Читать книгу The Battle of the Falkland Islands, Before and After - Henry Edmund Harvey Spencer-Cooper - Страница 6

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It is clearly impossible to state with any exactitude the motives which governed von Spee's policy; but, in briefly reviewing the results, a shrewd idea of the reasons which led him to certain conclusions may be formed. Also, it will assist the reader to a conclusion on the merits and demerits of the strategy adopted, and will help him to follow more easily the reasons for some of the movements of our own ships described in the next chapter.

That Admiral von Spee did not return to Tsingtau at the outbreak of hostilities appears significant, since he was by no means inferior to our squadron, and wished to mobilise his ships. He, however, sent the Emden there with dispatches and instructions to the colliers about meeting him after she had escorted them to sea. Japan, it will be remembered, did not declare war till August 23rd, 1914, and therefore could scarcely have come into his earlier calculations. His action in continuing his cruise in the Southern Pacific, where he was handy and ready to strike at the French colonies[2] at the psychological moment of the outbreak of hostilities, gives the impression that he did not consider England's intervention probable.

Previous to the war, the Leipzig and Nürnberg had been detached to the West Coast of America, and it appears likely that von Spee was influenced in his decision to remain at large in the Pacific by this fact, as, before this dispersal of his squadron, he would have been distinctly superior to the British Fleet in the China Station at that time. Great care was taken by him to keep all his movements secret, and he appears to have avoided making many wireless signals.

The decision of the British Government to proceed with operations against the German colonies in the Southern Pacific must have had a determining effect on German policy; this decision was made at the very outset and allowed the enemy no time to make preparations to counter it. The value of the patriotism and loyal co-operation of the Dominions in building up their own Navy in peace time was now clearly demonstrated, Australia being the first of our Dominions to embark on this policy.

The German China squadron was inferior in strength to our ships in Australian waters, and could not afford to risk encountering the powerful battle-cruiser Australia with her eight 12-inch guns; consequently, von Spee was compelled to abandon the many colonies in Polynesia to their fate. Finally, the advent of Japan into the conflict left him little choice but to make his way to the eastward, since not to do so was to court almost certain destruction, while to move west and conceal his whereabouts was an impossibility. That von Spee felt his position to be precarious, and had difficulty in making up his mind what to do, is shown by the slow and indecisive movement of his squadron at first.

The movements of the German light cruisers lead to the conclusion that they must have received orders to scatter so as to destroy our trade in various spheres. The Leipzig apparently patrolled the western side of North America, whilst the Karlsruhe took the South Atlantic, and so on.

Why the Dresden should have steamed over 6,000 miles to the Pacific instead of assisting the Karlsruhe is hard to explain, unless she had direct orders from the German Admiralty. She could always have joined von Spee later.

With the exception of the Emden, who operated with success in the Bay of Bengal, and the Karlsruhe, whose area of operations was along the junction of the South Atlantic and the West Indian trade routes, none of them succeeded in accomplishing a fraction of the damage that might reasonably have been expected at a time when our merchantmen were not organised for war and business was "as usual." It cannot be denied that the Emden's raids wholly disorganised the trade along the east coast of India. The local moneylenders—who are the bankers to the peasants—abandoned the coast completely, trade nearly came to a standstill, and the damage done took months to recover. In this case the effects could by no means be measured by an armchair calculation of the tonnage sunk by the Emden in pounds, shillings and pence.

The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the continuance of his supplies, which could only be assured by careful organisation. This was rendered comparatively easy in South America, where every port teemed with Germans; the wheels of communication, through the agency of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by German money, and there were numerous German merchantmen, fitted with wireless, ready to hand to be used as supply ships or colliers.

It was thus of paramount importance that the German Squadron should be rounded up and annihilated before it could become a serious menace to our trade and that of our Allies. The other remaining light cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could be dealt with more easily, since our ships could afford to separate in order to search for them, thus rendering it only a matter of time before they were destroyed.

What was the object, then, of the German Admiral? This was the all-important question that occupied the thoughts of all our naval officers in foreign parts. On the assumption that he would come eastwards, there appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the following:

(1) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the west coast of Africa and to attack weakly defended but by no means valueless naval stations (such as St. Helena), at the same time operating against British and French expeditions going by sea against German colonies.

(2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British squadron at the Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition by supporting a rising against us in the South African Dominions.

(3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany.

(4) To operate in the North Atlantic.

(5) To harass our trade with South America.

Both the first and second appeared quite feasible, but they had the twofold disadvantage of involving actions nearer England and of very possibly restricting the enemy a good deal in his movements; there are few harbours on this coast, and his every movement would become known in a region where we held the monopoly in methods of communication. Consequently, any success here was bound to be more or less short-lived. On the other hand, matters were undoubtedly very critical in these parts. De la Rey, when he was shot, was actually on his way to raise the Vierkleur at Potchefstroom, and any striking naval success which it would have taken us three weeks to deal with at the very least, might have just set the balance against us at this time in the minds of the waverers. Moreover, it would not have been difficult to ensure supplies from the German colonies.

The third may be dismissed as being extremely improbable at the outset, for it is difficult to run a blockade with a number of ships, and, for the enemy, it would too much have resembled thrusting his head into the lion's jaws. Besides, he could be of far greater service to his country in roaming the seas and in continuing to be a thorn in our side as long as possible.

The fourth will scarcely bear examination; cut off from all bases, he could hardly hope to escape early destruction.

The fifth seemed by far the most favourable to his hopes, as being likely to yield a richer harvest, and, if successful, might paralyse our enormous trade with South America, upon which we were so dependent.

German influence was predominant as well as unscrupulous along the Brazilian coasts, which would render it easy to maintain supplies. To evoke sympathy amongst the smaller Republics would also come within his horizon. Finally, he could have had little idea of our strength in South Africa; whereas information gleaned from Valparaiso (which von Spee evidently considered reliable) as to the precise extent of our limited naval resources then on the east coast of South America, must have proved a deciding factor in determining his strategy.

Whichever course were adopted, it was practically certain that the German Admiral would move eastwards, either through the Straits of Magellan or, more probably, round the Horn to avoid having his whereabouts reported. That this occurred to the minds of our naval authorities before the action off Coronel took place is practically certain, but it is to be regretted that reinforcements to Admiral Cradock's squadron operating in South American waters were not sent there in time to prevent that disaster.

This, then, in brief, was the problem that presented itself to our commanders after the battle of Coronel took place, and no doubt influenced them in the choice of the Falkland Islands as a base, its geographical position making it almost ideal in the event of any move in that direction on the part of the Germans.