned whether money laundering countermeasures can be a “one size fits all” solution for all crimes in which offenders may use the same money network as launderers use to conceal the origin of their funds. The point is that these measures have been designed to prevent drug offenses or offenses43 whose purposes are the legitimization and accumulation of a huge amount of money generated from criminal activities. However, in regard to terrorist financing, none of these elements are necessarily involved. While cloaking money may be important, transmission to the point of use is a much more pressing need for terrorists.
With regard to the accumulation element, while the basic requirement in money laundering operations is to launder and accumulate a large amount of money, not only does terrorist financing end by distributing funds to terrorist cells, but also “terrorism can, and does, operate on a shoestring.”44 This affects the volume of the money circulated in terrorist-related transactions. The 9/11 Commission Report provides an interesting insight into how easy it was for the 11 September hijackers to carry out their transactions. For example, it is reported that they mainly operated through wire transfers, using sums not exceeding $10,000 each time. The members of groups were on student visas and appeared to be receiving money from their parents or in the form of grants for their studies.45 It is also emphasized that none of the hijackers’ transactions were “extraordinary or remarkable.”46
In terms of the legitimization element, when terrorists are involved in crime to finance their activities, the quick response is that they are involved in money laundering. Of course, terrorists wish to hide the illegal sources of their funds.47 However, regarding the fact that the purpose in terrorist financing is to make funds available to terrorists on the ground, not to integrate funds into financial systems,48 the question is whether the funds necessarily need to go through those complex money laundering stages and processes to become usable. The answer is positive if terrorists intend to invest proceeds to produce regular revenue.
Looking at the evidence, it is argued that while the movement of “terrorist-related funds” and transactions does not generally resemble normal transactions, it does not include complex processes used in money laundering.49 In addition, the result of a study on money laundering activities in the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group countries shows that although it was more likely that terrorist funds in this region originate from illegal sources rather than legal sources, no indication as to the link between money laundering activities and terrorist groups had been found.50
What radically challenges the assumption of the inclusion of money laundering countermeasures to terrorist financing is the fact that proceeds derived from criminal activities are not the main source of funds for terrorists.51 As mentioned in chapter 1, terrorist funds may have a legal origin. In such a case, if terrorists, for whatever reason, try to conceal funds or their origin, it does not mean that they are engaged in money laundering.52 Even if they apply similar tools and methods used by criminals to move and transfer their money, they do not necessarily involve laundering in the normal sense of the word.53 In fact, unlike money laundering, where terrorist financing occurs there is no crime that precedes the endeavor to conceal the origin or movement of funds from scrutiny.54 Of course, there is criminal intent, but it does not make sense to deem the funds intended to be used for terrorist purposes “as the proceeds of that criminal intent.”55
Conclusion
Terrorism is not a crime committed for money; however, terrorists need resources to sustain their activities. This gives terrorist financing a multivariate nature; that is, terrorism can be financed by any means, legal or illegal, and by anyone, terrorists, or non-perpetrators. This feature also considerably differentiates terrorist financing from all those (organized) crimes which end in money laundering. The role and purposes of money laundering are to gain a legitimate appearance for the proceeds derived from illegal (often organized) activities, and to accumulate them into the legal economy. This necessitates that criminal activities from which proceeds are derived precede money laundering.
None of these elements are necessarily involved in most terrorist financing cases as the financial flows in terrorist financing go in a different direction. Terrorist financing begins with the gathering of funds and ends by distributing funds to terrorists. In such a process, there is no need for legitimization especially when the funds have a legal origin. Even if terrorist funds have an illegal background, money laundering cannot play a leading role because the purpose in terrorist financing is not the accumulation of funds in financial systems.
Similar to money laundering in which the attempt is to conceal the origin of proceeds from detection, the effort in financing terrorism is to hide the funds and their origin devoted to pursuing terrorist activities from scrutiny. This similarity has been used to draw an analogy between money laundering and terrorist financing, reasoning that terrorists and their supporters resort to similar tools and techniques to those used by launderers in organized crime to move terrorist funds.56 Nonetheless, where terrorist financing takes place, there often is no criminal offense that precedes the endeavor to hide the movement of funds from detection.57 Although there is criminal intent, it is unreasonable to consider the funds “as the proceeds of that criminal intent.”58
To sum up, the FATF claims that because “there is a close connection between terrorism, inter alia, and money laundering,” terrorist financing should be criminalized as a predicate money laundering.59 The analysis of this chapter, however, indicates that the crime-terrorism nexus assumption is not accurate as there are fundamental differences between terrorism and organized crimes, and between terrorist financing and money laundering. This raises serious doubt as to the effectiveness of the expansion of anti-money laundering measures to counter terrorist financing (although as noted the examination of such an expansion is beyond the scope of this research).
But relying on the crime-terrorism nexus assumption seems to have paved the way for the diffusion of the Terrorist Financing Convention’s approach that has an emphasis on treating terrorist financing independently of terrorism. In other words, while this approach to countering terrorist financing, preparatory in its nature, is not tenable in terms of existing notions of criminalization, the emphasis on the assumption that terrorist financing is closely and heavily involved in criminal activities has provided a more convincing, but inaccurate, argument in support of criminalizing terrorist financing as an independent offense even when there is no link between terrorist financing and an actual terrorist act for which financing is carried out. In the following chapters, the implication of this approach to the criminalization of terrorist financing will be examined.
NOTES
1. Financial Action Task Force, “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation” (February 2012), p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, December 9, 1999) (hereinafter the Terrorist Financing Convention), art. 2(1).
4. UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, December 20, 1988), art. 3(b) and (c). “Predicate crimes” refer to any crime as a result of which proceeds have been generated; see UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo, November 15, 2000), art. 2(h) (hereinafter the Palermo Convention).
5. Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 82. According to Article 2(e) of the Palermo Convention, “proceeds” mean “any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence.”
6. William C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures (2nd ed., Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1999), p. 9. “Organized criminal group” has been defined by the Palermo Convention as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”
7. Stessens, above n 5, p. 83.
8. Gilmore, above n 6, pp. 30–40.
9. Ibid., p. 29.
10. Ibid.
11. Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer, Berlin, 2006), p. 26.
12. Stessens, above n 5, p. 84.
13. The term “funds” refers to “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.” See the Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 2(1).
14. Jodi Vittori, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011), p. 26.
15. The Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 1.
16. Ilias Bantekas, “International Law of Terrorist Financing” 2003 97(2) American Journal of International Law 315, p. 321.
17. Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (Pluto, London, 2003), p. 40. See also Leslie Holmes, Terrorism, Organised Crime and Corruption: Networks and Linkages (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007), p. 25.
18. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Guidance: Crimialising Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 5) (October 2016), p. 28.
19. R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002), p. 10.
20. Armand Kersten, “Financing of Terrorism—A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering?” in Mark Pieth (ed) Financing Terrorism (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002), p. 301.
21. Charles Goredema, “Money Laundering in East and Southern Africa: An Overview of the Threat” (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2003), <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/money-laundering-in-east-and-southern-africa-an-overview-of-the-threat>, p. 78.
22. Terrorist may be motivated by various factors such as secession, insurgency, and regional retribution and so on. See Alex Conte, Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010), p. 10.
23. Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime (A Report Submitted to Foreign Affairs Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vancouver, 2004), p. 5.
24. Bantekas, above 16, p. 318.
25. Conte, above n 22, p. 11.
26. Ibid.
27. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18.
28. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism, a Dangerous Mix: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, May 20, 2003 (U.S. G.P.O., Washington, DC, 2003).
29. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 12.
30. Tom Obokata, Transnational Organised Crime in International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2010), p. 14.
31. Bantekas, above n 16, p. 318.
32. UNGA, Replies Given on 22 March 1999 by the Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Questions Asked by the Delegations of Belgium and Mexico Regarding the Implications of Article 2, Paragraph 1 (B) (A/AC.252/1999/INF/2, March 26, 1999).
33. Financial Action Task Force, Follow-Up Report to the Mutual Evaluation Report of Greece (Paris, October 28, 2011).
34. Koh, above n 11, p. 21. See also Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation” 2001 24(1) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, p. 43.
35. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 5.
36. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Result of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries (September 2002).
37. In September 2003, pursuant to the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/136, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime sent a questionnaire to Member States of the United Nations regarding the “Nature and links between Terrorism and other Forms of Crime.” This quote is the part of analysis of the replies to the questionnaire done by Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 32.
38. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000–2001 (Paris, February 1, 2001), p. 19.
39. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 (Paris, February 14, 2003), p. 3. See also Paul Allan Schott, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (2nd ed., The World Bank: International Monetary Fund, Washington, 2006).
40. Stefan D. Cassella, “Reverse Money Laundering” 2003 7(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 92. p. 93.
41. Nick Kochan, The Washing Machine (Duckworth, London, 2006), p. 245.
42. Financial Action Task Force, above n 38, p. 28.
43. Stessens, above n 5, p. 3.
44. For example, the cost of two current terrorist attacks, 9/11 U.S. attacks and the Madrid bombings in 2004, cost $500,000 and $10,000, respectively. Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (2nd ed., Kogan Page, London, 2006), p. 129.
45. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, DC, 2004), p. 237.
46. Ibid., p. 528.
47. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 14.
48. Lilley, above n 44, p. 150.
49. Bantekas, above n 16, p. 321.
50. Goredema, above n 21, p. 16.
51. Alex Peter Schmid, Eithne Boland, and Rebekah Grindlay, Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation: Proceedings of the International Conference on “Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation”: Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 22–24 September 2000 (ISPAC, Milano, Italy, 2001).
52. Mark Pieth, Financing Terrorism (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2002), p. 123.
53. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, above n 28, p. 88.
54. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18. See also Lilley, above n 44, p. 188.
55. Kersten, above n 20, p. 306.
56. Cassella, above n 40, p. 92.
57. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18.
58. Kersten, above n 20, p. 306.
59. Financial Action Task Force, above n 1 p. 37.
